11/11/2004

\”Race as a Biological Concept\”

Race as a Biological Concept
by J. Philippe Rushton
November 4, 1996

Professor Phillippe Rushton of the University of Western Ontario has released the following statement on race, in response to attempts to discredit the very concept of race and to argue that race “has no validity as a biological concept when applied to man.” We are pleased to make a copy of this important statement available to our readers.

Discussion of “race” shows little sign of diminishing, despite efforts to deconstruct the concept. Deconstructing the concept of race not only conflicts with people’s tendency to classify and build family histories according to common descent but also ignores the work of biologists studying non-human species. Ever since 1758, when the Swedish naturalist Carolus Linnaeus created the classification system still used in biology today, most zoologists have recognized at least the four human subdivisions Linnaeus delineated: Asians, American Indians, Europeans, and Africans. (Technically, some would group the first two Linnaean subdivisions together, thus yielding three major races, often termed, mongoloids, caucasoids, and negroids.) Such high-level classifications do not rule out making finer, hierarchical subdivisions within these major groups.

A race is what zoologists term a variety or subdivision of a species. Each race (or variety) is characterized by a more or less distinct combination of inherited morphological, behavioral, physiological traits. In flowers, insects, and non-human mammals, zoologists consistently and routinely study the process of racial differentiation. Formation of a new race takes place when, over several generations, individuals in one group reproduce more frequently among themselves than they do with individuals in other groups. This process is most apparent when the individuals live in diverse geographic areas and therefore evolve unique, recognizable adaptations (such as skin color) that are advantageous in their specific environments. But differentiation also occurs under less extreme circumstances. Zoologists and evolutionists refer to such differentiated populations as races. (Within the formal taxonomic nomenclature of biology, races are termed subspecies). Zoologists have identified two or more races (subspecies) in most mammalian species.

Unless one is a religious fundamentalist and believes that man was created in the image and likeness of God, it is foolish to believe that human beings are exempt from biological classification and the laws of evolution that apply to all other life forms. Of course, individuals vary greatly within each racial group and should be treated as such. Nonetheless, much has been learned by studying the statistical differences between the various human races. In my book Race, Evolution, and Behavior (1995, Transaction Publishers), as well as in other recent writings (e.g., the February 1996 issue of Current Anthropology), I review the behavioral, morphological, and physiological differences between the three major human races — mongoloid, caucasoid, and negroid — and show that these statistical differences are constant across both historical time, national boundaries, and political and economic systems.

Here I will briefly summarize the findings. Asians and Africans consistently aggregate at opposite ends, with Europeans intermediate, on a continuum that includes over 60 anatomical and social variables. These 60 variables include brain size, intelligence, sexual habits, fertility, personality, temperament, speed of maturation, and longevity. If race were an arbitrary, socially-constructed concept, devoid of all biological meaning, such consistent relationships would not exist.

Those objecting to the concept of race argue that the taxonomic definitions are arbitrary and subjective. Although critics are correct to point out that the variation within each race is extremely large, that there is disagreement as to exactly how many races there are, and that there is a blurring of category edges because of admixture, they are in error when they claim that classifications are arbitrary. For example, race-critic Jared Diamond, in the 1994 issue of Discover magazine, surveyed half a dozen geographically variable traits and formed very different races depending on which traits he picked. Classifying people using anti-malarial genes, lactose tolerance, fingerprint patterns, or skin color resulted in the Swedes of Europe being placed in the same category as the Xhosa and Fulani of Africa, the Ainu of Japan, and the Italians of Europe.

Jared Diamond’s classifications, however, are arbitrary and nonsensical because they have little, if any, predictive value beyond the initial classification. More significantly, they confuse the scientific meaning of race, that is, a recognizable (or distinguishable) geographic population. In everyday life, as in evolutionary biology, a “negroid” is someone whose ancestors were born in sub-Saharan Africa, and likewise for a “caucasoid” and a “mongoloid.” This definition fits with the temporal bounds offered by the best current theory of human evolution. Thus, since Homo sapiens first appeared in Africa about 200,000 years ago, branched off into Europe about 110,000 years ago, and into Asia 70,000 years after that, a “negroid” is someone whose ancestors, between 4,000 and (to accommodate recent migrations) 20 generations ago, were born in sub-Saharan Africa — and likewise, for a caucasoid and a mongoloid.

Social definitions — that is, self-identification and other-identification actually accord quite well with the physical evidence. Mongoloids, caucasoids, and negroids can be distinguished on the basis of obvious differences in skeletal morphology, hair and facial features, as well by blood groups and DNA fingerprints. Forensic anthropologists regularly classify skeletons of decomposed bodies by race. For example, narrow nasal passages and a short distance between eye sockets identify a caucasoid person, distinct cheekbones characterize a mongoloid person, and nasal openings shaped like an upside down heart typify a negroid person. In certain criminal investigations, the race of a perpetrator can be identified from blood, semen, and hair samples. To deny the predictive validity of race at this level is nonscientific and unrealistic.

The mean pattern of educational and economic achievement within multi-racial countries such as Canada and the United States has increasingly been found to prove valid internationally. For example, it is not often recognized, perhaps because it contradicts the politically correct theories that intelligence is purely a matter of socio-economic conditions, that Asian-Americans and Asians in Asia often outscore white Americans and white Europeans on IQ tests and on tests of educational achievement (even though the tests were largely developed by Europeans and white Americans for use in a Euro-American culture). Blacks in the Caribbean, Britain, Canada and sub-Saharan Africa as well as in the United States have low IQ scores relative to whites. For violent crime, analyses of INTERPOL data from the 1980s and 1990s show the same international distribution that occurs within the United States (that is, Asians least, Europeans in the middle, and Africans most). A similar racial gradient is found both within the U.S. and globally for measures of sexual activity and frequencies of sexually transmitted diseases such as AIDS (based on World Health Organization data).

One neurohormonal contributor to crime and reproductive behavior is testosterone. Studies show that black college students and military veterans have 3% to 19% more testosterone than their white counterparts. The Japanese have even lower amounts than whites. Sex hormones are circulated throughout the body and are known to activate many brain-behavior systems involving aggression and reproduction. For example, around the world the rate of dizygotic twinning per 1,000 births (caused by a double ovulation), is less than 4 among Asians, 8 among Europeans, and 16 or greater among Africans. The differences in multiple birthing are known to be heritable through the race of the mother regardless of the race of the father, as found in Asian/European matings in Hawaii and European/African matings in Brazil.

Publication of The Bell Curve brought widespread public attention to the research on race that has been accumulating over the last 30 years in technical and specialist journals that demonstrably challenges each and every article of the dogma of biological egalitarianism. Startling, and alarming to many, is the conclusion that follows from these data that if all people were treated the same, most average race differences would not disappear. With egalitarianism under siege, there has been a major effort to get the “race genie” back in the bottle, to squeeze the previously tabooed toothpaste back into the tube, to suppress or deny the latest scientific evidence on race, genetics, and behavior.

