8/8/2005

Aryans and Indian Civilization

The Question of Civilization: Part II, Aryans and Indian Civilization

Edited and posted by Dave Cooper

Excerpted from Dr. David Duke’s My Awakening

Aryans, or Indo-Europeans (Caucasians) created the great Indian, or Hindu civilization. Aryans swept over the Himalayas to the Indian sub-continent and conquered the aboriginal people. The original term India was coined by the Aryan invaders from their Sanskrit word Sindu, for the river now called the Indus. Sanskrit is perhaps the oldest of the Indo-European languages, having a common origin to all the modern languages of Europe. The word Aryan has an etymological origin in the word Arya from Sanskrit, meaning noble. The word also has been associated with gold, the noble metal and denoted the golden skinned invaders (as compared to the brown skinned aboriginals) from the West.

Composed in about 1500 B.C., the Hindu religious texts of the Rig Veta tell the story of the long struggles between the Aryans and the aboriginal people of the Indian subcontinent. Sixteen Aryan states were partitioned by the sixth century A.D., and Brahmanism became the chief religion of India. The conquering race initiated a caste system to preserve their status and their racial identity. The Hindu word for caste is Varna, which directly translated into English, means color. Today the word is usually associated with occupation or trade; but that is because occupations evolved on the basis of skin color and ethnicity. The most pale skinned were called the Brahmin. These were the warrior-priest class, the top of the social ladder. The Untouchables (or Pariahs) were the racially mixed in the bottom caste.

Over the past few centuries the clear racial differences have faded, but one can still notice the lighter hues and taller statures of the higher castes. Many scholars consider Sanskrit the oldest and purest of the Indo-European languages. In modern India, the greatest insult one could pay a fellow Indian is to call him “black.”

The average Christian conservative of the Western world would be aghast at the exuberant interest displayed by the ancient Indians in sex and in the ways they publicly displayed sexual experience through art. Hindu history, though, seems to indicate that it was not preoccupation with sex that brought down the high culture as much as it was the racial impact of that obsession. In spite of strict religious and civil taboos, the ancient Aryans crossed the color line. Slavery, or a similar system, had made servant women easily obtainable and proved a dangerous temptation for some of the basest of the slave holders. Only a small percentage of each generation had sexual liaisons with the lower castes, but over dozens of generations a gradual change in the racial composition occurred. Such changes are almost imperceptible in a single generation. But they are dramatic after a millennium. (more…)


11/11/2004

Dr. Roger Pearson – The Concept of Heredity in Western Thought

The Concept of Heredity in Western thought: Part Three
The revival of interest in genetics

by Dr. Roger Pearson

from Mankind Quarterly Sept. 1, 1995
Vol. 36, pp. 73

The Concept of Heredity in Western Thought: Part One
Vol. 35, Mankind Quarterly, 04-01-1995, pp 229.
posted at http://www.mugu.com

The Concept of Heredity in Western Thought: Part Two
Vol. 35, Mankind Quarterly, 06-01-1995, pp 343
Social Engineering and the Social Sciences

The Concept of Heredity in Western Thought: Part Three
Vol. 36, Mankind Quarterly, 09-01-1995, pp 73.

As noted in the two preceding articles in this brief series,1 European and American thought had historically recognized the role of heredity in shaping both human physiology and human personality. The early beliefs of the Classical and Medieval worlds were reinforced by an improved understanding of plant and animal breeding, which made especially rapid progress in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Subsequently, the discoveries of Darwin and Mendel led to an even clearer recognition of the significance of the role of heredity in human affairs, and this reinforced interest in the possibility of applying to human beings the breeding techniques used so successfully with plants and animals.

(more…)


The Concept of Heredity in Western Thought: Part Two

The Concept of Heredity in Western Thought: Part Two
Vol. 35, Mankind Quarterly, 06-01-1995, pp 343

Social Engineering and the Social Sciences

Introduction
Franz Boas
Simplistic Behaviorism Strengthens the “Anti-hereditarian” Cult
Stalinist-Marxism adopts the Lysenkovian Myth
Institutional Restrictions on Freedom of Academic Research
Media Misrepresentation
Conclusion
Footnotes
Bibliography

Anthropology and sociology were not always committed to egalitarianism and many of the original pioneers tended to favor the concept of eugenics in so far as breeding from highly regarded members of the community was concerned. Both society at large and members of academe at that time still recognized the vital importance of heredity, and as we earlier noted, many of the great names of sociology, anthropology and psychology were ‘outspoken in their emphasis on the role of heredity, working in conjunction with environment and culture, as a prime factor in shaping human behavior. Amongst these “hereditarian” social scientists we must include such names as Ales Hrdlicka, W. G. Sumner, Ernest A. Hooton, William McDougall, C. H. Cooley, F. H. Giddings, R. M. McIver, Pitirim Sorokin, E. S. Bogardus, and E. A. Ross. Even Lester Ward condemned socialism as creating an artificial equality, recommending instead the concept of a “sociocracy” (1899) which would benefit each according to his or her merit, but would provide equal opportunity to all. Ward supported the concept of eugenics, and recognizing the need for “race elevation” and “continuing the race”,1 he stressed the importance of women as progenitors of the race. Similarly, Thorstein Veblen (1922) warned against the inherent threat of “race suicide” and held that “providence is a virtue only so far as its aim is provision for posterity.”2

The indisputable fact is that most pioneer social scientists were by no means egalitarians, and were quite open-minded so far as the possibility of incorporating biological knowledge into their altruistic plans to improve the human lot was concerned. The attempt by egalitarians ensconced in academe to deny the relevance of biology to the human condition is of relatively recent origin, and has its roots in the activities of radical political ideologues who have consciously infiltrated the academic world in order that they can advance the egalitarian thesis from respected positions of influence and authority.

On the other hand, the study of human behavior was from its inception strongly linked to the natural human urge to use knowledge to improve the human condition. Indeed, sociology is customarily traced back to Comte Henri de Saint-Simon (1760-1825) – one of those extraordinary French aristocrats who acknowledged a degree of corruption in the ancien regime and genuinely desired to create a “brave new world” – though one that differed substantially from the teachings of Voltaire and Rousseau. Saint-Simon was an idealist who enrolled in the French army at the age of seventeen, fought with the French expeditionary force sent to help fight the British in the American Revolution, and was present at the surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown. He believed that a scientific, positivist approach to the study of society could eradicate many of the evils that beset mankind; but not being an egalitarian, he did not support the ensuing French Revolution which had a far different character from that of the American Revolution.

Imprisoned, because of his aristocratic background, during Robespierre’ s reign of terror, Saint-Simon was fortunate in surviving this bloody period and began to devote himself to the question of social and political reform. His ideal was a hierarchical society organized around an efficient system of industrial and agricultural productivity such as that which had made it possible for Britain to stand up against the power of Napoleon. His writings caught the eye of Napoleon, who attempted to impose some of them on the new United Europe he sought to create. Saint-Simon hired a young secretary, Auguste Comte (1798-1857), who admired his employer’s ideas so much that he decided to expropriate them as his own. Consequently, it was Auguste Comte, writing after Saint-Simon’s death, who is more commonly regarded as the founder of sociology.

Like his employer, Auguste Comte conceived of sociology as a science aimed at developing a system of efficient social control which would nevertheless be in harmony with man’s biologically determined nature (1830-42). His ideal was also an hierarchical system, with captains of industry holding the controlling positions; it was in no way egalitarian and it rejected the idea of biological egalitarianism. However, egalitarianism steadily gained strength as a result of the various revolutionary passions that swept Europe in the nineteenth century, and while some socialists identified with the eugenic concept, others moved in the direction of egalitarianism, accepting Saint-Simon and Comte’s advocacy of social engineering while rejecting the hierarchical concept of society implicit in more traditional philosophy. Notable amongst these was Franz Boas, who migrated to the United States from Germany to become the head of the first American Ph.D.-granting university department. Equipped with all the trappings of extreme environmentalism and egalitarianism, Boasian anthropology eventually became the bulwark of those in American academe who were committed to the myth of biological egalitarianism.

Franz Boas

Franz Boas (1858-1942) was born in Minden, Germany, and grew up in a strongly radicalized environment. Both his parents were radical socialists who were active in the 1870-71 revolutionary movement that swept Europe. Abraham Jacobi, his uncle by marriage, had actually been imprisoned after being found guilty of armed violence in Cologne during the revolution of 1848, after which he had emigrated to America, where he soon became influential in the early rise of radical socialism. Boas’s family background was thus intimately interconnected with the radical socialist revolutionary movement, and also provided him with ready contacts in the United States.

Although lacking any formal training in anthropology, Boas had studied a certain amount of cultural geography in addition to his main doctoral subject, which was physics. What gave him an entree to anthropology was a report he wrote on the Eskimos of Baffin Land in 1883 for Der Berliner Tageblatt, a liberal newspaper. After serving as a docent in geography at the University of Berlin, he migrated to the United States in 1886 to take up a position at Clark University. It was here that the first U.S. doctoral degree specifically designated as being in the area of anthropology was awarded under Boas’s supervision. Boas subsequently became the head of a department of anthropology established at Columbia University, where he was able to train and award doctoral degrees to numerous students. Equipped with the earliest American doctorates specifically designated as being in the field of anthropology, his students by default became the leaders and prime builders of academic anthropology in the United States, rapidly establishing themselves as the arbiters of a controlling network which heavily influenced the future of anthropological research, publishing and teaching in American universities.

Interestingly, as late as 1911, in his book The Mind of Primitive Man, Boas had admitted that:

[d]ifferences of structure must be accompanied by differences of function, physiological as well as psychological; and, as we found clear evidence of differences of structure between races, so we must anticipate that differences in mental ‘characteristics will be found.

However, Boas was shortly to reverse this position when he realized that the recognition of genetic forces conflicted with the goals of his egalitarian and internationalist ideology, which sought to demolish the unity and coherence of national units. Instead he began a massive campaign to undermine national and ethnic consciousness and “combat racism” in whatever form it might find expression. In particular, his Anthropology and Modern Life (1928) was devoted to downplaying the concept of heredity and undermining the eugenic ideal. The egalitarian ideology steadily gained ground as Boas’s disciples and their pupils gained increasing influence throughout American academe. The spread of Boasian doctrines was further facilitated by the position of world dominance then enjoyed by the Western nations. Spurred by an ethical desire to shoulder “the white man’s burden” in a shrinking world, many academics came to believe that mankind should now abandon the Darwinian struggle and treat the formerly competing subspecies of mankind as members of a single, international, gene pool. This was a reversal of the evolutionary process which has for all time been firmly rooted in procreative competition, and was an ethical concept not shared by the non-Western nations, who adhered to more functional, self-promoting, competitive patterns of behavior.3

Thus, despite mounting evidence that genetic factors were of profound importance in determining human physical and mental behavior, the desire that biological egalitarianism should be true gained strength as human altruism was redirected away from the immediate group toward even the most disparate members of diverse breeding populations. The evolutionary trend toward greater speciation, already threatened by increasing population and migratory pressures, was now further vitiated by cultural factors rooted in an ideology which favored overall sapiens homogenization. The new radicals in U.S. social science found it convenient to downplay heritability; and Boas’s earlier acknowledgment of human biological disparities was edited out of the 1938 edition of The Mind of Primitive Man.

Those to whom Boas chose to award doctoral degrees in anthropology generally shared his ideologies and became prime disciples of egalitarian universalism. As the only holders of designated doctorates in anthropology, they were natural candidates to head up newly-formed departments of anthropology in other universities where they, in turn, could train and award doctorates to a new generation of Boasian anthropologists. One readily perceives how much the egalitarian bias in anthropology owes to this one immigrant of solid egalitarian-revolutionary credentials.

In his biographical work Franz Boas (1953, p. 65), Melville Herskovits, himself a student of Boas, publicly acknowledged that Boas’s “political sympathies leaned towards a variety of socialism common among Nineteenth Century liberals.” A cynic might add that the nineteenth century liberals with whom members of Boas’s family were connected included some of the bomb-throwing variety! The records of the United States House of Representatives (1944, p. 9) actually attribute Boas with no less than forty-six communist-front connections.

Herskovits went on to confirm that:

[t]he Four Decades of the tenure of [Boas's] professorship at Columbia gave a continuity to his teaching that permitted him to develop students who eventually made up the greater part of the significant professional core of American anthropologists, and who came to man and direct most of the major departments of anthropology in the United States. In their turn, they trained the students who . . . have continued the tradition in which their teachers were trained. . . .

Despite such an open admission by his pupil, friend and biographer, few today fully appreciate the extent of Boas’s influence on the subsequent history of anthropology in America. Yet it is readily apparent when we look at the careers of just a few of Boas’s pupils, all of whom sought to revolutionize Western thinking about social relations and to minimize the role of heredity in the shaping of human abilities:

Margaret Mead, often called “the mother of American anthropology,” became the author of many influential but distorted anthropological texts. Mead earned her M.A. and Ph.D. from Columbia in 1929 under Boas, and obtained an influential position as associate curator of the American Museum of Natural History. Her Coming of Age in Samoa (1928) was a particularly blatant, now-transparent attempt to demolish support for Western family traditions in favor of free sex, and has since been shown to be based on a broadly false and flagrant misrepresentation of Polynesian customs.4 She co-authored with Gene Weltfish a pamphlet entitled The Races of Mankind (1940), which somehow came to be adopted by the War Department for distribution among American World War II military personnel, until it was withdrawn when it was judged to be communist propaganda. Its general thesis reflected the very core of Marxist-Leninist doctrine, extending the concept of “class exploitation” to include “race exploitation” and portraying race as nothing more than a cultural invention designed to keep the colored races in submission -or a conceptual artifact designed to promote a specialized form of class exploitation. Mead was officially cited as having numerous communist- front affiliations.

Melville Herskovits obtained his Ph.D. under Boas in 1927 and was subsequently hired by Boas as a research associate in anthropology at Columbia. Herskovits later became chairman of anthropology at Northwestern University, and a major power in the increasingly narrow, incestuous world of American cultural anthropology, in which virtually all the key positions were controlled by students of Boas. As the first granter of doctorates in an area specifically designated as anthropology, Boas had brought off a political coup which enabled his views not only to dominate subsequent generations of American anthropologists, but also to inspire leftist thinkers in sociology and other branches of the social sciences throughout the English-speaking world.

Ashley Montagu, born in England as Israel Ehrenburg, changed his name several times, adopting not merely a set of Anglophone names – which would not have been unusual – but one of uniquely aristocratic flavor, Montague Francis Ashley-Montagu. For a surname he appropriated the name Montagu from one of Britain’s oldest medieval titled families, and for good measure reinforced this by hyphenating it to the name of Ashley, since hyphenated surnames conveyed an additional aura of social status in Britain.5 Resenting the hereditarian views of Britain’ s leading anatomist, Grafton Elliot Smith, under whom he was studying, he dropped out of the University of London without getting his bachelor’ s degree, and disappointed by the failure of the 1928 General Strike in Britain, the new “Montagu” migrated to America where he was awarded a Ph.D. by Boas in 1936 – and was appointed chairman of anthropology at Rutgers University. “Montagu’s” entire career was built around a bitter crusade against the work of respected scholars such as Carleton Coon,6 who recognized race for what it is – a very real product of human evolution. A widely influential torrent of publications, such as his widely promoted book, Man’s Most Dangerous Myth (1942), all sought to dismiss the zoological reality of race.

Montagu was the rapporteur primarily responsible for drafting the academically absurd, but politically sententious, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization’s (UNESCO) 1950 Statement on Race, which sought to deny the significance of racial disparities. 7 This was widely protested by scientists from many countries, notably by the pre-eminent French paleontologist Henri Vallois, director of Musee de l’Homme.8 Not all the members of UNESCO’s own social science department accepted the original United Nations Statement. Professor Georges A. Heuse, director of the UNESCO ethno-psychology department, condemned it, commenting that it was “conceived chiefly by Ashley Montagu – an anthropologist who conceives race a social myth – and by a group of sociologists substantially ignorant of anthropology” (1955, p. 379). Indeed, the statement prepared by Montagu was so absurd that it was rewritten and republished in 1952, only two years after it was initially adopted. The revised Statement, although still largely reflecting universalist-egalitarian views as is only to be expected in view of the political composition of the United Nations, generously conceded the role of genetic factors in human life and admitted that human groups which were distinguished by “well-developed and primarily heritable physical differences from other groups” might justifiably be called races.9

It would not be irrelevant to note that in 1942 Montagu chose to lecture at the so-called School for Democracy, which was classified as a communist organization by the New York legislature, and that he is on record as stating that “Soviet Russia is the outstanding example of perfect management of ethnic group relations” – a claim that might be challenged by many ethnic groups who had the experience of living as a minority under communist rule.

Ruth Bendedict obtained her doctorate at Columbia University and became a lecturer at Columbia under the patronage of Boas, having been retained by him to teach there, where she eventually became a full professor. In 1945 a high point in the Boasian war against the concept of race and heredity was reached with the publication of Ruth Benedict’s Race: Science and Politics, which essentially argued that the study of race was “a vicious and brutal impediment to human progress, brotherhood, and understanding.” Her book Patterns of Culture (1959), containing an introduction by Boas and a preface by Margaret Mead, similarly sought to emphasize the role of culture to the exclusion of biology in determining human achievement. It became required reading in so many college courses taught by acolytes of the Boas tradition that it eventually sold over a million copies.

Isador Chein obtained his Ph.D. in 1939 under Boas at Columbia and became one of the prime court witnesses to give “expert” testimony in favor of school desegregation. Chein gave the Court only his opinion about segregation, as though that opinion, coming from him, was ipso facto “scientific,” without attempting to provide any scientific evidence to support his opinion.10

Kenneth B. Clark, a Panamanian Afro-American, obtained his Ph.D. under Boas at Columbia in 1940 and similarly became an “instant expert” on the American school system. Clark’s testimony before the Supreme Court played an important role in determining the decision to force the racial desegregation of American schools in the landmark 1954 Brown vs. Board of Education decision (347 U.S. 483). Central to his testimony was his claim that because seven out of sixteen black children in a all-black school, shown white and black dolls or drawings of such dolls, chose the white doll as that “which most looked like them, ” segregation had “harmed the development of their personalities.” The speciousness of his testimony was revealed by Ernest van den Haag, of New York University and the New School for Social Research, who showed from Clark’s own data, collected in a study involving 253 black children from both segregated and nonsegregated schools, that a higher percentage (39%) of black children from racially integrated schools chose the white doll than did black children from segregated schools (29%).11 In other words, Clark had mislead the Court with data that appeared to support his contention, while the data from his larger study clearly showed that the reality was the reverse of what he presented to the court.

Otto Klineberg was awarded a Ph.D. in psychology from Columbia, but also studied anthropology under Boas. He is credited with having helped persuade Boas to suppress his former belief that race and intelligence were linked. After receiving his Ph.D. in psychology, Klineberg was promptly hired by Boas as a Columbia research associate in anthropology, and became noted for his persistent attacks on “hereditarian” views.

Leslie Spier constantly supported the egalitarian claim that there was no evidence of any race being inferior in its ability to participate in any culture or even to create any culture, a sweeping statement which denies any validity to the concept of the inheritance of personality. The cultural achievements of different breeding populations were supposedly due. solely to environmental circumstances and never to inherited differences in personality, intelligence, or any other forms of ability.

Gene Weltfish obtained his Ph.D. from Columbia under Boas in 1929 and, after further studies under Alexander Goldenweiser at the New School for Social Research, where Margaret Mead also underwent postgraduate training, was hired by Boas to teach at Columbia. It was he who co- authored with Margaret Mead the notorious pamphlet The Races of Mankind (1948), mentioned above.

This is a remarkable and formidable list of politicized scholars, all educated under the same man and all reflecting his positions. The insidious and collective influence of these politicized academics within American academe soon became obvious, and it has been said that the Galton Society regarded the need to combat Boasian egalitarian and extreme environmentalist propaganda as one of its chief goals. But since the Boasians infiltrated academe as paid faculty members, working together to seize control of key positions and recruiting into academe only those of their students who had accepted their views, the members of the Galton Society were outgunned and outmaneuvered, and fought a losing battle. At this point those who still recognized the importance of genetics found themselves confronted by a new ideology, Marxist-Leninist Lysenkovianism.

Simplistic Behaviorism Strengthens the “Anti-hereditarian” Cult

Scientifically, the ground for the spread of egalitarian environmentalist theory was fertilized by the emphasis placed on the environment by the simplistic behaviorism of J.B. Watson (1878-1958), who expanded Pavlovian research into a broad philosophy which assumed that human beings were essentially plastic organisms all equally able to develop in virtually whatever direction might be determined by their environment and schooling. Watson, who spent a good part of his adult life as an executive with large advertising firms such as J. Walter Thompson, sought to account for sociopsychological phenomena in strictly behavioristic terms. In this he was close to reality, but his weakness was his denial of significant differences in the heredity of individuals, In short, he was a purely environmentalist behaviorist who assumed that all “healthy” human beings were equally capable to responding to training in any direction. His philosophy excluded what is now called behavioral genetics. His views were extended into the field of education by John Dewey (1859-1952), a pragmatist who believed that environmental manipulation could reshape human behavior in virtually any desired direction and whose influence on the shape of American education persists to this day. These environmental behaviorists rejected the idea that biologically programmed behavior affected human behavior and chose largely to ignore the possibility that disparate heritable influences might to any extent predetermine the limits of the individual human personality.

The importance of environment had never been ignored in European thought, and indeed traditional educators had always placed great importance on a strict regime of training and schooling; the older tradition differed from the new behaviorism in that it was recognized that heredity placed limits on the individual’s ability to benefit from experience and from educational opportunity. The new emphasis on environment, to the exclusion of all biological factors, proved a fertile field for those whose political agenda depended on promoting the myth of biological egalitarianism.

Stalinist-Marxism adopts the Lysenkovian Myth

The Boasians were not the sole source of anti-hereditarian views in academe. The idea of the biological equality of all mankind was a virtual necessity to political egalitarianism. In Russia, a quack geneticist named Trofim Lysenko rejected Mendelian genetics and claimed that the environment could directly modify the genome. This fallacy, linked to the equally false Lamarckian doctrine that adaptations acquired during the lifetime of individual organisms could be inherited by that organism’s offspring, reduced breeding and to philosophical irrelevance, thereby promoting the cause of egalitarians and those who believed they could reshape mankind at will by means of environmental manipulation without the need to resort to any form of genetic selection. This view were immediately adopted by Stalin, who declared Mendelian genetics to be a capitalist conspiracy, and the acceptance of the Lysenkovian fallacy became mandatory throughout the Soviet Union. Lysenkoism justified the doctrine of revolution by consigning Mendelian genetics to oblivion: if all races and individuals were potentially equal, given the appropriate manipulation of their environment, the argument that all economic inequality was the product of class exploitation would be logically justifiable.

With the advent of Stalinist-Lysenkovian doctrine, revolutionary Marxists, like the Jacobins before them, could forget Marx and Engels’ racist convictions and join the anti-hereditarian chorus with renewed enthusiasm. Outside the Soviet Union, Marxists now joined non-Marxist egalitarian activists in attacking all and any scholars who adhered to Mendelian theory, especially when these persisted in drawing attention to the link between genetics and human ability. In Britain, the ardent eugenicist J. B. S. Haldane resigned his communist party membership, and in America the university of Texas Nobel Prize-winning eugenicist, Hermann J. Muller, who had long been a card-carrying member of the U.S. communist party, abandoned his party membership after narrowly escaping arrest during a visit to the USSR. His crime: he had publicly condemned the Lysenkovian myth as unscientific.

Lysenkovianism remained for many years the only legally permitted form of genetics in the USSR, and most Marxist activists ensconced in the social science divisions of Western universities accepted the Stalinist-Lysenkoist doctrine out of political conviction. The story is well-documented in Conway Zirkle’s illuminating book, Evolution, Marxian Biology and the Social Scene (1959)12 Biological egalitarianism also became the only “politically correct” doctrine among Marxist- Stalinist thinkers elsewhere in the world, and Zirkle shows how widelywhat he calls “Marxian biology” permeated Western anthropology, sociology, and related studies through the teachings of faculty members who were ideologically attracted to egalitarianism but were balefully ignorant of even the simplest of biological knowledge. To quote his words:

Marxian biology . . . exists also in non-Communist countries – in countries where it is not protected by Marxian dictators. Moreover, it exists not merely as an intellectual lag among the unlearned, but as a carefully protected faith in disciplines whose members are equal in education – quantitatively. at least – to the biologists themselves. (1959, p. 418) … The usual course is to treat the human species as if it were composed of an amorphous, uniform and plastic raw material, as if it were a species which could be molded (conditioned is the usual word) to suit the heart’s desire.” (p. 420)

All kinds of eugenics are anathema to Marxists, Zirkle affirms, even though already in 1959 our knowledge of the machinery of hereditary was sufficient to enable us to assert that the outcome of any rational eugenic program would be beneficial. Indeed, the situation was so bad that the Marxists ensconsed in Western academe

. . . actually set the fashion not only in letters but also in popular up-to-date attitudes in morals and ethics. . . It is even possible that they furnished the dominant directives to the social sciences. This statement is not as far-fetched as it might seem at first, for practically all social scientists are familiar with the works of the more progressive writers, but almost none of them is technically equipped to evaluate the new discoveries in biology . . . . Marxian biology has always had allies, and this has been one of the sources of its strength. On the other hand, scientific biology has had few friends. The moment it grew to the point where it applied to Homo sapiens, it acquired enemies.”(p. 298)

Forty years later, contemporary Marxist-Leninist ideology, although humbled by events in Eastern Europe, remains alive and well in Western academe; and large numbers of faculty members in social science departments still refuse to recognize the implications of the fact that human beings are biological organisms, even though an overwhelming majority of psychologists now acknowledge the importance of heredity in shaping the limits of human personality and abilities.13

The earlier list we cited of radical social scientists was restricted to some of the more prominent of Boas’s pupils.14 However, the Boasians were soon joined by other blatantly radical academics. Gerhard Lenski and Marvin Harris, for example, advanced an essentially Marxist analysis of social behavior rooted in the concept of egalitarianism and class warfare which exerted a major influence on American sociology.15 In addition, a bitter campaign of guerilla warfare against those who acknowledge the role of heredity has been carried out for years by associates of an activist radical publication known as Science for the People – which uses the term “people” in its most traditional Marxist interpretation, reminiscent of the “Hall of the People” in Beijing.

In Storm over Biology,16 the late Bernard D. Davis, a respected molecular biologist at Harvard Medical School, charged Science for the People with aiming “to destroy the field of human behavioral genetics 11 (1986). The names of Richard Lewontin, Stephen J. Gould and Leon J. Kamin, in particular, feature prominently in this connection. Lewontin’ s 1984 book, Not in Our Genes, co-authored with Kamin and Britain’ s arch-antihereditarian Stephen Rose, was an outright attempt to undermine any proper understanding of the importance of heredity. Lewontin himself was a prime force behind Science for the People, although he has perhaps adopted a somewhat more moderate tone in light of the solid evidence provided by ongoing genetic research. Stephen J. Gould speaks out in a pro-egalitarian fashion as a scholar who has taken the trouble to fully acquaint himself with ongoing research, but who has not abandoned his ideological commitment to what he believes the facts ought to be rather than what they are. His widely promoted book The Misrneasure of Man (1981) notably created confusion in the minds of its readers concerning the heritability of intelligence. Kamin, the author of The Science and Politics of IQ (1974), by contrast, still participates in personal attacks against those who attempt to draw the attention of the public to the role of heredity in human behavior. A former New England editor of a weekly communist party newspaper, he shows little interest in abandoning the egalitarian dream and even recently has attacked “hereditarian” scholars in published letters which contain such flagrant inaccuracies that one can only suppose that he places an unscholarly reliance on secondary sources which he has not troubled to check for accuracy.

Institutional Restrictions on Freedom of Academic Research

With their intellectual underpinnings threatened by the advance of biological and genetic science, the egalitarians perceived that their most fertile field of influence lay in the quasi-scientific fields of sociology and anthropology, where their theories could be advanced without being subject to experimental test. Consequently these areas increasingly attracted egalitarian attention, and soon new generations of scholars were being trained and graduated in that tradition. Physical anthropology was cut off as something totally separate from cultural and social anthropology, thus allowing the latter field to develop a purely environmentalist approach which left students ignorant of the possibility of human biological differences.

The Great Depression created a political atmosphere which facilitated the promotion of the myth of biological egalitarianism, and the events of World War II made it even easier. Biological egalitarianism now became the “scientific” underpinning for the environmentalist conceptions of society which spread throughout both the social sciences and the media. Political pressures swung major foundations which fund both educational research and socio-political programs into alignment with the egalitarian creed, and a vast body of pseudo-science rapidly came to dominate the fields of anthropology, sociology and philosophy, with biased academic opinions about biological egalitarianism even influencing court decisions and governmental policy relative to social issues.

During the 1960s and ’70s, there was widespread intimidation by Marxists and other egalitarians of scholars who refused to ignore the genetic component behind human behavior. Violent Marxist SDS-organized17 campus riots were frequent, as documented in Race, Intelligence and Bias in Academe (Pearson, 1991) and in more specific detail concerning the harassment of Nobel Prize-winning William Shockley in Shockley on Eugenics and Race (Pearson, 1992). Marxist student organizations and their sympathizers, encouraged by similar-minded faculty members, rioted on campuses, disrupted lectures, threatened faculty members, and attacked the right of “hereditarian” scholars to report their research findings or to express their opinions either on and off the campus. During the 1980s, a degree of order returned to academe, but by now many of those who had been student activists in the 1960s and ’70s had followed the course advocated by the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci (1977), and had abandoned violent revolutionary activities in favor of infiltrating the established institutions of societies as paid employees. Numbers of the rebellious students of the 1960s and ’70s became the faculty members, the university administrators, and the government bureaucrats of the late 1980s and ’90s. Whereas universities such as the University of California, Berkeley, had hitherto defended the right of faculty members to express their opinions, numerous universities and other educational institutions now became leaders of the egalitarian cause, imposing restrictions on the freedom of faculty members to engage in research and practice free speech wherever this involved the influence of genetic factors on human behavior. Guidelines were laid down as to “racially sensitive” and “politically correct” terminology at Pennsylvania State and other universities and faculty members who published papers on the genetic basis of personality were discriminated against at universities such as Western Ontario, Delaware, and City University of New York.

As the myth of biological egalitarianism gained further political and emotional support, it began to inhibit not only individual scholars but also grant-making foundations. Even foundations which had been originally established by eugenic-oriented benefactors, such as the Carnegie Institute and the Kellogg Foundation, began to eschew support for research that might favor genetic rather than exclusively environmental solutions to human problems.

Unable successfully to refute solid research into the significance of genetic forces in determining the limits of human behavioral potential, in medical and non-medical fields, the egalitarians have in fact fallen back on (1) attempts to accuse individual researchers of poor methodology or even outright fraud, such allegations relying on the principle that when mud is thrown, some at least will stick, and (2) the argument that any research into the role of genetics in human behavior will lead inevitably to “discrimination” and therefore is morally unjustifiable. Currently, there is considerable publicity aimed at research into the genetic basis of breast cancer, on the ground that this will lead to “discrimination” by insurance companies and employers. What the media should be discussing is the vital importance of medical genetic research, the benefits that mankind can obtain from knowledge about genetic causality, and the fact that as medicine advances there is an increasing possibility of developing a humane eugenic program, based on the development of genetic surgery, which could largely free future generations from the ills which plague the present generation.

Media Misrepresentation

As has been revealed by Snyderman and Rothman in The IQ Controversy: The Media and Public Policy (1988), radical ideologues have generally found willing collaborators in the media. The intimidation of “hereditarian” scientists, as the radicals liked to call behavioral scientists, became a major plank in the politics of what has more recently come to be dubbed “political correctness.”

Because of media bias in favor of the fantasy of the biological uniformity of not just individuals but of all mankind, there was little favorable publicity for those like Bernard Davis. An outstanding scholar with an unimpeachable scientific reputation, Davis documented leftist distortions of scientific knowledge about heredity, protesting that these were promoting irrational public policies which assumed that contemporary Homo saplens were somehow exempt from biological forces and thus were completely malleable and subject to environmental manipulation. Yet his Storm over Biology received little attention from the media, and on his death the New York Times obituary completely ignored his extraordinary scientific achievements and represented him to the public as a holder of fringe views. Only under open pressure from Nobelist Arthur Kornberg did the Times publish a second more objective account of Davis’s achievements and scientific status. (Holden, 1994).

Politicized distortion of scientific findings is not limited to the popular media. Sadly, a number of semi-popular scientific journals have come to be controlled by individuals who seem to minimize the role of heredity in shaping human behavior. These journals are influential because many do a remarkable service in spreading sound scientific information on subjects other than human behavioral genetics. The Scientific American is one such publication, which despite its general excellence sympathetically provides a platform for such politicized writers as Leon Kamin, whose views were further promoted by John Horgan in a generally informative article entitled “Eugenics Revisited” (1993). Horgan gave considerable space to Kamin’s politicized attempts to debunk the Minnesota Twin Studies research findings18 Kamin has also claimed to have disclosed fraud in the findings of Sir Cyril Burt – a prominent British psychologist who early proclaimed the largely genetic basis of intelligence. Following his death, Burt’s research records concerning his twin studies were reportedly lost under suspicious circumstances when boxes of his files were reportedly destroyed on the recommendation of a colleague who was not sympathetic to his work. However, Burt’s published findings on the intelligence of twins have since been replicated by other researchers and the charge that Butt manufactured his data has been examined and repudiated by Joynson, in The Burt Affair (1989), and by Fletcher in Science, Ideology and the Media: The Cyril Butt Affair (1991).19

Conclusion

Shattered by the deeply dysgenic impact of World War I, and by the economic depression that followed, many who had previously put loyalty to the national ideal ahead of selfish interests now fell prey to the egalitarian myth, which blamed the old elite for the war and portrayed any ranking of human talents as nothing more than an excuse for class exploitation. The idea of eugenic policies, based on a recognition of the reality of biological inequality, of competitive reproduction, and on the fear that modern social conditions negated natural selection, now became increasingly disturbing to those who desired only to live their own lives free from worries about the well being of future generations.

The outbreak of World War II and the ensuing military defeat of Germany made it possible for the egalitarians to smear all who sought to advocate eugenics by highly unsubtle propaganda alleging that any concentration of interest in human genetics was likely to promote totalitarianism and genocide. World War II gave the political edge to the anti-eugenicists. Germany had adopted earlier, primitive eugenic policies, and information about this became intermingled with the “Holocaust” reports coming out of post-war Germany. A shock-wave of horror swept over the Western world, and in the process all discussion of eugenics was illogically but effectively equated with inhumanity – an exact reversal of the moral drive that prompted most eugenicists to support the movement. The egalitarians, of course, never mentioned the historical fact that egalitarian enthusiasm could also lead to totalitarianism – and to the greatest genocide the world has ever seen in the mass slaughter of Russian “bourgeois” peasants, to mass deaths in the Siberian “gulags” and to the mass genocide of the cultured and landowning classes in Maoist China, all committed in the name of “equality.” Their ideology prevented them from seeing or even desiring to see objective reality.

Irrational political ideologies can severely retard the progress of knowledge, but in a free country they cannot suppress the search for truth altogether. While genetic research has proceeded rapidly during the past two decades, the Stalinist-Lysenkovian tradition still strives to raise barriers to research into human behavioral genetics. However, increasing numbers of psychologists and social science scholars are acknowledging the need to examine the role of genetics in relation to human behavior and abilities even though their interest draws passionate condemnation from those who remain rooted in a Stalinist-like commitment to the myth of biological egalitarianism. Seeing their cherished notions challenged by research into the link between heredity and human behavior, these latter still strive with a vigor born of desperation to suppress public recognition of the importance of heredity and to prevent any such recognition from influencing public policy.

To understand the history of academic fashion one cannot ignore the influence of political interests, since these exert a powerful influence on academic ideologies at any one time. Thus, Karl Mannhelm, an activist Marxist immigrant who fled to Britain from Germany, was certainly right in advocating the need for a “sociology of knowledge” (1955) on the grounds that scholarly research is influenced by the personal conceptions, values and politics of the researcher. Unfortunately he saw this issue only in a Marxist light, attributing all non-Marxist theories to bourgeois class bias, and so hindered rather than advanced the development of this branch of knowledge.

Outright Marxist egalitarian propaganda was powerfully aided by a separate development that now began to pervade even respectable segments of academia, of the media and of the political world. This was the redirection of altruism away from the welfare of the immediate gene pool to engulf the most diverse members of the species.20 The new spirit of biological egalitarianism was accompanied by a transmutation of humanitarian values. Altruism had evolved because the survival chances of a population were enhanced when individual members were prepared to make personal sacrifices to protect the intergenerational well-being of their own kind. Now, however, altruism became confused in its application. Improvements in communications caused local breeding populations to lose their cohesiveness and their sense Of distinctive identity: consequently, altruistic emotions became increasingly stimulated not by threats to the survival of their own gene pool, but by the plight of all the world’s expanding multitudes, which nature had traditionally trimmed back by natural selection. As a result, many of the more talented and creative members of the advanced Western nations increasingly devoted their efforts to helping the less fit, both at home and abroad, to reproduce prolifically, while allowing their own birthrate to fall below replacement level. As Garrett Hardin pointed out repeatedly, and most notably in The Limits of Altruism, this redirection of the altruistic impulse effectively stood evolution on its head. 21

The term “genetic altruism” had now to be invented to describe the actions of those who showed themselves willing to refrain from passing on their own genes to posterity while assisting less competent individuals and groups to multiply. This inversion of the evolutionary function of altruism was accompanied by a decline of interest in eugenics. A new morality was developing which demanded that advanced societies should fight against evolution. Natural selection was to be replaced by dysgenic selection; nature was to be prevented from wielding its genetic pruning knife, and no attention was to be paid to the well- being of all those future generations of mankind who would be doomed to eke out their existence in an increasingly overcrowded world blighted by man-made dysgenic population trends.