Regardless of the extent to which the media promote “politically correct,” but scientifically wrong, resolutions from professional societies such as the American Anthropological Association, facts remain facts and require appropriate scientific, not political, explanation. On average, the Chinese, Koreans, and Japanese are more similar to each other and are different from Australians, Israelis and the Swedes, who in turn are similar to each other and are different from Nigerians, Kenyans, and Jamaicans. None of this should be construed as meaning that environmental factors play no part individual development. But with each passing year and each new study, the evidence for the genetic contribution to individual and group differences becomes more firmly established than ever.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

J. Philippe Rushton is a John Simon Guggenheim Fellow and a professor of psychology at the University of Western Ontario in London, Ontario N6A 5C2 Canada. He holds two doctorates from the University of London (PhD and DSc) and is a Fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Science and of the American, British, and Canadian Psychological Associations. His latest book Race, Evolution, and Behavior (1995, Transaction Publishers, telephone 908-445-2280) details the theories and data summarized in this article.


Racial Differences in Intelligence: What Mainstream Scientists Say

Racial Differences in Intelligence:
What Mainstream Science Says

This public statement, signed by 52 internationally known scholars, was active on the information highway early in 1995 following several rather heated and negative responses to Herrnstein & Murray’s The Bell Curve. It was first published in The Wall Street Journal, Tuesday, December 13, 1994. An alphabetical listing of the scholars and their home institutions are given at the end of the statement.

Prologue

The Meaning and Measurement of Intelligence

Group Differences

Practical Importance

Source and Stability of Within-Group Differences

Source and Stability of Between-Group Differences

Implications for Social Policy

Prologue

Since the publication of “The BELL CURVE,” many commentators have offered opinions about human intelligence that misstate current scientific evidence. Some conclusions dismissed in the media as discredited are actually firmly supported.

This statement outlines conclusions regarded as mainstream among researchers on intelligence, in particular, on the nature, origins, and practical consequences of individual and group differences in intelligence. Its aim is to promote more reasoned discussion of the vexing phenomenon that the research has revealed in recent decades. The following conclusions are fully described in the major textbooks, professional journals and encyclopedias in intelligence.

The Meaning and Measurement of Intelligence

Intelligence is a very general mental capability that, among other things, involves the ability to reason, plan, solve problems, think abstractly, comprehend complex ideas, learn quickly and learn from experience. It is not merely book learning, a narrow academic skill, or test-taking smarts. Rather, it reflects a broader and deeper capability for comprehending our surroundings — “catching on,” “making sense” of things, or “figuring out” what to do.

Intelligence, so defined, can be measured, and intelligence tests measure it well. They are among the most accurate (in technical terms, reliable and valid) of all psychological tests and assessments. They do not measure creativity, character, personality, or other important differences among individuals, nor are they intended to.

While there are different types of intelligence tests, they all measure the same intelligence. Some use words or numbers and require specific cultural knowledge (like vocabulary). Others do not, and instead use shapes or designs and require knowledge of only simple, universal concepts (many/few, open/closed, up/down).

The spread of people along the IQ continuum, from low to high, can be represented well by the BELL CURVE (in statistical jargon, the “normal CURVE”). Most people cluster around the average (IQ 100). Few are either very bright or very dull: About 3% of Americans score above IQ 130 (often considered the threshold for “giftedness”), with about the same percentage below IQ 70 (IQ 70-75 often being considered the threshold for mental retardation).

Intelligence tests are not culturally biased against American blacks or other native-born, English-speaking peoples in the U.S. Rather, IQ scores predict equally accurately for all such Americans, regardless of race and social class. Individuals who do not understand English well can be given either a nonverbal test or one in their native language.

The brain processes underlying intelligence are still little understood. Current research looks, for example, at speed of neural transmission, glucose (energy) uptake, and electrical activity of the brain.

Group Differences

Members of all racial-ethnic groups can be found at every IQ level. The BELL CURVES of different groups overlap considerably, but groups often differ in where their members tend to cluster along the IQ line. The BELL CURVES for some groups (Jews and East Asians) are centered somewhat higher than for whites in general. Other groups (blacks and Hispanics) are centered somewhat lower than non-Hispanic whites.

The BELL CURVE for whites is centered roughly around IQ 100; the BELL CURVE for American blacks roughly around 85; and those for different subgroups of Hispanics roughly midway between those for whites and blacks. The evidence is less definitive for exactly where above IQ 100 the BELL CURVES for Jews and Asians are centered.

Practical Importance

IQ is strongly related, probably more so than any other single measurable human trait, to many important educational, occupational, economic, and social outcomes. Its relation to the welfare and performance of individuals is very strong in some arenas in life (education, military training), moderate but robust in others (social competence), and modest but consistent in others (law-abidingness). Whatever IQ tests measure, it is of great practical and social importance.

A high IQ is an advantage in life because virtually all activities require some reasoning and decision-making. Conversely, a low IQ is often a disadvantage, especially in disorganized environments. Of course, a high IQ no more guarantees success than a low IQ guarantees failure in life. There are many exceptions, but the odds for success in our society greatly favor individuals with higher IQs.

The practical advantages of having a higher IQ increase as life settings become more complex (novel, ambiguous, changing, unpredictable, or multi-faceted). For example, a high IQ is generally necessary to perform well in highly complex or fluid jobs (the professions, management); it is a considerable advantage in moderately complex jobs (crafts, clerical and police work); but it provides less advantage in settings that require only routine decision making or simple problem solving (unskilled work).

Differences in intelligence certainly are not the only factor affecting performance in education, training, and highly complex jobs (no one claims they are), but intelligence is often the most important. When individuals have already been selected for high (or low) intelligence and so do not differ as much in IQ, as in graduate school (or special education), other influences on performance loom larger in comparison.

Certain personality traits, special talents, aptitudes, physical capabilities, experience, and the like are important (sometimes essential) for successful performance in many jobs, but they have narrower (or unknown) applicability or “transferability” across tasks and settings compared with general intelligence. Some scholars choose to refer to these other human traits as other “intelligences.”

Source and Stability of Within-Group Differences

Individuals differ in intelligence due to differences in both their environments and genetic heritage. Heritability estimates range from 0.4 to 0.8 (on a scale from 0 to 1), most thereby indicating that genetics plays a bigger role than does environment in creating IQ differences among individuals. (Heritability is the squared correlation of phenotype with genotype.) If all environments were to become equal for everyone, heritability would rise to 100% because all remaining differences in IQ would necessarily be genetic in origin.

Members of the same family also tend to differ substantially in intelligence (by an average of about 12 IQ points) for both genetic and environmental reasons. They differ genetically because biological brothers and sisters share exactly half their genes with each parent and, on the average, only half with each other. They also differ in IQ because they experience different environments within the same family.

That IQ may be highly heritable does not mean that it is not affected by the environment. Individuals are not born with fixed, unchangeable levels of intelligence (no one claims they are). IQs do gradually stabilize during childhood, however, and generally change little thereafter.

Although the environment is important in creating IQ differences, we do not know yet how to manipulate it to raise low IQs permanently. Whether recent attempts show promise is still a matter of considerable scientific debate.

Genetically caused differences are not necessarily irremediable (consider diabetes, poor vision, and phenal ketonuria), nor are environmentally caused ones necessarily remediable (consider injuries, poisons, severe neglect, and some diseases). Both may be preventable to some extent.

Source and Stability of Between-Group Differences

There is no persuasive evidence that the IQ BELL CURVES for different racial-ethnic groups are converging. Surveys in some years show that gaps in academic achievement have narrowed a bit for some races, ages, school subjects and skill levels, but this picture seems too mixed to reflect a general shift in IQ levels themselves.

Racial-ethnic differences in IQ BELL CURVES are essentially the same when youngsters leave high school as when they enter first grade. However, because bright youngsters learn faster than slow learners, these same IQ differences lead to growing disparities in amount learnedas youngsters progress from grades one to 12. As large national surveyscontinue to show, black 17-year-olds perform, on the average, more likewhite 13-year-olds in reading, math, and science, with Hispanics inbetween.

The reasons that blacks differ among themselves in intelligenceappear to be basically the same as those for why whites (or Asians orHispanics) differ among themselves. Both environment and geneticheredity are involved.

There is no definitive answer to why IQ bell curves differ acrossracial-ethnic groups. The reasons for these IQ differences betweengroups may be markedly different from the reasons for why individualsdiffer among themselves within any particular group (whites or blacks orAsians). In fact, it is wrong to assume, as many do, that the reason whysome individuals in a population have high IQs but others have low IQs must be the same reason why some populations contain more such high (or low) IQ individuals than others. Most experts believe that environment is important in pushing the bell curves apart, but that genetics could be involved too.

Racial-ethnic differences are somewhat smaller but still substantial for individuals from the same socioeconomic backgrounds. To illustrate, black students from prosperous families tend to score higher in IQ than blacks from poor families, but they score no higher, on average, than whites from poor families.

Almost all Americans who identify themselves as black have white ancestors — the white admixture is about 20%, on average — and many self-designated whites, Hispanics, and others likewise have mixed ancestry. Because research on intelligence relies on self-classification into distinct racial categories, as does most other social-science research, its findings likewise relate to some unclear mixture of social and biological distinctions among groups (no one claims otherwise).

Implications for Social Policy

The research findings neither dictate nor preclude any particular social policy, because they can never determine our goals. They can, however, help us estimate the likely success and side-effects of pursuing those goals via different means.

The following professors – all experts in intelligence and allied fields – have signed this statement:

Richard D. Arvey, University of Minnesota

Thomas J. Bouchard, Jr., University of Minnesota

John B. Carroll, Un. of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

Raymond B. Cattell, University of Hawaii

David B. Cohen, University of Texas at Austin

Rene V. Dawis, University of Minnesota

Douglas K. Detterman, Case Western Reserve Un.

Marvin Dunnette, University of Minnesota

Hans Eysenck, University of London

Jack Feldman, Georgia Institute of Technology

Edwin A. Fleishman, George Mason University

Grover C. Gilmore, Case Western Reserve University

Robert A. Gordon, Johns Hopkins University

Linda S. Gottfredson, University of Delaware

Robert L. Greene, Case Western Reserve University

Richard J.Haier, University of Callifornia at Irvine

Garrett Hardin, University of California at Berkeley

Robert Hogan, University of Tulsa

Joseph M. Horn, University of Texas at Austin

Lloyd G. Humphreys, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

John E. Hunter, Michigan State University

Seymour W. Itzkoff, Smith College

Douglas N. Jackson, Un. of Western Ontario

James J. Jenkins, University of South Florida

Arthur R. Jensen, University of California at Berkeley

Alan S. Kaufman, University of Alabama

Nadeen L. Kaufman, California School of Professional Psychology at San Diego

Timothy Z. Keith, Alfred University

Nadine Lambert, University of California at Berkeley

John C. Loehlin, University of Texas at Austin

David Lubinski, Iowa State University

David T. Lykken, University of Minnesota

Richard Lynn, University of Ulster at Coleraine

Paul E. Meehl, University of Minnesota

R. Travis Osborne, University of Georgia

Robert Perloff, University of Pittsburgh

Robert Plomin, Institute of Psychiatry, London

Cecil R. Reynolds, Texas A & M University

David C. Rowe, University of Arizona

J. Philippe Rushton, Un. of Western Ontario

Vincent Sarich, University of California at Berkeley

Sandra Scarr, University of Virginia

Frank L. Schmidt, University of Iowa

Lyle F. Schoenfeldt, Texas A & M University

James C. Sharf, George Washington University

Herman Spitz, former director E.R. Johnstone Training and Research Center, Bordentown, N.J.

Julian C. Stanley, Johns Hopkins University

Del Thiessen, University of Texas at Austin

Lee A. Thompson, Case Western Reserve University

Robert M. Thorndike, Western Washington Un.

Philip Anthony Vernon, Un. of Western Ontario

Lee Willerman, University of Texas at Austin


11/11/2002

Cranial capacity and IQ

Cranial capacity and IQ
Weber, Mark
from Mankind Quarterly April, 1992

As was the case in much of his other research, Sir Francis Galton (1888) was the first to report a quantitative relationship between human cranial capacity and mental ability. Galton’s subjects were 1095 Cambridge undergraduates. The statistical techniques available to him in 1888 did not include Pearson’s correlation coefficient nor an objective Binet-type measure of intelligence. Galton computed head capacity simply by multiplying head length by breadth by height. No adjustment was made for thickness of the skull. Mental ability was estimated from average college marks. He found the relationship to be low and insignificant. Years later when Galton’s 1888 data were reworked the correlation between head capacity and college marks was found to be in the range of rs reported by Pearson (1902, 1906, 1926), Pearl (1906) and many others.

From Galton’s early paper to Lynn’s series of studies in 1989-1990 there were at least 38 published investigations of the relationship of human head measurements to mental ability but only about one in four used cranial capacity as a head measurement despite the fact that in 1901 Dr. Alice Lee had developed a formula for determining cranial capacity which corrected for thickness of the skull. In the present study, which correlates mental ability with head capacity, Lee’s formula was applied to head measurements of 476 subjects from the Georgia Twin Study (Osborne 1980). At the suggestion of Richard Lynn (personal communication) two additional correlations were computed, mental ability rs. head circumference and mental ability vs. cranial capacity with height and weight controlled.

The Georgia Twin Study database contains 127 measures of physical, mental and personal characteristics for 238 pairs of twins. In this analysis only the following variables will be used; age, race, sex, height, weight, head length, head width, head circumference, and IQ obtained from the average of the twelve mental tests of the Basic Battery of the twin study.

The 476 subjects ranged in age from 12 to 18 but 2 subjects age 12 were placed in the 13-year-old group and 26 age 18 were combined with 70 subjects age 17 to yield a total of 96 for the oldest age group. There were 100 subjects age 16, 96 age 15, 116 age 14, and 68 in the 13-year-old group, including the two 12-year-olds who were assigned to the group. Of the 476 subjects 106 were white males, 84 black males, 118 white females and 168 black females. It should be mentioned here that in the total group of 476 subjects there are 50 pairs of unlike-sexed twins. For this reason the number of subjects in an age-sex analysis does not always yield an even number as would be the case if all the twins were like-sexed. For example, there are five subjects in the 13-year group of white males. At least one of these subjects has his twin in the white female group. In addition to the 50 pairs of unlike sexed twins, 20 pairs of white males were DZ, 21 MZ; 11 pairs of black males were DZ, 18 MZ. Of the white females 21 pairs were DZ, 26 MZ. Twenty eight pairs of black females were DZ, 43 MZ. The complete break-down by age, race and sex is given in Table 1.