Although this new anti-evolutionary philosophy of life took hold primarily in the more advanced countries, where the birthrate began to fall dramatically, it was widely rejected among the peoples of the Third World. By adhering to more traditional evolutionary practices, these populations began to explode at geometric rates following the introduction of modern Western health measures, technology, and economic aid.

Evolutionary progress is rooted in the process of speciation and competition between populations and subspecies to reproduce and control vital resources. Altruism served an evolutionary function among advanced social animals – the enhancement of the survival chances of a specific phylogenetic continuum. When the breeding population was itself not only the community but also the total society this worked well. But modern communications and modern mass migrations have reversed the evolutionary impact of altruism, commonly redirecting it away from members of the immediate gene pool to aid the members of competing gene pools to reproduce at the expense of the altruist’s own genetic heirs. Humane though it seems to us, the modern redirection of altruism away from the “home” represents a reversal of the evolutionary process, and could potentially bring about the downfall of humanity unless applied in conjunction with sound eugenic judgment. This is all the more true because the altruistic extension of modern medicine to all corners of the earth has created an ecologically frightening threat of world overpopulation which calls for sound and intelligent policies if it is not to totally destroy the human species – and with it most other advanced species of plant and animal life. The problem is that the ordinary human heart rests easier when the mind maintains the pretence that all is well, even when reason should warn that it is not.

This author summarized his views. on the vital issues now at stake, which have resulted from the reversal of natural selection as a result of illogical social ideologies and the impact of modern technology, in the concluding chapter of his Race, Intelligence and Bias in Academe (1991):

If truth prevails in our society, social science and social and political philosophy will eventually be obliged to take cognizance of the fact that human behavior is subject to the law of causality, just like other matter throughout the universe. It is now clear that genetic factors set the potential limits of behavior by the human animal, while environmental circumstances and events influence the individual organism within the potential limits of its behavior as determined by heredity. Not that one can say that either is more important than the other. Environment and heredity are two different categories of causal factors which intertwine and interact. Even to ask which is the more important can be a misleading question – just as it is to ask which is more important, the cart or the horse?

Yet there is a vitally significant difference between genetic forces and environment, a difference which raises eugenic considerations to a level of superior concern. One can enhance the environmental component of intelligence by creating a more favorable environment for the next generation, but this is only a temporary boost, and must be maintained at the heightened level for each successive generation. Its effect is not intergenerational as the Lysenkoists believed. By contrast, an improvement in the genetic constituency of a population is permanent, unless eliminated by new dysgenic forces. A genetic improvement is an intergenerational improvement, and genetic or dysgenic decline represents a genetic loss which is likewise transmitted intergenerationally. Unfortunately, a single generation of severe dysgenic decline can destroy tens of thousands of years of evolutionary progress laboriously achieved by means of natural selection – and thus constitutes a permanent blight on posterity.22

Emotionally-motivated and unintelligent responses to our environment can only do more harm to mankind than good. We need to heed the ancient Greek injunction to”Know Thyself.” If we are to be motivated by truly altruistic emotions, We should focus our altruism to embrace all those untold generations yet to be born, or which could yet be born provided we do not wreck the biosphere in which we live and destroy the genetic heritage given to us by past evolutionary selection. We must direct our concern not just to the well-being of those who chance to be alive at this present time, but to the well-being of that far greater number who are to follow when we and our generation have passed away. We can do no greater good than to leave the multitude of future generations a healthy genetic inheritance in a healthy and unspoiled environment. Our duty is to avoid pollution of the human genetic heritage, and to pass on a healthy and valuable gene pool to future generations, just as it is to avoid ecological pollution and to strive to conserve the rich environmental heritage we inherited from the generations that preceded us.

Lord Justice Lawton of Britain once said that a new Edward Gibbon writing about the present age might well entitle the last chapter “The Age of Compassionate Fools.” As a nation, he observed, Britain has allowed idealism to override common sense. The same might be said of all the contemporary nations of the Western world.

Virtually all of those who have sought to suppress human knowledge about heredity have done so with kindly intentions, but sound policies can never be constructed on bad science or unsound data. Any society that sets itself against the immutable causal laws of biology and evolution will be an unsuccessful society. An inappropriate culture that is not in harmony with the mechanics of the universe has only a poor chance of surviving. Heavily dysgenic trends have dominated this century as a result of the selective elimination of air crews and other talented personnel involved in modern warfare in Europe; the genocidal slaughter of the elite in Europe, the Soviet Union and Maoist China; and the general tendency for the more creative members of modernized societies around the world to have fewer children than the less creative. Nor should one ignore the impact on mankind of the increasing destruction of the biosphere by the wanton use of harmful technologies and by the unprecedented population explosion which is devastating the environment in even the poorest and least technologically advanced countries. Nevertheless, if the world does not collapse beneath the triple pressures of pollution, overpopulation, and severe dysgenic trends, and if governmental policies could be modified to take into consideration the findings of a scientific community which was encouraged to continue research in human behavioral genetics, uncensored by radical Luddite ideologues, it is possible that the human race might then still have a future worth calling a future.

Current research in medical and general genetics promises a potentially brighter future for mankind, and this will be outlined in a third article in this series, to be published in the next issue of The Mankind Quarterly.

FOOTNOTES

1 Lester F. Ward, Outlines of Sociology, 1899, New York: Macmillan, pp. 147-149.

2 Thorstein Veblen, The Instinct of Workmanship, 1922 NY: B.W. Huebsch, p. 26.

3 For more on this theme see A New Theory of Human Evolution by Sir Arthur Keith, 1940. London: Watts & Co., and other writings by the same author.

4 Mead’s prime claim to anthropological fame, the book she wrote as a graduate student about Samoan sexual practices, was eventually exploded by D. Freeman’s 1983 study entitled Margaret Mead and Samoa: The Making and Unmaking of an Anthropological Myth (Cambridge: Harvard University Press). The ensuing pyrotechnics were effectively documented in Hiram Caton’s 1990 publication, The Samoa Reader: Anthropologists take Stock (Lanham, MD: The University Press of America). Although the egalitarian forces were unable to defend Mead from Freeman’s charges after the fraudulence of her research was exposed, it is significant that some of the most powerful forces in contemporary American anthropology still strove to rescue what they could of her academic image in view of her historic importance as one of the main disciples of anti-hereditarian egalitarianism and Boasian anthropology.

5 Pat Shipman, in The Evolution of Racism (Simon and Shuster, 1994, pages 159-160), documents the history of his series of name changes, from Israel Ehrenberg to Moses Israel Ehrenberg, then to the aristocratic Montague Francis Ashley-Montagu, and finally to today’s somewhat more modest Ashley Montagu. She also documents the opposition to the UNESCO statement by leading scientists of that day, and notes the “overrepresentation” of Montagu’s associates on the panel that devised the 1950 UNESCO Statement on Race.

6 Prominent as America’s leading physical anthropologist, Harvard scholar Carleton Coon has been persistently attacked by egalitarians despite the fact that subsequent research in blood groups, DNA and other genetic markers has shown that his system of racial classification, based largely on skeletal data and other outward phenotypical characteristics, was remarkably accurate in revealing the degrees of relationship among the diverse peoples of the world. See the bibliography attached to this article for mention of some of his leading publications.

7 Another notable contributor to this statement was the biased Mexican anthropologist Juan Comas, who in 1961 authored a chapter entitled “Racial myths’ which appeared in a book entitled Race and science published, not unsurprisingly, by the Columbia University Press.

8 See Henri Vallois, 1951. ‘UNESCO on Race.” Man, no. 28. Vallois became one of the earliest members of the editorial advisory board of The Mankind Quarterly, publishing in the journal and continuing to serve on its board until his death. In his article in Man, Vallois stated unequivocally that ‘the existence of races of Man is an uncontestable biological fact.’

9 Active consideration is currently being given to further amendments necessitated by genetic and biological realism, although it may be confidently expected that the political considerations which dominate the United Nations will prevent the adoption of a truly balanced revision.

10 See Cahn in “Jurisprudence’, 31 N. Y.U.L. Review, 1956.

11 In short, black children in segregated schools were less pronounced in their preference for white dolls than were black children in nonsegregated schools. In addition, more black children in northern schools rejected the black doll than did black children in southern schools. See Ernest van den Haag, “Social Science Testimony in the Desegregation cases – a Reply to Professor Kenneth Clark,” Villanova Law Review, Fall, 1960, 6:1, pp 6979. Data is based on Clark’s ‘Racial Identification and Preference in Negro Children,” Readings in Social Psychology, pp. 174-5. Newcomb and Harley, Eds., 1947)

12 Se also Jamieson

13 See Snyderman and Rothman, The IQ Controversy: The Media and Public Policy, 1988. Transaction Books.

14 But the heirs of the Boasian school remain ensconced in the social sciences, and some ideologues have recently infiltrated even such a respected organization as the Behavioral Genetics Association, demanding the resignation of the Association’s outgoing president, professor Glayde Whitney, after he gave a talk suggesting the need to investigate the possibility of genetic factors behind the high incidence of black crime in America.

15 Lenski’s Power and Privilege (1966), a widely used textbook, presented an outright Marxist view of society in that it sought to examine human cultures entirely in terms of class exploitation and stratification.

16 Bernard Davis, Storm Over Biology: Essays on Science, Sentiment and Public Policy. 1986. Buffalo: Prometheus.

17 The ludicrously named Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) was an outright Marxist organization whose activities are detailed in Far Left of Center: The American Radical Left Today by Harvey Klehr, Transaction Books, New Brunswick. 1988.

18 Journals and newspapers that publish distorted or erroneous material too often ignore letters of refutation. Vincent Sarich wrote a letter protesting Horgan’s article, which was never published. Furthermore, when they do agree to publish letters of refutation they customarily allow the original author space to respond, while generally denying further space to the complainant to refute any new distortions contained in the “response.”

19 We will quote one further example of media distortion favoring the survival of the myth of biological egalitarianism among the more gullible members of the public, which could only have been made as a result of a deliberate policy decision by the editors of Scientific American. The June 1993 cover of that influential publication chose to advertise the “The Dubious Links between Genes and Behavior.” Contemporary scientific research clearly establishes the authority of animal behavioral genetics, and no geneticist would ever consider alleging that human beings were not animals, and that the laws of causality do not apply to human beings.

20 To understand the wide range of disparate qualities which distinguish men from each other today, it is necessary to reflect upon the evolutionary history of our species. Earlier hominids evolved as a variety of widely differing subspecies which, in the normal course of evolution, isolated in widely dispersed regions, would eventually have evolved into quite separate species – but for the fact that the more advanced populations successively tended to expand into neighboring territories, either supplanting or admixing with the earlier occupants of those territories. As a result, today’s population of Homo sapiens comprises the descendants of a more advanced subspecies whose forebears mixed in remote areas with the remnants of older local subspecies. Through such local genetic admixtures, the diverse populations and peoples of the modern world were created. By supplanting the more primitive hominid subspecies, and absorbing others, Homo sapiens remained one species, capable of fertile crossbreeding among its various subspecies and mixtures of subspecies, characterized by the wide disparity of innate biological properties which distinguish both living individuals and races from each other.

21 1977, Bloomington: The Indiana University Press. However, see also other works by this author listed in the bibliography. The works of Robert Retherford, listed in the bibliography, are also relevant here.

22 For an overview of the evolutionary interrelationship of physical and culture anthropology, see Pearson (1974) and Pearson (1985).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Benedict, Ruth 1940 Race: Science and politics. New York: Modern Age Books.

Benedict, Ruth, and Gene Weltfish 1943 The races of mankind. Public Affairs Pamphlet no. 85. New York: Public Affairs Committee.

Boas, Franz 1911 The mind of primitive man. New York: Macmillan. 1928 Anthropology and Modern Life. New York: Norton.

Bogardus, Emory S. 1928 Immigration and race attitudes. New York: D.C. Heath and Co. 1960 Development of social thought. 4th ed. New York: David McKay Company Inc. 1967 A forty- year racial distance study. New York: Cooperative League of the U.S.A.

Clark, Kenneth 1947 “Racial Identification and Preference in Negro Children,” Readings in Social Psychology, pp. 174-5. Newcomb and Harley, Eds., 1947)

Caton, Hiram 1990 The Samoa Reader: Anthropologists take Stock (Lanham, MD: The University Press of America)

Comas, Juan 1961 Racial myths. In Race and science. New York: Columbia University Press.

Comte, Auguste 1896 Positive philosophy. Translated by Harriet Martineau. 3 vols. London: George Bell and Sons.

Davis, Bernard 1986 Storm over biology: Essays on science,sentiment and public policy. Buffalo: Prometheus Books.

Fletcher, Ronald 1991 Science, ideology & the media: The Cyril Butt affair. New Brunswick, N J: Transaction Publishers.

Freeman, Derek 1983 Margaret Mead and Samoa: The making and unmaking of an anthropological myth. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Gould, Stephen J. 1981 The mismeasure of man. New York: W. W. Norton.

Gramsci, Antonio 1977 Selections from political writings, 1910- 1920. New York: International Publishing Co.

Herskovits, Melville 1953 Franz Boas. New York: Charles Scribner’ s Sons.

Heuse, Georges A. 1955 Race, racismes, antiracismes. Revue de Psychologies des Peuples 10 (3).

Holden, C. 1994 “‘Times’ Corrects Scientist’s Orbit” Science 263, 922.

Horgan, John 1993 Trends in behavioral genetics: Eugenics revisited. Scientific American June 1993, pp 122-131.

Jamieson, J. W. 1982 Conway Zirkle and the persistence of “Marxian biology” in the western social sciences. The Mankind Quarterly 22 (3).

Joynson, Robert B. 1989 The Butt affair. London: Routledge and Kegal Paul.

Kamin, L. J. 1974 The science and politics of IQ. Potomac, MD: Erlbaum.

Keith, Sir Arthur 1940 A new theory of human evolution, by Arthur Keith. London: Watts and Co.

Klehr, Harvey 1988 Far Left of Center: The American Radical Left Today. New Brunswick: Transaction Books.

Lenski, Gerhard E. 1966 Power and Privilege: A theory of social stratification. New York: McGraw.

Lewontin, R. C., S. Rose, and L. J. Kamin 1984 Not in our Genes; Biological Ideology and Human Nature. Pantheon, New York

Mannheim, Karl 1936 Ideology and utopia: An introduction to the sociology of knowledge. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.

Mead, Margaret 1928 Coming of age in Samoa. New York: Morrow.

Mead, Margaret, and Gene Weltfish 1940 The races of mankind. Pamphlet no. 85. New York: Public Affairs Committee, Inc.

Montagu, M. F. Ashley 1942 Man’s most dangerous myth: The fallacy of race. 2d ed. New York: Columbia University Press.

Pearson, Roger
1974 Introduction to anthropology. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
1985 Anthropological glossary. Malabar, FL: Robert E. Krieger Publishing Company.
1991 Race, intelligence and bias in academe. With an introduction by Hans J. Eysenck. Washington, D.C.: Scott- Townsend Publishers.

1992 Shockley on eugenics and race, with an introduction by Arthur R. Jensen. Washington, D.C.: Scott-Townsend Publishers.

Sarich, Vincent. 1993 Unpublished letter of protest to the editors of the Scientific American

Schiff, M. and R. Lewontin 1986 Education and Class: The Irrelevance of IQ Genetic Studies. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Snyderman, Mark, and Stanley Rothman 1988 The IQ controversy: The media and public policy. Vol. 4. New Brunswick, N J: Transaction Books.

Vallois, Henri 1951 UNESCO on


The Concept of Heredity

The Concept of Heredity
from Mankind Quarterly, April, 1995

Introduction
Heredity in Ancient Europe
The Discovery of Evolution and Genetic Science
Early Eugenics in Britain
The Eugenic Ideal Finds Favor in America
The More Advanced Countries Adopt Eugenics Laws
Eugenicists as Conservationists
Biological Egalitarianism Infiltrates Academe
Positive and Negative Eugenics
Footnotes
References

The recent publication of Herrnstein and Murray’s The Bell Curve, reviewed in this issue of The Mankind Quarterly, has led to a remarkable controversy within the media itself.

Several of the initial reviews were favorable, as in The New York Times Book Review, but the commitment to the fanciful concept of biological egalitarianism, so strong in the politicized world that is contemporary multi-racial Western society, soon led to a violent reaction against the book and all associated with its message. Few if any of the reviewers who criticized it cared to challenge the data contained in it: most preferred to trash it by seeking to demonize it by emotional and irrational tirades. Unfortunately, co-author Richard Herrnstein died of cancer shortly before it was published, and this placed the entire weight of its defense on Charles Murray. In particular, Mankind Quarterly was criticized by several radical commentators, such as Leon Kamin, a former New England editor of the U.S. Communist Party’s weekly newspaper, and by journalist Charles Lane, also the holder of strong political views. Lane attacked Mankind Quarterly as the source of a number of the articles containing data cited in The Bell Curve, complaining that “[N]o fewer than seventeen researchers cited in The Bell Curve have contributed to Mankind Quarterly. ” This is a charge the present writer, as publisher of Mankind Quarterly, does not dispute: though he regards it as an accolade rather than a criticism.1

However, the general reading public, including possibly a high percentage of those who have been exposed to contemporary politically biased university courses in the humanities, fail to appreciate the true history of Western thought concerning the role of heredity and race — for race is nothing if not a matter of heredity. The writer therefore feels that it might be useful to present a brief outline of this history, showing how committed the Western world was to a recognition of the efficacy of heredity until academic and media attitudes were affected in the first half of the present century by changes in the social, political and demographic climate. This first article is consequently designed to illustrate the deep belief in the importance of heredity and race which prevailed from the earliest times until roughly the end of the first quarter of the present century. It will be followed by a second article, in the Fall issue of The Mankind Quarterly, which will document the rise of politically-motivated egalitarian ideology in the classrooms, which with the support of a substantial portion of the media eventually succeeded in making the idea of biological inequality politically unacceptable. Despite the fact that there is today a rapidly developing body of scientific research which, when viewed without fear or prejudice, clearly validates the age-old comprehension of the role of heredity in shaping the potential limits of individual human abilities, too many people are unaware of the mechanics behind the swing toward the powerful political notion of the biological equality of mankind. It is to be hoped that the following observations will encourage readers to enquire more deeply into this remarkable development.

Heredity in Ancient Europe

Western tradition has long recognized that heredity plays a significant role in determining not merely the characteristics of plants and animals but also the mental and physical qualities of human beings. Some elementary recognition of the role of genetics as a causal force may have originated as early as the Neolithic revolution, when cultivators learned how to improve upon the various species of wild grasses and to breed domesticated milk- and meat-giving animals which were biologically more useful to mankind than those they found in the wild. By the time of the great classical civilizations of ancient Greece and Rome it had become commonplace knowledge – based on observing and remembering the generations from the same family – that heredity also played an important role in determining the character and abilities of men and women.

In most early European societies, as in virtually all early societies that achieved an advanced culture, the social group was seen by its members as an intergenerational affair, with the family and the ancestors playing an important role in the self-concept of the individual. Life does not begin, nor does it end, with the individual. As Fustel de Coulanges pointed out in 1864, in his classic study of ancient Greek and Roman culture entitled The Ancient City (1955), it was the idea of common descent from the same ancestral forebears – the idea of belonging to a specific community of families, and of sharing the same, hopefully eternal, thread of life – that held the freemen of the Greek city-state together. As long as the lineage survived, the ancestors lived on in the minds and bodies of their descendants; death was only final when the entire nation was eliminated. The biological reality was interpreted into religious terms. The individual was seen as the product of the forces of biological causality, a living link in the chain that was the lineage, just as the lineage comprised a vital component of the nation-state, and the nation-state was a distinctly biological unit, with its own distinctive gene pool:

Reproduction in the ancient community was a religious duty . . . The religious society was the family, the genos. Paternal dignity and sacerdotal dignity were fused: the eldest son, upon the death of the father, becomes the head and priest of the family. The deceased father is honoured by his children as a kind of divinity. He himself is honoured by his children as a kind of divinity. He himself rendered the same worship to his ancestors: thus the greatest misfortune that his piety had to fear, is that the line shall be stopped. For then his religion would disappear from the earth, his hearth would become extinct, the whole series of his departed ones would fall into oblivion . . .

The qualities that characterized individuals were acquired, it was believed, from their ancestors. Thus we find a speaker in the Odyssey (/V, 60) observing that “the blood of your parents was not lost in you, but ye are of the line of men that are sceptered kings, the fosterlings of Zeus, for no churl could beget sons like you.” Similarly there are references to the disguised Athena as being “delicate of countenance such as are the sons of kings” (XIII, 216), whereas in the Iliad Thersites is described as ill-formed with a warped head. It was recognized that well-born children still had to be schooled if they were to develop their abilities to the maximum; but their basic character was inborn. Indeed, even truthfulness – a revered value was deemed to be an hereditary quality, and to call a man a liar was tantamount to calling him a bastard, a man of impure, inferior descent. As late as Classical Athens, Aristotle defined the physical and moral characteristics that characterized nobility as “an inherited virtue” (Pol./V. 8). In this, as in so many of his opinions, Aristotle was echoing ancient convictions expressed in the Iliad, as when a speaker protests that: “Therefore ye could not say that I am weak and a coward by lineage, and so dishonor my spoken word” (II. XIV, 126).

According to L. R. Palmer, the authority on the Pylos tablets, Achaean kings held their office by virtue of the purity of their descent. Among the Achaeans, he wrote: “Where the ‘luck’ of the tribe is concerned, there is no substitute for blue blood” (Achaeans and Indo-Europeans 1955, p. 9). Werner Jaeger went even further in stressing the importance the Greeks placed on breeding, describing the Hellenic ideal as an “aristocracy of race.” (1945, p. 205)

Because of their respect for good breeding, the Greeks honored their women as the progenitors of the race, and it was said that men chose their wives as they chose their horses, by the length of their pedigrees. Only children born of legitimate wives (i.e., of women selected because of the quality of their forebears) could inherit the social status of the father. Indeed, in Athens and other Greek city-states, to be recognized as a eupatrid (a man of good ancestry) one had to be descended from no less than nine generations ‘of untainted noble stock on both sides of the family tree.

Plato, whose enthusiasm for eugenics is well known, praised the Spartan interest in eugenic breeding (Laws, 630). Aristotle was equally impressed by the need to breed good stock. Theognis of Megara constantly praised the importance of heredity, complaining that the well-born would sometimes accept inferior marriage partners for the sake of their wealth, lamenting that “We seek well-bred rams and sheep and horses and wish to breed from these . . . [but] men revere money, and the good marry the evil, and the evil the good. Wealth has confounded race.” (Theognis, V. 183). Racial purity was linked to physical appearance, with Spartan women renowned for their beauty; and character was seen as inherited along with personal features: “Thou art pleasing to look upon and thy character is like to thy form” (Stobaeus, 1xxxviii. 71). In Greek literature the importance of heredity is repeated again and again: “Noble children are born from noble sires, the base are like in nature their father” (Alcmeaon, Ft. 7); “I bid all mortals beget well-born children from noble sires” (Heraclitus, 7); “If one were to yoke good with bad, no good offspring would be born, but if both parents are good, they will bear noble children” (Meleager, Fr. 9).

The early Romans similarly held lineage in great respect and enforced a system of connubium, whereby freeborn Romans could only marry into certain approved stocks. However, the Romans were relatively few in number and, when their unparalleled military and administrative ability converted the Roman empire into a fully multiethnic community of enormous size, the circumstances became ripe for the rise of egalitarian political ideologies. Rome, the “multicultural giant,” disappeared before the onslaught of the smaller, more homogeneous, Germanic nations, which still retained a sense of group identity.

The Germanic peoples (the Germans, Dutch, Flemings, Anglo-Saxons, Franks, Lombards, Scandinavians, Goths, Burgundians and Vandals) who founded so many of the modern states of Europe following the demise of the Roman Empire, carried the concept of heredity to its logical conclusion in their virtually unique system of kinship. Unlike their kinsmen, the Greeks, Italics, Celts, Slavs, and East Baits, they did not organize themselves in patrilineal clans and phratries which recognized only their father’s kinfolk, but saw kinship in fully genetic terms. The Germanic “kindred” comprised all the individual’s relatives on both the paternal and the maternal sides, assessing the degree of closeness according to the closeness of their actual genetic relationship; this was a quite different system from the concept of patrilineal or matrilineal clans so widespread amongst other peoples of the world. This Germanic kindred was the subject of the exhaustive study Kindred and Clan in the Middle Ages and After (Phillpotts 1917). To this day most North Americans of European descent have come to accept the Germanic tradition, where kinship is determined by the closeness of genetic relationship, whether the relatives be on the maternal or paternal side, as distinct from patrilineal and matrilineal clan systems.

In ancient Scandinavia the belief in inherited talents was reflected in the concept of hamingja, an inherited “luck” force. However, it was recognized that siblings inherited qualities in different patterns, and kings who were “unlucky,” and under whose leadership things went badly, were readily replaced by more competent individuals from the same royal lineage that had already produced generations of distinguished and successful leaders. The belief in breeding and the intergenerational transmission of genetic qualities was overriding, or as the old Germanic folk dictum expressed it, one could not make a silk purse out of a sow’s ear!

Indeed, most Indo-European peoples, including those who resided outside the geographical borders of Europe, seem to have placed considerable trust in the powers of heredity. Max Weber documented the same emphasis on heredity among other Indo-Europeans. In The Religion of India (1958), Weber described the semi-magical xvarenah attributed to Indo-Iranian kings as a belief in inherited ability, calling it “familial charisma. ” The Indian caste system, he maintained, was sustained by a similar belief in the genetic inheritance of human qualities. The charisma of a caste, of a sib, and of a family, was genetically transmitted; its roots were to be found in the concept of inherited ability.

The coming of Christianity plunged classical philosophy into centuries of near-oblivion and clashed with the established and ancient European belief in the inequality of men. Spreading first among the slaves and lowest classes of the Roman empire, Christianity came to teach that all men were equal in the eyes of a universal Creator God, an idea that was totally alien to older European thought which had recognized a hierarchy of competence among men – and even among the gods. Opposing the traditions of classical philosophy and scientific enquiry, Christianity introduced the concept of a single, omnipotent “God of History” who controlled all the phenomena of the universe – with men and women being creations of that God. Since all men and women were the “children of God,” all were equal before their Divine Maker! Faith in the church’ s interpretation of supposedly prophetic revelations became more important than scientific or philosophical enquiry; and to question the church’ s view of reality came to be perceived as sinful.

However, traditional European convictions as to the significance of heredity never completely died. Heroes, aristocrats and other national leaders had been regarded as superior beings by virtue of their descent from famed heroes or even from the gods, just as the Germanic kings claimed descent from Woden.2 Kings and nobles were believed to inherit qualities superior to those of the average man, and to carry these qualities in their “blood.” In ancient myth heroes might even challenge the gods; and the Christian church, jealous of the “divinity” awarded to kings and nobles by virtue of their lineage,3 but finding it convenient to win their goodwill, offered them the “divine right” to rule as earthly representatives of the Christian God for so long as they obeyed the wishes of the Church as the representatives of God on Earth. The “divine right” to rule with the church’s approval was a very different concept from the “divinity” that came from well- born stock. Consequently, the idea of any disparity in genetic qualities came to be subtly discouraged by the church; and the success of the church was such that. by the Middle Ages those who tilled the fields began to ask the rhetorical question: When Adam delved and Eve span, who was then the Gentleman?

Stripped of their belief in the significance of human heredity and the notion of the state as a kinship unit – “a family writ large” – and believing instead in the essential equality of all men and women as the children of God, dissident sects espousing radically egalitarian ideals arose at intervals to protest social and economic inequality, especially at times when this became oppressive.

In time, secular political movements also began to assert the idea of biological equality, a theme which tended to be favorably received whenever the disquietude of a divided society erupted into revolution. Such was the case of the Levellers who fought alongside the Parliamentarians in seventeenth century Britain; of the Jacobins, who decimated the accomplished aristocracy of eighteenth century France; and of the Bolsheviks who wrought genocidal slaughter among the more successful members of Czarist Russian society – nobles and peasants alike – following the Bolshevik Revolution in the early twentieth century.4

In recent times, calls for political revolution have frequently invoked attacks on “genetic determinism” in favor of the alternate, wildly illogical, philosophy of human “biological egalitarianism.” Despite the fact that both Marx and Engels personally believed in the significance of heredity and race – Marx being particularly fond of resorting to some of the more vulgar racist terms to abuse his rivals in correspondence with his friends – the ideological movement that emerged from their teachings eventually yielded to the notion of biological egalitarianism as a necessary ploy to inspire revolutionary passions among members of what they chose to call the proletariat. It was under Stalin, who sought to spread revolution in the Third World against “capitalist imperialism,” that communist theoreticians found it convenient to overlook the fact that much economic inequality could be explained by biological inequality: the suggestion that one individual might be inherently more creative or productive than another tended to dampen the feelings of resentment so necessary to incite the masses to revolutionary action.

The Discovery of Evolution and Genetic Science

Yet even while the myth of biological egalitarianism was gaining ground in the Western world, the momentum of scientific inquiry, freed by the Renaissance from the shackles of medieval religious dictates, was deepening man’s knowledge about himself and the world around him. In addition, a renewed enthusiasm for the application of selective breeding to plants and animals in the agricultural revolution of the eighteenth century focused enlightened thought once again on the significance of heredity.

In the second half of the nineteenth century, Charles Darwin finally restored the concept of heredity to its rightful place with the completion of his epic work, The Origin of the Species by Means of Natural Selection or the Preservation of Favored Races in the Struggle for Life ([1859] 1914). It is of some small interest that his research troubled his deeply religious but loyal wife, because she sensed that it challenged the still dominant pattern of religious thought. Facing the need to defend his overall theory of evolution as applied to all living species, Darwin is described by his biographer, Sir Arthur Keith, as having decided to refrain from extending his evolutionary theory to explain the inequalities between the surviving races of man, which he regarded as being so apparent?

What Darwin found it necessary to avoid, so inundated was he with criticism of his claim that mankind as a whole had evolved from “lower” forms of life, his half-cousin Sir Francis Galton did not hesitate to tackle. Indeed, Galton established the science of statistics as he sought to apply mathematics to the study of inheritance. In his own way, Galton was quite as great a contributor to evolving science as was Darwin, for apart from the attention he directed to the need to study heredity, he not only laid the foundations for the science of meteorology, but together with his close friend, co-worker, and biographer Karl Pearson, he established the basic techniques of modern statistical methods and quite literally founded the science of eugenics. The goal of eugenics, a word created by Galton from the Greek eugenes (“well born”), was to apply scientific knowledge about heredity to the problem of human evolution in order to combat deleterious demographic trends which threatened to lead to a decline of genetic quality in modern societies. In Galton’s own words, the purpose of genetic science was “to give the more suitable races or strains of blood a better chance of prevailing speedily over the less suitable.” Significantly he described eugenics as “that science which deals with all influences that improve the inborn qualities of a race; also with those that develop them to the utmost advantage” (1909, 35). In short, Galton realized that nature and nurture work in tandem and are not to be seen as mutually exclusive opponents. Heredity was important, but so was a healthy and congenial environment.

Using mathematical techniques to demonstrate the role of genetics in shaping mankind, Galton argued that it was scientifically possible to increase the frequency of desirable qualities among human beings, and to prevent the spread of deleterious qualities, by eugenic measures, and the idea quickly attracted the favorable attention of most serious scholars following the publication of his epoch-making study Hereditary Genius: An Inquiry into Its Laws and Consequences (1869). This seminal text was followed by Natural Inheritance (1889) and Essays in Eugenics (1909).

It is on record that Darwin was impressed by his cousin’s work on Hereditary Genius. In a letter dated December 3, 1869 Darwin commended Galton on his “memorable work,11 stating that “I do not think I ever in my whole life read anything more interesting and original – and how well and clearly you put every point – You have made a convert. ” Two years later, in chapter seven of The Descent of Man, he developed Galton’s observations concerning the differences between human races, noting that:

. . . the various races, when carefully compared and measured, differ much from each other – as in the texture of hair, the relative proportions of all parts of the body, the capacity of the lungs, the form and capacity of the skull, and even the convolutions of the brain. But it would be an endless task to specify the numerous points of difference. The races differ also in constitution, in acclimatization and in liability to certain diseases. Their mental characteristics are likewise very distinct; chiefly as it would appear in their emotion, but partly in their intellectual faculties. Everyone who has had the opportunity of comparison, must have been struck by the contrast between taciturn, even morose aborigines of S. America and the light-hearted talkative negroes.”

Thus both Darwin and Galton came to the same conclusion, expressed by Galton as follows:

It is in the most unqualified manner that I object to pretensions of natural equality. The experiences of the nursery, the school, the university, and of professional careers, are a chain of proofs to the contrary . . . In whatever way we may test ability, we arrive at equally enormous intellectual differences.

Galton’s younger colleague, Karl Pearson, developed Galton’s novel statistical techniques to new levels of effectiveness, laying the foundations of modern scientific method in his publication The Grammar of Science (1892). Like Galton, Pearson realized that the genetic legacy each generation leaves to its successors is of prime importance for the future of mankind. Every generation, in fact, is a bottle- neck which sifts and determines which genes are to survive. Pearson delineated the fundamentals of the new field of eugenic science in a number of publications, including National Life from the Standpoint of Science (1905), Nature and Nurture: The Problem of the Future (1910). He expressed his concern for the genetic future of the British nation in a warning to his fellow-Britons in his Huxley Memorial Lecture of 1903:

“the mentally better stock in the nation is not reproducing itself at the same rate as of old – the less able and the less energetic are the more fertile . . . The psychical characters which are the backbone of a State in the modern struggle of nations are not so much manufactured by home and school and college; they are bred in the bone, and for the last forty years the intellectual classes of the nation, enervated by wealth or by love of pleasure, or following an erroneous standard of life, have ceased to give in due proportion the men wanted to carry on the ever-growing work of the Empire.” (Pearson, 1903)

Early Eugenics in Britain

Any people who recognize the significance of heredity must naturally think in terms of breeding. Once science had revalidated the concept of heredity in the Western world, the reaction in favor of extending the principles by which the quality of plants and animals had been improved to human beings was natural. The conditions of life in modern society seemed to be reversing natural selection and lowering the quality of each succeeding human generation. Support for the eugenic ideal quickly came from a wide range of varied intellectuals, including not only traditionalists who had always retained their belief in good breeding combined with good training, but also progressive thinkers. Those who cared for the unfortunates of this world saw how simply much human suffering could be eliminated in future generations by eugenic policies, and socialists such as George Bernard Shaw, whose Man and Superman (1965, p. 159) (essentially an ode to the inborn instinct to procreate the race) complained of contemporary society that “being cowards, we defeat natural selection under cover of philanthropy. ” H. G. Wells, another reformer who likewise cared for posterity, proclaimed that “the children people bring into the world can be no more their private concern entirely, than the disease germs they disseminate” (Kevles, 92). Others who supported the eugenic ideal were the youthful J. Maynard Keynes; left-leaning Julian Huxley, who sought not revolution but the reduction of human suffering by genetic improvement; and J. B. S. Haldane, who adopted Marxist values but always opposed its anti-hereditarian extremes. Numerous other social reformers of that time, such as Sidney and Beatrice Webb, likewise embraced the eugenic ideal -they were patriotic in the tradition of William Morris and Charles Dickens and eschewed revolutionary socialism, but feared emerging capitalism as a threat to the traditional bliss of agrarian England, and felt that much misery could be eliminated by rearing fit and healthy children rather than those who were burdened by genetic handicaps.

Also joining the eugenics cause was the ardent advocate of social change, Havelock Ellis, who supported the call for female liberation but emphasized the essential role that women played in ensuring the future of the race. Ellis (1912 pps., 46-47, 205) declared that the aims of eugenics “could only be attained with the realization of the woman movement in its latest and completest phase as an enlightened culture of motherhood.” The new St. Valentine, he observed, would be a scientific saint, not one of folklore, because marriage should be for the procreation and health of the race, not merely for personal pleasure. Scholars and politicians alike applauded the new sense of responsibility in procreation,6 with diverse figures such as the Cambridge biologist Francis Maitland Balfour, founder of the British school of evolutionary biologists, British Prime Minister Arthur James Balfour,7 and the young politician Winston Churchill, all paying homage to the eugenic ideal.

Galton, childless himself, applied his personal fortune toward the promotion of research into heredity and eugenics, funding the establishment of a biometrics laboratory at the University of London under the direction of his fellow-eugenicist Karl Pearson, for the primary purpose of studying heredity in man. He also helped finance the establishment of the Eugenics Education Society, which later changed its name to the more simple Eugenics Society. Patriotic Englishmen who feared a dysgenic trend in national ability eagerly supported the eugenic doctrine that the fittest, most intelligent and creative parents should be encouraged to have larger families. In this, they were joined by Fabian socialists, who sought to decrease what was seen to be an excessive rate of reproduction among the genetically unfortunate, so as to ” level up” society instead of “leveling it down” – which latter was the usual outcome of revolutionary socialism.

Possibly it was Julian Huxley who best summed up the confidence with which so many British academics who lived during the first half of this century viewed the future, when he wrote (1941, p. 22):

Once the full implications of evolutionary biology are grasped, eugenics will inevitably become part of religion of the future, or whatever complex of sentiments may in future take the place of organized religion. It is not merely a sane outlet for human altruism, but is of all outlets for altruism that which is most comprehensive and of longest range.

In all honesty, although it would seem difficult to envisage his prophecy becoming a reality in any foreseeable date in the Western world, tendencies in Mainland China, and in the Chinese republic of Singapore, strongly indicate that it may be the billion-plus Chinese people who first realize Huxley’s dream of the future.

The Eugenic Ideal Finds Favor in America

Scientific ideas are seldom confined to one country in the modern world, except where political suppression enters onto the scene, as in Marxist Russia, and although it was in England that the concepts of evolution and eugenics first saw light, European and American scholars soon responded. We will not here attempt to cover the continental scene, although scholars such as Ernest Haeckel, who became an ardent advocate of Darwinian evolution, seeing nations as potentially incipient races and the major racial divisions of mankind as virtually separate species, undoubtedly influenced the English-speaking world. At this time the determination of what constituted a species had not yet come to be linked to the concept of mutual inter-fertility, but was judged purely by the extent of phenotypical variation, as in the Linnaean system of classification still broadly accepted by biologists today. Consistent with such views, Haeckel and others began to urge not only eugenic breeding but also racial purity.

The concept of a new eugenic science was also welcomed in the United States, which shared the same traditional appreciation of the role of heredity held by those Europeans who had remained behind in Europe. At the turn of the century, the United States was still a land of opportunity, yet one which had already acquired a sense of nationhood, so that many of its most important families had developed a profound social conscience and a strong desire to ensure that the hopes they held for the well-being of their descendants, as Americans, would be realized. Idealists such as president Theodore Roosevelt were convinced that the existing American population possessed generally superior genetic qualities, shaped by severe selective evolution over the previous generations. Their forebears had been adventurous individuals who had first elected to undertake, and then survived, what was in earlier centuries a dangerous ocean crossing. After arrival in the New World, they had to protect themselves and their families from the depredations of the native Indian tribes who had the advantage of familiarity with the local environment. While doing this, they had to tame vast primeval forests and grassland wildernesses – something Europeans had not seen since their forebears first began to convert the forests of Europe into the rich but increasingly overpopulated farmlands of civilized agrarian and mercantile culture. Thus a century and a half ago, Ralph Waldo Emerson reflected the views of his countrymen when he wrote that: “Where the race is right, the place is right”.8

Americans at that time did not think of their country as a potential microcosm of all humanity, but as an emerging micro-race of predominantly European origin. President Theodore Roosevelt, credited with advancing the “melting pot” ideology, wanted only quality immigrants from ethnic stocks which would readily assimilate into the “Old American” population – a term used to refer to persons descended from Europeans who had settled in North America prior to the War Between the States. While the British eugenicists were primarily concerned with maintaining the breeding quality of the resident population of the British Isles, Americans also debated the question of immigration, since they instinctively knew that immigrants affect what we would today call the national gene pool quite as significantly as differential selection within that pool.

Like Theodore Roosevelt, eugenicists felt that the new America must remain a vital and homogeneous nation. But, Roosevelt strongly believed that the Old Americans were not producing enough children, and that they must either change their ways or submit to an invasion of non- white peoples, most likely from Asia. Selected immigration from Europe was welcome, but those who would not fit in were not wanted. Immigrants should match the genetic character of the existing population, and, to ensure this, most favored the restriction of immigration to the nations from which the predominantly North European pioneers who had built the United States had been drawn. The eugenic ideal matched perfectly the optimistic, forward-looking spirit of the people of the United States as they entered the twentieth century (although Roosevelt was fearful that those who advocated negative eugenics might discourage large families). But when eugenicists looked at increasing Asian and Hispanic immigration, some feared that the “great race” – as eugenicist and conservationist Madison Grant (1924) described those whose ancestors had pioneered the establishment of European civilization in North America -might be drowned by hordes of immigrants from Asia and Central America, too numerous to be assimilable, if it failed to defend its coasts and increase its own rate of reproduction. Madison Grant’s own ancestors, it might be noted, had come to the American colonies from Scotland following the failure of the 1745 Highland uprising led by Bonnie Prince Charlie. His writings were therefore ‘well received by a generation of proud, self-confident, and essentially prosperous Old Americans who wished to see their lovely country remain in the hands of their own kind, and who like the Greeks of ,old treasured the memory of the achievements of their forebears. .American scholars, wealthy self-made industrialists, farmers, and even politicians saw the eugenic ideal as a means of ensuring the future well-being and happiness of the new nation to which they were proud to belong. Indeed, it was those who could claim to be Old Americans who gathered most enthusiastically in support of the eugenic cause.

The hopes of the eugenicists were raised in 1910 by the establishment of the Cold Spring Harbor Eugenics Record Office by the Carnegie Institute of Washington. This was funded by Mrs. Mary Harriman,8 the widow of E. H. Harriman, whose forebears left England for America in the seventeenth century. The director was Charles B. Davenport, the Harvard zoologist who was twice president of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), as well as president of the American Zoological Society. The superintendent was Harry H. Laughlin, a leading light in the eugenics movement which flourished in America during the first half of the present century.

The distinguished inventor, Alexander Graham Bell, figured prominently among the members of the Board of Scientific Directors established to support the work of the Eugenics Record Office. In a letter to Davenport, dated December 27, 1912, Bell revealed himself as a “mainstream” eugenicist who believed in “positive eugenics,” which aimed at increasing the percentage of healthy and talented individuals in succeeding generations, rather than in “negative eugenics,” the term commonly ascribed to measures designed to prevent the spread of deleterious genes. In light of the somewhat limited development of genetic and medical science at that time, and the heavily dysgenic impact of two World Wars which were shortly to follow, his observations reflect the perspicacity of a scientist whose name will live forever in history as a major contributor to technological progress and as a benefactor of the human race. Bell attended eugenics conventions, and himself authored several papers on eugenics, such as his essay entitled “How to Improve the Race,” which appeared in the January 1914 issue of the Journal of Heredity, edited by Paul Popenoe.

The Galton Society- formed in New York in 1918 at the American Museum of Natural History by Henry Fairfield Osborn, C. B. Davenport, and Madison Grant – became actively involved in endeavors to shape U.S. policy relating to population quality. Spontaneous eugenics societies were established in many American cities, and hopes for a bright future for eugenics and future generations were raised when in 1923 (due largely to the efforts of Alexander Graham Bell, Luther Burbank and Charles B. Davenport) the American Eugenics Society was established, with branches in numerous American cities. With the foundation of the Society, the eugenics movement began to take shape in a businesslike manner, placing heavy emphasis on the participation of scholars as scientific advisors on various advisory committees. Other eugenics organizations proliferated at this time, among which were the Eugenics Research Association, the International Federation of Eugenic Organizations, the American Social Hygiene Association, and even such bodies as the American Genetics Association, and the American Association for the Study of Human Heredity. Eugenicists were kept informed of new developments in science through a publication the Eugenical News.

Devoted to the well-being of their young nation, many of the early American eugenicists were proud to claim to be of Old American stock? The term “Old American” was further popularized by the book of the same name, compiled by the anthropologist Ales Hrdlicka. Hrdlicka was himself a recent European immigrant, of Bohemian origin, who had accompanied his father to America at the age of fourteen and, after working in a cigar factory as a teenager, had entered the Eclectic Medical College of New York and graduated with an M.D. at the top of his class. Hrdlicka practiced medicine for a while but soon found his interest turning to the problem of human quality and the significance of racial differences, which he saw in an evolutionary context. Traveling extensively to study the diverse living peoples of the world, as well as paleontological remains, he emerged as America’s leading physical anthropologist, serving as editor of The American Journal of Physical Anthropology (which he founded in 1918), and as first president of the American Association of Physical Anthropologists. Significantly he found nothing wrong in the historical pride of his new compatriots, and served for many years on the American Eugenics Society subcommittee on anthropometry and on the advisory council, being deeply concerned, as an expert on evolution, with the threat of dysgenics (of a deterioration in genetic stock) facing modern man. In his article “Race Deterioration and Destruction with Special Reference to the American People,” published by the Race Betterment Foundation of Battle Creek, Michigan as part of the Proceedings of the Third Race Betterment Conference held on January 2–6, 1928, Hrdlicka defined “race deterioration” as “the degradation of its standards of mentality and effectiveness, generally attended also by the lowering of those of physique” (p. 82). “Race destruction,” another threat with which he was concerned, meant the loss of racial identity either “through complete submergence into another race” (p. 82) or simply by failure to reproduce itself.

History, Hrdlicka noted, recorded the rise and fall of nations. Vital, healthy nations tended to rise, but nations could also fall when, weakened by luxury and the exhaustion of ambition, they suffered a “dilution of the physical as well as mental status by admixture with poorer blood” (p. 83). He observed (pp. 84-85):

There are still some benevolent minds who would like to see aH men, white and black, potentially equal. Yet they will hold that there are differences between one family and another family, and even between the children of the same family, in the same racial group. If they did not, there would obviously be no use for eugenics . . . no use even for much of genetics and biology. As a matter of fact there are similarities but no absolute equality anywhere in living nature, either in races, or families or even individuals. The problem is merely how great in a given case is the dissimilarity. Races, especially the further distant ones . . . are not equipotential, or equally effective, or able . . .

The Race Betterment Foundation, which sponsored the conference at which Hrdlicka presented these views, was first established in 1906 as the American Medical Missionary Board (but soon changed its name to the Race Betterment Foundation). Its founder was John Harvey Kellogg, a descendant of an Englishman named Joseph Kellogg who had arrived in North America as early as 1651. Kellogg, who launched the breakfast cereals industry by introducing granola to the American public as a health food, was chief surgeon at the then world-famous Battle Creek Sanitorium.

Publishing a journal called Good Health, the Race Betterment Foundation became a major center of the new eugenics movement in America. Kellogg himself was an important and respected figure who authored numerous medical and eugenics treatises, and his circle of influence extended to several successful businessmen including J. C. Penney and C. W. Barron, whose names remain familiar to this day. Another member of the Kellogg family, Vernon Lyman Kellogg, a zoologist of international repute, also espoused the eugenics movement. As a personal friend of President Herbert Hoover, he served on various national health and agricultural committees, becoming a trustee of the young Brookings Institute and of the Rockefeller Foundation while continuously taking an active role in the eugenics movement as the latter grew in size and influence.

The movement was also early supported by famed educator David Starr Jordan, first president of Stanford University.10 Jordan’s first American ancestor had arrived in the North American colonies from England circa 1700. Jordan’s status in the American education scene of his day is illustrated by the fact that he was a trustee of the Carnegie Foundation and president of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, the National Educational Association, and the California and Indiana Academies of Science, as well as vice president of the Eugenics Education Society in Britain. In the opinion of the present writer, his major contribution to eugenic thought was the emphasis he placed on the dysgenic effect of modern warfare in such books as War and the Breed (1915). Charles William Eliot, president of Harvard University, trustee of the Carnegie Institution of New York, and one of the most eminent educators in America, also rallied to the eugenic crusade, as did astronomer William Wallace Campbell, president of the University of California, whose Scottish forebears had migrated to the colonies in the eighteenth century. Livingston Farrand, president of the University of Colorado and subsequently president of Cornell University, chairman of the central committee of the International Red Cross, and editor of the American Journal of Public Health, similarly espoused the eugenics movement, as did innumerable other educators and faculty members of note.

American paleontologists and anthropologists were also generally enthusiastic. Another leading anthropologist who served on the American Eugenics Society subcommittee on anthropometry was Earnest A. Hooton, the respected Harvard professor who later became director of the Peabody Museum. Hooton’s father had been born in England, and Hooton himself attended Oxford University on a Rhodes scholarship. Returning to America, where he became one of the main pioneers of physical anthropology, Hooton was an active member of the American Genetics Association and the Galton Society. He saw eugenics in terms of different levels of human evolution, and strongly believed that different inherited personalities contributed to susceptibility to engage in criminal behavior. Hooton collated data on some seventeen thousand criminals, and took a keen interest in the effects of race mixing. His Up from the Ape (1931), Apes, Men and Morons (1937) argued that heredity was at least as important as environment as a determinant of human behavior.

Most scholars who were in any way connected with the study of evolution came to see races as representing different levels of human evolutionary development. Ellsworth Huntington, a Yale geologist descended from one, Simon Huntington, who had emigrated from England to the colonies in 1633, was at one time or another president of the Association of American Geographers, president of the Ecological Society of America, director of the Population Association of America, member of the American Eugenics Society advisory council and chairman of its Committee on Biologic Genealogy.11 A widely traveled scholar, Huntington expressed his fear that the more advanced human stocks would likely be overrun by the less advanced, and, as a prolific author (he wrote no less than twenty books and several hundred articles), his views reached a broad audience of educated men and women.

Biologists were naturally prominent among those who recognized the role of heredity in human affairs, and many adopted the eugenics cause. Notable amongst these was H. S. Jennings of The Johns Hopkins University, himself of Old American stock, who wrote several influential books on the subject: notably Prometheus or Biology and the Advancement of Man (1925), which forecast a bright future for mankind through the application of eugenic policies, and The Biological Basis of Human Nature (1930). Jennings was president of the American Society of Zoologists and the American Society of Naturalists, as well as a member of the advisory committee of the American Eugenics Society.

Psychologists who were interested in intelligence also tended to become involved with the new ideal of population improvement. R. M. Yerkes, a descendant of Anthony Yerkes who had come to America from Holland in 1700, became an influential member of the American Eugenics Society and the Galton Society. A professor of psychology at Harvard, Yerkes is particularly known for his mammoth World War I study of the IQ ratings of one and three-quarter million U.S. military recruits, compiled while he was head of the psychology division of the office of the United States Surgeon General. Yerkes’s concern with the different qualities of individuals and races led him to become active in the matter of immigration control, and he was elected chairman of the Committee on Human Migration in 1922. Leaving Washington to take a professorship at Yale, Yerkes recognized the potential for sociobiological studies in helping to explain human behavior, and in 1929 he founded the Laboratory of Primate Biology in Florida for this purpose. He also served as chairman of both the American Psychological Association (1916) and the American Society of Naturalists (1938). Carl C. Brigham, professor of psychology at Princeton University and author of A Study of American Intelligence (1923) was another member of the American Eugenics Society who became involved in immigration control, seeking to ensure that the American gene pool would not be adulterated by inferior genes, and was a keen member of the Galton Society and the Eugenics Research Association.

Possibly the most influential of the early psychologists who were active in the eugenics movement was William McDougall. Born in England, and educated at the universities of Cambridge and Gottingen, McDougall taught at Oxford University before eventually emigrating to the U. S. to take up a position at Harvard. With his experience of anthropological work in Borneo, McDougall was a fellow of the prestigious Royal Society in Britain and the author of numerous major textbooks which earned him preeminence in the field of social psychology. His respect for heredity showed itself in a series of books, beginning with An Introduction to Social Psychology (1908). Acutely conscious of the role of heredity in shaping human behavior, McDougall was an evolutionist who realized that human behavior was shaped by the evolutionary past of the human race. Because of the significant degree of racial diversity within the living peoples of the world, he prophesied that “racial psychology” would one day become a recognized field of study. As a believer in the quality of the North European stock relative to diverse other populations in the contemporary world, McDougall also took an interest in the composition of the future population of America: his book Is America Safe for Democracy? (1926) stressed the need for a selective immigration policy which would ensure that the United States remained a relatively homogeneous nation, and the need to design a truly scientific eugenic policy.

Of equal significance, however, was Lewis Madison Terman, president of the American Psychological Association and of the National Academy of Sciences. Terman authored a number of popular books on psychology, sex, and mental health, but is academically best known for his revision of the Binet Scale (1916), his co-authorship of the Stanford Achievement Tests, and his massive four-volume Genetic Studies of Genius (1926- 30). Terman was a major voice in the eugenics movement, and was a key member of the Eugenics Society committee on psychometry.

Notable sociologists also rallied to the logic of eugenics. Franklin H. Giddings, author of several major works in early American sociology, professor of sociology at Bryn Mawr College, later chairman of the sociology department at Columbia University and president of the American Sociological Society, was a strong supporter of the eugenics movement who helped organize some of the first international conferences on eugenics and population. Giddings was descended from George Giddings who came to the colonies from England as early as 1635. Frank H. Hankins, a Columbia University educated sociologist who taught at Clark and Smith Colleges, was an active member of the board of directors of the American Eugenics Society. President of the American Sociological Society, and of the later-formed Population Association of America, Hankins authored a penetrating study entitled The Racial Basis of Civilization (1926).

Another sociologist who firmly believed in the importance of heredity was Robert M. MacIver, a Scottish immigrant who had been born in Stornaway on the isle of Harris. Well known for his many sociology texts, MacIver taught at Barnard College and Columbia University, and later was president of the New School for Social Research, which did not prevent it from later becoming identified with leftist views. A dedicated humanist, MacIver recognized the importance of good heredity and enthusiastically served on the board of the American Eugenics Society.

Another realist was the renowned sociologist and social psychologist, Emory Stephen Bogardus, who likewise served on the American Eugenics Society advisory council. A professor at the University of Southern California, Bogardus edited the Journal of Sociology and Social Research for over forty years, was founder and editor of the Journal of Applied Sociology, and a contributing editor to the Journal of Social Forces and the Journal of Educational Psychology. He authored numerous textbooks which were widely used and his Development of Social Thought (1960), written toward the end of his life, remained a classic survey of the history of sociology right into the fourth quarter of the present century. Less remembered today is his Immigration and Race Attitudes (1928), which more clearly shows his personal convictions on the importance of an understanding of heredity to the shaping of national policies.

The common cause between liberals and the traditionalists who both initially welcomed eugenics eventually became somewhat strained over the question of the feminist movement. This was not because the traditionalists despised women, but because they saw the outcome of the feminist movement differently. In general, the liberals favored “negative eugenics,” the reduction of the excessively large number of births among the less favored, while the traditionalists tended to think in terms of the competition between nations and races, and favored “positive eugenics, ” which sought to encourage a higher rate of reproduction among the better stock.

Women made up an appropriately high proportion of those who attended eugenics lectures in both America and England, showing a proper concern for the future of the children they bore and the nation they nourished. Consequently, feminists such as Margaret Sanger, who for eugenic reasons wanted to make contraceptives equally available to the poor as to the middle and upper income groups, agreed with eugenicist Margaret Stopes when the latter proclaimed: “[m]ore children from the fit, less from the unfit – that is the chief issue of birth control” (Hall 1977). Traditionalists such as the British eugenicists W. C. D. and C. D. Whetham, authors of The Family and the Nation: A Study in Natural Inheritance and Family Responsibility (1909), while agreeing with the female liberationists in that statement, nevertheless feared that feminism and the entry of the more intelligent women into the professions would reduce the birth rate among precisely those women who should be having more children: “Woe to the nation whose best women refuse their natural and most glorious burden,” they wrote, warning that “freedom from marriage and reproduction . . . is suicidal” (pp. 198- 99).

Today, the birth rate in the Western and other more advanced nations of the world, and the massive ongoing population explosion in the Third World, have rendered the views of these traditionalist eugenicists prophetic. Even the Singaporeans, who are not a Third World nation, have noted the low birth rate among the more intelligent and educated of their womenfolk. As Leonard Darwin, Charles Darwin’s son, a leading supporter of the British Eugenics Education Society and the British Eugenics Review, warned in 1927, the spread of birth control devices has been “racially devastating” to the more advanced countries. Sir Charles Galton Darwin, grandson of the renowned evolutionist and one of the early editorial board members of The Mankind Quarterly, also stressed the threat of overpopulation – arising from reduced infant mortality in the Third World as a result of modern medical advances – in his book The Next Million Years (1951) and in his 1960 Mankind Quarterly article “World Population: Can Man Control His Numbers?”

Nevertheless in the early decades of this century, both in America and in Britain, there was a generally happy overlap of interest on the subject of eugenics between leading liberals, who espoused negative eugenics aimed at discouraging the genetically defective from procreating, and traditionalists such as Leonard Darwin and Coldstream Guards officer C. P. Blacker, who generally supported positive eugenics and who were more concerned that the talented and healthy should be sure to pass on their genes to future generations. This political overlap was matched by a softening of the attitude of the Church, and the Bishop of Ripon urged the greater procreation of the fit in order to populate the British dominions overseas. The same moderation of attitude toward eugenics among the more progressive churchmen was also to be found in America. As Rudolph M. Binder wrote in his article “Eugenics and Religion,” in the Eugenical News:

There has always been a double line in theological reasoning. One holds that God is not only omnipotent but controls absolutely everything; and all the various phenomena in the universe, including human activities are but manifestations of his power. This theory is best known by the term “predestination,” and would imply that . . . any attempt at contraception is an interference with the will of God. Hence, the opposition to eugenics which, while primarily concerned with the increase of good stock, is at least indirectly opposed to the propagation of poor stock.

This theological theory has gradually yielded to a more ethical conception of the deity. The omnipotence of God is less emphasized than His love. And the new theory permits a different interpretation of man. He has some liberty, he is held responsible for his acts, he is praised for his good actions as a co-worker with God and blamed for his bad ones.

With various other religious leaders such as Dean Inge of St. Paul’ s Cathedral supporting eugenics, the years between 1900 and the early 1930s were generally marked by a happy collaboration among those who truly desired to improve the conditions of life for future generations of human beings.

The More Advanced Countries Adopt Eugenics Laws

Today, continuing and rapid progress in genetic science holds out the promise that gene ’splicing’ or genetic ’surgery’ may make the elimination of many hereditary defects a real possibility in the foreseeable future. If individual deleterious genes can be replaced by healthy counterparts so that future generations can inherit all the desirable qualities of their forebears free from adverse mutations and other heritable disabling conditions, one of the major dreams of eugenicists will have been realized. Of course, this will not solve the entire eugenic problem, for although it is easy to repair a disabled Rolls Royce by replacing a leaking hosepipe or other defective part, it is not practicable to attempt to convert a Yugo or Lada into a Rolls Royce by replacing a major number of parts: not only is the task too large, but also many of the Rolls Royce parts would be incompatible with those of the inferior vehicle. The justification for “positive” or “mainline” eugenics — the encouragement of an appropriate rate of reproduction among overall healthy and competent individuals — would still remain.

However, in the early decades of the twentieth century, although the consciousness of responsibility for the well-being of posterity ran high, genetic engineering was still hopelessly out of reach, and eugenicists knew that if the members of their generation were to pass on their genetic heritage to posterity in at least as good a condition as they had received it, it was necessary to avoid an undue proliferation of deleterious genes and to ensure the transmission of at least an undiminished percentage of the more desirable genes. It was obvious to the more conscientious that modern conditions of life had undermined nature’s own methods of preserving the quality of the human stock in those populations that had emerged from a feral state of life and had advanced into what they so proudly called a “civilized” existence. Something had to be done to block the dysgenic trends that were weakening the quality of the population in the more technologically advanced nations. Native tribes living in the Amazon were still subject to nature’s pruning knife and did not yet face these dysgenic trends, but they too, as their lifestyle became “modernized,” were likely in the course of time to face the same dysgenic influences.

As a result, the more responsible members of the advanced Western nations, conscious of their duty to the well-being of future generations, came to press for eugenic laws, and the majority of the more enlightened nations of the West introduced some such kind of legislation. Some might argue today that they should have waited until genetic science had advanced to the level where genetic “surgery” had become a real possibility, but the immediacy of the dysgenic threat introduced by modern conditions did not permit the luxury of delay. The entire genetic potential of future generations was going to be restricted to whatever collation of genes those who were living in the early decades of the twentieth century passed on to their heirs. Eugenicists realized that the future genotype of a nation depends on the reproductive activity of each successive generation, and the massive dysgenic impact of modern warfare, combined with the emergence of disproportionate rates of reproduction between the fit and the unfit, indicated that there was no time to be lost.

In consequence, virtually all the more enlightened nations of the Western world decided to introduce eugenic laws intended to control the reckless spread of deleterious genes. With this objective in mind, eugenic laws were introduced in Denmark, Norway, Finland, Sweden, Lithuania, Estonia, Iceland and a number of Swiss cantons. Germany introduced similar laws and has been much criticized for this, but so also did Austria, Hungary, Italy, Greece, and Spain. Britain, which had largely pioneered the eugenics movement and was suffering from the decimation of its leadership class in World War I, did not get around to following suit. Even outside Europe, there were countries such as Argentina, Chile, Peru, Brazil where laws covering hereditary mental pathologies, hereditary feeblemindedness and serious hereditary physical pathologies were enacted.

It is of some interest that these legislative measures, designed to protect future generations, were largely pioneered by the United States; U.S. legislation being copied by many of the other countries, including Germany. By 1931 twenty-seven of the forty-eight states of the U.S. had eugenics laws on their statute books, and no less than thirty states in all passed such laws at one time or another. In addition, many states had statutes prohibiting miscegenation, on the theory that the scrambling together of separate gene pools created by nature might be dysgenic. In Canada, both British Columbia and Alberta adopted similar laws, and it seemed probable that in the course of time all the leading nations of the West would eventually take steps intended to free their future populations from the dysgenic threat already so apparent. Responsible individuals were confident that advancing scientific knowledge would eventually enable man to take the evolutionary steering tiller out of the hands of nature, and enable posterity- inspired by a high moral vision – to chart a rational course to a far happier future than any to which primitive man could possibly have dreamed to aspire. Julian Huxley’s prophecy seemed about to be fulfilled.

Eugenicists as Conservationists

To truly appreciate the social conscience of those who supported the eugenics ideal it is revealing to note that those who most desired to preserve the genetic quality of the human population were also anxious to conserve all else that was wonderful in the world of nature. Indeed, it was those who sought to conserve the genetic heritage of mankind who pioneered the conservationist movement – seeking to preserve the rich variety of plant and animal species that nature had bequeathed to the care of man.

Possibly the most notable figure in this conservationist movement was Gifford Pinchot, a grandson of one of Napoleon’s generals. A respected and popular figure who had the honor of having Mount Pinchot named after him, Pinchot was a professor of forestry at Yale who was twice elected governor of Pennsylvania and who combined his services to the environment with an active engagement in the eugenics movement. But the list of eugenicists who were active in the conservation movement is a long one: to cite just a few examples, the foundation of the American Bison Society was largely due to the work of eugenicist Madison Grant, and the Save-the-Redwoods League owed its existence to eugenicists Madison Grant, the aforementioned Henry Fairfield Osborn, and the distinguished scholar John Campbell Merriam (president of the American Paleontological Society, the Carnegie Foundation of Washington and the Geological Society). Despite a very full calendar, Merriam, who was proud of his father’s “Old American” ancestry and his mother’s Scottish ancestry, distinguished himself as an extremely active president of the Save-the-Redwoods League, while seldom missing a meeting of the Galton Society or the Eugenics Advisory Council.

With the support of Theodore Rooseve


Ideology and Censorship in Behavior Genetics

Ideology and Censorship in Behavior Genetics
by Prof. Glayde Whitney
(Past President Behavior Genetics Association Florida State University, Tallahassee, Florida)
Vol. 35, Mankind Quarterly, 06-01-1995, pp 327.

Presented below is the entire text of my presidential address presented to the Behavior Genetics Association (BGA) on the occasion of its 25th annual meeting at Richmond, VA on the second of June, 1995. Since the journal Behavior Genetics is sponsored by the BGA, some explanation is required as to why this presidential address is not published in the Association’s own journal.

The primary topic of the address was ideologically-based dogma and taboo hampering the pursuit of knowledge in the science of behavior genetics. The response to the address has been such a parody of political correctness that it might appear to be an instance of collusion between the perpetrator and the detractors for the purpose of exposing an absurdity of our times. However sadly, there is no collusion. Both the author and the detractors appear to be sincere.

The address was presented at an evening banquet. The very next morning at a meeting of the BGA Executive Committee the author was shunned except for a brief scolding, and was the recipient of demeaning ad hominem asides. The Executive Committee busied itself with how to distance the BGA from the offensive talk. The editor of Behavior Genetics refused to publish the paper (contrary to understood policy) and the Executive Committee voted (with one abstention – mine) to issue an official statement of denouncement. Then shortly after the meeting there began a call for the author to resign from the BGA. As stated in a public mention of the affair (Science, 1995), officers of the BGA, and a few others, began to post condemnatory “open letters” on the BGA’s electronic bulletin board.

The issuers of these calls for resignation seem to have lost track, in the finest Lysenkoist tradition, of the many distinctions between scientific organizations and political/religious organizations. Scientific organizations are composed of scientists with some common interests, wherein science consists of alternative hypotheses, the truth value of which is judged by their congruence with observable data. Typical as a scientific organization, the BGA bylaws state purposes which include the promotion of scientific study, assistance in training of research workers, and dissemination of knowledge. Nowhere in the BGA bylaws is there a creed or a listing of necessary beliefs.

On the other hand, political/religious organizations usually have an official creed, or party platform, to which members swear fealty. Those heretics that violate the faith are typically shunned, expelled, or forced to resign. Science has no heretics, and honest science does not thrive in an atmosphere of inquisitional control (Whitney, 1995). A century ago Andrew White (1896/1965) wrote an excellent historical account of the warfare between science and ideology. Although the battlefields shift, the war continues.

It would be highly misleading to leave the impression that the author is alone, adrift in a sea of condemnation. On the contrary, private letters of support and commendation greatly outnumber the public critics. In view of the attempt. at censorship, I greatly appreciate the editors of The Mankind Quarterly providing an archival repository for the address:

Twenty-Five Years of Behavior Genetics

Today there are more and better data concerning genetic influences on behavioral and neuroscience variables than ever before in history. We have tremendously benefited from the revolution in molecular genetic techniques – the new genetics. In 25 years behavior genetics has come from being a small field on the fringe of the social sciences to being recognized as central to an understanding of the human condition (Wiesel, 1994). Just a few weeks ago Science noted that the new director of NIMH should be someone who appreciated the role of genetics in mental health (Marshall, 1995). This is an amazing shift from 25 years ago when behavioristic environmental determinism still reigned supreme. We are obviously well into a paradigm shift of major dimensions, perhaps a true Kuhnian revolution in Science and Society (Barker, 1985; 1992; Kuhn, 1970). In the future it might be referred to as the Galtonian Revolution, on a par with the Copernican. The shift is but one illustration of the long-term self-correcting nature of science: Objective investigation of the real world, conducted with integrity and interpreted without intentional ideological bias, can eventually lead to real advance.

As has sometimes been the case for these after dinner talks, I want to take just a few minutes to share with you some personal reminiscences and some personal views. Twenty-five years ago I got my first full- time faculty position. This was after student days at Minnesota, a bit of a time-out for military service, and a post-doctoral stint in Colorado. At Colorado the Institute for Behavioral Genetics was a wonderful setting. Gerry McClearn and John DeFries, along with Jim Wilson, were running the place. There were a bunch of stimulating graduate students around: I recall Tom Klein studying the taste of mice and Boris Tabakoff messing with alcohol. Doug Wahlsten and I were side-by-side post-docs, Joe Hegmann had just left and Carol Lynch was just arriving. Wonderful friends and colleagues, all of them. The best of days in a stimulating environment.

Well then, I got hired to represent behavior genetics in the neuroscience program at Florida State University. A good program but vastly different in orientation. Not a lot of geneticists. I was there only a brief time when one of the old-timers who ran the place came by for a friendly chat. As polite southerners do, he began with a lengthy discussion of weather, trees, traffic, chiggers, and children. And then, finally, by-the-way, he said “Glayde, you know we hired you because we want genetics in our psychology program, but, as a Professor at a southern university, we hope you will have the good sense to keep away from that human business. Because of your location you would have no credibility, and none of us need the flak”!

Well. That in fact was consistent with my plans, I was busy setting up a mouse laboratory at the time and sure-enough had enough good sense to do passably well with mouse research. After all, I’ve still got the job and I’ve been invited here tonight.

To understand my mentor’s concern, we need to view it in historical context. 1970 was an interesting time. Tallahassee, being a state capital with two state universities, had already had its share of demonstrations, riots, burning and looting. It was in 1970 that Black Panther supporters got around to killing jurors and a judge; 1970 that a mathematics building was bombed on the campus at Wisconsin, also with loss-of-life (Collier & Horowitz, 1995).

It was also in 1970 that our colleague Arthur Jensen was taking a lot of flak (Pearson, 1991). As everyone in behavior genetics knows, Jensen published an interesting review paper in 1969 (Jensen, 1969). Interesting but hardly ground breaking. As a student at Minnesota, I had had the course in differential psychology. With interesting textbooks (Anastasi, 1958; Jenkins & Paterson, 1961) and team taught by such professors as Lykken and Meehl. We had considered fifty years worth of data, and various interpretative theories. Jensen in 1969 had a few new data, by-and-large consistent with all that had gone before. No big deal scientifically, at least not to any student of behavior genetics from Minnesota. But obviously a great big deal in some circles.

Over the intervening twenty-five years it has become obvious that Jensen’s sins were, and continue to be, two-fold. First, he did not stay within the confines of a reigning dogma, and second, he violated a current taboo.

The dogma of course is that of environmental determinism for all important human traits. This dogma has relaxed in recent years, at least for individual differences, and at least within science. But the dogma has not relaxed for group differences and has not relaxed within politics as differentiated from science. The attacks on Jensen, and by extension on all human behavior genetics, are clearly political, ideological, philosophical.

The Marxist-Lysenkoist denial of genetics, the emphasis on environmental determinism for all things human, is at the root of it (Davis, 1986; Medvedev, 1971; Pearson, 1991; Weiss, 1991). Economic oppression is at the root of all group differences and don’t you dare say anything else. The Marxist invasion of left-liberal political sentiment has been so extensive that many of us think that way without realizing it.

It has been suggested that I should talk about “Marxitis” that is, the Marxist infection of ideas. Many of the scholars that suffer from Marxitis do not realize that they are infected. The symptoms of this disease include an intellectual bias, an insistence on environmental determinism as the acceptable cause of group differences. In severe cases, it includes an unbending intellectual absolutism akin to medieval scholasticism. It is lethal to honest science.

A couple of quotes from heretics that have left the movement: “the utopianism of the Left is a secular religion . . . . However sordid Leftist practice may be, defending Leftist ideals is, for the true believer tantamount to defending the ideals of humanity itself. To protect the faith is the highest calling of the radical creed. The more the evidence weighs against the belief, the more noble the act of believing becomes” (Collier & Horowitz, 1995, p. 246).

There is a “readiness to reshape reality to make the world correspond to an idea” (Collier & Horowitz, 1995, P. 37). There is a “Willingness to tinker with the facts to serve a greater truth” (Collier & Horowitz, 1995, p. 37). And so it has obviously been with many of the critics of behavior genetics. Over the last twenty-five years, as the scientific data accumulate, as the paradigm shifts, the stridency of the critics intensifies. Driven by ideology and not constrained by the truth, when all else fails they engage in misrepresentation and character assassination. They accuse their targets of committing the very propagandistic excesses that they themselves are doing (Avery, et. el., 1994; Beardsley, 1995; Brimelow, 1994; Gould, 1994; Kamin, 1995; Lane, 1994; Miller, 1994; Murray, 1994; Weyher, Lynn, Pearson, & Vining, 1995).

Some one among them coined the term “Jensenism”. Near as I can tell “Jensenism” consists of scientific integrity, outstanding technical competence, and objective honesty.

Well, Jensen’s first sin was to venture outside the Left-Liberal Marxist dogma of environmental determinism. His second sin was even less forgivable, he violated a Taboo: He mentioned race outside the environmental envelope. The Behavior Genetics Association has been in existence for 25 years. The end of the Second World War was 50 years ago. Peter Brimelow (1995) has suggested that since the second world war we have been suffering what he calls “Adolf Hitler’s posthumous revenge on America” (Brimelow, 1995, p. 1). The posthumous revenge is that the intellectual elite of the western world, both political and scientific, emerged from the war “passionately concerned to cleanse itself from all taints of racism or xenophobia” (Brimelow, 1995, p. xv). The aversion to racism has gone so far that the scientific concept of race itself is frequently attacked. The results are often ludicrous. For example, on three adjacent pages of a recent issue of Science we are led to believe that races do not exist, but that it is important to assess the genetic diversity of remaining native populations, and a black scientist at a black university should be funded to investigate the black genome as a route to appropriate treatment of diseases of blacks! (Kahn, 1994). The many and important distinctions between objective investigation of group characteristics, and prejudicial pejorative values are lost in a political atmosphere where objective reality is sacrificed to political creed.

Brimelow suggests that the term “racist” is now so debased that its new definition is “anyone who is winning an argument with a liberal” . (Brimelow, 1995 p. 10, italics in original). He suggests that we feel uneasy because we have been trained – like Pavlov’s dog – to recoil from any explicit discussion of race.

Let’s test Brimelow’s theory of emotional conditioning with just a couple of illustrations of data. Here and now is the setting for our experimental test. Here we are scientists, sophisticated with regard to behavior genetics. We tell our students that we are the scientists concerned with the causes of individual and group differences (Fuller & Thompson, 1978; Rowe, 1994). Any time you observe a phenotypic difference between definable groups, it is a reasonable scientific hypothesis that the difference might be caused by environmental difference between the groups, or the difference might be caused by genetic differences between the groups, or by some combination of genetic and environmental differences. Elementary.

Now to look at the data relating to the Brimelow test, we include five figures.

The first figure has data from a UN demographic yearbook (United Nations, 1994). The variable here is murder rate per 100,000 of population, for a few countries. This is a typical representative figure: Among so-called advanced nations, or industrialized nations, the United States suffers a high murder rate. The environmental determinists have many theories, some complex and all critical to aspects of American society. Often we are asked, for instance, “why are Scandinavians in the U.S. so much more murderous than are Scandinavians in Scandinavia?” The answer is that they are not. The premise of the question is false.