Head capacity was determined by Lee’s formula which requires head height. Since this measure was not one of the 127 twin-study variables, head height was estimated from a table prepared by Berry and Porteus (1920) and reproduced by Penrose as Appendix 2 (Penrose 1963).

From Table 1 it is seen that in the first phase of the analysis correlations were computed by age, for four race-sex groups. Because of the small numbers in some of the categories little credence can be placed in the rs. However, the correlations for the total race-sex groups compare favorably with recent studies of head measurements as they relate to mental ability. Among the mostly positive rs the insignificant and even negative rs at the 16-year level stand out. These subjects are all age 16; this is not a collapsed age bracket as we have at ages 13 and 17. The 16-year-old white males, black males and black females show this deviation in rs from adjacent ages. All the correlations in the table for white females are positive and compare favorably with the total rs by sex. Since the subjects’ ages were not determined until after the tests were administered there is no way some 16-year-olds could have been singled out for special or different treatment from 15-year-olds or 17-year-olds. In the case of black males the small number of cases might have been a factor but not in the case of black females nor white

Since Galton’s 1888 study there have been at least 21 published studies examining the quantitative relationship between head measurements and mental ability. The first significant correlational study was Pearson’s 1902 Royal Society paper, which he published again in 1926 in Annals of Eugenics. Results of studies before 1902 for the most part here reported as differences in means.

There has been little agreement among investigators as to which cranial measurements yielded the best estimate of cranial capacity. They varied from simple head width to brain weight/spinal cord weight ratio. Head circumference was the most frequently used head measurement, Correlations ranged from .02 in one of Lynn’s studies (1989) to .41 (Wienberg 1974). Cephalic index consistently produced a very low or negative correlation with mental ability. Galton estimated cranial capacity by multiplying head length by head height by head breadth but he had no method of estimating the relationship between the variables except to show mean differences. Since Galton’s Cambridge study numerous other investigators have used cranial capacity to compute head measurements-mental ability correlations. The range of rs for these studies was from .08 (Reed, 1923) to .14 (Passingham 1979).

In Table 1 correlations between head capacity and mental ability and head circumference and IQ are shown by age for four different sex-race groups and for the total group by sex. Also given for the five groups are the rs between IQ and head capacity with height and weight partialed out. From the table a trend of consistent age differences in correlations is not apparent unless it would be that of the white females who show slightly decreasing rs with increasing age. When only total groups are considered; i.e., all white males, black males, white females and black females, the rs between IQ and head capacity are higher than any reported in the literature. When the two races are compared, rs for females are significantly higher than those for males. The pattern does not hold when comparing total group rs for head circumference and IQ. Black males rs > than black females and white females rs > than white males. As would be expected when partial r’s are computed between head capacity and IQ with height and weight partialed out the rs are attenuated when compared with those between head capacity and IQ alone.

While the database for this study was the 238 sets of twins from the Georgia Twin Study (Osborne 1980) intraclass correlations or other twin statistics were not computed. Each member of a twin pair was treated as an individual for our analysis. Positive correlations were found between head size as measured by head capacity and IQ and by head circumference and IQ. The rs were significant when the subjects were grouped by race and by sex. When the subjects were analyzed by age, race and sex the groups were too small to yield a pattern of meaningful correlations.

This article supports the recent studies of Lynn (1989, 1990) and Broman (1987) which found a positive association between human head size and intelligence. Lynn interprets this finding as an explanation for the rapid evolution of brain size in hominids during the last $-2 million years. Our finding that head capacity-IQ correlations rs hold up equally for males and females and for both blacks and whites is the unique contribution of this paper.

TABLE 1
Correlations between Mental Ability, Head Capacity and
Head Circumference by Age, Race and Sex

Correlation between IQ and
AGE Number Head Measurements
(a.) (b.) (c.)

White Males

13
5
.451
-.072
-.345

14
25
.334
.112
.371

15
23
.150
.351
.144

16
26
.042
.113
-.033

17
27
.162
.042
.208

Total
106
.278
.161
.217

Black Males

13
20
.106
.228
.071

14
29
.319
-.030
.398

15
12
.211
.536
.323

16
12
-.252
.137
-.299

17
11
.396
.646
.811

Total
84
.296
.340
.250

White Females

13
11
.716
.632
.484

14
23
.312
.311
.286

15
23
.340
.295
.366

16
30
.237
.356
.286

17
31
.167
.015
.122

Total
118
.387
.231
.367

Black Females

13
32
.045
-.245
.086

14
39
.509
.496
.555

15
38
.417
.261
.369

16
32
.061
-.051
-.003

17
27
.521
.236
.292

Total
168
.325
.126
.307

Total Group By Sex

Male
190
.447
.163
.300

Female
286
.295
.019
.292

(a.) Pearson r (IQ vs. Head Capacity)

(b.) Pearson r (IQ vs. Head Circumference)

(c.) Partial rs (IQ vs. Head Capacity) Ht. and Wgt. partialed out.

References

Berry, R. J. A., Porteus, S. D.
1920 Intelligence and Social Valuation, Vineland Training School Publications, No. 20.
Broman, S., Nichols, P. L., Shaughnessy, P., Kennedy, W.
1987 Retardation in Young Children, Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum.
Galton, F. 1888
Head Growth in Students at the University of Cambridge, Nature, 38; 14-15.
Lee, Alice and Pearson, K.
1901 A First Study of the Correlation of the Human Skull, Phil. Trans. Royal Society, 196 (Series A): 225-264.
Lynn, R.
1989 A Nutrition Theory of the Secular Increases in Intelligence; Positive Correlations between Height, Head Size and I.Q., British Journal of Educational Psychology, 59:372-77.; 1990 New Evidence on Brain Size and Intelligence: A Comment on Rushton and Cam and Vanderwolf, Person. Indivi d.
Diff., 11:795-797.
Osborne, R. T.
1990 Twins: Black and White, Athens, GA: Found. for Human Understanding.
Passingham, R. E.
1979 Brain Size and Intelligence in Man, Brain, Behavior and Evolution, 16: 253-270.
Pearl, R.
1906 On the Correlation between Intelligence and the Size of the Head, Jour. Comp. Neurol. and Psychol., 16: 189-199.
Pearson, K.
1902 On the Correlation of Intellectual Ability with the Size and Shape of the Head, Royal Society Proc., 69: 333-342.
1906 On the Relationship of Intelligence to Size and Shape of Head, and to other Physical and Mental Characters, Biometrika, 5; 105-146.
1926 On Our Present Knowledge of the Relationship of Mind and Body. Annals of Eugenics, 1: 382-406.
Penrose, L. S.
1963 The Biology of Mental Defect, New York, NY: Grune and Stratton, Inc.
Reed, R, W., Mulligan, J. H.
1923 Relation of Cranial Capacity to Intelligence, Jour. Royal Anthropological Inst., 53:322-332.
Weinberg, W. A., Dietz, S. G., Penick, E. C., McAlister, W. M.
1974 Intelligence, Reading Achievement, Physical Size, and Social Class, J. Pediatrics, 85: 482-489.