The second figure has the same “industrialized” European, largely Caucasian, countries along with an estimate of the murder rate among whites in the U.S. Surely nothing to be proud of, the murder rate among whites is pretty consistent across countries, the rate among U.S. Caucasians is identical to England, and somewhat lower than the two Scandinavian countries. The United States is of coursea multicultural, racially diverse country. This same point has been made previously, with data from different sources (Taylor, 1994).

The third figure has the murder rate for the United States across 22 years, by race. Obviously quite consistent, approximately a 9-fold difference averaged across years (Uniform Crime Reporting Program, 1988).

Like it or not, it is a reasonable scientific hypothesis that some, perhaps much, of the race difference in murder rate is caused by genetic differences in contributory variables such as low intelligence, lack of empathy, aggressive acting out, and impulsive lack of foresight.

The United Nations has a lot of indexes; another one is the HDI (that is, Human Development Index). The HDI is meant to index a bunch of desirable characteristics (such as longevity, knowledge, real income, etc.). Overall, the U.S. ranks fifth among the nations in the HDI. To get fifth on the international list, you combine U.S. whites, who rank first, with US blacks who rank 31st, a level similar to some other black countries (Eisenberg, 1995), and this after more than a generation of racially preferential social policies. If you equate for IQ, U.S. blacks are actually doing at least as well as U.S. whites (Herrnstein & Murray, 1994).

Back to murder rates. Environmental determinists seem generally befuddled by murder, and most of their social policy suggestions, when implemented, seem to make matters worse rather than better. Of course environments do matter, and environmentalistically based policies do have an impact. In 1994, the murder rate in New Orleans, LA, reached 86.5, while in Richmond, VA, the murder rate was 77.9, for second-worst large city in the United States (Perlstein, 1995). Obviously, the environmental determinists are not benign; they do not occupy a moral high ground; their policy recommendations do have consequences.

We can do a pretty good job of predicting differential murder rates, simply by considering racial composition of the population. For example, in the fourth figure we have aggregate data across the 50 states of the United States. The simple correlation between murder rate and percent of the population that is black, is r= +0.77. For Figures 4 and 5, the homicide data are from the U.S. Department of Justice (1981), while the population percentages are from the 1980 census (Race, 1981). I know of no environmental variable that accounts for more of the variation. Rather than the 50 states, we can look at all of the 170 cities in the United States that had a 1980 population of at least 100,000. With 170 data points, it would make a messy scatter- plot; the overall correlation between murder rate and percent of the population which is black is r=+0.69 (Kleck & Patterson, 1993; Kleck, 1995).

Simply for illustrative purposes, the fifth figure is the rate-by- state as in figure 4, but with the values for Washington, DC included. As you can see, the very high murder rate for Washington, DC is simply what one would predict, given knowledge of its population composition.

We could go on-and-on, there are books-full of variables (Baker, 1981; Rushton, 1995). But this is enough to conclude the Brimelow Test.

Do you have an emotional reaction? I know I do: Uncomfortable to even consider; Anxious; Repulsed; Upsetting. I conclude that I have been quite thoroughly conditioned. The Taboo against considering race runs deep. But some of our social problems continue to get worse.

I would like to conclude on an uplifting and happy note. But what to say? Perhaps the optimistic prediction that over the next 25 years, as we get further into the second century of the Darwinian revolution, we in behavior genetics will do for group differences what we already have accomplished with individual differences.

Acknowledgments

I wish to thank Richard Hagan for thoughtful comments on an earlier draft, Sharon Wittig for assistance in preparation, and Paul M. Hammersten for valuable assistance with references.

GRAPH: Figure 1. Murder rates per 100,000 of population for a few “industrialized” countries. Data are from the United Nations Demographic Yearbook, forty-fourth issue.

GRAPH: Figure 2. Murder rates per 100,000 of population for a sample of countries. The estimate of U.S. white rate is the average over 22 years from the U.S. Uniform Crime Reporting Program (1988). The values for other countries are from the U.N. Demographic Yearbook, forty-fourth issue.

GRAPH: Figure 3. Murder rates per 100,000 of population for the United States, by race, for the 22 years of 1965 to 1986. Data are from the U.S. Department of Justice, Uniform Crime Reporting Program.

GRAPH: Figure 4. Homicide rate per 100,000 of population, plotted against percent of the population that is black, for the 50 states of the United States. The homicide data are from the U.S. Department of Justice (1981), while the population percentages are from the 1980 census. The correlation is r=+0.77.

GRAPH: Figure 5. Homicide rate per 100,000 of population, plotted against percent of the population that is black, for the 50 states of the United States, as in Figure 4, with the addition of data for Washington, D.C. in upper right of the figure.

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Avery, R.D., et. al. (with 51 co-authors) 1994 Mainstream science on intelligence. The Wall Street Journal, December 13, 1994, A-18

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Barker, J. A. 1985 Discovering the Future. St. Paul, MN: ILI Press 1992 Future Edge. New York: William Morrow & Co.

Beardsley, T. 1995 For whom the bell curve really tolls. Scientific American, January, 1995, 14-17

Brimelow, P. 1994 For whom the bell tolls. Forbes, October 24, 1994, 153-163 1995 Alien Nation. New York: Random House

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Miller, A. 1994 Professors of hate. Rolling Stone, October 20, 1994, 106-114

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Neo-Lysenkoism, IQ, and the Press

Neo-Lysenkoism, IQ, and the Press
by Bernard D. Davis

Introduction
Reviews in the popular press
The scientific reviews
Gould’s selective history
What is “biological determinism”?
The concept of general intelligence
The “deep fallacies” of reification and factoring
Objectivity in science
Politicizing and publicizing science
Neo-Lysenkoism
Footnotes
New York Times Corrects Scientist’s Obit

Stephen Jay Gould, a professor of geology at Harvard, has become one of the best known American scientists. His many essays on natural history are entertaining and highly readable, and his attack on the “establishment” version of Darwinian evolution has received so much attention that his picture appeared on the cover of Newsweek. He personalizes his expository writing in a breezy, self-deprecating manner, and he comes across as warm-hearted, socially concerned, and commendably on the side of the underdog. Hence he is able to present scientific material effectively to a popular audience–a valuable contribution, and a public service, as long as his scientific message is sound.

It is therefore not surprising that Gould’s history of the efforts to measure human intelligence, The Mismeasure of Man, received many glowing reviews in the popular and literary press, and even a National Book Critics Circle award.1 Yet the reviews that have appeared in scientific journals, focusing on content rather than on style or on political appeal, have been highly critical of both the book’s version of history and its scientific arguments. The paradox is striking. If a scholar wrote a tendentious history of medicine that began with phlebotomy and purges, moved on to the Tuskegee experiment on syphilitic Negroes, and ended with the thalidomide disaster, he would convince few people that medicine is all bad, and he would ruin his reputation. So we must ask: Why did Gould write a book that fits this model all too closely? Why were most reviewers so uncritical? And how can nonscientific journals improve their reviews of books on scientific aspects of controversial political issues?

Reviews in the popular press

Typical of the literary reviews of Gould’s book is the one that appeared in the New York Times Book Review. June Goodfield, a historian and popular writer on science, is effusive: In his “most significant book yet, Mr. Gould grasps the supporting pillars of the temple in a lethal grip of historical scholarship and analysis–and brings the whole edifice of biological determinism crashing down.” The Mismeasure of Man, she writes, also shows that, while science can never be wholly objective, “this gloriously human enterprise does provide us both with a method for challenging the status quo and for revealing true knowledge about the world.” Moreover, Gould “affirms that most things are humanly possible, and that attempts to confine human beings to limited categories are both downright wicked and bound to be self-defeating.”

In the New Yorker the book was reviewed by Jeremy Bernstein, a philosophically-inclined physicist. His analyses of scientific books have in general been excellent, and we might have expected him to be critical of Gould’s methodology. But in fact, because Bernstein saw the book as a powerful salvo against racism, he misread it, imputing to Gould his own, different views on intelligence. Bernstein’s answer to racism is to emphasize “how numerous the genetically expressed variations are within any social group,” whereas Gould in fact insists that in the area of behavior, genetic differences should be ignored. Missing this fundamental disagreement, Bernstein uncritically accepts Gould’s indictment of intelligence tests: “because of the false reification of intelligence hundreds of thousands–perhaps millions–of people’s lives have been circumscribed or even ruined.”

The most perplexing review is Richard Lewontin’s in the New York Review of Books. Lewontin represents a biased choice on the part of that journal, since he and Gould had taught a course together at Harvard on the dangers of applying biology to society, and he has called for the development of a true “socialist science” to challenge the “bourgeois science” of most Western culture. Yet he turns out to be an interesting choice, for his article is, as usual, brilliant, erudite, and idiosyncratic.

Lewontin agrees that political views, whether good or bad, will inevitably influence the conclusions of scientists, but be chides Gould for ignoring Marxist principles and overemphasizing racism: “The Mismeasure of Man remains a curiously unpolitical and unphilosophical book.” The emphasis “on racism and ethnocentrism in the study of abilities is an American bias.” Further, “In America, race, ethnicity, and class are so confounded, and the reality of social class so firmly denied, that it is easy to lose sight of the general setting of class conflict out of which biological determinism arose.” He concludes with a profoundly pessimistic bit of metaphysics: “The reification of intelligence … is an error that is deeply built into the atomistic system of Cartesian explanation that characterizes all of our national science. It is not easy, given the analytic mode of science, to replace the clockwork mind with something less silly.” But “the wholesale rejection of analysis in favor of an obscurantist holism has been worse. Imprisoned by our Cartesianism, we do not know how to think about thinking.” It is unfortunate that this truly gifted scientist trapped himself in evolutionary genetics, a field so at odds with his social convictions.

The popular press has thought the issues to be more clear-cut. Newsweek refers to “this splendid new case study of biased science and its social abuse.” The Saturday Review speaks of “a rare book–at once of great importance and wonderful to read.” The Atlantic Monthly says, “The tale would be funny if one could overlook the misery that such tests have inflicted on generations of defenseless school children.” The Key Reporter (of Phi Beta Kappa) calls the book “a strident, polemical, effective critique.”

The scientific reviews

While the nonscientific reviews of The Mismeasure of Man were almost uniformly laudatory, the reviews in the scientific journals were almost all highly critical. In Science, a widely read American publication that covers all the sciences, the book was reviewed by Franz Samelson, a psychologist at Kansas State University. He concludes that as a history of science the book has a number of problems. For example, he notes, Gould claims that Army intelligence tests led to the Immigration Restriction Act of 1925; in fact, no psychologist testified before Congress, and the three reports of the House Committee on Immigration do not mention intelligence tests at all. On another point, Gould’s discussion of the “fallacy of reification”–the grouping of different abilities, such as verbal reasoning and spatial reasoning, into one measure of intelligence–”remains blurred, since Gould’s emphasis seems to shift about. Exactly what does he object to? [Gould] never tells us directly what his own proper, unreified conception of intelligence is.” Finally, Gould fails to acknowledge that ability testing is “a sizable industry in the real world and a smaller one in academia.” And all Gould’s incisive thrusts at finagling and fallacies seem to be almost irrelevant. … Whatever intellectual victories over the [mostly dead] testers Gould’s eminently readable book achieves … the real action seems to be elsewhere.”

In Nature, a distinguished British journal of general science, Steve Blinkhom, writing from the Neuropsychology Laboratory at Stanford University, is blunt: “With a glittering prose style and as honestly held a set of prejudices as you could hope to meet in a day’s crusading, S.J. Gould presents his attempt at identifying the fatal flaw in the theory and measurement of intelligence. Of course everyone knows there must be a fatal flaw, but so far reports of its discovery have been consistently premature.” More specifically, “the substantive discussion of the theory of intelligence stops at the stage it was in more than a quarter of a century ago.” Gould “has nothing to say which is both accurate and at issue when it comes to substantive or methodological points.” Finally, many of his assertions “have the routine flavor of Radio Moscow news broadcasts when there really is no crisis to shout about. You have to admire the skill in presentation, but what a waste of talent.”

Science 82, a journal designed for the general public, chose as its reviewer Candace Pert, a biochemist at the National Institute of Mental Health, who has been researching the application of molecular biology and cell biology to the study of the brain. “Gould’s history of pseudoscientific racism in measuring human intelligence,” she writes, “does not, despite his claims, negate the sociobiological notion that differences in human genetic composition can produce differences in brain proteins, resulting in differences in behavior and personality.” In her view, “if modem neuroscience reveals biochemical differences that account for human variability, we must deal with this important knowledge; … ignoring differences because they could become abuses will not make them go away.”

The most extensive scientific analysis of Gould’s book appeared in Contemporary Education Review. Arthur R. Jensen, of the Institute for Human Learning at the University of California, Berkeley, analyzes Gould’s technical arguments in great detail and reaches sharply critical conclusions. He also discusses recent research demonstrating a high correlation of IQ with speed of information processing, as measured by simple reaction-time techniques. These findings encourage a hope that a merger with neurobiology may soon make studies of intelligence much more penetrating and less controversial.

The review that appeared in Scientific American is an exception to the harsh criticism in the scientific press. Ordinarily Scientific American presents solid science in an interesting way to a very broad audience, and it has been restrained and non-partisan in treating most controversial issues of science. However, there is one exception: The publisher, Gerard Piel, and the book editor, Philip Morrison, have long seen the study of the genetics of intelligence as a threat to racial justice. According to Morrison, as “a persuasive chronicle of prejudice in science, founded on scrupulous examination of the record, enlivened by the talent of a gifted writer, this volume takes on some of the sinister appeal of a tale of heinous crime.”

Gould’s selective history

It is important for the general public to understand why scientists close to the field have reacted so negatively to The Mismeasure of Man. The strength of science in analyzing reality comes from its strict separation of facts from values, of observations from expectations. Measurements of intelligence, and of its hereditary and environmental origins, are part of natural science–even though one must go beyond science, bringing in judgments of value, in order to probe the social implications of the results. Hence any purported scientific exposition of these topics must be as dispassionate and objective as possible about the facts, whatever the social views the author favors. These are precious standards, whose corruption we must resist. Unfortunately, throughout Gould’s book they are not met.

The early chapters describe in detail some extremely naive nineteenth-century attempts to measure intelligence in terms of brain size or body shape. These are fossils from the history of mental testing, and their excavation would ordinarily bore most readers. Gould, however, uses them skillfully, both to give the impression of a thorough scholarly analysis and to arouse indignation at such evil uses of science. Unfortunately, the advocacy and the emotional appeal betray the scholarship. In the early stages of any science, naive ideas, often reflecting the prejudice of the time, are inevitable. Gould infers that this legacy will persist; but history demonstrates that the advance of science depends on continually discarding false hypotheses and preconceptions. Gould further arouses the reader’s indignation by describing the ill-informed and prejudiced views of Paul Broca and Louis Agassiz on racial differences. But at a time when slavery was legal, and long before the science of genetics revolutionized our understanding of the nature of race, it is hardly surprising that these views were held by leading scientists–and even, as Gould notes, by such enlightened social critics as Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson. To remind us of these roots in the history of racism is instructive–but to imply a similar prejudice in today’s investigators of intelligence is unfair.

After emphasizing that Alfred Binet developed the first intelligence test, in France in 1905, only in order to improve the education of backward children, Gould goes on to describe misuses of the subsequent tests. His most horrifying example is a primitive study conducted in 1912, in which H.H. Goddard administered intelligence tests to a number of Ellis Island immigrants. He set his standards at an absurdly high level, classifying in the end an extraordinarily large percentage of subjects as “feeble-minded”–a term that then included “morons” who could nonetheless manage to make a living, though it is now applied only to those with a more severe deficiency. Probably nothing has so aroused antipathy to intelligence testing as his widely-cited findings that, for example, 83 percent of the Jews and 79 percent of the Italians he tested were “feeble-minded.”

Gould’s interpretation of Goddard’s findings is summarized as follows: “Could anyone be made to believe that four-fifths of any nation were morons?” But let us look at what Goddard actually wrote. The first sentence of his paper states that “this is not a study of immigrants in general but of six small highly selected groups” leaving out those at either end of the scale who were “obviously” either normal or feeble-minded.2 At that time immigration officers were using subjective impressions to reject those people who appeared to be too retarded to learn to make a living, and Goddard hoped that tests could provide a more reliable basis for such decisions. Surprised at the results, he added a discussion that Gould conveniently ignores:

“Are these … cases of hereditary defects or cases of apparent mental defects by deprivation? … We know of no data on this point, but indirectly we may argue that it is far more probable that their condition is due to environment than it is due to heredity. To mention only two considerations: First, we know their environment has been poor. It seems able to account for the result. Second, this kind of immigration has been going on for 20 years. If the condition were due to hereditary feeblemindedness we should properly expect a noticeable increase in the proportion of the feeble-minded of foreign ancestry. This is not the case.”

Goddard ended up favoring the immigration of people who appeared to possess limited present intelligence: Not only would they perform useful work, but “we may be confident that their children will be of average intelligence and if rightly brought up will be good citizens.” Goddard was hardly a great scientist, but he deserves a fair hearing. The statements cited here hardly warrant Gould’s conclusion that to Goddard “the cure [for feeble-mindedness] seemed simple enough: don’t allow native morons to breed and keep foreign ones out.”

After some years, as Gould notes, most of the early enthusiasts changed their views. Goddard, Terman, and Brigham each admitted that he had overestimated the ability of tests to detect innate differences and had underestimated the influence of cultural background. One might take this example of growth in understanding as a sign of the whole field’s increasing maturity and objectivity. Gould, however, sees these confessions only as support for his accusation of bias.

What is “biological determinism”?

Gould’s own degree of bias is unusual in a work by a scientist. What is the source of this passion? Not mental testing itself, he makes it clear. Rather, his arguments against this testing are merely weapons for attacking the real enemy: what he calls “biological determinism.”

As Gould correctly points out, early investigators who tried to measure intelligence were indeed determinists: They had the illusion that they were directly measuring a capacity determined by the genes. But while he continues to tar investigators of behavioral genetics with this brush, in fact they are now all interactionists. For while genetics necessarily began with the simplest relationships, in which a single gene determines a trait (such as the color of Mendel’s peas, or a human blood type), the science eventually moved on to the quantitatively varying (metric) physical or behavioral traits, which socially are much more interesting. These were found to depend on multiple genes, and also on their cumulative interactions with the environment. This concept is now precisely formulated as the concept of heritability: a measure of what fraction of the total variance in a trait, in a particular population, is due to genetic differences between individuals–the other fraction coming from environmental influences.

Since Gould would prefer to combat the straw man of naive, “pure” determinism, he fails to note that the science of genetics has altogether replaced this concept with interactionism. But since he is too familiar with biology to deny this conceptual shift, he appropriates it for his own ideological argument: “The difference between strict hereditarians and their opponents is not, as some caricatures suggest, the belief that a child’s performance is all inborn or all a function of environment and learning. I doubt that the most committed antihereditarians have ever denied the existence of innate variation among children.” Curiously, “hereditarians” (Gould’s misnomer for interactionists) are not credited with a similar appreciation of both factors. Instead, they are neatly skewered by being called “strict.”

What, then, is the quarrel about? According to Gould, “the differences [between the camps] are more a matter of social policy and educational practice. Hereditarians view their measures of intelligence as measures of permanent inborn limits. Children, so labeled, should be sorted, trained according to their inheritance and channeled into professions appropriate for their biology.” But good investigators, such as Binet, did not want mental testing to become a theory of limits. For them, Gould argues, “Mental testing becomes a theory for enhancing potential through proper education [emphasis added].”3

This is a deliberate effort to blur the issue. With one hand Gould concedes innate differences, and with the other he takes them away. If the two camps really differ mostly about social policy and not about the importance of hereditary factors, why does he struggle so to deny the latter? Similarly, whether the hereditary component is large or small, is it not a fact that individuals differ widely in their phenotypic, developed ability to absorb various kinds of education and to perform various kinds of jobs? Yet the book has not one word about the possible value of mental tests for educational and vocational placement or for comparing educational programs. (However, consistent with Gould’s admiration for Binet’s circumscribed aim, he does note the value of mental tests in guiding the therapy of his own child.) Finally, in describing the incredibly crude use of the Army’s “Alpha” tests in 1917, Gould ignores the current use of sophisticated tests to help the armed forces select candidates for expensive training programs.

It is sad that Gould, preoccupied with the destructive social consequences of earlier biological misconceptions, is convinced that any modem studies on human behavioral genetics must have similar consequences. For to the contrary, modern evolutionary biology has had an opposite effect–by providing a powerful argument against racism. In the past, a widely-accepted justification for race discrimination stemmed from a Platonic doctrine that prevailed for over two millennia: the belief that we can best understand groups of entities (including species and races) in typological (essentialist) terms, i.e., characterizing all the individuals in a group in terms of a hypothetical ideal type or essence, and dismissing differences from the ideal as trivial. Today, however, population genetics has shown that all species are genetically diverse, and that the differences are not trivial but rather are the source of evolution. With this shift from an essentialist to a populationist view, the genetic differences between races (except for some superficial physical traits) are now seen to be statistical rather than essentially uniform. And since the statistical distributions overlap extensively from one group to another, one cannot infer an individuals potential from his race.

If the pre-genetic, typological misconceptions still prevailed, the modern revolt against race discrimination would surely have encountered much greater resistance, and it might even have been impossible. Unfortunately, biology has received little credit for this major social contribution, and none at all from Stephen Jay Gould.

The concept of general intelligence

The historical chapters, constituting most of The Mismeasure of Man, serve to convince the reader that the measurement of intelligence is immoral. But after this build-up, Gould, shifting from historian to scientist, offers an even sharper objection: The measurement is also unscientific.

The problem arises because these tests were developed for teachers who often have trouble deciding whether a pupil’s poor performance is primarily due to limitations in motivation or to limitations in ability. The original purpose of intelligence tests, as we have noted, was to provide a more objective and reliable supplement to the teacher’s subjective impression, in order to help pupils who are doing badly. But this early use of testing inevitably led to the development of additional possibilities. For example, by ranking the whole class, the tests also detected students who could move faster than the average. In addition, more specialized tests have evolved, especially for advanced students and for purposes of job placement. But as practical tools in public education, the most widely used tests are still composite ones designed, like Binet’s test, to cover a range of abilities pertinent to the whole curriculum.

Psychologists generally agree that the greatest success of their field has been in intelligence testing–both practical, in estimating individual abilities, and theoretical, in exploring the cognitive functions of the human brain. For it might have turned out that the determinants of different cognitive abilities were uncorrelated: that is, that the levels of abilities might be distributed independently. But in fact, tests for different kinds of intelligence–the ability to assimilate, retain, process, and express different kinds of complex information–show a remarkably high correlation in their results. The rank-ordering of most individuals is similar–but not identical–on a verbal test, an arithmetic test, or a nonverbal test involving spatial patterns. These results confirm an impression that we all tacitly build on in our daily lives: Some people are generally brighter than others, but people also differ in their special aptitudes. Both sets of differences are partly inborn and partly due to factors affecting the development of the inborn potentials.

The common factor shared in different cognitive abilities, as determined by statistical analysis of their correlations, was named g by Charles Spearman. In the ordinary IQ tests it contributes well over half the variance within a population, the rest representing uncorrelated differences in special abilities. Someday, the basis for both kinds of variation will no doubt be better understood in cellular and biochemical terms. Indeed, it is encouraging that studies of the brain are rapidly progressing from its simpler integrative functions, such as the processing of visual stimuli, to more complex cognitive activities. Meanwhile, though, it is fruitful for psychologists to examine intelligence at the level of performance, and to compare ways of improving that performance, just as geneticists could usefully deal with genes as formal units long before discovering their molecular structure and mode of action.

Examined at this level, such tests have unquestionably helped innumerable teachers to identify pupils whose brightness was concealed by shyness, cultural barriers, or rebelliousness. On the other hand, there is also no doubt that the tests have often been interpreted or applied badly. If teachers focus excessively on general intelligence, measured on a one-dimensional scale, they may fail to encourage the development of each individual’s particular strengths. Moreover, the assumption that g is entirely innate may persist in some quarters even though the concept of heritability (fractionation into genetic and environmental components) has now completely replaced that early view among scientists. But perhaps the greatest danger is that the test results may tend to be regarded as some kind of index of social worth, instead of recognizing that they measure only a limited set of behavioral traits. For while these are key traits for certain educational and vocational purposes, the tests ignore many other traits that also have great social value: for example, physical attractiveness, motor skills, creativity, artistic talent, social sensitivity, and features of character and temperament. The concept of any single scale of social worth has no meaning. Gould, however, keeps the reader’s indignation alive by regularly defining the objective of the tests as the measurement of “worth”–sometimes qualified as “intellectual worth,” but often unqualified, or even denoted as “innate worth.”

Gould is clearly not interested in evaluating the past uses of intelligence tests fairly, or in improving their use. To him the tests must be extirpated because–and here we get back to the real villain–in using them to compare individuals one inevitably runs into consistent differences in the mean values for various racial and socioeconomic groups. “This book … is about the abstraction of intelligence as a single entity .. invariably to find that oppressed and disadvantaged groups–races, classes, or sexes–are innately inferior and deserve their status.”4 This statement, for all its hyperbole, captures what the book is about: Concerned with group differences, Gould has decided not to add to the polemics on their causes, but to attack the problem at another level. For if he can demonstrate that the very concept of measurable intelligence is meaningless, then it follows that all those disturbing data on group differences are meaningless as well. His weapon is his “discovery,” first announced in the New York Review of Books, of two alleged “deep fallacies” underlying the concept of general intelligence: reification and the factoring of intelligence.

The “deep fallacies” of reification and factoring

Gould’s argument on reification purports to get at the philosophical foundation of the field. He claims that general intelligence, defined as the factor common to different cognitive abilities, is merely a mathematical abstraction; hence if we consider it a measurable attribute we are reifying it, falsely converting an abstraction into an “entity” or a “thing”–variously referred to as “a hard, quantifiable thing,” “a quantifiable fundamental particle,” “a thing in the most direct, material sense.” Here he has dug himself a deep hole. If this implication of localization is a fallacy for general intelligence, why is it not also a fallacy for specialized forms of intelligence, which Gould professes to accept? Going even further, he seems to abandon materialism altogether: “Once intelligence becomes an entity, standard procedures of science virtually dictate that a location and physical substrate be sought for it. Since the brain is the seat of mentality, intelligence must reside there.” But we must ask what reasonable scientific alternative there is. A Cartesian dualism, in which mental processes exist apart from a material base?

Indeed, this whole argument is fantastic. The scientist does not measure “material things”: He measures properties (such as length or mass), sometimes of a single “thing” (however defined), and sometimes of an organized collection of things, such as a machine, a biological organ, or an organism. In a particularly complex collection, the brain, some properties (i.e., specific functions) have been traced to narrowly-localized regions (such as the sensory or motor nuclei connected to particular parts of the body). Others, however, depend on connections between widely-separated regions. Accordingly, the reality of generalized intelligence–or equally, of any specialized cognitive ability–does not require a “quantifiable fundamental particle.” Like information transfer in a telephone network or in a computer, cognition would be much the same whether the cells involved are grouped together in one region of the brain or are connected by fibers running between dispersed locations.

It is astonishing that a scientist with Gould’s credentials, and with ready access to colleagues in the relevant fields, would present such a phony “discovery” as the fallacy of reification, and on the basis of truly antiquated views of neurobiology. He writes that the existence of general intelligence could have been proved correct “if biochemists had ever found Spearman’s cerebral energy.” This phrase refers to a particularly thin speculation, in the 1920s, about the physical basis for differences in IQ. But neurobiologists today simply do not deal in such vague concepts. Instead, they measure variation in the richness of cells, and connections, and neurotransmitter molecules in different areas of the brain.

The molecular studies linking these features of the brain to genes have hardly begun. But it is clear that this molecular biology must build on the principle that genes code for specific molecular components in brain cells, as in all other cells, and that these genes, like other genes, will vary from one individual to another. Moreover, these gene products in the brain will give rise to variation not only in its wiring diagram but also in the switches (synapses) that transmit impulses between its nerve cells. We are unlikely to be able to correlate intelligence with the incredibly complex and subtle circuitry of the brain for a long time to come; but it is not hard to imagine correlation with molecular differences in a class of synapses in different brains, affecting the speed of processing information just like differences in the transistors of different computers.

Gould’s second “deep fallacy”, factoring, is statistical. Here he reconstructs an old controversy, which the field has long outgrown. In this dispute, Spearman calculated g (the measure of general intelligence) by running tests for different abilities and analyzing their correlations so as to extract their common component. Thurstone, whom Gould admires as “the exterminating angel of Spearman’s g,” preferred to focus on the specialized differences in intelligence. He therefore analyzed the results in a way that did not extract the overall correlation, but dispersed it among the differentiated primary factors. But the correlation did not disappear: Another calculation could extract it from the primary factors as a “second-order” g. Gould, however, sets out to “prove” mathematically that the primary correlation is a statistical artifact and that the second-order one is negligible.

To analyze Gould’s unconvincing argument would be irrelevant. For in the end, after claiming to have disproved the correlations, he casually accepts them as self-evident: “The fact of pervasive positive correlation between mental tests must be one of the most unsurprising major discoveries in the history of science.” This is itself a very curious judgment. In fact, the correlation is not inevitable or self-evident, for the brain might have been so constructed that a strong endowment of cells for verbal skills would have less room for cells concerned with numerical abilities, etc. Different cognitive abilities might then exhibit no correlation, or even a negative correlation, and psychologists would then have found no general intelligence to measure.

Gould’s arguments about g are irrelevant for another reason as well: Though he believes they support his aim of slaying the dragon of the heritability of intelligence, the assumed link to that problem does not exist. “The chimerical nature of g is the rotten core of Jensen’s edifice, and of the entire hereditarian school. … Spearman’s g, and its attendant claim that intelligence is a single, measurable entity, provided the only theoretical justification that hereditarian theories of IQ have ever had.” This assertion is utterly false. Whether an IQ test measures mostly general intelligence or mostly a collection of independent abilities, the heritability of whatever it measures will be precisely the same. IQ’s factor structure simply does not enter the equations for calculating its heritability.

It is unfortunate that Gould contrasts general and special intelligence with such overkill, for the differences deserve serious consideration, and the advance of behavioral genetics, focusing on units of inheritance, will force psychologists to aim for a more refined dissection of cognitive functions. But the prospect of such advances does not require us to deny that a wider, overall measurement might have had historical value, and might still have practical value for educational purposes.

Objectivity in science

In addition to moral and technical objections to mental testing, Gould offers an epistemological argument that has much broader implications: “I criticize the myth that science itself is an objective enterprise…. By what right, other than our own biases, can we identify Broca’s prejudice and hold that science now operates independently of culture and class?” On the other hand, he adds that “As a practicing scientist, I share the credo of my colleagues: I believe that a factual reality exists and that science, though often in an obtuse and erratic manner, can learn about it.” This is all very well–but throughout the rest of the book he proceeds as though objectivity is a myth and no factual reality can be discovered.

In fact, the key to the success of the scientific enterprise is its passionate dedication to objectivity: Its advance depends on accepting the conclusions dictated by verifiable observations and by logic, even when they conflict with common sense or with treasured preconceptions. To be sure, some years ago Marxist philosophers, generalizing from the influence of social and economic arrangements on many aspects of our behavior, initiated an attack on the objectivity of science. Moreover, this view has become rather widely accepted in the social sciences. But the study of the genetics of intelligence is a part of natural science, rather than of social science, even though its findings have relevance for social questions. If the science is well done it will tell us objectively what exists, without value judgments; these judgments will arise only in the social applications of that knowledge. For example, insights into the range and distribution of abilities do not tell us how much of our educational resources to devote to the gifted and how much to the intellectually handicapped; this knowledge simply improves our recognition of the reality with which we must cope.

The main source of confusion here is that the word “science” is used with three different meanings, in different contexts: science as a set of activities, as a methodology, and as a body of knowledge. The activities of a scientist certainly depend heavily on non-objective factors. These include the resources and the incentives that a society provides for pursuing particular projects, and also the personal choice of problems, hypotheses, and experimental design. The methodology of science is much more objective, but it is also influenced by fashions in the scientific community. The body of scientific knowledge, however, is a very different matter. Its observations and conclusions, after having been sufficiently verified and built upon, correspond to reality more objectively and reliably than any other form of knowledge achieved by man. To be sure, attachment to a cherished hypothesis may lead a scientist into error. Moreover, at the cutting edge of a science, contradictory results and interpretations are common. But the mistakes are eventually discarded, through a finely honed system of communal criticisms and verification. Thus Broca’s name has been immortalized by its assignment to a structure in the brain that be recognized, whereas his premature efforts to correlate gross structural variations with intelligence have left no residue in the body of scientific knowledge.

Accordingly, however much the findings in some areas of science may be relevant to our social judgments, they are obtained by a method designed to separate objective analysis of nature from subjective value judgments. Long experience has shown that when these findings are well-verified, they have an exceedingly high probability of being universal, cumulative, and value-free. Gould, however, treats the history of science like political history, with which his readers are more familiar: a history in which human motives and errors from the past will inevitably recur. He thus skillfully promotes a doubt that the biological roots of human behavior can ever be explored scientifically.

Politicizing and publicizing science

A left-wing group called “Science for the People,” of which Gould is a member, has been particularly active in campaigning against such studies. Instead of focusing, in the earlier tradition of radical groups, on defects in our political and economic system that demand radical change, this group has aimed at politicizing science, attacking in particular any aspect of genetics that may have social implications. Their targets have included genetic engineering, research on the effects of an XYY set of chromosomes, sociobiology, and efforts to measure the heritability of intelligence. Several years ago Gould co-signed their intemperate attack on E.O. Wilson’s Sociobiology: The New Synthesis.5 Now, in The Mismeasure of Man, he has extended the attack to cognitive psychology and educational testing, because they may reveal genetic differences.

Gould has spelled out explicitly his ideological commitment, and also its influence on his science. As we shall see, his main scientific contribution has been the claim that evolution has occurred mainly through revolutionary jumps, rather than by small steps. Both in a “Dialectics Workshop”6 and in a scientific paper7 he supports this claim with a citation from Marx: “Darwin’s gradualism was part of the cultural context, not of nature.” He adds that “alternate [sic] conceptions of change have respectable pedigrees in philosophy. Hegel’s dialectical laws, translated into a materialist context … are explicitly punctuational, as befits a theory of revolutionary transformation in human society.” And, “it may also not be irrelevant to our personal preferences [about evolutionary mechanisms] that one of us learned his Marxism, literally at his Daddy’s knee.” To most scientists (other than those tethered to a party line) such a claim of support from (or for) Hegel is silly, and such an insertion of an ideological preference, whether from the left or the right, is a corruption of science.

These quotations may help us to understand why The Mismeasure of Man ends up as a sophisticated piece of political propaganda, rather than as a balanced scientific analysis. Gould is entitled, of course, to whatever political views he wishes. But the reader is also entitled to be aware of his agenda.

It may also be pertinent to comment briefly on Gould’s scientific writing. His claim to have disproved the widely-accepted, “gradualist” view of evolution has had great appeal for science reporters, but it has been subject to intense criticism by his professional colleagues. Of course, controversies in science are not rare, and it would not be appropriate here to try to judge Gould’s stature as a scientist. It is pertinent, however, to note features of his professional writing remarkably similar to those that I have criticized in The Mismeasure of Man. In both contexts be focuses primarily on older approaches to problems in which genetics is now central; he picks his history; and he handles key concepts in an ambiguous manner. Moreover, he is fond of artificial dichotomies that oversimplify complex issues: evolution by leaps versus evolution by gradual steps; biological determinists versus environmentalists; general intelligence versus specialized intelligence.

While Gould has made a valuable scientific contribution in providing evidence that marked fluctuations in rate are common in evolution, the most general professional criticism is that in dramatizing this contribution he has set up a non-existent conflict with the prevailing gradualist view. For he proceeds as though gradualism implies a relatively constant rate as well as small steps. But even Darwin recognized that the rate of evolution might vary widely, and modem investigators have demonstrated many mechanisms that contribute to such fluctuation.

Neo-Lysenkoism

In The Mismeasure of Man Gould fails to live up to the trust engendered by his credentials. His historical account is highly selective; he asserts the non-objectivity of science so that he can test for scientific truth, flagrantly, by the standards of his own social and political convictions; and by linking his critique to the quest for fairness and justice, he exploits the generous instincts of his readers. Moreover, while he is admired as a clear writer, in the sense of effective communication, he is not clear in the deeper sense of analyzing ideas sharply and with logical rigor, as we have a right to expect of a disciplined scientist.

It has been uncomfortable to dissect a colleague’s book and his background so critically. But I have felt obliged to do so because Gould’s public influence, well-earned for his popular writing on less political questions, is being put to mischievous political use in this book. Moreover, its success undermines the ideal of objectivity in scientific expositions, and also reflects a chronic problem of literary publications. My task has been all the more unpleasant because I do not doubt Gould’s sincerity in seeking a more just and generous world, and I thoroughly share his conviction that racism remains one of the greatest obstacles.

Unfortunately, the approach that Gould has used to combat racism has serious defects. Instead of recognizing the value of eliminating bias, his answer is to press for equal and opposite bias, in a virtuous direction–not recognizing the irony and the danger of thus subordinating science to fashions of the day. Moreover, as a student of evolution he might have been expected to build on a profound insight of modem genetics and evolutionary biology: that the human species, and each race within it, possesses a wide range of genetic diversity. But instead of emphasizing the importance of recognizing that diversity, Gould remains locked in combat with a prescientific typological view of heredity, and this position leads him to oppose studies of behavioral genetics altogether. As the reviewer for Nature stated, The Mismeasure of Man is “a book which exemplifies its own thesis. It is a masterpiece of propaganda, researched in the service of a point of view rather than written from a fund of knowledge.”

In effect, we see here Lysenkoism risen again: an effort to outlaw a field of science because it conflicts with a political dogma. To be sure, the new version is more limited in scope, and it does not use the punitive powers of a totalitarian state, as Trofim Lysenko did in the Soviet Union to suppress all of genetics between 1935 and 1965. But that is not necessary in our system: A chilling atmosphere is quite sufficient to prevent funding agencies, investigators, and graduate students from exploring a taboo area. And such Neo-Lysenkoist politicization of science, from both the left and the right, is likely to grow, as biology increasingly affects our lives–probing the secrets of our genes and our brain, reshaping our image of our origins and our nature, and adding new dimensions to our understanding of social behavior. When ideologically committed scientists try to suppress this knowledge they jeopardize a great deal, for without the ideal of objectivity science loses its strength.

Because this feature of science is such a precious asset, the crucial lesson to be drawn from the case of Stephen Jay Gould is the danger of propagating political views under the guise of science. Moreover, this end was furthered, wittingly or not, by the many reviewers whose evaluations were virtually projective tests of their political convictions. For these reviews reflected enormous relief: A voice of scientific authority now assures us that biological diversity does not set serious limits to the goal of equality, and so we will not have to wrestle with the painful problem of refining what we mean by equality.

In scientific journals editors take pains to seek reviewers who can bring true expertise to the evaluation of a book. It is all the more important for editors of literary publications to do likewise, for when a book speaks with scientific authority on a controversial social issue, the innocent lay reader particularly needs protection from propaganda. Science can make a great contribution toward solving our social problems by helping us to base our policies and judgments upon reality, rather than upon wish or conjecture. Because this influence is so powerful it is essential for such contributions to be judged critically, by the standards of science.

FOOTNOTES

1 Stephen Jay Gould, The Mismeasure of Man (New York: Norton, 1981).

2 H. H. Goddard, “Mental Tests and the Immigrant,” Journal of Delinquency 2 (1917): 243.

3 Gould’s reference to “enhancing potential” is revealing, for it confuses genotype (an inborn range of potential) and phenotype (the actual ability developed within that range). He should have spoken instead of enhancing performance, or of enhancing the development of potential. This is not a trivial semantic distinction: It is essential for any clear analysis of the interaction of genes and environment. Gould’s language suggests that he either does not fully understand, or feels compelled to ignore, this key concept of genetics.

4 Gould’s broad generalization ignores the fact that the disadvantaged Chinese and Japanese in this country have consistently scored even higher than Caucasians. Moreover, in including sex discrimination in the IQ controversy, he is straying far from reality. In fact, females average the same as males on standard IQ tests: They perform slightly better on verbal tests, and slightly worse on spatial tests, but the tests are constructed to balance these differences.

5 E. Allen et al., Letter, New York Review of Books (November 13, 1975): 43. See also Sociobiology Study Group of Science for the People in Bioscience 26 (1976): 182. This article includes the remarkable statement that “We know of no relevant constraint placed on social processes by human biology.”

6 S. J. Gould, “The Episodic Nature of Change versus the Dogma of Gradualism,” Science and Nature 2 (1979): 5.

7 S. J. Gould and N. Eldridge, “Punctuated Equilibria: The Tempo and Mode of Evolution Reconsidered,” Paleobiology 3 (1977): 115.

New York Times Corrects Scientist’s Obit
Constance Holden, 18 February 1994, Science, 263, p. 922.

Harvard molecular biologist Bernard Davis only died once, on 14 January, but has been accorded two obituaries in the New York Times. Why? The first obit managed to ignore almost all of Davis’ career, igniting a storm of protest from former colleagues who badgered the newspaper until it agreed to do the story over.

The first obituary, published on 17 January, was a short item that highlighted a 1976 controversy in which Davis expressed worries that affirmative action efforts were lowering the academic standards at some medical schools. It made no mention of his scientific accomplishments, including pioneering work in bacterial genetics, his involvement in issues relating to science and society, and his numerous honors and publications.

Davis’ former colleagues were appalled. “Inadequate and mean and distorted,” is what Stanford Nobelist Arthur Kornberg called the obit; an example of the press zeroing in on “a trivial political incident at the expense of one of the finest scientific careers in America,” said rheumatologist Gerald Weissman of New York University Medical Center.

In response to a storm of letters from scientists, the newspaper quickly capitulated, and on 3 February it ran a longer story with a note observing that the first one was “incomplete.” Davis’ friends are happy. “We were so pleased we got a retraction, as it were,” says Weissman, who authored one of the letters along with 12 colleagues.


Egalitarian Fiction and Collective Fraud

Egalitarian Fiction and Collective Fraud
Linda S. Gottfredson
Society, March-April 1994

Brief Summary: Social Science researchers have contributed to the myth that there is no difference in intelligence levels among different racial and ethnic groups. Some researchers ignored significant data because it did not fit into the accepted belief of genetic equality.

Introduction
The Egalitarian Fiction
Misrepresentation of Expert Opinion
Living Within a Lie
Covert and Overt Censorship
Suggested Readings

Social science today condones and perpetuates a great falsehood – one that undergirds much current social policy. This falsehood, or “egalitarian fiction,” holds that racial-ethnic groups never differ in average developed intelligence (or, in technical terms, g, the general mental ability factor). While scientists have not yet determined their source, the existence of sometimes large group differences in intelligence is as well-established as any fact in the social sciences. How and why then is this falsehood perpetrated on the public? What part do social scientists themselves play, deliberately or inadvertently, in creating and maintaining it? Are some of them involved in what might be termed “collective fraud?” Intellectual dishonesty among scientists and scholars is, of course, nothing new. But watchdogs of scientific integrity have traditionally focused on dishonesty of individual scientists, while giving little attention to the ways in which collectivities of scientists, each knowingly shaving or shading the truth in small but similar ways, have perpetuated frauds on the scientific community and the public at large. Perhaps none of the individuals involved in the egalitarian fiction could be accused of fraud in the usual sense of the term. Indeed, I would be the first to say that, like other scientists, most of these scholars are generally honest. Yet, their seemingly minor distortions, untruths, evasions, and biases collectively produce and maintain a witting falsehood. Accordingly, my concern here is to explore the social process by which many otherwise honest scholars facilitate, or feel compelled to endorse, a scientific lie.

The Egalitarian Fiction

It is impossible here to review the voluminous evidence showing that racial-ethnic differences in intelligence are the rule rather than the exception (some groups performing better than whites and others worse), and that the well-documented black-white gap is especially striking. All groups span the continuum of intelligence, but some groups contain greater proportions of individuals that are either gifted or dull than others. Three facts regarding these group differences are of particular importance here for together they contradict the claim that there are no meaningful group differences. Racial-ethnic differences in intelligence are real. The large average group differences in mental test scores in the United States do not result from test bias, which is minuscule overall, as even a National Academy of Science panel concluded in 1982. Moreover, intelligence and aptitude tests measure general mental abilities, such as reasoning and problem solving, not merely accumulated bits of knowledge – and thus tap what experts and laymen alike view as “intelligence.”

Regardless of how we choose to construe them, differences in intelligence are of great practical importance. Overall they predict performance in school and on the job better than any other single attribute or condition we have been able to measure. Intelligence certainly is not the only factor that affects performance, but higher levels of intelligence greatly increase people’s odds of success in many life settings. Group disparities in intelligence are stubborn. Although individuals fluctuate somewhat in intelligence during their lives, differences among groups seem quite stable. The average black-white difference, for example, which appears by age six, has remained at about 18 Stanford-Binet IQ points since it was first measured in large national samples over seventy years ago. It is not clear yet why the disparities among groups are so stubborn – the reasons could be environmental, genetic, or a combination of both – but so far they have resisted attempts to narrow them. Although these facts may seem surprising, most experts on intelligence believe them to be true but few will acknowledge their truth publicly.

Misrepresentation of Expert Opinion

The 1988 book The IQ Controversy: The Media and Public Policy by psychologist-lawyer Mark Snyderman and political scientist Stanley Rothman provides strong evidence that the general public receives a highly distorted view of opinion among “IQ experts.” In essence, say Snyderman and Rothman, accounts in major national newspapers, newsmagazines, and television reports have painted a portrait of expert opinion that leaves the impression that “the majority of experts in the field believe it is impossible to adequately define intelligence, that intelligence tests do not measure anything that is relevant to life performance, and that they are biased against minorities, primarily blacks and Hispanics, as well as against the poor.” However, say the authors, the survey of experts revealed quite the opposite: On the whole, scholars with any expertise in the area of intelligence and intelligence testing … share a common view of [what constitute] the most important components of intelligence, and are convinced that [intelligence] can be measured with some degree of accuracy. An overwhelming majority also believe that individual genetic inheritance contributes to variations in IQ within the white community, and a smaller majority express the same view about the black-white and SES [socioeconomic] differences in IQ.

Unfortunately, such wholesale misrepresentation of expert opinion is not limited to the field of intelligence, as Rothman has shown in parallel studies of other policy-related fields such as nuclear energy or environmental cancer research. However, the study of IQ experts revealed something quite surprising. Most experts’ private opinions mirrored the conclusions of psychologist Arthur Jensen, whom the media have consistently painted as extreme and marginal for holding precisely those views. As Snyderman and Rothman point out, the experts disclosed their agreement with this “controversial” and putatively marginal position only under cover of anonymity. No one, not even Jensen himself, had any inkling that his views now defined the mainstream of expert belief. Although Jensen regularly received private expressions of agreement, he and others had been, as Snyderman and Rothman note, widely castigated by the expert community for expressing some of those views.

Several decades ago, most experts, among them even Jensen, believed many of the views that the media now wrongly describe as mainstream – for example, that cultural bias accounts for the large black-white differences in mental test scores. While the private consensus among IQ experts has shifted to meet Jensen’s “controversial” views, the public impression of their views has not moved at all. Indeed, the now-refuted claim that tests are hopelessly biased is treated as a truism in public life today. The shift in private, if not public, beliefs among IQ experts is undoubtedly a response to the overwhelming weight of evidence which has accumulated in recent decades on die reality and practical importance of racial-ethnic differences in intelligence. This shift is by all indications a begrudging one, and certainly no flight into “racism.”

Snyderman and Rothman found that as many IQ experts as journalists and science editors (two out of three) agreed with the statement that “strong affirmative action measures should be used in hiring to assure black representation.” Fully 63 percent of the IQ experts described themselves as liberal politically, 17 percent as middle of the road, and 20 percent as conservative – not much different than the results for journalists (respectively, 64, 21, and 16 percent). Moreover, as Snyderman and Rothman suggest (and as is consistent with personal accounts by Jensen and others), many of the surveyed experts, while agreeing with Jensen’s conclusions, may disapprove of his expressing these conclusions openly. Consistent with this, when queried about their respect for the work of fourteen individuals who have written about intelligence or intelligence testing, the IQ experts rated Jensen only above the widely but apparently unjustly) vilified Cyril Burt. Despite the fact that most agreed with Jensen, they rated him far lower than often like-minded psychometricians who had generally stayed clear of the fray. Jensen even received significantly lower ratings than his vocal critics, such as psychologist Leon Kamin, whose scientific views are marginal by the experts’ own conclusions. By contrast, the experts in environmental cancer research behaved as one would expect; they gave higher reputational ratings to peers who are closer to the mainstream than to high-profile critics. Snyderman’s and Rothman’s findings therefore suggest that a high proportion of experts are misrepresenting their beliefs or are keeping silent in the face of a public falsehood. It is no wonder that the public remains misinformed on this issue.

Living Within a Lie

IQ experts feel enormous pressure to “live within a lie,” to use a phrase by Czech writer and leader Vaclav Havel characterizing daily life under communist rule n Eastern Europe. Havel argued, in The Power of the Powerless, that, by living a lie, ordinary citizens were complicit in their own tyranny. Every greengrocer, every clerk who agreed to display official slogans not reflecting his own beliefs, or who voted in elections known to be farcical, or who feigned agreement at political meetings, normalized falsification and tightened the regime’s grip on thought. Each individual who lived the lie, who capitulated to “ideological pseudo-reality,” became a petty instrument of the regime. As many commentators have noted, Americans may not speak certain truths about racial matters today. To adapt a phrase, there is a “structured silence.”

Social scientists had already begun subordinating scientific norms to political preferences and creating much of our current pseudo-reality on race by the mid-1960s. Sociologist Eleanor Wolf, in a 1972 article in Race, for example, detailed her distress at how fellow social scientists were misusing research data to support particular positions on civil rights policy: presenting inconclusive data as if it were decisive; lacking candor about “touchy” subjects (such as the undesirable behavior of lower-class students); blurring or shaping definitions (segregation, discrimination, racism) to suit “propagandistic” purposes; making exaggerated claims about the success of favored policies (compensatory education and school integration) while minimizing or ignoring contrary evidence. As a result, social science and social policy are now dominated by the theory that discrimination accounts for all racial disparities in achievements and well-being. This theory collapses, however, if deprived of the egalitarian fiction, as does the credibility of much current social policy. Neither could survive intact if their central premise were scrutinized.

No wonder, then, that IQ researchers find themselves under great professional and institutional pressure to avoid not only engaging in such scrutiny but even appearing to countenance it. The scrutiny itself must be discredited; the egalitarian fiction must be raised above serious scientific question. Scientists must at least appear to believe the dogma. As was the case in Havel’s communist-dominated Eastern Europe, in American academe feigned belief in the official version of reality is maintained largely by routine obeisance of academics as they pursue their own ambitions.

Scholars realize their scholarly ambitions primarily through other scholars. Peer recognition is the currency of academic and scientific life. It is crucial to a scholarly reputation and all the steps toward status and success – publications, professional invitations and awards, promotion, tenure, grants, fellowships, election to professional office, appointment to prestigious panels. One’s ability even to carry out certain kinds of research, funded or not, may be contingent upon peer recognition and respect – for instance, getting collaborators, subjects, or cooperation from potential research sites. Just as in personal life, a high professional reputation depends upon a sustained history of “appropriate” behavior, and it may be irreparably damaged by hints of scandal or impropriety. Similarly, the reputations of scientists and their organizations are enhanced or degraded by those for whom they show regard and approval. Associating oneself with highly regarded individuals or ideas enhances, even if slightly, one’s own status.

Awarding an honor to a luminary can enhance the reputation of one’s own organization, especially if the recipient accepts the honor with genuine appreciation. By the same token, one risks “staining” one’s reputation by associating with, honoring, defending, or even failing to condemn the “wrong” sort of individual or idea. In short, how one gives or withholds one’s regard is important for one’s professional reputation because it affects the regard one receives. Such a social system enhances the integrity of science and is furthered by personal ambition when the members of the community base their regard on scholarly norms, such as competence, creativity, and intellectual rigor. However, such a system breeds intellectual corruption when members systematically subordinate scientific norms to other considerations – money, politics, religion, fear. This is what appears to be happening today in the social sciences on matters of race and intelligence. As sociologist Robert Gordon argues, social science has become “one-party science.”

Democrat or Republican, liberal or conservative, virtually all American intellectuals publicly adhere to, if not espouse, the egalitarian fiction. And many demonstrate their party loyalty by enforcing the fiction in myriad small ways in their academic routine, say, by off-handedly dismissing racial differences in intelligence as “a racist claim, of course,” criticizing authors for “blaming the victim,” or discouraging students and colleagues from doing “sensitive” research. One can feel the gradient of collective alarm and disapproval like a deepening chill as one approaches the forbidden area. Researchers who cross the line occasionally face overt censorship, or calls for it. For example, one prominent (neoconservative) editor rejected an author’s paper, despite finding it scientifically sound, because there are social “considerations” which “overweigh the claims of social science.” Another eminent editor, after asking an author to soften the discussion in his article, recently published the revised paper with an editorial postscript admonishing scientists in the field to find a “balance” between the need for free exchange of research results on intelligence and the (presumably comparable) “need” that “no segment of our society. . .feel threatened” by it.

Covert and Overt Censorship

Whether motivated by a sincere concern over supposedly “dangerous” ideas or by a desire to distance themselves publicly from unpopular ideas, editors who use such non-academic standards discourage candor and stifle debate. They deaden social science by choking off one source of the genuine differences of opinion that are its lifeblood. Overt censorship of research is uncommon, probably because it is an obvious affront to academic norms. Less striking forms of censorship directly affect many more academics, however, and so may be more important. Easier to practice without detection and to disguise as “academic judgment,” they serve to keep scholars from pursuing ideas that might undermine the egalitarian dogma.

A less obvious form of censorship, which has become somewhat common recently, is indirect censorship. It is accomplished when academic or scientific organizations approve some views but repudiate or burden others on ideological grounds. Sometimes the ideological grounds are explicit Campus speech codes are a well-known example which, had they been upheld in the courts, would have made repudiation of the egalitarian fiction a punishable offense on some campuses. The earlier (unsuccessful) attempt to include possible “offense to minority communities” as grounds for refusing human subjects approval is another example.

Gordon reports yet others, including the National Institutes of Health’s new extra layer of review for politically “sensitive” grant proposals and the University of Delaware’s recent policy (reversed by a national arbitrator) of banning a particular funding source because, so the university claimed, it supports research on race which “conflicts with the university’s mission to promote racial and cultural diversity.” Gordon also outlines in detail – as political scientist Jan Blits has done – the covert application of ideological standards to facilitate expression of some views but burden others. This form of indirect censorship, also falling under the rubric of “political correctness,” occurs when university administrators, faculty, or officers of professional associations disguise as “professional judgment” an ideological bias in their enforcing of organizational rules, extending faculty privileges, protecting faculty rights, and weighing evidence in faculty promotions and grievances.

Recently, some American universities have invoked “professional judgment” as a pretext for reclassifying “controversial” scholarly publications in their annual merit reviews as “non-research,” to misrepresent outside peer reviews in evaluating controversial professionals up for promotion, and to limit student access to these professors. Such thinly veiled bias publicly demonstrates the officials’ own adherence to the prescribed institutional attitudes and their willingness to enforce them, not only protecting those officials from protest but also encouraging fellow members of the institution to toe the line.

Covert censorship is far more common than overt or indirect censorship. It consists of bias in the application of scientific norms when reviewers evaluate their peers’ work for funding, publication, presentation, or dissemination. Individual ideological biases are found in all fields, of course, but the hope is that such biases remain small and will cancel each other out over the long run-hence the importance of a free and open exchange of data, theories, and results. What I have in mind is systematic bias and a pervasive double standard which impedes one line of research and accords another undeserved hegemony. In one-party science, the disfavored line of work is subjected to intense scrutiny and nearly impossible standards, while the favored line of work is held to lax standards in which flaws are overlooked (called “oversight bias” in the psychological literature). Similarly, the disfavored idea is rejected unless it is “balanced” by including proponents of the favored view (even if that view is the equivalent of “flat-earth theory”), where the favored line of work is readily accepted for publication or presentation, even when it totally ignores the opposing literature. Getting a controversial paper accepted under such circumstances often becomes a test of endurance between the editor and reviewers (in coming up with criticisms) and the author (in rebutting them). Submitting IQ research or grant proposals outside the narrowest professional confines exposes intelligence researchers to yet other biases, usually of the kind to which reviewers of the proposals will accept no rebuttal.

The broader circle of critics in the social sciences often implicitly dismisses the legitimacy of research on intelligence itself by arguing that “intelligence” is undefinable or unmeasurable – as if the critics’ own favored constructs (social class, culture, self-concept, anxiety, and so on) were as well validated and operationalized. Others now also seek to deny IQ researchers (but not themselves) use of the concept “race” because, they assert, race is not a biological condition, but is socially constructed. The double standards can even ricochet back and forth, depending on the particular question being considered. Gordon recalls how sociologists failed to criticize sociologist James Coleman for omitting student ability from his analyses of school integration (which led to overstating the impact of integrated schools on black achievement-for sociologists a favorable outcome), but how they criticized him roundly for the very same omission in analyses of private versus public schools,(which led to overstating the impact of private schools on black achievement – an unfavorable outcome). In short, in one-party science, scientific regard flows like political patronage to loyal and active party members, who can demonstrate their loyalty by being alert to hints of dissidence. Like all one-party political systems, one-party science becomes intellectually corrupt and arrogant as it gains confidence in its power.

The most insidious corruption to which one-party science leads is pervasive self-censorship, what involved researchers generally prefer to regard as “prudence” or “avoiding unnecessary trouble.” Coleman has drawn particular attention to the problem of “self-suppression “the impulse not to ask the crucial question” – in research on race. In an example from his own research for the influential “Coleman Report,” he describes his failure to conduct important analyses that might have produced embarrassing findings about the abilities of black teachers. Another way of avoiding unwanted results is to ignore certain data, subjects, or variables. Or unwanted results can be omitted, buried in footnotes, explained away, or simply ignored in one’s conclusions. The most subtle form of self-censorship is deliberate avoidance of making crucial connections, or denying them. Psychologist Richard Herrnstein has noted that it was his drawing out the implications of one such connection, namely, that some portion of (white) social class differences in intelligence is genetic, that sparked his public excoriation in the 1970s.

Normally, scholars are eager to explicate illuminating connections between subspecialties. They are reluctant to do so, however, when these connections put in question the egalitarian dogma on race. Virtually all sociologists and economists ignore the literature on intelligence despite its central importance to core issues in their disciplines, such as inequalities in occupation and income. Researchers in the various subfields of intelligence obviously cannot ignore the literature with impunity. Yet they, too, often prefer to stay strictly within the confines of their specialties rather than making crucial, but unpopular, connections, or they use language that obscures what otherwise would be quite obvious.

Many psychometricians, especially those working for large testing organizations, avoid referring to “intelligence” and often seem reluctant to say much about the practical or theoretical meaning of the racial differences they observe on unbiased tests. But even remaining within one’s subfield is often not enough, for the field of intelligence itself is widely suspect. Hence some scholars explicitly disavow unpopular connections that critics might attribute to them. For example, they will argue in favor of the importance of intelligence for scholastic performance but then assure their readers, over-optimistically, that the racial gap “seems to be closing rapidly.” The tenor of these preemptive disclaimers is clear. While researchers in any field may lightly dismiss the credibility of key connections regarding race and intelligence, no one ever lightly endorses their credibility with impunity. Even those of us committed to candor are exceedingly cautious when expressing informed opinions on certain topics, especially the genetics of race. Thus, publicly stated opinions of researchers about matters outside their subfields tend in one direction – to dispute or undercut the facts necessary for toppling the egalitarian fiction. What may be tolerable behavior at the individual level becomes intolerable bias at the aggregate level. Censorship – even self-censorship – requires justification, or at least apparent justification.

On the whole, those who would squelch open inquiry of the egalitarian fiction base their justification on two assertions: 1) Research on racial differences in intelligence has already been scientifically “discredited.” 2) Inquiry into racial differences is immoral.

Point one asserts that the egalitarian premise is absolute truth and hence beyond scientific scrutiny. Point two is indifferent to its truth. Both counsel outrage at the very thought of the research. The claim that the research has been discredited rests largely on extensive misrepresentation that is often embarrassingly crude or casual – for example, contradicting arguments an author never made, while ignoring what was actually stated; attributing policy preferences to an author which are opposite of what the author actually expressed; or simply alleging fraud or gross incompetence without any substantiation whatsoever. The claim that the research is immoral rests squarely on the view that, regardless of the truth, the study itself can only be harmful. In fact, some critics assert (mostly privately) that the greater the truth, the greater the danger it poses to lower-scoring groups, and thus the greater the need to suppress it.

Despite their differences, both justifications for censorship often take the form of demonizing open inquiry by labeling it (and the people who practice it) as “dangerous,” “fascist,” “ideological,” or “racist.” The study of race and intelligence is something, they tell us, that no decent person – let alone a serious scientist – would ever do and that every decent person and serious researcher would oppose. Thus, in a kind of Orwellian inversion, marked by what Gordon calls “high talk and low blows,” the suppression of science presents itself as science itself. Intellectual dishonesty becomes the handmaiden of social conscience, and ideology is declared knowledge while knowledge is dismissed as mere ideology. Neither social policy, nor science, nor society itself is served well by scientific silence on racial differences in intelligence.

Enforcement of the egalitarian fiction has tragic consequences, especially for blacks. The outcomes are even worse than researchers of intelligence predicted two decades ago. The falsehood, because it tries to defy a reality that has conspicuous repercussions in daily life, is doing precisely what it was meant to avoid: producing pejorative racial stereotypes, fostering racial tensions, stripping members of lower-scoring groups of their dignity and incentives to achieve, and creating permanent social inequalities between the races. Enforcement of the lie is gradually distorting and degrading all institutions and processes where intelligence is at least somewhat important (which is practically everywhere) but especially where it is most important (in public schools, higher education, the professions, and high-level executive work). The falsehood requires that there be racial preferences and that their use be disguised, wherever intelligence has at least moderate importance. Society is thus being shaped to meet the dictates of a collective fraud. The fiction is aiding and abetting bigots to a fat greater degree than any truth ever could, because its specific side-effects – racial preferences, official mendacity, free-wielding accusations of racism, and falling standards – are creating deep cynicism and broad resentment against minorities, blacks in particular, among the citizenry.

Enforcement of the egalitarian fiction is not a moral or scientific imperative; it is merely political. It is terribly short-sighted, for it corrupts both science and society. However, just as the fiction is sustained by small untruths, so can it be broken down by many small acts of scientific integrity. This requires no particular heroism. All that is required is for scientists to act like scientists-to demand, clearly and consistently, respect for truth and for free inquiry in their own settings, and to resist the temptation to win easy approval by endorsing a comfortable lie.

Linda S. Gottfredson is professor of educational studies at the University of Delaware and co-director of the Project for the Study of Intelligence and Society. She has published widely on fairness in testing and racial inequality, focusing most recently on race-norming and the dilemmas in managing workforce diversity. Her current work examines social policy based on the egalitarian fiction.

READINGS SUGGESTED BY THE AUTHOR

Jan H. Blits and Linda S. Gottfredson. “Equality or Lasting Inequality?” Society, 27 (3) March/April 1990.

Robert A. Gordon. The Battle to Establish a Sociology of Intelligence: A Case Study in the Sociology of Politicized Disciplines. Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkin University, Department of Sociology, 1993.

Linda S. Gottfredson. “Dilemmas in Developing Diversity Programs.” In Diversity in the Workplace: Human Resources Initiatives, Susan Jackson (ed.). New York: The Guilford Press, 1992.

Linda S. Gottfredson and James C. Sharf (eds.). “Fairness in Employment Testing.” Journal of Vocational Behavior, 33, December 1988.

Richard J. Herrnstein. “A True Tale from the Annals of Orthodoxy.” Preface to IQ in the Meritocracy. Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown and Company, 1973.

Daniel Seligman. A Question of intelligence. New York: Birch Lane Press, 1992.


The Reality of Race

The Reality of Race
by Thomas Jackson
From American Renaissance magazine November, 1993

“Race is a veritable mountain of evidence, all of which can lead only to the conclusion that the races differ in ability. Nevertheless, Dr. Baker is strictly the scientist. He draws no further conclusions and makes no suggestions about social policy. There is no doubt in his mind that current orthodoxy on this subject is absurd, but he limits his exegesis to the interpretation of data.”

John R. Baker, Race, Foundation for Human Understanding (original publisher: Oxford Univ. Press), 1974

Introduction
The Proper Study of Mankind
Race and Color
Equal or Unequal?
A Mountain of Evidence

Race, by John Baker, is a remarkable book. There is probably no other treatment of the biology and physical anthropology of race that approaches it in breadth, detail, erudition or style. Even more remarkable is the book’s point of view. Far from evading the issue of racial differences in ability, it was written for the very purpose of investigating and clarifying those differences.

Dr. Baker, now deceased, was the ideal author for this book. He was professor emeritus of cytology at Oxford University, a Fellow of the Royal Society, and president of the Royal Microscopical Society. To these professional qualifications he added an abiding interest in what he called the “ethnic question,” that is to say, the entire range of ways in which the races differ.

Written late in life, Race is Dr. Baker’s definitive statement on what he considered one of the most important issues of our time. From start to finish the book is stuffed with little-known, eye-opening facts, and it is fascinating, even essential reading for anyone with a serious interest in race. It is supplemented with more than 80 illustrations, and some of the simpler line drawings are reproduced here.

Race is organized in four parts. The first is a summary of what was thought and freely written about racial differences up through the end of the 1920s when, as Dr. Baker puts it, “the curtain came down” on open discussion. The second is an introduction to the biology of taxonomy or classification, including a thorough treatment of how races and species are identified. The third is a detailed inventory of the biological differences that distinguish the major races and subraces. In this section Dr. Baker makes a particular study of whites, or Europids as he calls them, and of Africans (Negrids), Bushmen (Sanids), Australian aborigines (Australids), Celts, and Jews. In the final section, Dr. Baker sets out what he considers to be the essential criteria for determining what he bluntly calls superiority and inferiority. Not surprisingly, his conclusions are at odds with current dogma.

Dr. Baker’s historical account of what has been written about ethnic differences includes introductions to a number of people one might well expect, such as the Comte de Gobineau, Houston Stewart Chamberlain, Nietzsche, Francis Galton, and even Hitler. Dr. Baker also describes the pioneering but no longer recognized work of men like Johann Blumenbach (1752-1840) and Samuel Sommerring (1755-1830).

Other famous men have pronounced themselves on the question of racial differences and, until recently, few have had any sympathy for the notion of equality. Rousseau, for example, thought the chimpanzee was a primitive form of human being, and Kant, Voltaire, and Hume thought the Negro vastly inferior to the European. Dr. Baker reminds us that even the Bible is hardly silent on the ethnic problem. The Children of Israel routinely exterminated enemies, whom they considered inferior, and in the tenth book of Joshua, they enslaved the entire Hivite people.

The Proper Study of Mankind

In the more technical sections that follow, Dr. Baker draws on his scientific training to treat homo sapiens as just one more member of the animal kingdom. “No one knows man who knows only man,” he observes, and adds: “One might almost go so far as to say, in relation to the ethnic problem, that the proper study of mankind is animals.” By this he means that without a thorough grounding in biology and taxonomy it is impossible to view man with the detachment that science requires. Dr. Baker writes, he explains, in the spirit that inspired T.H. Huxley to conclude that “Anthropology is a section of zoology [and] . . . the problems of ethnology are simply those which are presented to the zoologist by every widely distributed animal he studies.” In this, Dr. Baker is out of step with many contemporary social scientists who seem to believe that humans are uniquely exempt from the laws of heredity and from the kind of scrutiny to which all other animals are subject.

Dr. Baker leads us firmly back to biology with an account of how evolution gave rise to different species, how species are classified, the nature of hybridity, and the circumstances under which animals can be made to mate with differing species. Anthropology indeed becomes a branch of zoology. However, in this discussion it becomes clear that man differs from animals in at least one important way: humans are exceedingly unselective in their mating habits and will copulate with individuals–across racial lines, for example–from whom they are physically very different.

The contrast with the seven kinds of European mosquito, for example, could not be greater. Their eggs can be distinguished because of slight differences, but adults are so similar that not even experts can tell them apart under a microscope. What experts cannot do, the mosquitoes do without fail; they never interbreed.

Dr. Baker likewise reports that Grant’s gazelle and Thompson’s gazelle live together in mixed herds and are so similar in appearance that it takes a trained eye to tell them apart. They, too, never interbreed. It is only under domestication that animals can be made to overcome their repugnance for mates unlike themselves and thus produce mules or leopons (a cross between tiger and leopard). Domesticated dogs breed indiscriminately with widely different types but wild dogs like wolves, foxes, and coyotes breed only with their own kind.

Man is the most domesticated of animals and the least exclusive in his amours–but his promiscuity varies enormously by group and individual. As Dr. Baker points out, the Indian caste system successfully prevented interbreeding even among racially similar people. At the same time, there are individuals whose lust for animals is so great that bestiality has had to be specifically forbidden ever since Biblical times.

The races and sub-races of man have evolved largely because of geographical separation, but Dr. Baker also refers to what he calls “ecological races” that evolved to fill different but overlapping niches. The small stature of African pygmies, for example, fits them to forest life while the larger Negrids live in clearings.

If humans had continued to evolve in isolation or if they were as discriminating as animals in their choice of mates, racial differences would eventually lead to mutually infertile species. This would be diversity of a truly remarkable kind.

Domestication and travel have led to increasing miscegenation, but Dr. Baker speculates about another possible reason. The skulls of our remote ancestors show that their olfactory organs were much better developed than ours. It is also likely that ancient man had stronger odors than does modern man, and since our ancestors’ mating habits were probably governed by smell just like those of animals, this discouraged mating with unfamiliar peoples. Even today the races have different odors.

Dr. Baker notes drily that although modern man is scrupulous in selecting only the most promising breeding couples among his domestic animals, he almost never gives the same attention to his own reproduction. “It follows,” he adds, “that we cannot look for any advance in inborn intelligence . . . .”

Race and Color

Dr. Baker writes at some length about skin color, but only because race and color are sometimes confused. He himself thinks the subject is trivial and, in fact, since at least Darwin’s time scientists have recognized that color is unimportant in distinguishing biological forms. Dr. Baker points out that to make color the touch stone of race is as stupid as to think that a red rose is more closely related to a red petunia than to a white rose.

Australian aborigines are similar in color to Bushmen, for example, but it would be difficult to think of two racial groups that are more dissimilar biologically. Likewise, Dr. Baker explains that some of the inhabitants of northern India have relatively dark skin but are racially very close to Europids.

Skin color is affected by the color of blood that may be visible through it, but the main reason for variations in skin color is the presence of different amounts of the pigment melanin. All humans make the same melanin and have much the same number of melanocytes–the difference is in how much melanin is produced. The darkest Africans have visible concentrations of melanin even in the whites of their eyes and on their tongues. Melanin colors hair as well as skin, though it is the presence of a slightly different substance, called phaeomelanin, that causes “red” hair.

Dr. Baker explains that blue eyes are not caused by a blue pigment but by the absence of pigment. Eyes appear to be blue for the same reason the edges of a snow bank may appear blue: red light and other long wave lengths pass through but shorter, bluer wave lengths are refracted and scattered, and some are reflected back towards the viewer.

Light-skinned people are probably descended from dark-skinned people who migrated from the tropics. The skin of Europeans transmits three and a half times as much sunlight as the skin of Africans, and the ultraviolet rays convert ergosterol in the body into vitamin D. Dark-skinned people, whose skins are adapted to sunnier latitudes, may therefore get rickets–caused by vitamin D deficiency–if they live in cold climates.

The third section of Race, in which Dr. Baker describes the myriad ways in which the races differ from each other physically is the most technical. It includes general descriptions of blood chemistry, physiology and skeletal structure, with a special emphasis on the characteristics of the skull. It introduces concepts like brachycephaly, paedomorphism, and the cranial index.

It is useful for the reader to have had some training in physiology but it is not necessary. Even the most technical passages can usually be understood by a non-specialist who has paid close attention to earlier explanations, and Dr. Baker has set his most abstruse observations in smaller type as a signal to laymen that they may skip over them without much loss.

A certain level of scientific detail is necessary here not merely because physiological differences between the races require a certain vocabulary. In this section Dr. Baker is at pains to explain the extent to which some races show the traits of primitiveness–the retention into the modern era of features possessed by our remote ancestors–and paedomorphy–the retention as adults of traits commonly associated with children.

For example, it is indisputable that Australids are more primitive than other races. Like Pithecanthropus, their teeth and lower jaws are strikingly large, and their skulls are twice as thick as those of any other race. The forehead recedes sharply, and the brow ridges are so well developed as to be reminiscent of Pithecanthropus and of the larger apes. The brain is only about 85 percent the size of that of Europids and the back part has lunate folds not found in other races but similar to those in the brains of orang-utans. Likewise, the nasal aperture is similar, in some respects, to that of the orang-utan.

The Bushmen, or Sanids, show equally remarkable evidence of paedomorphy. Their very small size–males are often no taller than 4′7″ or 4′9″–is the most obviously juvenile characteristic retained by adults. Their skulls are notably short and squat like those of a Europid infant and their eyes are set wide apart like a new-born’s. The facial and body hair of both sexes is very weakly developed and reminiscent of children. Among males, the scrotum is like that of a pre-adolescent: so small and tightly drawn up that one might think only one testicle had descended.

As for Negrids, aside from a brain that is very slightly smaller than that of Europids and Sinids (North Asians), Dr. Baker finds no characteristics that could be called either primitive or paedomorphous. Negrids differ in blood chemistry from other races, and have broader shoulders and thinner calves. Certain tribes, such as the Hottentot, show extreme steatopygia or enlarged buttocks. In some cases the posterior extends horizontally, almost like a shelf.

Francis Galton, who travelled among the Hottentot in 1850 and 1851, wrote of one such woman that he was “perfectly aghast at her development.” He wanted to measure her dimensions but could not bring himself to ask her permission to do so. Instead, he took observations through his sextant and, he says, “worked out the results by trigonometry and logarithms.”

Equal or Unequal?

The question of whether Africans are, on average, equal in intelligence to whites is important both in the United States and in Britain. Dr. Baker therefore devotes considerable space to 19th-century accounts of African societies before they came into sustained contact with foreigners. This is the only sure way to know how far they had been able to advance without outside influence.

Every explorer found a remarkable poverty of development. No black African society had a written language or a calendar. None used the wheel or practiced joinery or built multi-story buildings. Iron smelting was common but no black Africans built what could be called a mechanical device, even one so simple as a hinge. Africans apparently tamed no animals themselves but received already-domesticated dogs and cattle from north of the Sahara. None used any beast of burden, despite the presence of large mammals that could have been tamed.