The Debunking of Scientific Fossils and Straw Persons

The Debunking of Scientific Fossils and Straw Persons
by Prof. Arthur R. Jensen from Contemporary Education Review Summer, 1982

[ARTHUR R. JENSEN is Professor of Educational Psychology, University of California, Berkeley, CA 94720. His areas of specialization are Differential Psychology, Psychometrics and Behavioral Genetics. Recent publications include Straight Talk about Mental Tests, New York: The Free Press, 1981. Dr. Jensen received his B.A. at UC, Berkeley and his Ph.D. at Columbia University.]

Introduction
Overview of Gould’s Thesis
General Criticisms
Sociology of Science
Focus on the Past
Distorted and Misleading Information
Brain Size and Intelligence
IQ Heritability
The “Reification” of General Intelligence
References

This book, The Mismeasure of Man (Stephen Jay Gould, W. W. Norton, 1981) concerns the biasing influence that social ideology may have on purportedly objective science–the behavioral and brain sciences especially and psychometrics in particular. Ironically, the book itself serves as a patent example of its own thesis.

Stephen Jay Gould is a paleontologist at Harvard’s Museum of Comparative Zoology and offers a course at Harvard entitled, “Biology as a Social Weapon.” Apparently the course covers much the same content as does the present book. Having had some personal cause for interest in ideologically motivated attacks on biologically oriented behavioral scientists, I first took notice of Gould when he played a prominent role in a group called Science for the People and in that group’s attack on the theories of Harvard zoologist Edward 0. Wilson, a leader in the development of sociobiology (BioSciences, March, 1976, Vol. 26, No. 3). I wonder if Gould’s present book is an example of his idea of “science for the people”? It is written in a popular and sometimes engagingly entertaining style; it is filled with “human interest,” and with vivid accounts of eminent but self deluding, cheating, and foolish scientific figures of the past–a kind of intellectual morality play of wrong doing (or wrong thinking); it focuses on accounts of subsequent “recanting” by the “big names” in the history of mental testing, those wittingly or unwittingly self-deceived bad guys in this “tale of zealotry.” (“Goddard recants,” “Brigham recants,” “Terman recants,” “Spearman recanted,” etc. Indeed, whenever a scientist alters his view on some point over a 20 year period, or later places a different emphasis on some particular fact, Gould insistently refers to his “recanting.”) Naive readers might develop a gut-level dislike for the many reactionary elitist schemers exposed in Gould’s book. But then readers will be gratefully relieved to see all the villains toppled to ignominy for their egregious fallacies.

Most of the reviews of the book which I have seen thus far in the popular press already bear out half of my prediction: Gould’s book will receive much more uncritically favorable and sentimentally sympathetic reviews from the professional literati in the popular press (it has won official acclaim from the National Book Critics’ Award) than it will receive in the technical journals at the hands of qualified professionals in the relevant fields. (I have not yet seen any reviews in the technical journals.) Gould’s debunking expedition offers many an easy target to critics with an intimate knowledge of the topics discussed. Before taking aim at those specific points, which I feel most competent to criticize, I shall first try to abstract the main message of Gould’s book from his own perspective.

Overview of Gould’s Thesis

Underlying all the varied detail of Gould’s exposition is a philosophy of science, or rather a sociology of science, which emphasizes the notion that scientific endeavor generally is not so much a search for o objective knowledge as it is a sociopolitical activity, reflecting the social context and value systems within which individual scientists do their work. According to this view, socially conditioned presuppositions or prior prejudices about the nature of society force even “good scientists” to produce theories and conclusions that inevitably confirm their own social prejudices and lend to them additional support in the guise of scientific truth.

This charge of a social, value-laden science undoubtedly contains an element of truth. In recent years, however, we recognize this charge as the keystone of the Marxist interpretation of the history of science. In this view, science is motivated to promote that form of socioeconomic class structure that most favors the privileged elite, reinforcing its position of political and economic power. By the same token, any unwitting biases of scientists are deemed most prone to line up against the socially underprivileged and economically disadvantaged classes. Presumably, such ideological science only pretends to test its hypotheses in the idealized, objective manner we learned about in our introductory high school and college science courses. In this view, scientists actually, begin with prejudices, then frame them as theories, and create only the illusion of demonstrating the validity of their hypotheses. The conclusions are, to use Gould’s apt phrase, “advocacy masquerading as objectivity.” This end is accomplished through “biased selection” -of data, of methods of analysis, and of various possible interpretations of evidence-such that the final outcome will confirm whatever dogma originally motivated the supposedly objective search for the truth. This theme is the foundation of the seven chapters of Gould’s opus.

According to Gould, the inescapable dialectic of science and social ideology is best illustrated in the behavioral sciences through the agency of several long-lived and closely intertwined key beliefs.

Biological determinism is the poison root. This notion (a “lie,” according to Gould) is manifested in the attempt to discover, or failing that, to invent, some biological (i.e. nature-given) justification for “ranking people” (or groups of people) according to their “inborn worth.” Biological determinism is a “theory of limits,” which assumes that the current status of different races and social groups is an inevitable consequence of their “innate worth.” By Gould’s definition, biological determinism essentially is the attempt to make nature an accomplice in the crime of political and socioeconomic inequality. It arises in a political context to serve the group in power. Its perpetuation depends on the myth that science is an objective enterprise, whereas science actually mirrors the predominantly religious or political ideology of its time. Biological determinists in the human sciences are claimed to be identified with politically conservative and reactionary ideologies. The centrality of this theme for Gould is shown by his claim that he was inspired to write the book “because biological determinism is rising in popularity again, as it always does in times of political retrenchment.” Hence, the book is primarily an attack on “biological determinism” as it applies to human mental ability.

By what means can the “lie” of biological determinism be sustained by the establishment? How can this reactionary hope, belief, or claim (viz., that “worth” can be assigned to individuals or groups) be implemented, while still maintaining the appearance of objective, scientific sanction?

Intelligence, or rather the concept that intelligence can be measured as a “single quantity,” is the answer. Gould portrays this concept as utterly fallacious. Indeed, Gould characterizes the attempt of psychometrists, past and present, at the quantification of intelligence, as the attempt to assign “all individuals to their proper status in a single series.” But how can this scheme be made scientifically believable? How can we justify scientifically the determination of people’s “worth” on the basis of assigning a single number or score on an “intelligence test” to each person?

Reification of the concept of intelligence is the answer, according to Gould. By converting an abstract concept, intelligence, into a “unitary thing,” a “single substance,” an “object” (all Gould’s words) that occupies space inside the brain, the pioneer psychometrists established the essential rationale for ranking individuals, social classes, and races on a unidimensional scale of “worth.” The awful fallacy of reifying intelligence (or Spearman’s g, the general factor common to a large number of cognitive abilities) becomes a central theme in Gould’s account. The conscious or unconscious motive behind this reification of general mental ability, or intelligence, is that such reification presumably is demanded by the dogma of biological determinism. The “quantification” and the reification of intelligence facilitate and justify the distinctions and divisions between people, which political and social orders dictate, according to this view.

The whole nefarious, fallacious enterprise is best exemplified by two fields of research: “craniometry,” in the 19th century, and its replacement in the 20th century, by “psychometry,” particularly intelligence testing. Scorn heaped on the early craniometrists, particularly those concerned with the relationship of brain size to intelligence, should transfer to modern psychometrists who are interested in the measurement and nature of intelligence. “We live in a more subtle century, but the basic arguments never seem to change. . . The crudities of the cranial index have given way to the complexity of intelligence testing” (p.143). To Gould, the old-fashioned craniometric science and modern psychometric science are as parent and offspring. The purpose of both is essentially the same: to prove that the innate construction of people is reflected in their present social and economic roles. Both the outmoded craniometry of the 19th century and the mental tests of the present day have stemmed from the false belief that intelligence is a “thing” in the head, according to the measurement of which all persons, social classes, and races can be ranked in “mental worth”-a term that Gould uses repeatedly (in addition to “innate worth” and “ultimate worth”) as a substitute for “intelligence” or “IQ,” as if to imply that all these terms are entirely synonymous in present-day psychometrics.

The essential message of Gould’s book is epitomized in his own words: “This book. . . is about the abstraction of intelligence as a single entity, its location within the brain, its quantification as one number for each individual, and the use of these numbers to rank people in a single series of worthiness, invariably to find that oppressed and disadvantaged groups-races, classes, or sexes-are innately inferior and deserve their status” (pp. 24-25).

General Criticisms

Before addressing specific points in each of the chapters, I shall first mention what seems to me to be general deficiencies pervading the work as a whole.

Sociology of Science

First, I think Gould exaggerates the threat of the sociology of science as an obstacle to objective science. Errors, blind spots, and biases on the part of individual scientists have always existed in every scientific field. Yet over the course of time there indisputably has been scientific progress and the growth of objective knowledge in every sphere of scientific endeavor. Of course, the theory that science cannot be objective because it cannot escape the context of social values is itself not exempt from the same generalization. If this theme is overplayed, as it is by Gould, it places its advocate in a position not unlike that of the Greek philosopher’s paradox of the Cretan who declared, “All Cretans always lie. ” If the statement is true, it must be untrue, and hence need not be taken seriously.

Fortunately, progress in scientific knowledge is distilled out of the endeavors of the many individually imperfect scientists who investigate the same phenomenon. The enterprise succeeds in its aim of objectivity, in the long run, despite the subjective biases of individual scientists and despite the influence of social context as portrayed by the Marxist sociology of science. Mendel’s theory is accepted and Lysenko’s is rejected (even by the Soviet ideologues who once promoted it), not because one scientist was necessarily a better man than the other, but because there is indeed a reality out there in the realm of phenomena, a reality in terms of which theories can be criticized and tested by innumerable other scientists, albeit each with his or her own individual biases or blind spots, each scrutinizing and testing the others formulations. One chief virtue of science is that, in order to succeed, its practitioners need not be saints or paragons of detached objectivity. When many individual scientists-ordinary men and women with specialized technical competencies-are all able to think as they please and do their research unfettered by collectivist or totalitarian constraints, science is a self-correcting process.

In any case, the Marxist sociology of science, whatever general truth it may contain, cannot exempt the critic from a detailed analysis of any particular theory or empirical claim, showing precisely how it fails as objective science, or why it should be rejected and replaced by some competing formulation or body of evidence. That has always been the normal procedure of science, and we know that it works. At one point, Gould covers himself by claiming this general view: “As a practicing scientist, I share the credo of my colleagues: I believe that a factual reality exists and that science, though often in an obtuse and erratic manner, can learn about it” (p. 22). But Gould would want us to believe that the behavioral sciences are especially unlucky in this regard. That could be. Still, the situation would be by no means hopeless. The behavioral sciences, including differential psychology, psychometrics, and behavioral genetics, surely can be, and for the most partake, normal science.

Unfortunately, Gould’s book itself contributes heavily to promoting the ideological encumbrance of these fields. This is a pity. The field is faced with many real problems, which call for objective analysis and research, yet in my judgment Gould’s book contributes absolutely nothing to this effort. The Mismeasure of Man attempts to debunk, and, as far as I can make out, attempts to do nothing else. Of course, debunking can be a useful activity in the scientific enterprise, provided the specific objects of attack are real and present issues. The disappointment of this book is its failure really to debunk anything currently regarded as important by scientists in the relevant fields. Because of Gould’s peculiar selection of flawed scientific relics as targets for attack, it is hard for me to imagine that this work will impress any but those unfamiliar with current research in these fields, despite the author’s evident intelligence and keen literary style. I believe he has succeeded brilliantly in obfuscating all the important open questions that actually concern today’s scientists. Instead of taking on the real issues of contemporary research in these fields, paleontologist Gould tilts at a museum collection of scientific fossils and at many a straw person of his own making.

Focus on the Past

The fossil nature of practically all the objects of Gould’s expose is suggested by the fact that, although the book is not properly a history of mental testing, most of the key references are amazingly old. Present-day workers in these fields will have nothing to worry about! Few, if any, will consider it worth the bother to dig into such ancient tomes to check the validity of Gould’s interpretations. Of all the book’s references, a full 27 percent precede 1900. Another 44 percent fall between 1900 and 1950 (60 percent of those are before 1925); and only 29 percent are more recent than 1950. From the total literature spanning more than a century, the few “bad apples” have been hand-picked most aptly to serve Gould’s purpose. Yet what relevance to current issues in mental testing are the inadequacies and errors of early anatomical studies by Samuel Morton (who died in 1851) or Paul Broca (who died in 1880) concerning racial variation in cranial capacity (to which Gould devotes the better part of two chapters): Who now wishes to resurrect Lombroso’s (1836-1909) theory of physical criminal types; Cyril Burt’s 1909 report (his very first publication) of social class differences in intelligence; Goddard’s account of the Kallikak family (1912) and the long since discredited theory of “feeblemindedness” as a simple Mendelian character; Terman’s pronouncements in 1916 about eugenic measures to reduce the incidence of mental retardation; the primitive 1917 army mental tests; or the U.S. Congress’s 1924 Immigration Restriction Act, which cited the 1917 army test data? These antiquated topics, which occupy most of Gould’s book, can in no way serve to undermine or discredit current work in physical anthropology, psychometrics, differential psychology, behavioral genetics, and sociobiology. Readers expecting to find a forthright critique of the present status of issues and controversies in these fields are in for disappointment. The closest thing they will find to criticism of contemporary mental testing is the insinuation of its guilt through remote historic lineage.

In distant retrospect, the early history of every science often looks bizarre in some respects. Why should we expect the behavioral and brain sciences to be the great exception? Should we ridicule the Early astronomers for claiming that the Earth is the center of the universe, or the early anatomists for claiming that the heart is the seat of emotion? Why should anyone demand of psychology that it be hatched fully mature and perfect at its very beginnings?