Although African societies are today described as having rich oral histories, this was by no means universal. A few tribes did have men who could recite the histories of their kings, but many were completely ignorant of the past. The Ovaherero tribe, for example, kept no count of years at all.

Slavery and polygamy were widespread. Arbitrary execution of subjects by rulers or wives by husbands was common. A few tribes ate human flesh though even some of their own members seem to have rejected this custom. Some coastal natives, seeing slaves being fed before being loaded onto ships for export, believed that Europeans intended to eat them.

Some people have argued that the reason Africans showed such poor development was that the effort to maintain life was too great to permit the leisure for advancement. On the contrary, the missionary and explorer, David Livingstone, found that some parts of the continent were a veritable paradise:

“To one who has observed the hard toil of the poor in old civilized countries, the state in which the inhabitants here live is one of glorious ease. . . . Food abounds, and very little labour is required for its cultivation; the soil is so rich that no manure is required.”

Although Dr. Baker does not pursue this idea very far, he suggests that it was the very ease of life in Africa that kept high intelligence from being as necessary for survival as it was in harsher climates.

In the concluding section of Race, Dr. Baker draws the only conclusions that the data will permit: Just as they differ in biology, the races differ in their mental traits. They are not equally intelligent or capable of building civilized societies. Dr. Baker reviews the literature on mental testing and on the heritability of intelligence and finds that it only confirms his conclusions.

After setting out an interesting set of criteria for genuine civilization he finds that the first people to achieve it were the Sumerians of the fourth millennium B.C. Physically, it is likely that they were more closely related to the Kurds than to any other present people. Europids and Sinids have also created genuine civilizations, but Negrids and Australids have not.

Dr. Baker puts the Maya of Central America in a category of their own. Their astronomy and mathematics were extremely advanced and were at one time the most sophisticated in the world. They built great cities and administered large territories. However, Dr. Baker hesitates to call them genuinely civilized for several reasons: they did not use the wheel or use commercial weights, their written language was poorly developed and their religion was a mass of superstitions that were often the basis for torture, human sacrifice, and mass slaughter.

A Mountain of Evidence

Race is a veritable mountain of evidence, all of which can lead only to the conclusion that the races differ in ability. Nevertheless, Dr. Baker is strictly the scientist. He draws no further conclusions and makes no suggestions about social policy. There is no doubt in his mind that current orthodoxy on this subject is absurd, but he limits his exegesis to the interpretation of data.

In its realm, however, Race is a magisterial work to which justice cannot be done in a review. It is probably the single most ambitious and comprehensive volume on the subject ever attempted, and is surely without peer in its treatment of the physical differences that distinguish races. It is not an easy book — Dr. Baker does not address himself to dullards or dilettantes — but in these blighted times it is a stroke of astonishing good fortune that a man of his immense learning and ability should have chosen to take up a position on the unpopular but truthful side of “the ethnic problem.”


Race, Evolution, and Behavior: A Life History Perspective

Race, Evolution, and Behavior: A Life History Perspective
by Mark Snyderman
from National Review, Sept 12, 1994

WHAT MUST Pat Shipman think of Phillipe Rushton? Dr. Shipman describes how the scientific study of racial difference has too often been polluted by political forces; she proclaims her allegiance to science, and declares that we are better off knowing the unaltered truth about racial differences. But her rhetoric betrays great fear of what science may reveal.

Phillipe Rushton apparently has no such fear. Although his story is absent from Dr. Shipman’s book, it would fit neatly. Mr. Rushton, a professor of psychology at the University of Western Ontario, has endured excoriation because he has dared to posit an evolutionary/genetic explanation for racial differences in a wide variety of physical and behavioral characteristics. Undeterred, he has even appeared on Geraldo (though this episode may demonstrate more an ignorance of American television than fortitude). Mr. Rushton’s new book — a synthesis of a vast body of scientific research on racial differences — is his most ambitious, and fearless, work. Pat Shipman should be happy. She probably won’t be.

Dr. Shipman’s book, The Evolution of Racism, is beautifully written, and endlessly intriguing, but one is never quite sure what it is supposed to be about. For starters, the title is misleading. The book is only marginally about racism, as the word is commonly understood.

What Dr. Shipman does present is a series of case studies, told largely through biographical accounts, of the politicization of scientific debate over racial differences and genetic explanations of behavior. These are fascinating stories, well told. But the stories have no clear moral.

The book begins with a wonderful portrayal of Darwin’s insecurity about his new theory, of Thomas Huxley’s unabashed championing of Darwinism, and of Huxley’s famous debate with Bishop Wilberforce which put the theory of evolution over the top. Dr. Shipman begins the real discussion of race with the clash between the owlish Rudolf Virchow, perhaps the pre-eminent German scientist of the mid nineteenth century, and the vigorous Aryan Ernst Haeckel. Virchow opposed the theory of evolution because he thought it inconsistent with his own scientific theories and a fundamental challenge to his view of the social order, while Haeckel championed Darwinism and then used it to further his theories of racial superiority and his political position. Dr. Shipman decries the damage to science in the ensuing struggle.

There follows a discussion of the eugenics movement and of Hitler (who sought justification in Haeckel’s writings), and the post-war backlash against the scientific study of race. Dr. Shipman gives us an enlightening account of anthropologist Ashley Montagu [aka Israel Ehrenberg], a vehement anti-racist and author of the 1950 UNESCO Statement on Race. The Ashley Montagu Statement, as it has come to be known, denies the validity of any notion that human groups differ in innate characteristics of intelligence or temperament, and touts scientific support for “the ethic of universal brotherhood.”

Montagu subsequently was among those who led the attack on Carleton Coon. According to Dr. Shipman, Coon was “a man betrayed by history.” An anthropologist-explorer trained in the early twentieth century, Coon published his life’s work, The Origin of Races, in 1962. His thesis was that the various races developed long ago–a half million years before we became Homo sapiens–and that some races developed into modern humans more slowly than others. Whatever its merits, Dr. Shipman explains, this was a work of science, not of racial politics. Yet it is not difficult to imagine the reaction to such a work in 1962, at the very moment that the civil-rights movement was coming into full swing. What is remarkable is that so much of the criticism from other scientists took the form of personal attack and political diatribe. As the line between concerned scientist and social activist blurred, genetic and evolutionary accounts of racial differences simply would not be tolerated even by those whose job it was to search for the truth: “It was an unresolvable conflict between the fervent social activist and the irascible scientific purist. But the tenor of the times was such that it was the scientific purist, Coon, who was disgraced and, to some extent, driven out of his profession.”

Dr. Shipman’s final case study is the tale of an attorney and researcher named David Wasserman. Mr. Wasserman had the idea to sponsor a conference on the legal and social implications of behavioral genetic studies of criminality. The story of how his innocent project became entangled in, and eventually destroyed by, the racially charged reaction to a wholly independent Bush Administration program is out of Kafka. Like many interested in biology and behavior, Mr. Wasserman was defeated by those who believe that there are some questions science simply should not ask.

In the end, one wonders where Dr. Shipman stands on this issue. She bemoans the politicization of science and proclaims that we are better off studying racial differences, yet she is afraid of what such research might find. Her fear comes very close to overwhelming her defense of science. Thus, the book ends with the following cryptic summation:

The trajectory begun with Darwin has run its course. No one has sought to provoke a bitter controversy, but the value of differences among humans has reached out its sticky pseudopods and engulfed the unwary over and over again. The monster cannot be outran; it threatens us all. There is a real danger here …. To date, we have feared to wrestle with it openly, we have turned our heads and shielded our eyes from the horror of the problem. Rather than face the monster, we have played, instead, at politicizing first evolutionary theory and then genetics, for we are intrinsically political animals and it is a game that comes naturally. We have fought each other–called each other names, accused each other of sinister intent, promulgated bitter insinuations–instead of fighting ignorance. In so doing, we have given the hate-mongers time to feed the monster. It has swelled on a steady diet of racial divisiveness, lies, and half-truths until it is strong enough to destroy us all.

What exactly is this “monster” to which Dr. Shipman refers? It is, apparently, the truth about human differences. How are we to handle the truth, if it “threatens us all”?

Dr. Shipman’s unsatisfying answer is to trust in the power of the environment. Should it turn out that there is a significant genetic component to individual and racial differences in behavior, she concludes, “Our only hope lies in the certainty that these attributes are subject to tremendous environmental modification.” For her, this is simply an article of faith.

Dr. Shipman’s fear of the genetic is evident in her readiness to reject biological explanations. In criticizing early behavioral genetics, for example, she explains that “we have a different perspective on what traits are heritable today.” She takes as an example the perceived difference in volubility between Italians and Finns. “Is it because Italians more commonly carry genes for talkativeness than Finns? It is wildly improbable that this is so, for how could such a gene work?” This is a naive response from a physical anthropologist. Of course there is no single gene for talkativeness, yet there plainly is some genetic mechanism that allows humans to talk (unless Dr. Shipman postulates that the lack of speech in other species is entirely due to a difference in environment). Why, then, is it difficult to imagine that this genetic mechanism might differ in degree among individuals or groups?

Dr. Shipman’s unease about any genetic explanation is particularly apparent in her treatment of intelligence, which lies at the heart of the controversy about racial differences. She follows unthinkingly the argument set forth by Stephen Jay Gould in his 1981 book The Mismeasure of Man. The argument is that the development of intelligence tests in the early part of this century was driven largely by the eugenics movement and belief in the inferiority of certain groups. The upshot of this argument is a form of guilt by association: intelligence tests were born of racism; thus they must retain their racist tint. Mr. Gould’s conclusion, which Dr. Shipman parrots, is that intelligence tests at best are extremely sensitive to environmental variation, and therefore are of limited usefulness in measuring intelligence or establishing any genetic component to differences in intellectual functioning.

Mr. Gould is wrong, and so is Dr. Shipman. While it is true that racists found some support in early test results, the historical record reveals that the majority of early mental testers were engaged in a legitimate scientific enterprise. There were flaws in these tests to be sure, as there are flaws today, but the large-scale problems with test development and administration to which Mr. Gould points have been eliminated. Evidence of the validity of modern intelligence and aptitude tests, and of the significant heritable component to individual differences in intelligence, is beyond rational refutation. (The genetic basis of group differences remains uncertain.) In following Mr. Gould, Dr. Shipman has fallen prey to the same environmentalist bias she condemns in the reaction to Coon and Wasserman.

WHAT IF she is wrong. What if scientific investigation reveals, for example, that there are average differences in intelligence between members of different races that cannot be accounted for by any known sources of environmental variation? Faith in the power of the environment will not shield us from that “monster.”

Phillipe Rushton is willing to accept the results of his science. He describes hundreds of studies worldwide that show a consistent pattern of human racial differences. The three primary human racial groups–Mongoloids (Orientals), Negroids (blacks), and Caucasoids (Caucasians)–show significant average differences in such characteristics as intelligence, brain size, genital size, strength of sex drive, reproductive potency, industriousness, sociability, and rule following. On each of these variables, the groups are aligned in the order: Orientals, Caucasians, blacks. On average, according to the data Mr. Rushton reports, Orientals are more intelligent, have larger brains for their body size, have smaller genitalia, have less sex drive, are less fecund, work harder, and are more readily socialized than Caucasians; and Caucasians on average bear the same relationship to blacks. There is, of course, tremendous variation within each group on each of these variables, and a great degree of overlap between groups. The group differences Mr. Rushton reports are not large, but they are demonstrable.

He proposes an evolutionary explanation based on “life history theory.” The theory assumes “that each species (or subspecies, such as a race) has evolved a characteristic life history adapted to the particular ecological problems encountered by its ancestors.” These strategies are organized along a continuum from “K-strategies” to “r-strategies.” K-strategies “emphasize high levels of parental care, resource acquisition, kin provisioning, and social complexity,” while r-strategies “emphasize gamete production, mating behavior, and high reproductive rates.” Compared to other species, humans are K-strategists. Based on the data he reports, Mr. Rushton observes that Orientals are the most K-strategizing of the human races, and blacks are the most r-strategizing.

According to Mr. Rushton, r-strategies evolve in environments in which the population is kept below the carrying capacity of the environment (that is, where there are more resources for survival than there are members of the population to use them) because of unpredictable factors such as weather or predators. K-strategies are more adaptive in environments in which the population is close to carrying capacity and competitive interactions among individuals are important. Put simply, when there are abundant resources, organisms are better off producing many offspring and letting them fend for themselves; when the environment is difficult, organisms are better off putting their resources into equipping each offspring to survive.

Mr. Rushton’s thesis now falls into place. Blacks evolved in Africa in an abundant but unpredictable environment that favored reproduction over nurturance, relative to other human populations. The harsh environment of northeast Asia in which Orientals evolved favored more nurturing, socialization, and greater intellectual capacity. Caucasian evolution in Eurasia imposed intermediate pressures.

Underlying Mr. Rushton’s thesis is the contention that there is a genetic basis for much of the observed between-race variation he reports. Here is where he will meet the most resistance. Behavioral genetic studies of between-race differences are notoriously difficult, as Mr. Rushton admits. Nonetheless he strongly argues for a genetic component to average between-race differences. He presents much behavioral genetic evidence on the question, but his most compelling argument is intuitive. What possible environmental variables could account for the systematic alignment of the races on such a wide variety of characteristics, including behavioral traits evident soon after birth, “the speed of dental and other maturational variables, the size of the brain, the number of gametes produced, [and] the physiological differences in testosterone?” The strictly environmental hypothesis also is undermined by the various studies that demonstrate a significant genetic component to within-race individual differences on each of the behavioral and physical characteristics and the fact that these racial differences are consistent across cultures. Mr. Rushton contends that only an evolutionary/genetic explanation makes sense of these disparate data.

This is dynamite he fails to handle with sufficient care. Mr. Rushton tries in the preface of his book to temper the impact of what follows. He notes that he is dealing for the most part with relatively small group differences, and that these differences are likely the result of environmental determination as much as genetic. He explains also that the mechanisms that mediate genetic effects offer “numerous ways for intervention and the alleviation of suffering.” His three-paragraph caveat is a tame cousin to the paean to the environment with which Pat Shipman ends her book. As such, it is woefully inadequate to head off any of the attack that is to come. Mr. Rushton must be aware of this; he seems not to care. “There are no necessary policies that flow from race research,” he declares. His reliance on this single idea indicates either a naivete about political reality or an unshakable faith in science.

Mr. Rushton is not naive. He begins his book with a discussion of the difficulties of the scientific study of race:

The propensity to defend one’s own group, to see it as special, and not to be susceptible to the laws of evolutionary biology makes the scientific study of ethnicity and race differences problematic. Theories and facts generated in race research may be used by ethnic nationalists to propagate political positions. Antiracists may also engage in rhetoric to deny differences and suppress discoveries. Findings based on the study of race can be threatening. Ideological mine fields abound in ways that do not pertain in other areas of inquiry.

This passage could serve as a summary of Pat Shipman’s treatise. Mr. Rushton adds a twist. He posits that the politicization of the scientific study of race may itself have evolutionary origins. He devotes a chapter to genetic similarity theory, the hypothesis that genetically similar people tend to seek one another out and to provide mutually supportive environments.” This phenomenon, according to Mr. Rushton, “may represent a biological factor underlying ethnocentrism.” Thus, the reaction to work like Mr. Rushton’s may have deeper roots than in our present environment.

Phillipe Rushton has written his own epitaph. Any genetic predisposition toward the defense of one’s race only adds to the near impossibility of rational response to the scientific study of race in a world that has seen the Holocaust and racial subjugation. As he explains, “The evolutionary psychology of race differences has become the most politically incorrect topic in the world today.” Mr. Rushton’s work may be ignored by the fearful, damned by the liberals, and misused by the racists. It is unlikely to be truly understood by anyone.


Summary of Rushton\’s \”Race, Evolution and Behavior\”

Race, Evolution, and Behavior: A Life History Perspective
by J. Philippe Rushton
New Brunswick NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1995, 334 pp.

***

Reviewed by FSU Professor Glayde Whitney
in Contemporary Psychology, December 1996, pp. 1189-1191.

The Return of Racial Science

The Theory

The History

The Reception

The Pity

References

If the mavens of Politically Correct could enforce an Index Librorum Prohibitorum, then you would not be allowed to read this book. Serious scientific considerations of similarities and differences among the living races of humankind have been in eclipse for most of a century. With Race, Evolution and Behavior author Rushton goes a good distance toward reinstating objective scientific rationality to this important and sensitive area of investigation. Here within a single cover are considered topics of race with regard to intelligence, aggression and criminality, sexual behavior, parenting behaviors, personality, rates of maturation, sexually transmitted diseases, social stability, brain size, differential rates of twinning, pharmaceutical reactions, and much more, along with genes and evolution. Rushton reports that for over 60 variables he has found the same pattern among races: “people of east Asian ancestry (Mongoloids, Orientals) and people of African ancestry (Negroids, blacks) define opposite ends of the spectrum with people of European ancestry (Caucasoids, whites) falling intermediately,” (p xiii). Although there is much variability among individuals within each broad racial category, the average differences between them are consistent indirection across diverse physical, behavioral, and social variables.

The Theory

To theoretically account for the consistent pattern of differences across races for so many disparate variables requires a high-level, broad conceptual framework. Rushton proposes a “gene-based evolutionary theory” that utilizes concepts from population biology. The r – K scale of reproductive strategy has been widely used in many sociobiological applications. The symbol “r” initially denoted “intrinsic rate of increase”, while “K” is the symbol for “carrying capacity of the environment” (MacArthur and Wilson, 1967). The individuals of populations which have been r-selected tend to mature rapidly and reproduce at a young age. The emphasis is on maximization of number of offspring with less resources devoted to the care of each individual offspring. The species which are r-selected often exist at population densities that are well below the theoretical carrying capacity of their environment; they experience high rates of death due to unpredictable causes (disease, local famine). The r evolutionary strategy has been to throw out lots of kids in the likelihood that some might survive in a capricious world.

Individuals which are K strategists tend to live in more predictable environments and they mature more slowly. Rather than high rates of reproduction, there is delayed reproduction and considerable resources are devoted to caring for the smaller number of offspring which are produced. The K evolutionary strategy has been to produce far fewer kids and to carefully nurture each one through the most difficult times in a predictable world (think winter blizzard). K-selected species tend to have more stable and complex social structure than do r-selected species.

In order to emphasize that all humans tend to be K-selected in comparison to many other species, Rushton has referred to his theory as “Differential K Theory”. Essentially, the proposal is that African populations, evolving with a tropical abundance of both food and diseases, are relatively less K-selected. Relative that is, to Mongoloid populations which were more K- selected in the harsh environments encountered during the last Glacial epoch, or which are experienced today in cold climates. There is a positive Darwinian selective advantage favoring more forward planning, sexual restraint , parental nurturing, family stability, and social structure in order to successfully raise children across hard cold winters.

The History

On many of the variables that are considered, the racial differences are not large and Rushton emphasizes “the indisputable fact that much more research is needed. Objective hypothesis testing about racial differences in behavior has been much neglected over the past 60 years and knowledge is not as advanced as it ought to be” (p. xv). In view of the near taboo on race as a causal variable in the social sciences, it is interesting to consider how much do we know and since when have we known it. The answers to these two questions, as given in the chapter “race and racism in history”, as well as throughout the book, will likely surprise many psychologists and social scientists educated in the last 60 years. We knew a lot about race differences and we knew it prior to the early decades of the twentieth century.

Indeed, some of the race differences only now being investigated (re-investigated) have been known and have been stable with regard to direction of average differences since the first recorded contacts among the races. One example is the case of brain size. Well known to Broca and other 19th century scientists, then lost in a fog of misspeak and obfuscation and only now reemerging as a stable and potentially important difference between races. The context of progressive, socialistic, or communistic environmentalist-egalitarianism in which the study of race differences went from being respectable science to ideologically suppressed evil is a fascinating study in itself (Degler, 1991; Pearson, 1991). The widespread abhorrence of wartime excesses fed a mid- century frenzied denial of the legitimacy of racial science from which we are just now emerging. It is in large part this history of denial and demonization which marks Rushton’s book as a landmark volume.

The Reception

It will come as no surprise to learn that Rushton’s work, although well written and very readable, has not been greeted with universal acclamation. Indeed. He has probably suffered as much controversy and abuse stemming from his professional activity as any modern psychologist in the “free world”. Following a 1989 invited presentation of Differential K Theory at a meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, a firestorm of controversy arose. Although not widely reported in the United States, an academic, governmental, and media circus played out in Canada. The Premier of Ontario (analogous to a state governor) called for the University to fire him. The Premier also asked the Ontario Provincial Police to investigate whether he had violated the federal criminal code of Canada. A leading Toronto newspaper kept a steady stream of scurrilous editorials flowing until threatened with a lawsuit, upon which they desisted. Canadian television news programs propagandized and demonized Rushton’s appearance with the insertion of Nazi flim clips, as did Connie Chung of CBS’s “eye-to-eye” infamy.

On the academic front the institution of tenure saved Rushton’s position at University, but not without cost. His annual performance rating suddenly went to “unsatisfactory” (as at most places a first step in laying the paper trail to eventual dismissal) until legally challenged, at which point his rating, as one of the most prolific researchers in his unit, went back to the customary high level.

One of the most ignominious events involved a covey of influential members of the Behavior Genetics Association (BGA). Because of their field of research, investigators of behavior genetics (even mousers and fruit fly devotees) have not been immune from Nazi name-calling and attacks on their academic credibility. Accordingly, the BGA had long established a “public and professional affairs committee” to issue the occasional “official statement” in support of attacked members. In a totally unprecedented turn-about that committee was requested to disavow, on behalf of the BGA, the member-in-good-standing Rushton and his research. When the committee refused, the afore mentioned covey took it upon themselves to circulate widely a statement throwing Rushton to the wolves. None of the attacks involved data or rational theory. Rather they were emotional attacks on Rushton’s “repugnant” insensitivity.

In the face of tenure protection, a move was instigated to criminalize Rushton because of his research. In what has been called “the worst attack on freedom of speech ever perpetrated in Ontario”, the Ontario Human Rights Commission investigated for four years and then unceremoniously dropped the case (Leishman, 1995).

It is not just the political left that has trouble acknowledging the legitimacy and importance of racial science. Irving Horowitz (1995), Rushton’s publisher, has written an interesting account of the refusal of a leading conservative publication to accept paid advertisements which announced the availability of Race, Evolution, and Behavior.

The Pity

More is the pity of these emotional rejections of racial science, since it is often members of the “protected groups” which suffer because of ideologically enforced politically correct ignorance. As an example, it has been quite unacceptable to discuss race differences in testosterone levels, although this taboo is crumbling since it was noted that the hormone difference might be causal to the substantial race difference inmortality due to prostate cancer. In the U.S. the epidemic of murders of young black males by young black males has reached such levels that even the most ideologically committed can no longer deny reality.

The remarkable resistance to racial science in our times has led to comparisons with the Inquisition of Rome active during the Renaissance. It is probably not the case that Pope Paul V and Cardinal Bellarmin were evil men. They were quite well educated for their time and probably sincerely concerned for the welfare of their society. Their duty was to prevent the destruction of society that must surely follow if the heresies were allowed. Now the Copernican heliocentric theory could be tolerated; it was after all only a theory and Copernicus was dead. Kepler’s mathematical calculations could be tolerated; they were after all quite mathematical and not likely to arouse the curiosity of the common man. But Galileo Galilei went too far. He said it was true. Come, look through his telescope. Not just a theory but real observable data. Not in the past but here and now. Truth from which who knew what evil might follow. Galileo Galilei was arrested and forced to recant. Astronomy and the physical sciences had their Copernicus, Kepler, and Galileo a few centuries ago; society and the welfare of humanity is the better for it today. In a directly analogous fashion, Psychology and the social sciences have today their Darwin, Galton, and Rushton. Discipulus est prioris posterior dies [Publius Syrus].

REFERENCES

Degler,C.N. (1991) In search of human nature: The decline and revival of Darwinism in American social thought. New York: Oxford University Press.
Horowitz, I.L. (1995) The Rushton file: Racial comparisons and media passions. Society, 32, 2, 7-17.
Leishman, G. (1995) Shoddy attack on free speech is over. The London Free Press (Ontario), Dec. 2, opinion page.
MacArthur, R.H., & Wilson, E.O. (1967) The theory of island biogeography. Monographs in Population Biology, 1. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press. Pearson, R. (1991) Race, intelligence and bias in academe. Washington DC: Scott-Townsend Publishers.


\”Race as a Biological Concept\”

Race as a Biological Concept
by J. Philippe Rushton
November 4, 1996

Professor Phillippe Rushton of the University of Western Ontario has released the following statement on race, in response to attempts to discredit the very concept of race and to argue that race “has no validity as a biological concept when applied to man.” We are pleased to make a copy of this important statement available to our readers.

Discussion of “race” shows little sign of diminishing, despite efforts to deconstruct the concept. Deconstructing the concept of race not only conflicts with people’s tendency to classify and build family histories according to common descent but also ignores the work of biologists studying non-human species. Ever since 1758, when the Swedish naturalist Carolus Linnaeus created the classification system still used in biology today, most zoologists have recognized at least the four human subdivisions Linnaeus delineated: Asians, American Indians, Europeans, and Africans. (Technically, some would group the first two Linnaean subdivisions together, thus yielding three major races, often termed, mongoloids, caucasoids, and negroids.) Such high-level classifications do not rule out making finer, hierarchical subdivisions within these major groups.

A race is what zoologists term a variety or subdivision of a species. Each race (or variety) is characterized by a more or less distinct combination of inherited morphological, behavioral, physiological traits. In flowers, insects, and non-human mammals, zoologists consistently and routinely study the process of racial differentiation. Formation of a new race takes place when, over several generations, individuals in one group reproduce more frequently among themselves than they do with individuals in other groups. This process is most apparent when the individuals live in diverse geographic areas and therefore evolve unique, recognizable adaptations (such as skin color) that are advantageous in their specific environments. But differentiation also occurs under less extreme circumstances. Zoologists and evolutionists refer to such differentiated populations as races. (Within the formal taxonomic nomenclature of biology, races are termed subspecies). Zoologists have identified two or more races (subspecies) in most mammalian species.

Unless one is a religious fundamentalist and believes that man was created in the image and likeness of God, it is foolish to believe that human beings are exempt from biological classification and the laws of evolution that apply to all other life forms. Of course, individuals vary greatly within each racial group and should be treated as such. Nonetheless, much has been learned by studying the statistical differences between the various human races. In my book Race, Evolution, and Behavior (1995, Transaction Publishers), as well as in other recent writings (e.g., the February 1996 issue of Current Anthropology), I review the behavioral, morphological, and physiological differences between the three major human races — mongoloid, caucasoid, and negroid — and show that these statistical differences are constant across both historical time, national boundaries, and political and economic systems.

Here I will briefly summarize the findings. Asians and Africans consistently aggregate at opposite ends, with Europeans intermediate, on a continuum that includes over 60 anatomical and social variables. These 60 variables include brain size, intelligence, sexual habits, fertility, personality, temperament, speed of maturation, and longevity. If race were an arbitrary, socially-constructed concept, devoid of all biological meaning, such consistent relationships would not exist.

Those objecting to the concept of race argue that the taxonomic definitions are arbitrary and subjective. Although critics are correct to point out that the variation within each race is extremely large, that there is disagreement as to exactly how many races there are, and that there is a blurring of category edges because of admixture, they are in error when they claim that classifications are arbitrary. For example, race-critic Jared Diamond, in the 1994 issue of Discover magazine, surveyed half a dozen geographically variable traits and formed very different races depending on which traits he picked. Classifying people using anti-malarial genes, lactose tolerance, fingerprint patterns, or skin color resulted in the Swedes of Europe being placed in the same category as the Xhosa and Fulani of Africa, the Ainu of Japan, and the Italians of Europe.

Jared Diamond’s classifications, however, are arbitrary and nonsensical because they have little, if any, predictive value beyond the initial classification. More significantly, they confuse the scientific meaning of race, that is, a recognizable (or distinguishable) geographic population. In everyday life, as in evolutionary biology, a “negroid” is someone whose ancestors were born in sub-Saharan Africa, and likewise for a “caucasoid” and a “mongoloid.” This definition fits with the temporal bounds offered by the best current theory of human evolution. Thus, since Homo sapiens first appeared in Africa about 200,000 years ago, branched off into Europe about 110,000 years ago, and into Asia 70,000 years after that, a “negroid” is someone whose ancestors, between 4,000 and (to accommodate recent migrations) 20 generations ago, were born in sub-Saharan Africa — and likewise, for a caucasoid and a mongoloid.

Social definitions — that is, self-identification and other-identification actually accord quite well with the physical evidence. Mongoloids, caucasoids, and negroids can be distinguished on the basis of obvious differences in skeletal morphology, hair and facial features, as well by blood groups and DNA fingerprints. Forensic anthropologists regularly classify skeletons of decomposed bodies by race. For example, narrow nasal passages and a short distance between eye sockets identify a caucasoid person, distinct cheekbones characterize a mongoloid person, and nasal openings shaped like an upside down heart typify a negroid person. In certain criminal investigations, the race of a perpetrator can be identified from blood, semen, and hair samples. To deny the predictive validity of race at this level is nonscientific and unrealistic.

The mean pattern of educational and economic achievement within multi-racial countries such as Canada and the United States has increasingly been found to prove valid internationally. For example, it is not often recognized, perhaps because it contradicts the politically correct theories that intelligence is purely a matter of socio-economic conditions, that Asian-Americans and Asians in Asia often outscore white Americans and white Europeans on IQ tests and on tests of educational achievement (even though the tests were largely developed by Europeans and white Americans for use in a Euro-American culture). Blacks in the Caribbean, Britain, Canada and sub-Saharan Africa as well as in the United States have low IQ scores relative to whites. For violent crime, analyses of INTERPOL data from the 1980s and 1990s show the same international distribution that occurs within the United States (that is, Asians least, Europeans in the middle, and Africans most). A similar racial gradient is found both within the U.S. and globally for measures of sexual activity and frequencies of sexually transmitted diseases such as AIDS (based on World Health Organization data).

One neurohormonal contributor to crime and reproductive behavior is testosterone. Studies show that black college students and military veterans have 3% to 19% more testosterone than their white counterparts. The Japanese have even lower amounts than whites. Sex hormones are circulated throughout the body and are known to activate many brain-behavior systems involving aggression and reproduction. For example, around the world the rate of dizygotic twinning per 1,000 births (caused by a double ovulation), is less than 4 among Asians, 8 among Europeans, and 16 or greater among Africans. The differences in multiple birthing are known to be heritable through the race of the mother regardless of the race of the father, as found in Asian/European matings in Hawaii and European/African matings in Brazil.

Publication of The Bell Curve brought widespread public attention to the research on race that has been accumulating over the last 30 years in technical and specialist journals that demonstrably challenges each and every article of the dogma of biological egalitarianism. Startling, and alarming to many, is the conclusion that follows from these data that if all people were treated the same, most average race differences would not disappear. With egalitarianism under siege, there has been a major effort to get the “race genie” back in the bottle, to squeeze the previously tabooed toothpaste back into the tube, to suppress or deny the latest scientific evidence on race, genetics, and behavior.

Regardless of the extent to which the media promote “politically correct,” but scientifically wrong, resolutions from professional societies such as the American Anthropological Association, facts remain facts and require appropriate scientific, not political, explanation. On average, the Chinese, Koreans, and Japanese are more similar to each other and are different from Australians, Israelis and the Swedes, who in turn are similar to each other and are different from Nigerians, Kenyans, and Jamaicans. None of this should be construed as meaning that environmental factors play no part individual development. But with each passing year and each new study, the evidence for the genetic contribution to individual and group differences becomes more firmly established than ever.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

J. Philippe Rushton is a John Simon Guggenheim Fellow and a professor of psychology at the University of Western Ontario in London, Ontario N6A 5C2 Canada. He holds two doctorates from the University of London (PhD and DSc) and is a Fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Science and of the American, British, and Canadian Psychological Associations. His latest book Race, Evolution, and Behavior (1995, Transaction Publishers, telephone 908-445-2280) details the theories and data summarized in this article.


Racial Differences in Intelligence: What Mainstream Scientists Say

Racial Differences in Intelligence:
What Mainstream Science Says

This public statement, signed by 52 internationally known scholars, was active on the information highway early in 1995 following several rather heated and negative responses to Herrnstein & Murray’s The Bell Curve. It was first published in The Wall Street Journal, Tuesday, December 13, 1994. An alphabetical listing of the scholars and their home institutions are given at the end of the statement.

Prologue

The Meaning and Measurement of Intelligence

Group Differences

Practical Importance

Source and Stability of Within-Group Differences

Source and Stability of Between-Group Differences

Implications for Social Policy

Prologue

Since the publication of “The BELL CURVE,” many commentators have offered opinions about human intelligence that misstate current scientific evidence. Some conclusions dismissed in the media as discredited are actually firmly supported.

This statement outlines conclusions regarded as mainstream among researchers on intelligence, in particular, on the nature, origins, and practical consequences of individual and group differences in intelligence. Its aim is to promote more reasoned discussion of the vexing phenomenon that the research has revealed in recent decades. The following conclusions are fully described in the major textbooks, professional journals and encyclopedias in intelligence.

The Meaning and Measurement of Intelligence

Intelligence is a very general mental capability that, among other things, involves the ability to reason, plan, solve problems, think abstractly, comprehend complex ideas, learn quickly and learn from experience. It is not merely book learning, a narrow academic skill, or test-taking smarts. Rather, it reflects a broader and deeper capability for comprehending our surroundings — “catching on,” “making sense” of things, or “figuring out” what to do.

Intelligence, so defined, can be measured, and intelligence tests measure it well. They are among the most accurate (in technical terms, reliable and valid) of all psychological tests and assessments. They do not measure creativity, character, personality, or other important differences among individuals, nor are they intended to.

While there are different types of intelligence tests, they all measure the same intelligence. Some use words or numbers and require specific cultural knowledge (like vocabulary). Others do not, and instead use shapes or designs and require knowledge of only simple, universal concepts (many/few, open/closed, up/down).

The spread of people along the IQ continuum, from low to high, can be represented well by the BELL CURVE (in statistical jargon, the “normal CURVE”). Most people cluster around the average (IQ 100). Few are either very bright or very dull: About 3% of Americans score above IQ 130 (often considered the threshold for “giftedness”), with about the same percentage below IQ 70 (IQ 70-75 often being considered the threshold for mental retardation).

Intelligence tests are not culturally biased against American blacks or other native-born, English-speaking peoples in the U.S. Rather, IQ scores predict equally accurately for all such Americans, regardless of race and social class. Individuals who do not understand English well can be given either a nonverbal test or one in their native language.

The brain processes underlying intelligence are still little understood. Current research looks, for example, at speed of neural transmission, glucose (energy) uptake, and electrical activity of the brain.

Group Differences

Members of all racial-ethnic groups can be found at every IQ level. The BELL CURVES of different groups overlap considerably, but groups often differ in where their members tend to cluster along the IQ line. The BELL CURVES for some groups (Jews and East Asians) are centered somewhat higher than for whites in general. Other groups (blacks and Hispanics) are centered somewhat lower than non-Hispanic whites.

The BELL CURVE for whites is centered roughly around IQ 100; the BELL CURVE for American blacks roughly around 85; and those for different subgroups of Hispanics roughly midway between those for whites and blacks. The evidence is less definitive for exactly where above IQ 100 the BELL CURVES for Jews and Asians are centered.

Practical Importance

IQ is strongly related, probably more so than any other single measurable human trait, to many important educational, occupational, economic, and social outcomes. Its relation to the welfare and performance of individuals is very strong in some arenas in life (education, military training), moderate but robust in others (social competence), and modest but consistent in others (law-abidingness). Whatever IQ tests measure, it is of great practical and social importance.

A high IQ is an advantage in life because virtually all activities require some reasoning and decision-making. Conversely, a low IQ is often a disadvantage, especially in disorganized environments. Of course, a high IQ no more guarantees success than a low IQ guarantees failure in life. There are many exceptions, but the odds for success in our society greatly favor individuals with higher IQs.

The practical advantages of having a higher IQ increase as life settings become more complex (novel, ambiguous, changing, unpredictable, or multi-faceted). For example, a high IQ is generally necessary to perform well in highly complex or fluid jobs (the professions, management); it is a considerable advantage in moderately complex jobs (crafts, clerical and police work); but it provides less advantage in settings that require only routine decision making or simple problem solving (unskilled work).

Differences in intelligence certainly are not the only factor affecting performance in education, training, and highly complex jobs (no one claims they are), but intelligence is often the most important. When individuals have already been selected for high (or low) intelligence and so do not differ as much in IQ, as in graduate school (or special education), other influences on performance loom larger in comparison.

Certain personality traits, special talents, aptitudes, physical capabilities, experience, and the like are important (sometimes essential) for successful performance in many jobs, but they have narrower (or unknown) applicability or “transferability” across tasks and settings compared with general intelligence. Some scholars choose to refer to these other human traits as other “intelligences.”

Source and Stability of Within-Group Differences

Individuals differ in intelligence due to differences in both their environments and genetic heritage. Heritability estimates range from 0.4 to 0.8 (on a scale from 0 to 1), most thereby indicating that genetics plays a bigger role than does environment in creating IQ differences among individuals. (Heritability is the squared correlation of phenotype with genotype.) If all environments were to become equal for everyone, heritability would rise to 100% because all remaining differences in IQ would necessarily be genetic in origin.