Gould devotes the larger part of a chapter to a minutely detailed and damning critique of the first group mental test ever devised. Yet everyone today would surely agree that the first army tests fall far short of current standards of test theory and construction. Psychometric theory and technology have come a long way since 1917. Indeed, a half-century after the first group tests were used in the army, the office of the Surgeon General estimated that the use of modern tests for selection in the armed forces saves the nation more than $14O million a year in the cost of training recruits after basic training-not a trivial utility for psychology’s most practical and most indisputably successful invention.

Gould’s exclusive critical focus on forebears (and the worst examples, at that) is much like trying to condemn the modern automobile by merely pointing out the faults of the Model T. An entire chapter is devoted to Lombroso and his school of criminal anthropology! As an undergraduate nearly 40 years ago, I recall learning that Lombroso’s theory of “criminal types,” all bearing distinctive anatomical stigmata of their moral pathology, had long since been discredited. Although it makes for amusing reading to see Lombroso’s old theories once again so enthusiastically panned, Gould’s motive in reviewing them seems clear. The Lombroso critique serves merely as a long prelude to the short epilogue of this chapter, which disparages modern research on the suspected relationship of the XYY chromosomal anomaly to violent and criminal behavior, research Gould refers to as a “reincarnation” of Lombroso. Gould writes, “The signs of innate criminality are no longer sought in stigmata of gross anatomy, but in twentieth-century criteria: genes and the fine structure of the brain” (p. 143). Apparently any research on the biological correlates of human behavior is deemed anathema by Gould.

Distorted and Misleading Information

It would be practically impossible for me to assess the accuracy of representation or the carefulness of interpretation of all the specific targets of Gould’s multifarious critique. Frankly, I feel little inclination to comb the many archaic references on which most of Gould’s debunking depends, especially because they are no longer of any concern to modern researchers in these fields. Who in 1982 is interested in debating precisely what was said by whom about the phlogiston theory in its heydey? I am able, however, to testify concerning a number of contemporary references, which are already at my fingertips.

In his references to my own work, Gould includes at least nine citations that involve more than just an expression of Gould’s opinion; in these citations Gould purportedly paraphrases my views. Yet in eight of the nine cases, Gould’s representation of these views is false, misleading, or grossly caricatured. Nonspecialists could have no way of knowing any of this without reading the cited sources. While ant author can occasionally make an inadvertent mistake in paraphrasing another, it appears Gould’s paraphrases are consistently slanted to serve his own message. Through hyperbole and caricature he converts real issues into straw persons, which can be easily disproved.

Some examples are:

Gould states that the normal variation within a population is a different biological phenomenon from the variation in average values between populations. (Actually, this may be or may not be true for any given trait; it is an empirical question.) Failure to recognize this distinction, Gould claims, is an error that occurs “over and over again “and is the “basis of Arthur Jensen’s fallacy in asserting that average differences in IQ between American whites and blacks are largely inherited” (p. 127). The fact is, of course, that I have never “asserted” (Webster: “assert implies stating confidently without need for proof or regard for evidence”) that IQ differences between any races are largely inherited. Nor have I ever claimed that the well-established heritability of individual differences in IQ within races proves the heritability of differences between races. To quote directly from some earlier writing (Jensen, 1970): “Group racial and social class differences are first of all individual differences [i.e., they are the statistical averages of individual measurements], but the causes of the group differences may not be the same as of the individual differences” (p.154, italics added). Whether the causes are or are not the same for any particular trait for any particular groups is a question open to rival hypotheses and empirical investigation. Such has always been my position, a position spelled out most recently in Chapter 6 of my book Straight Talk About Mental Tests (Jensen, 1981a).
Gould claims that ” ,Jensen recognizes that his hereditarian theory of IQ depends upon the validity of [Spearman's] q” (p.265), and that ” ,Jensen has demonstrated by example that a reified Spearman’s g is still the only promising justification for hereditarian theories of mean differences in IQ among human groups” (p. 320). This is simply nonsense. Neither I nor anyone else in behavioral genetics has ever claimed or believed any such thing. If the total variance in any battery of tests were treated by different methods of factor analysis, some methods yielding a large g, or general factor, and other methods spreading the variance over a number of group factors (or “primary mental abilities”), the total proportion of genetic variance in all of the factors would not be altered in the least. This is because heritability (i.e., the proportion of the total variance that is attributable to genetic factors) does not depend at all on the factor structure of the variables in question. (Similarly, either methodological preference whether for concentrating variance on g and possibly a few large group factors, or for distributing it more or less evenly over a larger number of “primaries,” should not alter in the least the total amount of variance associated with race.) All this is not to say, however, that it would be scientifically trivial or theoretically uninteresting should it turn out that certain methods of factor analysis yield some factors that show high heritability while the remaining factors show virtually zero heritability. We already know that the g factor shows substantial heritability; and recently, Lloyd Humphreys (1981), in interpreting his analysis of twin and cross-twin correlations on the Project TALENT tests (a large battery of diverse aptitude and scholastic achievement tests), stated that “the genetic contribution to these cognitive tests, whatever its amount, was restricted to the general factor” (p. 99). This interpretation, if generally substantiated, would bear out Spearman’s (1927) conjecture that g is the only heritable cognitive factor, while the various group factors (independent of g) arise from the investment of g in different contents of learning, as influenced by opportunity, interest, and reward. My own hunch is that a few of the largest and most stable group factors (e. g., verbal, numerical, memory, and spatial) as well as some components of musical and artistic aptitude, will probably also show some heritable variation independent of g.
Gould claims that I have defended a g, or general intelligence, which is “reified as a measurable object” (p.318). Yet in the same chapter from which Gould is supposedly paraphrasing my views (Jensen, 1980a), I stated unequivocally that “[I]ntelligence is not an entity, but a theoretical construct…. The g factor may also be termed a theoretical construct, which is intended to explain an observable phenomenon, namely, the positive intercorrelation among all mental tests, regardless of their apparently great variety” (p. 249).
In a table in Bias in Mental Testing (Jensen, 1980a, p. 220) showing a factor analysis of 16 tests, the g factor is shown in the first column, and the first four rotated varimax principal components (including the first component, which, unrotated, was the g of the first column) are shown in the next four columns. I make it absolutely clear that the rotated factors g was extracted. (Note the table headings, the arrangement of the table, the presentation of the communalities in the last column, and the explanation in the text.) Nonetheless, Gould offers the following misleading account: “[H]e [Jensen] records the same thing twice for each test-g as a first principal component and the same information dispersed among simple structure axes giving some tests a total information of more than 100 percent. Since big g’s appear in the same chart with large loadings on simple-structure axes, one might be falsely led to infer that g remains large even in simple-structure solutions” (p. 319). A thorough twist! And a logical error to boot, because no factor which could properly be interpreted as g could possibly emerge from a simple structure, or varimax rotation, the express purpose of such rotation being to disperse and submerge the general factor in the rotated primaries!
In discussing Burt’s (1940) now discredited and probably fictitious data on the IQs of identical twins reared apart, [note: Burt appears to have been the victim of a politically-motivated slander, and the case agaainst him is now collapsing: see Nature 340:439 (10 Aug. 1989); 352:120 (11 July, 1991); 354:97 (14 Nov. 1991)], Gould writes, “It is scarcely surprising that Arthur Jensen used Sir Cyril’s figures as the most important datum in his notorious article (1969) on supposedly inherited and ineradicable differences in intelligence between whites and blacks in America” (p. 235). In fact, I have never used twin differences in any aspect of the discussion of racial differences, except when pointing out the errors in this approach by a number of psychologists who had held that monozygotic twin differences in IQ (because they are entirely nongenetic) favor a strictly environmental interpretation of the observed race differences in IQ (Jensen, 1973, p. 161).
Gould claims that “[h]e [Jensen] believes that all God’s creatures can be ordered on a g scale from amoebae at the bottom (p. 175 [Jensen, 1980a]) to extraterrestrial intelligences at the top (p. 248 [ibidem])” (p. 317). This will be recognized by any fair-minded person who has read my Bias in Mental Testing (Jensen, 1980a) as a gross travesty of one section in that book, namely, a section summarizing some of the main research findings on animal intelligence (pp. 175-182). (Note that I have referred to “extraterrestrial beings” 74 pages later in another context, and not as being at the “top” of anything!) To top it off, Gould then refers to his own travesty as” Jensen’s caricature of evolution”! Disbelieving readers may find it instructive to compare Jensen’s (1980a) Chapter 6 with Gould’s flagrant caricature of its content, with “reified” g as an “object” ascending on a “unilinear” evolutionary hierarchy of all existing species from amoebae to extraterrestrial beings! Such a picture is, of course, utter nonsense, but it is Gould’s nonsense, not Jensen’s.
Gould writes: “Arthur Jensen (1980a, pp. 361-362) supports the value of IQ as a measure of innate intelligence by claiming that the correlation between brain size and IQ is about 0.30. He doesn’t doubt that the correlation is meaningful and that ‘there has been a direct causal effect, through natural selection in the course of human evolution, between intelligence and brain size’” (p. 108). What Gould does not indicate is that this hypothesis was never represented as my own claim. Rather, it was explicitly and accurately represented as a paraphrase of the most up-to-date and technically sophisticated review of the evidence on human brain size and intelligence available, by Leigh Van Valen (1974), a biologist at the University of Chicago. Why then does Gould not cite Van Valen’s thorough and scholarly treatment of this topic? Instead he makes it appear that Van Valen’s conclusions are simply Jensen’s claim. Moreover, the Jensen chapter has merely summarized the literature on the various physical correlates of IQ (including brain size, brain-evoked potentials, stature, basal metabolic rate, obesity, and myopia). Contrary to Gould’s paraphrase, it has offered no opinions at all about the meaning of these correlations with respect to the “innateness of IQ.”
In a recent publication (Jensen, 1980a, p. 535), I have presented new evidence for Spearman’s (1927, p. 379) observation that the magnitudes of the average white-black differences on various tests are positively related to the g factor loadings of the tests, a point in my review that is germane to factor-analytic criteria of test bias. Gould writes, “Jensen also uses g more specifically to buttress his claim that the average difference in IQ between whites and blacks records an innate deficiency of intelligence among blacks” (p. 319). Nowhere in the cited reference (Jensen, 1980a) (or in any other publication) have I ever erred by inferring genetic causation of racial differences from the g factor or any other use off actor analysis, and nowhere have I “claimed” an “innate deficiency” of intelligence in blacks. My position on this question is clearly spelled out in my most recent book: “The plain fact is that at present there exists no scientifically satisfactory explanation for the differences between the IQ distributions in the black and white populations. The only genuine consensus among well-informed scientists on this topic is that the cause of the difference remains an open question” (Jensen, 1981a, p. 213). Apparently Gould does not tolerate so openly agnostic a stance on scientific questions which have important social implications.