Members of the same family also tend to differ substantially in intelligence (by an average of about 12 IQ points) for both genetic and environmental reasons. They differ genetically because biological brothers and sisters share exactly half their genes with each parent and, on the average, only half with each other. They also differ in IQ because they experience different environments within the same family.

That IQ may be highly heritable does not mean that it is not affected by the environment. Individuals are not born with fixed, unchangeable levels of intelligence (no one claims they are). IQs do gradually stabilize during childhood, however, and generally change little thereafter.

Although the environment is important in creating IQ differences, we do not know yet how to manipulate it to raise low IQs permanently. Whether recent attempts show promise is still a matter of considerable scientific debate.

Genetically caused differences are not necessarily irremediable (consider diabetes, poor vision, and phenal ketonuria), nor are environmentally caused ones necessarily remediable (consider injuries, poisons, severe neglect, and some diseases). Both may be preventable to some extent.

Source and Stability of Between-Group Differences

There is no persuasive evidence that the IQ BELL CURVES for different racial-ethnic groups are converging. Surveys in some years show that gaps in academic achievement have narrowed a bit for some races, ages, school subjects and skill levels, but this picture seems too mixed to reflect a general shift in IQ levels themselves.

Racial-ethnic differences in IQ BELL CURVES are essentially the same when youngsters leave high school as when they enter first grade. However, because bright youngsters learn faster than slow learners, these same IQ differences lead to growing disparities in amount learnedas youngsters progress from grades one to 12. As large national surveyscontinue to show, black 17-year-olds perform, on the average, more likewhite 13-year-olds in reading, math, and science, with Hispanics inbetween.

The reasons that blacks differ among themselves in intelligenceappear to be basically the same as those for why whites (or Asians orHispanics) differ among themselves. Both environment and geneticheredity are involved.

There is no definitive answer to why IQ bell curves differ acrossracial-ethnic groups. The reasons for these IQ differences betweengroups may be markedly different from the reasons for why individualsdiffer among themselves within any particular group (whites or blacks orAsians). In fact, it is wrong to assume, as many do, that the reason whysome individuals in a population have high IQs but others have low IQs must be the same reason why some populations contain more such high (or low) IQ individuals than others. Most experts believe that environment is important in pushing the bell curves apart, but that genetics could be involved too.

Racial-ethnic differences are somewhat smaller but still substantial for individuals from the same socioeconomic backgrounds. To illustrate, black students from prosperous families tend to score higher in IQ than blacks from poor families, but they score no higher, on average, than whites from poor families.

Almost all Americans who identify themselves as black have white ancestors — the white admixture is about 20%, on average — and many self-designated whites, Hispanics, and others likewise have mixed ancestry. Because research on intelligence relies on self-classification into distinct racial categories, as does most other social-science research, its findings likewise relate to some unclear mixture of social and biological distinctions among groups (no one claims otherwise).

Implications for Social Policy

The research findings neither dictate nor preclude any particular social policy, because they can never determine our goals. They can, however, help us estimate the likely success and side-effects of pursuing those goals via different means.

The following professors – all experts in intelligence and allied fields – have signed this statement:

Richard D. Arvey, University of Minnesota

Thomas J. Bouchard, Jr., University of Minnesota

John B. Carroll, Un. of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

Raymond B. Cattell, University of Hawaii

David B. Cohen, University of Texas at Austin

Rene V. Dawis, University of Minnesota

Douglas K. Detterman, Case Western Reserve Un.

Marvin Dunnette, University of Minnesota

Hans Eysenck, University of London

Jack Feldman, Georgia Institute of Technology

Edwin A. Fleishman, George Mason University

Grover C. Gilmore, Case Western Reserve University

Robert A. Gordon, Johns Hopkins University

Linda S. Gottfredson, University of Delaware

Robert L. Greene, Case Western Reserve University

Richard J.Haier, University of Callifornia at Irvine

Garrett Hardin, University of California at Berkeley

Robert Hogan, University of Tulsa

Joseph M. Horn, University of Texas at Austin

Lloyd G. Humphreys, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

John E. Hunter, Michigan State University

Seymour W. Itzkoff, Smith College

Douglas N. Jackson, Un. of Western Ontario

James J. Jenkins, University of South Florida

Arthur R. Jensen, University of California at Berkeley

Alan S. Kaufman, University of Alabama

Nadeen L. Kaufman, California School of Professional Psychology at San Diego

Timothy Z. Keith, Alfred University

Nadine Lambert, University of California at Berkeley

John C. Loehlin, University of Texas at Austin

David Lubinski, Iowa State University

David T. Lykken, University of Minnesota

Richard Lynn, University of Ulster at Coleraine

Paul E. Meehl, University of Minnesota

R. Travis Osborne, University of Georgia

Robert Perloff, University of Pittsburgh

Robert Plomin, Institute of Psychiatry, London

Cecil R. Reynolds, Texas A & M University

David C. Rowe, University of Arizona

J. Philippe Rushton, Un. of Western Ontario

Vincent Sarich, University of California at Berkeley

Sandra Scarr, University of Virginia

Frank L. Schmidt, University of Iowa

Lyle F. Schoenfeldt, Texas A & M University

James C. Sharf, George Washington University

Herman Spitz, former director E.R. Johnstone Training and Research Center, Bordentown, N.J.

Julian C. Stanley, Johns Hopkins University

Del Thiessen, University of Texas at Austin

Lee A. Thompson, Case Western Reserve University

Robert M. Thorndike, Western Washington Un.

Philip Anthony Vernon, Un. of Western Ontario

Lee Willerman, University of Texas at Austin


11/11/2002

Whatever Happened to Eugenics?

Whatever Happened to Eugenics?

Glayde Whitney

Florida State University, Tallahassee

Review of:

Heredity and Humanity: Race, Eugenics and Modern Science
Roger Pearson
Scott-Townsend Publishers, Washington D.C., 1996
ISBN 1-878465-15-5 162 pps.

“Most of those who have sought to suppress human knowledge about heredity have done so with kindly intentions, but sound policies can never be constructed on bad science or unsound data. Any society that sets itself against the immutable causal laws of biology and evolution will ultimately bring about its own demise” (Pearson, p. 140).

Whatever happened to Eugenics? How is it that the prevention of human suffering came to be considered as the greater evil? In this delightful little book Roger Pearson takes us on an excursion through history, science and ideologies.

In so doing he illuminates the origins of great concepts and names the heroes and the villains in a saga that is not yet complete. In recommending this book to a Seminar in Evolutionary Psychology I told the graduate students that it is “an anti-PC, anti-egalitarian, historical polemic, well referenced and worth reading this is not the story you got in cultural anthropology class.” This is a story well-told that needs wide telling, and serious pondering by all who are concerned for the welfare of our civilization.

The opening chapter (The Concept of Heredity in the Ancient World) serves to remind the reader that heredity has been considered important since before the beginning of recorded history, and at least until earlier in the twentieth century. Unfortunately, these observations will be new to many students who have suffered a modern deconstructed education. Pearson announces his agenda in that the opening chapter “illustrates the deep belief in the importance of heredity and race which prevailed from the earliest times until roughly the end of the nineteenth century. Subsequent chapters document the rise of politically-motivated egalitarian ideology which, heavily supported by the media, eventually succeeded in making the idea of biological inequality taboo. Despite the fact that there is today a rapidly developing body of scientific research which validates the age-old comprehension of the role of heredity in shaping human abilities, too many people are unaware of the mechanics behind the swing toward the notion of the biological equality of mankind” (p. 9).
(more…)


Brain Size Matters: a Reply to Peters

Brain Size Matters: a Reply to Peters
by J. Philippe Rushton and C. Davison Ankney
University of Western Ontario

Abstract

Peters (1993) claimed that published research on brain size and IQ is flawed because it did not meet his list of minimum conditions that (a) subjects should be matched for height, weight and age, (b) analyses should be conducted separately within sex, (c) subjects should not vary in prenatal and nutritional history, (d) people with IQs appreciably below the population mean of 100 should not be studied, and (e) brain size measures should be done blind . However, these conditions have either been met or are unnecessary and/or inappropriate. We show, contrary to Peters’ claims, that (a) brain size is related to mental abilities, (b) brain size varies by sex and race, and (c) mental abilities vary by sex and race. Finally, we suggest that brain size constraints on behavioural complexity may be best understood from an evolutionary perspective.

In a reply to Lynn (1993) about brain size and IQ, Peters (1993) charged bias and questionable motives to dismiss relations first established over 100 years ago. Peters (1993) claimed that studies of brain size are confounded by systematic bias, including racial bias , over and above normal measurement error. Peters (1993) also conjectured that uni-directional measurement errors may exist and so he dismissed Rushton’s (1992) analyses showing race and sex differences in cranial capacity in 6,325 U.S. military personnel. Consequently, Peters claimed that such studies must be done blind , i.e., the person doing the measurement should not know the race of the subject being measured.

Peters did not note, although it was made clear in Rushton’s (1992) paper, that (1) Rushton neither made the measurements nor knew who did, and (2) measurements were made to determine proper helmet sizes not brain sizes (i.e., they were done blind , as the measurers were unaware of the use that Rushton would make of their data). The East Asian/European/African differences that Rushton (1992) found in cranial capacity (cm3) using external head measurements are similar to those found by Beals, Smith, and Dodd (1984) who estimated cm3 from endocranial volume, and by Ho, Roessmann, Straumfjord, and Monroe (1980) who weighed brain mass (grams) at autopsy. Does Peters believe that Ho et al. leaned on their scales, when weighing brains of European-Americans, by just enough to produce the same difference caused by extra snug measurements supposedly made by those measuring heads of African-Americans? Regardless, it is implausible that the racial bias alleged by Peters would also produce findings that East Asians have relatively larger brains than do Europeans.

Allometric and nutritional factors
Brain size and intelligence
Sex differences
Race differences
Evolutionary considerations
References

Allometric and nutritional factors

Peters (1993) misstates when and why it is appropriate to correct for variation in body size (e.g., height or weight) when analyzing human attributes. It is only appropriate to correct for body size if one wishes to determine whether two (or more) individuals or groups are relatively different in some attribute, when it is already known that they are absolutely different in that attribute and/or in body size. For example, men and women differ in both absolute brain size and absolute body size. Thus, it is appropriate to correct for body size to determine if men have relatively larger brains. But, it would be inappropriate to correct for body size to determine if men have absolutely higher IQs.

Consider this simple analogy: John Doe is 178 cm tall and can jump 1 m off the ground, whereas basketball star Michael Jordan is 208 cm tall and can jump 1.17 m off the ground. There are two questions that we can ask from this: (1) For his size, can Michael Jordan jump higher? (Answer is no he’s 17% taller and can jump 17% higher), and (2) Can Michael Jordan jump higher? (Answer is, obviously, yes).

Now, consider Peters’ argument that to determine if larger brains produce (absolutely) higher IQs, one must correct for body size. This, as can be seen from the above, makes no sense. A higher IQ is a higher IQ (just as a higher jump is a higher jump) regardless of body size. On average, taller people have higher IQ’s, not because they are taller, per se, but because, on average, they have larger brains. Correcting for body size reduces the question to a nullity, i.e., do tall people with their larger brains have relatively higher IQ’s?

Peters erred similarly when he argued that age must be controlled when analyzing brain-size/IQ relations in adults. Both brain size (Ho et al., 1980) and IQ (Brody, 1992) decline after the age of 45 years. This likely is not coincidental but, regardless, if one corrects for age then the result would simply be that brains of similar size tend to produce similar IQ’s.

Peters’ erroneously stated that subjects in studies of brain-size/IQ relations should have similar early-life nutrition and be from the same social class. His rationale is that these factors can affect brain size. But, the question is do people with smaller brains have lower IQ’s? , not why do they have smaller brains? . It might be interesting to know why John Doe is shorter than Michael Jordan but, regardless, he cannot jump as high.

Brain size and intelligence

As Lynn (1993) showed, the IQ/brain-size relation is ubIQuitous. Studies, additional to those provided by Lynn (1993), show that the correlation ranges from 0.10 to 0.30 with a mean of about 0.20 (Wickett, Vernon, & Lee, 1994). The head-perimeter/IQ relation occurs in Orientals as well as whites and blacks and is apparent early in life. The National Collaborative Perinatal Project (Broman et al., 1987) found that head perimeter at birth, at 1 year, and at 4 years correlated with IQ at age 7 from r = 0.13 to 0.24 in 19,000 black and 17,000 white children. Jensen and Johnson (1994) used these data to show that head size at age 7 (although not at age 4) is correlated with IQ within-families (i.e., among same-sex full siblings, with age partialed out), thus indicating a functional relation between brain size and IQ.

Magnetic resonance imaging technIQues that create a 3-dimensional model of the brain in vivo confirm the brain-size/IQ relation. Five studies found an average correlation greater than 0.40, an improvement over studies that used head perimeter as a measure (Willerman et al., 1991; Andreasen et al., 1993; Raz et al., 1993; Egan et al., 1994; Wickett et al., 1994). Peters critIQued the two studies then available, but only confused the issue. First, he claimed that Willerman et al.’s (1991) low IQ group, because it averaged only 90.5, was an improper control . It was, however, not intended to be a control. Importantly, Willerman et al. showed that those with below average IQ had, on average, smaller brains. Second, Peters (1993) almost conceded the brain-size/IQ relation in his footnote citation to Andreasen et al. (1993). However, even there he suspected bias, i.e., self-selection of subjects. But, this could only bias such results if people with large-brains/high-IQ and small-brains/low-IQ volunteered, whereas those with large-brains/low-IQ and small- brains/high-IQ did not. We are unaware of evidence to support such an implausibility. Regardless, beside studies by Willerman et al. (1991) and Andreasen et al. (1993) cited by Peters (1993), the brain-size/IQ relation established using magnetic resonance imaging was corroborated by Raz et al. (1993), Egan et al. (1994), and Wickett et al. (1994).

The null hypothesis of no relation between brain size and IQ is false. In anticipation of this, Peters (1993) argued that even if brain-size/IQ correlations are valid, they account for only a small percentage of variation. But, it is predictable that correlations between IQ and overall brain size will be modest. First, much of the brain is not involved in producing what we call intelligence; thus, variation in size/mass of that tissue will reduce the correlation. Second, IQ is an imperfect measure of intelligence and thus, variation in IQ scores is an imperfect measure of variation in intelligence.

Sex differences

Peters (1993) correctly noted the absolute male/female difference in brain size. He was, however, incorrect that comparisons of brain size across sex cannot be made because there are (supposedly) no appropriate scalars of body size. Ankney (1992) reexamined Ho et al.’s (1980) autopsy data on 1,261 Americans aged 25 to 80 after excluding obviously damaged brains. Using allometric technIQues that are standard in comparative biology, Ankney (1992) found that at any given surface area or height, brains of European-American men are heavier than those of European-American women and brains of African-American men are heavier than those of African-American women. For example, among 168 cm (5′7 ) tall European-Americans (the approximate overall mean height for men and women combined), brain mass of men averages about 100 grams heavier than that of women.

Ankney’s (1992) results were confirmed in Rushton’s (1992) study of a stratified random sample of U.S. Army personnel. After adjusting for effects of age, stature, weight, military rank and race, cranial capacity of men averaged 1,442 cm3 and women 1,332 cm3. This difference was found in all of the many analyses that were done to control for various possible body size effects (see Rushton, 1992). Moreover, the difference was replicated across samples of Asian-Americans, European-Americans and African-Americans, as well as in officers and enlisted personnel.

Peters (1993) correctly noted the paradox that women have proportionately smaller brains than do men, but apparently have the same IQ scores. Thus, Ankney (1992) proposed that the sex difference in brain size relates to those intellectual abilities at which men excel. Briefly, according to Kimura (1992), women excel in verbal ability, perceptual speed, and motor coordination within personal space; men do better on various spatial tests and on tests of mathematical reasoning. Ankney hypothesized that it may require more brain tissue to process spatial information. Just as increasing word processing power in a computer may require extra capacity, increasing 3-dimensional processing, as in graphics, requires a major jump in capacity. In support of Ankney’s hypothesis, although Lynn (1994) found that men average 4 points higher than do women on standard IQ tests, Ankney (1995) showed that nearly all of this difference derived from men’s higher scores on spatial and mathematical reasoning subtests.

Race differences

Rushton (1995) reviewed 100 years of scientific literature and found that across a triangulation of procedures, brains of East-Asians and their descendants average about 17 cm3 (1 in3) larger than those of Europeans and their descendents whose brains average about 80 cm3 (5 in3) larger than those of Africans and their descendents. Although critics can pick outliers to show counter-examples and suggest opposite trends (as could critics of a statement that men are, on average, taller than women) the aggregated data are clear (see Rushton, 1995, for full discussion of alleged counter examples).

Consider the following statistically significant comparisons. Using brain mass at autopsy, Ho et al. (1980) summarized data for 1,261 adults (see above) and reported a sex-combined difference between 811 European- Americans with a mean of 1,323 g (sd = 146) and 450 African-Americans with a mean of 1,223 g (sd = 144). Using endocranial volume, Beals et al. (1984, page 307, Table 5) analyzed 20,000 crania and found sex-combined brain cases differed by continental area. Excluding Caucasoid areas of Asia (e.g., India) and Africa (e.g., Egypt), 19 East Asian populations averaged 1,415 cm3 (sd = 51), 10 European groups averaged 1,362 cm3 (sd = 35) and 9 African groups averaged 1,268 cm3 (sd = 85). Using external head measure- ments, Rushton (1992) found, in a stratified random sample of 6,325 U.S. Army personnel, measured in 1988 to determine head size for fitting helmets, Asian-Americans, European-Americans, and African-Americans averaged 1,416, 1,380, and 1,359 cm3, respectively (see also, Rushton, 1994).

Globally, racial differences in brain size parallel those found in measured intelligence. Europeans in North America, Europe and Australasia have mean IQs of around 100. For East Asians, measured in North America and in Pacific Rim countries, means range from 101 to 111. Africans living south of the Sahara, African-Americans and African-Caribbeans (including those living in Britain), have mean IQs of from 70 to 90 (Lynn, 1991). Elementary speed of information processing in 9- to 12-year-olds, in which children decide which of several lights stands out from others, show that racial differences in mental ability are pervasive. All children can perform the tasks in less than 1 s, but more intelligent children, as measured by traditional IQ tests, perform the tasks faster than do less intelligent children. Japanese and Hong Kong children have faster decision times (controlling for movement time) than do British and Irish children who have faster decision time than South African Black and African-American children (Jensen, 1993; Jensen & Whang, 1993; Lynn, 1991).

Evolutionary considerations

Metabolically, the human brain is an expensive organ. Representing only 2% of body mass, the brain uses about 5% of basal metabolic rate in rats, cats, and dogs, about 10% in rhesus monkeys and other primates, and about 20% in humans. Thus, from an adaptationist perspective, unless large brains substantially contributed to evolutionary fitness (defined as increased survival of genes through successive generations), they would not have evolved.

Paradoxically, Peters (1993) cited Haug (1987) to refute speculations about the significance of differences in brain size across individuals, sex, or race , even though Haug (1987, p.135) reported a correlation of r = 0.479 (n = 81, p < .001) between number of cortical neurons and brain size including both men and women in the sample. Haug’s analysis showed that a person with a brain size of 1,400 cm3 has, on average, 600 million fewer cortical neurons than an individual with a brain size of 1,500 cm3. The difference between the low end of normal (1,000 cm3) and the high end (1,700 cm3) equates to 4.200 billion neurons (a difference of 27% more neurons for a 41% increase in brain size).

Haug noted that most female data points lay above the regression line (i.e., women average more neurons for a given brain size than do men). This suggests that women’s brains are differently organized than are men’s, and so causes and results of race differences in brain size may be different from those of sex differences. Kolakowski and Malina (1974) hypothesized that differing roles of men and women during human evolution produced a sexual dichotomy in abilities. Men roamed from the home base to hunt, which would select for targeting ability and navigational skills; women were relatively sedentary. Ankney (1992, 1995) expanded on this hypothesis to argue that selection for such abilities also selected for relatively larger brains in men and that it may require more brain tissue to process spatial information.

Rushton (1995) provided an evolutionary hypothesis for why East Asians have the largest brains. The currently accepted view of human origins posits a beginning in Africa some 200,000 years ago, an African/non-African split about 110,000 years ago, and a European/East Asian split about 40,000 years ago (Stringer & Andrews, 1988). Evolutionary selection pressures were different in the hot savanna where Africans evolved than in the cold arctic where East Asians evolved. According to Rushton (1995), the further north the populations migrated, out of Africa, the more they encountered cognitively demanding problems of gathering and storing food, gaining shelter, making clothes, and raising children during prolonged winters. As the original African populations evolved into Europeans and East Asians, they did so in the direction of larger brains, greater intelligence, slower rates of maturation, and other traits that differentiate these populations.

Conclusion

The evidence is overwhelming that there are racial and sexual differences in brain size, that there are racial differences in general IQ, that there are sexual differences in verbal versus performance IQ, and that differences in mental abilities are related to differences in brain size. Peters cannot simply deny this evidence. Thus, important research questions include (1) what is responsible for the group differences, i.e., are they genetically and/or environmentally caused?, (2) does the brain size/IQ correlation indicate cause and effect ?, and (3) is there bidirectional causality such that the greater learning ability of high IQ children feeds back to produce even larger brain size?

Address correspondence to:

rushton@sscl.uwo.ca

References

Andreasen, N.C., Flaum, M., Swayze, V., O’Leary, D.S., Alliger, R., Cohen, G., Ehrhardt, J. & Yuh, W.T.C. (1993). Intelligence and brain structure in normal individuals. American Journal of Psychiatry, 150, 130-134.

Ankney, C.D. (1992). Sex differences in relative brain size: The mismeasure of woman, too? Intelligence, 16, 329-336.

Ankney, C.D. (1995). Sex differences in brain size and mental abilities: Comments on R. Lynn and D. Kimura. Personality and Individual Differences, 18, 423-424.

Beals, K.L., Smith, C.L. & Dodd, S.M. (1984). Brain size, cranial morphology, climate, and time machines. Current Anthropology, 25, 301-330.

Brody, N. (1992). Intelligence. New York: Academic Press.

Broman, S.H., Nichols, P.L., Shaughnessy, P. & Kennedy, W. (1987). Retardation in young children. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Egan, V., Chiswick, A., Santosh, C., Naidu, K., Rimmington, J.E., & Best, J.J.K. (1994). Size isn’t everything: A study of brain volume, intelligence and auditory evoked potentials.Personality and Individual Differences, 17, 357-367.

Haug, H. (1987). Brain sizes, surfaces, and neuronal sizes of the cortex cerebri. American Journal of Anatomy, 180, 126-142.

Ho, K.C., Roessmann, U., Straumfjord, J.V., & Monroe, G. (1980). Analysis of brain weight. Archives of Pathology and Laboratory Medicine, 104, 635-645.

Jensen, A.R. (1993). Spearman’s hypothesis tested with chronometric information processing tasks.Intelligence, 17, 47-77.

Jensen, A.R., & Johnson, F.W. (1994). Race and sex differences in head size and IQ.Intelligence, 18, 309-333.

Jensen, A.R., & Whang, P.A. (1993). Reaction times and intelligence.Journal of Biosocial Science, 25, 397-410.

Kimura, D. (1992). Sex differences in the brain.Scientific American, 267 (No. 3), 119-125.

Kolakowski, D., & Malina, R.M. (1974). Spatial ability, throwing accuracy, and man’s hunting heritage.Nature, 251, 410-412.

Lynn, R. (1991). Race differences in intelligence. Mankind Quarterly, 31, 255-296.

Lynn, R. (1993). Brain size and intelligence in man: A correction to Peters. Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology, 47, 748-750.

Lynn, R. (1994). Sex differences in intelligence and brain size. Personality and Individual Differences, 17, 257-271.

Peters, M. (1993). Still no convincing evidence of a relation between brain size and intelligence in humans. Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology, 47, 751-756.

Raz, N., Torres, I.J., Spencer, W.D., Millman, D., Baertschi, J.C., & Sarpel, G. (1993). Neuroanatomical correlates of age-sensitive and age-invariant cognitive abilities. Intelligence, 17, 407-422.

Rushton, J.P. (1992). Cranial capacity related to sex, rank, and race in a stratified random sample of 6,325 U.S. military personnel. Intelligence, 16, 401-413.

Rushton, J.P. (1994). Sex and race differences in cranial capacity from International Labour Office data. Intelligence, 19, 281-294.

Rushton, J.P. (1995). Race, evolution, and behavior. A life-history perspective. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction.

Stringer, C.B. & Andrews, P. (1988). Genetic and fossil evidence for the origin of modern humans. Science, 239, 1263-1268.

Wickett, J.C., Vernon, P.A., & Lee, D.H. (1994). In vivo brain size, head perimeter, and intelligence in a sample of healthy adult females. Personality and Individual Differences, 16, 831-838.

Willerman, L., Schultz, R., Rutledge, J.N., & Bigler, E.D. (1991). In vivo brain size and intelligence. Intelligence, 15, 223-228.


Paternal Provisioning versus Mate-Seeking in Human Populations

Paternal Provisioning versus Mate-Seeking in Human Populations
by Prof. Edward M. Miller
Professor of Economics and Finance
University of New Orleans

from Personality and Individual Differences, Vol. 17, August 1994

Abstract
Introduction
Male Competition for Mating Opportunities
Hunting as a Fuction of Latitude
The Cold Climate Situation
Predictions of the Hypothesis
Using Racial Data to Test Clinal Theories
Explaining Racial Variation by Mating Competition versus Provisioning
Aggression
Dominance
Anxiety
Impulsivity
Delay of gratification
Sociability
Extraversion
Behavioral restraint
Criminal activity
Sexual restraint
Sexual behavior
Size of sex organs
Body build
Muscle characteristics
Life Span Variations
Hormonal Levels Versus Timing of Sexual Maturity
Implications for Females
The Distribution of Polygyny
New World African Origin Populations
Father Absent Societies
Testing the Theory with other Populations
Conclusions

Abstract

Paternal investment theory suggests that in cold climates males were selected for provisioning, rather than for mating success. In warm climates, where female gathering made male provisioning unessential, selection was for mating success. Male hunted meat was essential for female winter survival. Genes that encouraged mating success were selected for in warm (was cold) climates. Negroids (blacks) evolved in warm cold climates, while Caucasians (whites) and Mongoloids (Asians) evolved in colder climates. Mating is assisted by a strong sex drive, aggression, dominance, sociability, extraversion, impulsiveness, sensation seeking, and high testosterone. Provisioning is assisted by anxiety, altruism, empathy, behavioral restraint, gratification delay, and a long life span. Explanations are offered for racial differences in many personality characteristics, hormone levels, monamine oxidase levels, testosterone levels, lactase dehydrogenase metabolic paths, life spans, prostate cancer rates, hypertension, genital (penis and testes) size, vocal frequencies, liver size, muscle structure, mesomorphy, bone density, sports performance, crime rates, rape, child abuse, earnings, age at first sexual activity, AIDs, illegitimacy, divorce, marriage, and polygyny rates. Eye color correlations are discussed. Negro family structure in the Caribbean and the U.S. may reflect selection in Africa during hunter-gather times. Comparison is made with differential K theory and father absence theories.

Key words: race, climate, evolution, personality, polygyny, aggression, provisioning, mating, dominance seeking, paternal investment

Rushton (1985, 1987, 1988, 1989b, in press) and Ellis (1987) have drawn attention to the existence of many racial differences, including behavioral ones, and shown that they were frequently arranged in the order Mongoloid, Caucasoid, Negroid (or Negroid, Caucasoid, Mongoloid, depending on the trait). The differences Rushton drew attention to include twinning rates, (Negroids first, Caucasoids second, Mongoloids third), intelligence (Mongoloids first, Caucasoids second, Negroids third), various differences in aggression, dominance seeking, impulsivity, extraversion, sexual behavior, genital size (Negroids first, Caucasoids second, Mongoloids last), extent of altruism, and behavioral restraint (Mongoloids first, Caucasoids second, and Negroids last), and timing of birth, menarche, birth of first child, and death (Negroids earliest, Caucasoids second, Mongoloids last).

Rushton explains his observations by a version of r versus K selection theory. The terms r and K come from population biology, where r is a population’s maximum growth rate, and K is the environment’s carrying capacity. K selected species have been selected for success at competition with conspecifics. Species selected for fast reproduction with low ability to compete are called r selected. Rushton extends the idea to human populations. He argues that Negroids are the least K selected among human populations, Mongoloids the most K selected, and Caucasoids in between. This idea has produced considerable scientific (J. Anderson, 1991; Flynn, 1989; Leslie, 1990; Lynn, 1989; Roberts & Gabor, 1990; Silverman, 1990; Weizmann, Wiener, Wiesenthal, & Ziegler, 1990; Zuckerman, 1991; Miller, 1993) and popular controversy (Gross, 1990; Pearson, 1991, Chap. 5; Lerner, 1992, pp. 139-147), to which Rushton (1989a, 1990a, 1990b, Rushton & Ankney, 1993) has responded. Chisholm (1993) has also applied life cycle theory to humans, arguing that early experiences with the correlates of high death rates affects the allocation between mating and parenting.

This paper will propose an alternative explanation to differential K theory. Like differential K theory, it will be derived from a standard biological theory, parental investment theory. In some species, males devote more effort to seeking mating opportunities. In other species, they devote more effort to assisting their offspring. In each species, males evolve to use the strategy that most promotes their fitness. Which strategy most promotes their fitness depends on the effect of paternal investment on offspring survival and fitness, and on the opportunities for obtaining reproductively successful additional matings (Katz & Konner, 1981; Clutton-Brock, 1991). Likewise, within the same species different populations have been selected for different positions on the paternal investment versus mating effort continuum.

In humans, an especially important form of paternal investment is provisioning, bringing the mother and child food. Offspring’s benefit from provisioning depends on climate. In warm climates, females typically can gather enough food for themselves and their children. In cold climates, hunting is required to survive winter, and females typically do not hunt (other than for easily captured small game). Hence, offspring survival requires male provisioning in cold climates. Thus, cold climate males were selected to devote more efforts to provisioning, and less to seeking matings. In warm climates, such male provisioning was not essential, even if desirable. Thus, warm climate males who devoted more efforts to seeking mating opportunities, and less to provisioning, left more offspring. This theory can explain many of the known racial differences.

Paternal investment theory’s chief advantage is its specificity as to the traits populations should exhibit. It makes specific testable predictions (which are generally sustained) as to how cold-adapted populations and tropical populations should behave. In contrast, Rushton’s and Ellis’s differential K theories, after stating that Mongoloids are most K selected, and Negroids least, are very vague as to why this is. They fail to predict how other races (Malays, Australian aborigines, Polynesians, etc), or populations within the major races, should differ (J. Anderson, 1991; Miller, 1993).

To limit this paper’s length, a detailed treatment of the evidence for the racial differences discussed will not be attempted. The reader can find relevant references in Ellis (1987, p. 159) and in Rushton’s papers (especially 1987, p. 1019, 1989a, p. 9) and in Rushton’s forthcoming book (in press). The author has checked most of these. Although many of the individual studies could be improved on, the racial differences do appear to be as Rushton and Ellis depict them. Strong evidence as to whether most racial differences in behavior are of environmental or genetic origin is lacking. While cultural explanations have been proposed for many of the behavioral differences, (but not for the morphological, or biochemical ones), there is not space to discuss them here. Occasionally, when new evidence has appeared since Rushton and Ellis wrote, it will be noted.

This paper combines several generally accepted ideas from different disciplines. It accepts the evidence from human behavior genetics that most personality traits have an inherited component (for instance Eaves, Eysenck & Martin, 1989; or Bouchard, Lykken, McGue, Segal, & Tellegen, 1990, or Rushton, in press, chap. 4). From biology and population genetics, it takes natural selection. From physical anthropology, it takes the theory that humans have been separated into races long enough to have evolved somewhat different appearances, many of which can be traced to climatic differences. From sociobiology, it takes the idea that males differ in the extent to which they devote their efforts to mating versus parenting, and that basic human behavior traits evolved during the hunter-gatherer 99% of human history (Barash, 1977; E. Wilson, 1975). It extends this by arguing that cold weather hunter-gatherers evolved into Mongoloids and Caucasoids, and tropical African hunter-gatherers into Negroids, and that differences in morphological and behavioral gene frequencies can be explained by the climatic differences during hunter-gatherer times.

MALE COMPETITION FOR MATING OPPORTUNITIES

In many species, much male behavior consists of competition for females (Barash, 1977; Wilson, 1975; Trivers, 1972). This seems to be true of humans. Standard sociobiology explains differences between human male and female behavior by contrasting the male’s ability to father children by several females with the female’s inability to have children by more than one male at a time (Symons, 1979; Hrdy, 1981). Thus, men evolved to exploit any impregnation opportunities that arise, while women direct their copulations to males who are willing and able to invest in them and their children.

Thus, in discussing male behavior across species, biologists argue that males evolved a trade-off between paternal investment and mating efforts that maximizes their inclusive fitness for that environment (Draper, 1989, pp. 149-150). The argument generalizes easily to explain differences in male mating and paternal investment within a single species, such as humans.

Under some conditions males leave more descendants by devoting more energy to seeking copulations (an endeavor that often includes prestige seeking), and relatively less to provisioning their offspring. In these conditions, selection will be for such characteristics as high sex drive, aggression, a mesomorphic body build, and large testes. In these conditions females can raise children with only limited male provisioning.

In other circumstances, males are selected for extensive provisioning of their children. This normally implies less energy being devoted to seeking matings for two reasons. First, energy and resources devoted to seeking additional matings would be diverted from provisioning their mates and children, thus reducing the number of surviving children. Secondly, added matings would frequently produce children able to survive only if resources were diverted from the father’s other children. The net gain in surviving offspring would be small, or even negative. The first effect of devoting more energy to mating is to reduce total male investment in offspring, while the second spreads it among more offspring, reducing per capita investment.

I will argue that selection for male provisioning is especially common in climates with cold winters, where large game hunting is required for survival. Children of males who failed to provision would often not survive the winter.

Physical anthropologists can explain many racial variations as climatic adaptations (Baker, 1974; Coon, 1965, 1982; Krantz, 1980; Roberts, 1978). For instance, in northern latitudes, winter ultraviolet radiation intensity is low, and pale skin permits maximum vitamin D production. In low latitudes, there is a risk of excess vitamin D production and sunburn. Here dark skin is optimal (see Robins, 1991). Likewise, variations in adult ability to tolerate lactose has been interpreted as partially an adaption to low levels of ultraviolet radiation (Durham, 1991). Lynn (1991b) has contrasted the hunting required for survival in cold climates, in which Mongoloids and Caucasoids evolved, with the tropical gathering. He used this to explain the racial intelligence differences he had earlier documented (Lynn, 1991a). Here, this difference in reliance on hunting will be used to explain many other behavioral differences.

The reader will probably have little difficulty in accepting that Negroids evolved in the tropics, and Caucasoids and Mongoloids in colder climates. However, some may wonder why the Mongoloids are considered to have evolved in a colder climate than did the Caucasoids. One reason is that certain Mongoloid features (a stocky body build, and distinctive eye folds) appear to be adaptations to arctic conditions (Baker, 1974; Coon, 1965, 1982; Krantz, 1980; Roberts, 1978).

Admittedly, Europe is also cold. However, it is believed that farming started in the Middle East and then spread with the farmers’ migration into Europe. This conclusion comes from archaeology and a northwest to southeast distribution of certain genes (Menozzi, Piazza, & Cavalli-Sforza, 1978; Piazza,1993; Sokal, Oden, & Wilson, 1991). The latter suggests a population movement, rather than merely technology diffusion. The result is that some European ancestors were Middle Eastern hunter-gatherers, rather than hunter-gatherers who had evolved where the populations now live.

Hunting as a Fuction of Latitude

Richard Lee (1968, pp. 42-43) in the widely cited Man the Hunter book emphasized that most calories eaten among typical (tropical) hunter-gatherers come from gathering, leaving the impression that gathering was the primary subsistence mode for the ancestors of most peoples. However, this really held only for the well studied inhabitants of warm and tropical areas, which are the majority of surviving hunter-gatherers. He reports that “In warm-temperature, sub-tropical, and tropical latitudes, zero to thirty-nine degrees from the equator, gathering is by far the dominant mode of subsistence, appearing as primary in 25 of the 28 cases.” He found that 6 of the 8 societies whose latitude exceeded 60 degrees relied primarily on hunting. Eskimos (Inuits) are classic examples. In cool to cold temperature latitudes, from 40-59, degrees fishing was the most common subsistence mode. Temperature tells the same story, “Hunting is primary in three of the five societies in very cold climates (annual temperatures less than 32 F0.), fishing is primary in 10 of the 17 societies in cold climates (32-50 F0.): and gathering is primary in 27 of 36 societies in mild to hot climates (over 50 F0.).”

Fishing (usually male) appears to be a relatively recent development (Washburn & Lancaster, 1968, p. 294). In earlier times, before the most fertile mid-latitude lands were cleared for farming, there was probably more mid-latitude hunting. The hunting of large sea mammals from boats, so important to Eskimos, developed relatively recently.

Especially significant in the Lee tabulation (p. 43) is the absence of any predominantly gathering society above 500 latitude. Gathering is the primary way a single mother can feed her family.

The above tabulations suggest that ancestral Negroids relied on gathered vegetable material and ancestral Caucasoids and Mongoloids relied on animal matter from hunting and fishing. Supporting evidence is provided by blacks’ greater current salt retention compared to whites (Luft et al., 1991). Presumably, the lower salt content of the prehistoric low meat African diet, combined with greater sweat loss, selected for salt retention.

Another piece of evidence consistent with the environment of evolutionary adaptation for Caucasoids involving more meat eating than Negroids’ original environment is that the Negroids’ livers are smaller (Lewis, 1942, p. 276). The liver’ s function is to produce bile, which is used in fat digestion. A diet lower in fats (which are much more common in animal foods) would requires less bile for digestion.

The obvious problems of hunting while pregnant or with a small child assure that males do the hunting (for other than small and slow game) in virtually all societies (Friedl, 1975, p. 16-18; Watanabe, 1968).*(1) In climates typical of those now prevailing north of 500 a woman would have difficulty raising children without male supplied meat.

An example of women hunting small game is provided by the Twi of Melville Island, Australia (Goodale, 1971, pp. 151-169). They commonly hunt lizards, snakes, crabs, rats, and opposum and bandicoot. The last two are small animals found sleeping in logs or hollow trees, and typically are easily killed where found (i.e. without pursuit). In northern climates most such small animals would be hibernating during winter, or would be rare then.

The Hadza of Tanzania are typical tropical hunter-gatherers. Woodburn (1968, p. 52) describes the abundance of game and other food, stating, “For a Hadza to die of hunger, or even to fail to satisfy his hunger for more than a day or two, is almost inconceivable.”

Barnard and Woodburn (1988) noted that, “In all known hunter-gatherer societies, with immediate return systems, and in many but not all, hunter-gatherer societies with delayed return systems, people are almost always able to meet their nutritional needs very adequately without working long hours.” If gathering permits this, one would expect that women could adequately feed themselves and their children without male provisioning. Most tropical hunter-gatherer societies are immediate return ones.

Gardner (1972, p. 414), in describing the Paliyans, a foraging people of India, has pointed out that, “In normal times Paliyan men and women spend a bare three to four hours a day obtaining food and evidence no anxiety whatsoever about its supply.” Single individuals are able to feed themselves easily, and married couples may not feed each other. Male provisioning is clearly not necessary. Not surprisingly, with the parties not needing each other economically, “the usual situation is one of fragile, often serial, unions, terminated quickly by the offended party when conflict arises” (p. 419).

A similar impression is left by descriptions of other tropical hunter-gatherer societies. Lee & DeVore’s famous Man the Hunter is often summarized as showing that most calories come from gathering, not hunting, that most gathering is done by females, and that hunter-gatherers need spend only a relatively small part of their time in gathering. Taken together, these facts imply that a woman can feed her family with little male assistance. This suggests that males would leave more descendants by focusing their efforts on mating rather than on provisioning.*(2)

The Cold Climate Situation

Now consider a cold climate, such as prevailed where the northeastern Mongoloids (Chinese, Japanese, Koreans) are believed to have evolved. Even now these areas have cold winters. During the last ice age they were much colder. Their people’s physical features evidence numerous cold adaptations (Coon, 1965, 1982; Krantz, 1980; Roberts, 1978).

Although winter is only part of the year, it is the season animals have the greatest difficulty surviving. Most plant foods disappear (fruits, berries, edible leaves). Hunting becomes more difficult. Most animals time their reproductive cycles so there are no winter young or eggs. Eggs and young were the easiest animal protein for primitive men and women to obtain, since they were immobile or moved too slowly to escape. Many adult animals migrate (birds) or hibernate to escape the winter food shortage. Frozen ground prevents humans from digging for tubers and ice prevents or complicates fishing. Snow cover makes it hard to find fallen nuts or tuber locations, and makes walking much more difficult (Jochim, 1976, p. 138). Winter has severe weather episodes in which it is unsafe to leave shelter to hunt. Also, winter cold increases the body’s food requirements (Kleiber, 1961, p. 164, p. 239). Finally, winter is a time of short days (Torrence, 1983, emphasizes this). Thus, the very period when food is needed most is also when it is scarcest, hardest to acquire, and the time for gathering it is least.

Admittedly, there could be geographical circumstances where winter is easier. Many ungulates (such as elk) in mountainous areas winter in the lowlands. Possibly this concentration, aided by ease of tracking in snow, could make winter an easier time for survival. However, males would still be expected to be the sex that took advantage of this situation.

Jochim (1976, pp. 141-143) has estimated food consumption for German mesolithic foragers by seasons. Plants (female gatherable) are estimated to be 30% for spring and summer, 23% for fall, but zero in winter.

In northern climates a female cannot be self supporting. A female would avoid marriage to a hunter already supporting another’s family. Even if married to an excellent hunter, a second wife (receiving half of his support) would probably be poorly provisioned. Cold climates lead to environmental monogamy (Alexander, Hoogland, Howard, Noonan, and Sherman, 1979). Males evolve drives that encourage family provisioning, and discourage competing for mates.

Large game hunting often requires cooperation by groups of males. A male who doesn’t have the cooperation of others is likely to bring home less meat, and to leave fewer descendants. Variability in hunting success makes it desirable to hunt in groups that share their kills. Withdrawal of cooperation by other males is a likely penalty for trying to impregnate another’s wife. In such circumstances, the drives that lead to seeking multiple mates are selected against.

Of course, in a warm climate hunting groups are likely to exist and a philandering male may be penalized by exclusion from the group, or less cooperation. However, with opportunities for gathering and hunting small game abundant at all times, the penalty of loss of participation in the large hunts is less severe, and the selection against mating drives weaker.

Why presume that primitive hunters could not kill enough food to carry multiple females through the winter? After all, there is a lot of meat on even a single ungulate carcass. If game were abundant enough for a typical hunter to support more than one wife, population would grow. It would grow until the pressure on the game resource had reduced the yield from hunting to where one hunter could typically support only a single wife and offspring. The argument is the standard Malthusian one.

Although Man The Hunter is usually cited as showing that hunter-gatherers can feed themselves with a short work day, this appears true only of the tropical peoples discussed. That book also contains Balikci’s (1968, p. 82) discussion of the Netsilik Eskimos, who had a 10% loss of life from starvation in two years. The inland Eskimos appear to be able to support only one family per male (Alexander et al., 1979). Other northern hunter-gatherers such as the Ainu appear to have monogamy as the typical pattern, even if a few males have more than one wife.

Other descriptions of northern hunting peoples emphasize the difficulty of the life and the risks of starvation. For instance, Rogers (1972, p. 104) in his discussion of the Mistassini Cree, American sub-Arctic natives, states that, “Securing sufficient food is a constant problem and a never ending concern. Times of starvation are vividly remembered.” He also states that the gathering of vegetable foods is minimal. In such an environment a typical male could not support more than a single female. Any inadequate provisioning of her offspring could reduce his reproductive success.

Likewise, Nelson (1973) discusses how those Kutchin (north Alaska) who remembered the old ways emphasized hardships and lack of food. He reports that similar attitudes to the past are found among other Athapaskan people. Emphasis is placed on far north people because Ice Age Europe and Asia had climates similar to these peoples’ current homes (Soffer & Gamble, 1989; Scott, 1984).

Admittedly, a female without a “husband” would probably receive some meat from brothers, other family members, and other band members. In contemporary hunting bands game is usually shared with other band members (Hawkes, 1993). Even unmated females get some. Such a meat sharing system is very useful in spreading the risks of the hunt among families (Hames, 1990). In the short run, this clearly supplies some meat to women without husbands. However, it is likely that in the long run a female unattached to a male hunter would suffer. Adverse effects are most likely during occasional famines, when social traditions of sharing are likely to break down. Then band members are likely to give priority to their own offspring. One possible mechanism is through the more successful hunters joining bands with fewer non-related dependents, where their own families would be better provisioned. Thus, in time of famine, poor provisioning by a father would affect his children’s survival. The sharing systems observed among current hunters probably evolved relatively late, after an earlier system in which males gave priority to themselves and their families. While sharing may moderate regional differences in the consequences for offspring survival of male provisioning, they are unlikely to eliminate them.

Predictions of the Hypothesis

There appear to be several traits that contribute to success in mating competition. A strong sex drive would lead to more matings. A strong Coolidge effect (in which women other than regular sex partners were considered unusually attractive, see Symons, 1979, p. 209) would encourage taking additional wives, matings with other men’s wives, and rape. Efforts to mate with other men’s wives involves risks of retaliation. Thus, aggressiveness, impulsiveness, and lack of fear would contribute to leaving more descendants. If one were to have only an occasional mating with certain women, greater sperm production would lead to leaving more children. If males frequently succeeded in mating another’s wife, a high sperm production and strong sex drive would lead to leaving more offspring.

Empathy with others is not conducive to extra-marital relationships or even to taking additional wives. For instance, strong sympathy for one’s children is likely to lead to devoting spare resources to them, rather than using the resources to purchase sexual access through prostitutes, concubines, or extra wives. Likewise, if extramarital intercourse violates social mores, a strong tendency to follow social mores is not conducive to extra-marital access.

The above paternal investment theory makes a number of interesting predictions about the mating patterns of hunter-gatherer populations in warm versus cold climates.

Using Racial Data to Test Clinal Theories

Because agriculture was adopted relatively recently, differences that emerged during the hunter-gatherer stage should have survived into the ethnographic present. The above suggests that personality and behavior differences among modern populations should be correlated with the winter temperatures where they evolved. Tropical populations would be selected for greater mating efforts and lower paternal investment. In cold climates, the opposite would be true.

Ideally, analysis would use data expressed as behavioral clines drawn from data on many different populations. (A cline is a line connecting points of equal values for observations, such as lines on a weather map.) Unfortunately, such data is rare. Admittedly, some data is available from physical anthropologists’ studies of specific populations, and from the ethnographic record, coded in the Ethnographic Atlas (Murdock, 1967).

However, some population level studies do exist using such data. Wolfe and Gray (1982) found a correlation between the extent of polygyny and the height of males and females. This is easily explained by the taller males having an advantage in acquiring mates, which leads to greater selection for height in polygynous societies. Wolfe and Gray were surprized not to find clear evidence of greater sexual dimorphism is such societies, which they expected from the animal evidence. However, in humans it is known that most genes that affect height appear to affect both males and females equally (excluding the obvious exception of those carried on the X or Y chromosomes). What they regarded as a puzzling correlation between polygyny and female height is easily explained. If taller males leave more offspring, the mean height of both males and females will be raised, leaving sexual dimorphism little changed.

Wolfe and Gray used a code for the extent of father-infant proximity in the first year of life as a measure of male parental investment. They found that this correlated to a statistically significant degree with measures of polygyny (Table 8.1), and with male and female heights. Since it is unlikely that height causes differences in marriage patterns, it is more plausible that sexual selection has affected the frequencies of genes for height, and possibly for a measure of paternal investment (if that is subject to genetic variability). For these effects to have appeared, the differences in marriage patterns must have persisted long enough for natural selection to have acted. Although Wolfe and Gray did not notice this, this is the first clear evidence that sexual selection has played a role in the evolution of differences in gene frequencies among human populations.

Studies of the above type can be done for only a few variables. As Wolfe and Gray (1982, pp. 206-207) report, “Our search of the literature of cross-cultural codes revealed no codes that directly rate societies on the degree of male parental investment. This lack of codes is partly due to the fact that ethnographers rarely had a theoretical orientation in which the problem of male parental investment was of central concern and therefore rarely collected data on this problem.”

However, various physical variables do correlate with climate, among which are skin color, shape of nose, body mass and shape, etc. These highly visible surface features include the variables usually used for racial classification. It appears that Negroids evolved in the warmest climate (tropical Africa), Mongoloids in the coldest (the North China-Siberia area), and Caucasoids in intermediate climates (Europe and the Middle East). These areas are separated from each other by barriers to gene flow. The Sahara partially isolates tropical Africa. During the ice ages, the Himalayan ice sheet separated the Caucasoids from the Mongoloids.

Limits on gene flow between different areas (although not complete) permitted populations in each region to develop somewhat different morphology and behaviors. Each evolved in their respective environments so as to produce the largest numbers of descendants. Each of the major races of mankind, Negroid, Caucasoid, and Mongoloid, is itself composed of numerous separate populations. In the absence of detailed information on personality in a large number of localities around the world, the best way to look for evidence of personality varying with climate is through examining racial variability.

Rushton and Ellis have assembled considerable racial information. (These differences of course are related only to central tendencies, and any one individual need not resemble his race with regard to any single trait.) Theirs are the best summaries of non-morphological racial differences. They deserve considerable credit for assembling this data. While they interpreted their findings in differential K selection terms, their data can also be used to test the male mating effort versus paternal investment hypothesis.

Explaining Racial Variation by Mating Competition versus Provisioning

Let us start by taking the list of personality characteristics Rushton assembled (1987, p. 1019; 1988, p. 1010; 1989a, p. 9; Rushton & Bogaert, 1989) and see whether a mating effort versus parental investment framework can explain them. This can be done for most items.

Aggression

Negroids are reported (by Rushton) to be the most aggressive and Mongoloids least aggressive (Caucasoids intermediate). From a reproductive viewpoint, aggression’s benefits include leadership positions. These assist in obtaining multiple wives, and frequently provide opportunities for extramarital relationships. Aggression also produces children through rape. In warm climates, where extra wives can be self-supporting, there are clear reproductive benefits to additional wives. In cold climates, lower survival of children by the first wife will provide a partial or even complete offset.

The disadvantage to high levels of aggression is that it leads to injury or even death, either in the course of the conflict caused by the aggression, or through retaliation by victims or society. In all climates death eliminates, and disability reduces, the chances of fathering additional children. However, in cold climates, death and disability are more likely to lead to the death of existing children, while in warm climates the mother is more likely to be able to rear her children alone. This effect alone would make the optimal position on an aggression-fearfulness continuum climate dependent.

Aggression also leads to interband raiding and warfare. These increase sexual access to other bands’ females. Direct access may be through rape or wife capture. Indirectly, killing or defeating competing males reduces mating competition. Wives are later obtained by courtship or exchange.

However, additional wives only contribute to reproductive success if there is enough food to rear the resulting offspring. Where women supply their own subsistence, warfare and wife capture can produce reproductive gains. This is likely to be true in tropical areas. In cold areas, where wives must be provisioned by hunting, additional children from captured wives would divert scarce resources from other children, limiting the net gain.

A defeat in interband conflict leads to deaths and injuries. In northern climates, where the gains from success are small, and the losses large, the relatively non-aggressive will leave more descendants. In tropical climates, where the benefits are larger, selection will be for higher aggression.

While Rushton interprets aggression as a r characteristic, this is implausible. Gould (1982, p. 367) argues, “Since member of K-selected species inhabit the same niche and compete for population-limiting resources, it should not be surprising that these animals regularly fight with each other for control of those resources. Among r-selected species, on the other hand, fighting would be a waste of their most precious commodity, time.” In essence, if resources are abundant, organisms will not benefit from fighting. Destroying other individuals is only beneficial when it eliminates competitors, which is to say in K conditions. In contrast, aggression appears unambiguously useful for obtaining numerous matings, even if not for provisioning.

Dominance

Very similar comments can be made regarding dominance, where Negroids are reported to be the strongest seekers of dominance and Mongoloids least (Caucasoids intermediate). Dominance seeking leads to more mating opportunities, but also to death and injury, which reduces the survival of already born offspring, especially where male provisioning is essential. If the extra wives that dominance and prestige provide cannot be supported, the ability to attract them gives little reproductive benefit.

Anxiety

Mongoloids are reported to be the most anxious, and Negroids least (with Caucasoids in between). This is closely related to dominance seeking and aggression, in that high anxiety deters dominance seeking and aggression. The more prone an individual is to anxiety, the less likely he is to seek additional matings beyond his first wife. It is usually not in the wife’s reproductive interest for him to either take additional wives, or to seek extramarital relationships. She can be expected to have evolved to threaten retaliation, and occasionally retaliate by leaving, attacking the offending male, or enlisting the aid of her relatives or society against him. Conducting an affair with another man’s wife, or an unmarried chaste female, or rape, all involve risk taking. Thus, where the optimal male strategy is to devote less efforts to mating than to provisioning existing children, high anxiety is selected for .

There are additional reasons for selection for high anxiety in cold climates. One strategy for surviving the winter is food storage (see Miller, 1991). Food storage is practiced only (with exceptions) in societies whose growing seasons are less than about 200 days (Binford, 1980). Anxiety about food supply encourages storage, and discourages their too rapid consumption. Where storage makes a difference, high anxiety is selected for.

Coon’s descriptions (1971, p. 26-39) of hunter-gatherer housing shows that simple domed houses and lean-tos are used by southern people, while igloos, plank houses, and pit houses are used further north. Pit houses, roofed holes, are common among northern hunters because they protect well against intense cold. Houses in snowy areas can collapse with a heavy snowfall, and cause loss of life, as well as leaving the inhabitants exposed to the cold. Collapse of a tropical conical hut, or lean to, is only an inconvenience. Anxiety would appear to encourage the construction of houses with adequate safety margins, and possibly an early start to such construction. Thus, anxiety would appear to promote reproductive success more in areas with snow than in tropical areas.

Anxiety about being caught in a freezing storm, or away from a warm campfire overnight is likely to promote survival in cold climates. Thus, stronger cold climates selection for anxiety is predicted. (Nelson [1969] mentions the caution and absence of thrill seeking in Eskimos).

Impulsivity

Frequently, short term pleasures can be obtained by acting, but acting requires risking adverse consequences. One who frequently takes advantage of short term opportunities displays impulsivity. Those with high anxiety levels are less likely to seek immediate pleasures. Thus, it is not surprising that the ordering on impulsivity, Negroids highest, Mongoloids lowest (Caucasoids in between), is opposite to the ordering on anxiety.

In particular, males frequently have the opportunity to father children through extramarital relationships or rape. High impulsivity individuals would be expected to more often act on these opportunities than would low impulsivity individuals. Thus, impulsivity would be selected for where a high mating effort contributed to fitness.

Delay of gratification

Closely related to impulsivity is the ability to delay gratification. Mischel (1958, 1961c, 1971, p. 127) found a racial difference in preference for delayed gratification. Trinidad Indians (i.e. India origin) children would wait longer for a reward than Negro children, although he interpreted this as reflecting the greater absence of fathers among the Negro children. As is common in Negroid populations (see below), many of the Negroes lacked a father in the home, while few Indians lacked a father in the home. Cultural factors probably also play a role, since Grenada Negroes were similar to Trinidad Indians (Mischel, 1961c). Delay of gratification was less in a Trinidad industrial school for juvenile deliquents than in an ordinary Trinidad school, supporting the theory that difficulty in deferring gratification (such as choosing the immediate gratification obtainable from stealing, risking a future punishment) contributes to criminal activity (Mischel, 1961a). Gratification delay in Trinidad Negroes was found to be positively related to Harris’s Social Responsibility Scale, which conceptualized responsibility “as a composite of attitude elements reflecting behavior classifiable as reliable, accountable, loyal, or doing an effective job” (Mischel, 1961a, b). Interestingly, the Trinidad Negroes scored much lower than a similar aged (presumably predominantly white) US group, which Mischel (1961a, p. 6) notes is “fully consistent with anthropological observations.”

It is not known how heritable the ability to defer gratification is, although most personality variables appear to have a significant degree of heritability. However, in one experiment, using Barbadian Negroes in the Cambridge area, the mother’s delay of gratification (choice of large bottle of instant coffee in a week or a small bottle now) was found to be correlated with the child’s violating or not violating a prohibition in a temptation situation (Mischel & Gilligan, 1964, p. 412). This suggests both behaviors are reflecting a heritable trait.

Difficulty in delaying gratification and impulsivity makes provisioning more difficult. Provisioning requires suppressing the desire to eat in order to bring food back to the family. In warm climates, not eating food when available would merely deny the male forager the nutrition required to compete with other males, since his children will normally be fed in any case.

Also, a food storage strategy for surviving the winter requires deferring gratification. The impulse to immediately eat available food must be resisted to store it, and later the impulse to eat the stores must be resisted in order to retain them for later use. Survival through the winter may require not only storing food, but also storing fuel, making clothing, and building shelters. These activities require resisting impulses to divert energy to activities with shorter term returns (gathering non-storable food, drinking, or even flirting). Thus, there are other reasons why seeking immediate gratification and impulsivity would be selected against in cold climates.

Banfield (1974) has proposed that seeking immediate gratification among the U. S. inner city poor (who tend to be Negroids) explains much of their poverty. While he carefully denies believing in genetic differences (like other writers of the time), it is plausible that this trait, like most personality traits, has a genetic component. Furthermore, tropical environments, such as that of Africa, are ones where hunter-gatherer populations are described by Woodburn (1980) as “immediate gratification” ones. He has described how for the Hadza of Tanzania, food is available in the bush at any time, and that as a result there is little need to plan ahead or to defer gratification. Thus, it is plausible that the immediate gratification behaviors that Banfield blames for so many inner city problems may be a continuation of tropical hunter-gatherer behavior.

Sociability

Sociability assists in learning of, and exploiting, mating opportunities. However, time spent socializing reduces the time available for gathering food and for other parental investments. Sociability often involves remaining near the camp where others are located, while provisioning requires leaving to forage. Thus, selection for provisioning will reduce sociability.

It should be noted that if sociability leads to talking it would be selected against in northern climates, where quiet is required for hunting.

Extraversion

Extraversion represents a combination of impulsivity and sociability (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1985). Thus, extraversion will be selected for where selection for seeking copulations occurs, and be selected against in other areas. Thus, it is not surprising that Negroids rank highest in extraversion, and Mongoloids rank lowest, with Caucasoids in between.

Behavioral restraint

Rushton (1988, p. 1013) combined many of these characteristics and described them in terms of behavioral restraint, with Mongoloids being highest in behavior restraint, and Negroids being lowest (Caucasoids intermediate). Behavioral restraint is not conducive to males seeking mating opportunities, but is conducive to making high paternal investment, which frequently requires resisting immediate gratification opportunities.

Criminal activity

Criminal activity is closely related to behavior restraint, for which the evidence is that Negroids are highest, Mongoloids lowest, and Caucasoids in between (for documentation see Wilson & Herrnstein, 1985; Ellis, 1988, p. 532; Jaynes & Williams, 1989, chap. 9; Rushton, 1990a). Paternal investment theory would explain high crime rates as resulting from high aggressivity and low empathy, altruism, and rule following behavior, traits that contributed to tropical reproductive success. A contributing factor is that the racial ordering for intelligence (Mongoloids first, Caucasoids next, and Negroids last [Jensen, 1987 on Negroids; see Rushton, in press, for other references]) is opposite to those for crime, and criminal behavior is known to be more common among the less intelligent. Intelligence differences have been offered as explaining the racial differences in crime (Gordon, 1987).

If those selected for mating effort have higher levels of aggression, lower behavioral restraint, and higher sex drives, it would be predicted that rape rates would be higher. They are known to be higher in Negroids than in Caucasoids (Brownmiller, 1975, pp. 213-216; Ellis, 1989, p. 94).

Child abuse is another form of crime. Abusing a child is the opposite of investing in it. If cold climate fathers were selected for paternal investment, their descendants should commit less child abuse. Caucasoids do have lower child abuse rates than Negroids (Ellis, 1987, p. 159), and Mongoloids the lowest (Ellis 1993, p. 171) .

Sexual restraint

The form of behavioral restraint most sensitive to natural selection is sexual restraint. With regard to a wide range of sex related variables, including marital instability, Rushton (1988) and Rushton & Bogaert (1987) show that Mongoloids are the most sexually restrained, and Negroids least, with Caucasoids intermediate. Sexual restraint is the ability to resist opportunities for copulation. Males that devote their energies to paternal investment have less energy left for seeking additional matings.

Two mechanisms could produce greater sexual restraint. The sex drives (including those for seeking variety in partners) could be weaker, or the inhibitions to sexual activity could be greater. That populations exhibiting greater sexual restraint are also more restrained in other ways suggests that part of the explanation is the greater inhibition (discussed above).

However, populations may also differ in the strength of sex drives. Selection for a stronger sex drive (and for a stronger desire for variety in partners) appears a more efficient mechanism for increasing mating effort than merely selection for less restraint. Generalized mechanisms, such as changing anxiety levels, might prove counterproductive in non-sexual spheres. For instance, less anxiety might encourage taking excessive hunting risks.

Simpson and Gangestad (1991) show that the strength of the desire for numerous sexual partners (what they call sociosexuality) varies independently of the strength of the desire for frequent sex. It is very plausible that both are genetically influenced. They (Gangestad & Simpson, 1990; Simpson & Gangestad, 1991) present evidence that sociosexuality varies with personality dimensions that have been shown to possess heritable components. Gangestad and Simpson (1990) argue that seeking separate partners, versus making a commitment to one partner represent different reproductive strategies, but fail to consider the possibility that the equilibrium percentage of individuals following the different strategies may vary with the environment (and hence with race).

A genetic influence on the drive for sexual variety is also suggested by the greater male desire for variety. This is probably caused by the effects of testosterone (or another sex related hormone) on some part of the brain. Genetically controlled variability in the number of receptors or the level of hormones could produce variability in the strength of the desire for sexual variety across populations.

Sexual behavior

Rushton and Bogaert (1987) document differences in sexual behavior. Besides a literature review, they reanalyzed the Kinsey data on sexual behavior in American whites and blacks. This showed greater sexual activity in blacks than in whites. For instance, the black frequency for coitus in their first marriage was 3.83 times per week for those aged 21-25 versus 3.11 for similar whites. The more frequent intercourse within marriage suggests differences in sex drive, rather than in a generalized restraint (which should not affect the frequency of marital relations). Measures of the extent and frequency of extra-marital sexual activity (p. 542) showed more activity outside of marriage among blacks than among whites, with all reported measures being statistically significant at the .001 level. Most black working class females believe that a wife should expect running around (Staples & Johnson, 1993, pp. 156-157). “. . .Black females have their first full sexual intercourse some years earlier than the typical White female.” (Staples & Johnson, 1993, p. 77). Differences in either sex drive or in social restraint could explain these differences.

Since age at first intercourse (Martin, Eaves, & Eysenck, 1977), and age at first date, marriage, and first and second child appears to be genetically influenced (Mealey & Segal, 1993), it appears appropriate to consider hypotheses that population differences in sexual behavior are also genetically influenced.

Differences in sexual restraint and in the number of sexual partners predict racial differences in sexually transmitted diseases. Such differences exist in the distribution of AIDS (Rushton and Bogaert, 1989). They had earlier been reported for syphilis, where the negro rate (often approximated by the rate for non-whites) is a multiple of the white rate, both in civilians and in the military (Aral & Holmes, 1984, p. 130; Berg, 1984, p. 93; Lewis, 1942, p. 158). The reported gonorrhea rate is 21 times as high in blacks as in whites, although part of this difference may reflect better reporting from the public clinics frequented by blacks (Aral & Holmes, 1990, p. 22). For the common herpes simplex virus -2, the antibodies at ages 60-74 are found in over 80% of black females versus slightly over 20% of the white females (Aral & Holmes, 1990, p. 27). Pelvic inflammatory disease (caused by the spread of gonorrhea and/or chlamydia to the upper reproductive structures of women) is currently a major cause of female infertility in parts of Africa.

The most plausible proximate explanation for racial differences in sex drives is the possibility discussed below of differences in testosterone levels at the relevant ages. Testosterone promotes male sexual activity (Kemper, 1990, pp. 38-46).

Size of sex organs

One consequence of higher levels of puberty causing hormones could be greater development of the sex organs. Rushton and Bogaert (1987) use the Kinsey data to document longer penises and greater circumference of penises in blacks than in whites. From other sources they find Mongoloids to have shorter penises than Caucasoids. One condom manufacturer provides for larger size condoms for Africa than for other areas, and the smallest size for Asia (Wong, 1991). Mongoloids have smaller testes than Caucasoids (Short, 1984; Diamond, 1986).

It would be desirable to have good quality measurements of Negroid testes size, because the theory that they have been selected for high mating effort would predict larger testes in order to win at sperm competition. High levels of polygyny, and accompanying sperm competition, would select for large testes and high sperm production, especially allowing for the tendency for the largest number of wives to occur late in life. Among the large apes, the species that have multimale mating systems (notably the chimpanzee) have larger testes (Short, 1981; Smith, 1984).

The available evidence, while not of the highest quality, does not confirm this prediction. Ajmani, Jain, & Saxena (1985) found the scrotum diameters in 320 Nigerian males to be greater than had been reported for Europeans, as predicted. An American study of adolescents (Daniel, Feinstein, Howard-Peebles & Baxley, 1982) reported “There was no significant differences in testicular volumes between black and white adolescent boys. Any possible simple correlation with race was not significant against the general variability of testicular volume.” No actual report is provided of the racial averages, leaving the possibility that some difference was found. In any case, a difference in adolescents might reflect only an earlier start to maturation among the blacks. In addition, one early autopsy study actually found lower testes weights in Negroids than in Caucasoids (Freeman, 1934).

Rushton and his colleagues explain these sex organ differences with his differential K selection hypothesis. Yet it is not obvious that larger penises (or clitorises or vaginas) lead to more offspring. Thus, they should not be interpreted as r characteristics. More plausibly, they are a mere by product of selection for high levels of sex hormones. The testosterone surge at puberty enlarges the penis, and it is plausible that higher hormonal levels would produce a larger organ. Testosterone increases the penis size of castrated rats whether applied externally or injected (Wigodsky & Greene, 1940). This makes it more plausible that racial differences in penis size reflect hormonal differences.

Body build

There are racial differences in body build. Negroes have a more masculine body build than Caucasians (Laska-Mierzejewska, 1982). The masculine body build implies strong accentuation of such masculine characteristics as a large chest, and muscular body. Negro soldiers (males) have been found in two studies to be more mesomorphic (and less endomorphic) than white soldiers, with the difference being more than one standard deviation (Damon, Bleibtreu, Elliot, & Giles, 1962, Table 2).*(3). Simply put, mesomorphy is the amount of visible muscularity. Such a body appears to have been selected for conflict with other males. Notice, this observation is evidence for paternal investment theory, since other theories do not predict that the Negroid males will be more masculine.

However, the Japanese are relatively mesomorphic, both in Hawaii (Heath, Hopkins, & Miller, 1961), and in Japan (Kraus, 1951). Thus, the extent of mesomorphy appears to be one case where Ruston’s generalization that the Caucasoids fall between the Negroids and Mongoloids breaks down.

Hudson & Holbrook (1982) found lower mean fundamental vocal frequencies in Negro males and females than others had found for whites. As is well known (and found by them), males display a lower frequency (deeper voice) than do females, and puberty deepens the male voice. This deepening is generally attributed to testosterone. The deeper Negro voice may reflect the influence of higher testosterone levels at puberty or prenatally.

Muscle characteristics

An interesting set of statistically significant differences in muscle characteristics has been found between black and white sedentary males (Ama, Simonau, Boulay, Serresse, Theriault, and Bouchard, 1986). African blacks were found to have less type I muscle fibers, more type IIa and lower activities in enzymes catalyzing reactions in phosphagenic and lactase dehydrogenase metabolic pathways. These were interpreted as likely to be inherited, and suggesting that blacks would exhibit better performance in sports requiring a short duration of exertion. Malina (1988) reviewed the literature on childhood performance, and found that blacks excelled in the dash, the standing long jump, the vertical jump, and the ball throw for distance. All of these involve a short burst of exertion. Tests with a bicycle ergocycle have shown Caucasians to have higher maximal O2 uptake, a trait adapted for endurance activities. Also, Ama, Lagasse, Bouchard, and Simonau (1990) reported better white performance (compared to black West Africans) in the last 30 seconds of a 90 second knee extension exercise, a result consistent with blacks making greater use of anaerobic energy metabolism than whites. What would have selected for racial differences in such traits?

Hunting is implausible both because Caucasoids are likely to have hunted more than Negroids, and because hunting often requires prolonged exertion to follow large animals. A likely explanation is male fighting, since fights often involve short periods of vigorous exertion (after which the opponent is hopefully defeated). Thus, Negroids appear to be selected more for fighting. This would be consistent with their more muscular body build and higher aggression. It is what would be expected if Negroids had been selected to win mating competitions.

Blacks have denser and stronger bones than whites (Himes, 1988; Pollitzer and Anderson, 1989). The disadvantage to higher density bones is higher weight (more energy required for movement) and greater need for calcium. The advantage is fewer fractures, and thus, lower mortality. The bone differences can be explained if black males engaged in more intermale conflicts, and those with stronger bones were less often injured. No other hypothesis comes immediately to mind that can explain these density differences.

Worthy (1977, chapter 2; Worthy & Markle, 1970; see also Jones & Hochner, 1973) has shown systematic differences in the sport positions blacks and whites play. He argues that where the positions require reacting properly to the opponents’ actions, blacks are more successful, while whites do better where the player initiates his own motions, as in baseball pitching, marksmanship, or in shooting a basketball free goal. He reports a Negroid relative advantage in the defensive position of an experimental game where they had to react to their opponents’ initiatives.

Worthy also correlated eye color with positions played. Dark eyed whites are overrepresented in the same positions in which blacks are overrepresented. In Worthy’s theory, eye color plays a direct role. However, eye color also varies with ethnic origin, with north Europeans having more blue eyes. This suggests an Old World cline such that ability to react to opponents’ actions increases to the south.

What circumstances would have selected for these different abilities? Survival in fights with other males would appear to depend on quick reactions to opponents’ moves. In contrast, a hunter usually stalks his prey and then chooses the time to attack. Worthy’s observations could be explained if male reproductive success in colder regions varied with hunting ability, while in the tropics it varied more with fighting ability. The eye color differences could be explained if hunting was even more important in northern Europe than in southern Europe, or if southern Europeans had interbred more with farmers of Middle Eastern origin.

Possibly relevant evidence is provided by Coleman (1980). Successful prone rifle shooters (who choose the moment of shooting) are the most introverted, while successful rapid fire pistol shooters (who have very little time to fire five shots, and have to move the pistol from target to target), are very extroverted. Apparently personality correlates with what looks like Worthy’s reactive versus non-reactive distinction. Thus, an alternative explanation for these racial differences would rely on selection for different personality traits. Since tropical climates seem to select for both quick reactions (as in fighting) and for extraversion, and cold climates for the opposite, both theories predict a similar north-south behavioral gradient.

There are other intriguing reports of correlations of eye color with behavior. Rosenberg & Kagan, (1987, 1988) and Rubin & Both (1989) report that Caucasian children that are behaviorally inhibited ( a concept related to introversion) are disproportionately blue eyed. While Rosenberg & Kagan suggest several possible biological mechanisms for this effect, a very plausible explanation is that north European children (more likely to be blue eyed) are more behaviorally inhibited than South European children (who are more likely to have brown eyes). Both eye color and behavioral inhibition are believed to be genetically influenced. If the effect is really biological with both eye color and behavior having a common cause (a pleiotropic gene effect), it would be predicted that where one sibling was blue eyed and one brown eyed, that the blue eyed one was more likely to be behaviorally inhibited. If the genes for eye color and behavior were associated merely because the ancestors of different children came from different regions, there would be no sibling correlation. Unfortunately, such a study has not yet been done.

An argument against Negroids having evolved for fighting is that they show lower pain tolerance than other races (Worthy, 1977, pp. 123-124)

Life Span Variations

Negroids have shorter lives than Caucasoids, who have shorter lives than Mongoloids. For instance, U. S. whites have a life span estimated at 76.1 years versus 69.1 years for U. S. blacks (U. S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1993). If testosterone shortens life (Hamilton, 1948), as it appears to do (shown by the shorter life span of males than females, and of normal males compared to castrated males), differential testosterone levels could explain the life span ranking.

Part of the shorter Negroid life span reflects more violent and accidental deaths, which could result directly from higher aggression. However, disease causes most of the excess deaths. As a general rule, more polygamous species have higher male death rates (relative to female rates), with much of the difference being due to degenerative diseases (Daly and Wilson, 1988, p. 142). As discussed below, Negroids appear to be more polygamous than other races.

An evolutionary biology theory of aging (Rose, 1991) holds that many genes are pleiotropic (i.e. have more than one effect). The same genes that contribute to longer life often impose disadvantages earlier in life. In the simplest case, genes which delay degeneration (perhaps through directing more energy to cell repair) also imply early life disadvantages (perhaps through leaving less energy available for mating or for lactation). A longer life can be purchased only at the expense of an earlier reproductive disadvantage. Which genes are selected for depends on whether reproductive success is facilitated more by a long life, or by early life success. This may depend on whether selection is for high paternal investment or high mating effort.

Copulation precedes childbirth, while paternal investment follows childbirth. Since death destroys a man’s ability to help his children, longevity facilitates paternal investing. Thus, if a father’s death hurts his child’s survival chances, selection for a long life will be stronger than if children can be raised without paternal assistance. Conversely, if an early death from mating competition is going to eliminate any reproductive benefits from slower degeneration later, the alleles that protect against degeneration in old age will be less beneficial (Diamond, 1992, Chapter 7, especially p. 132).

If a male does not obtain a mate when young, living longer will not add to his descendants. Suppose the number of matings determines how many descendants a man leaves. Then men are more likely to be selected for early vigor and competitive ability, even at the expense of an earlier death. Where males have been selected for mating competition, polygyny often emerges (see below). For many men to have multiple wives, others must have no wives. Thus, to perpetuate his genes in a polygynous society, a man must be ranked relatively highly by those who control sexual access. Dominance and prestige seeking would be selected for.

In a monogamous or nearly monogamous society, even undesirable men marry. Suppose genes that handicap men in mating also contribute to a longer life, and hence to greater offspring survival. Then carriers of these may leave more descendants than worse providers who are better at mating, but who still get only one wife. Genes for high testosterone probably shorten life but may contribute to mating success through stronger muscles, higher sex drive, and aggression. Many athletes shorten their lives by taking steroids (essentially synthetic testosterones) to promote competitive success.

Thus, strong male sexual competition leads to a shorter life span. This can be explai


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