Despite Gould’s poor batting average for accuracy and fairness in his paraphrasing of references to Jensen, may we hope that he has perhaps afforded more impartial treatment to all the other targets of his critique:

Brain Size and Intelligence

Gould devotes two chapters to race and sex differences in brain size, and to the relationship between brain size and intelligence. Again, though practically all the studies cited are more than 100 years old, Gould meticulously points out their errors and biases.

Brain size is of some scientific interest in relation to intelligence, presumably because the great increase of brain size in the course of human evolution resulted primarily from the selective advantage of the greater capacity for complex learning and problem-solving ability conferred by a larger cerebrum. It seems a natural question whether variation in brain size (or any other features of the brain) is related to differences in psychometric intelligence among contemporary humans. After dismissing the pioneer studies, Gould is wholly uninformative about current thought and evidence on this topic.

Van Valen’s (1974) well-known review and analysis of the evidence on brain size and intelligence is conspicuous by its absence from Gould’s book. Although Van Valen’s article is an excellent review, it unfortunately overlooks one crucial point. That point concerns any correlation between different traits, especially correlations between physical and psychological traits, namely, whether the obtained correlation represents a functional (i. e., causal) relationship between the variables or merely an adventitious genetic correlation resulting from the common assortment of the genes for the two traits as a consequence of cross-assortative mating for the two traits (e.g., if blue-eyed persons mated only with curly-haired persons, blue eyes and curly hair could become correlated in the population, even though there is no intrinsic connection between these characteristics). No study of the correlation between brain size and intelligence, to my knowledge, has applied the necessary methodology based on sibling data (explicated by Jensen, 1980b) to rule out mere assortative genetic correlation between these variables. Until this is done, the theoretical significance of the correlation (whatever its magnitude may be) between brain size and IQ remains unknown. Any correlation existing between families but not within families (i.e., not among siblings), is scientifically empty as far as advancing our understanding of the nature of intelligence. Evidence suggests that such is the case for the population correlation (of about 0.25) between height and IQ. This does not mean, however, that one must automatically partial height out of the brain-size x IQ correlation, as Gould advocates. Theoretical interpretation of the intercorrelations among brain size, body size, and IQ is possible only by means of genetical analysis (e.g., analysis employing data on between and within-family correlations) combined with path analysis.

The essence of Gould’s message in his two chapters on race and sex differences in brain size, and the relationship between brain size and intelligence is that craniometry served no valid scientific purpose, but was merely an expression of the prejudicial self-interest of comfortable white males. But to complain that an investigator’s conjectures stem from personal prejudices (or any other source) is, of course, scientifically irrelevant. The importance of scientific conjecture arises solely from its relation to some theory and its testability, or susceptibility to empirical refutation. Gould’s disparagement of craniometry, however, seems to serve merely as a prelude to the more currently important topic of intelligence testing. Gould writes: “Craniometric arguments lost much of their luster in our century, as determinists switched their allegiance to intelligence testing-a more “direct” path to the same invalid goal of ranking groups by mental worth-and as scientists exposed the prejudiced nonsense that dominated most literature on form and size of the head” (p. 108). Not surprisingly, in the last two-thirds of his book, Gould launches a concerted attack on the “prejudiced nonsense” of intelligence testing.

IQ Heritability

Gould’s first broadside against intelligence testing is an 88-page chapter entitled “The Hereditarian Theory of IQ. “The most remarkable feature of this chapter is that it does not present even a hint of the kinds of evidence, or the quantitative-genetic methods applied thereto, which have caused many reasonable and fair-minded contemporary scientists to conclude that genetic factors are substantially involved in individual differences in IQ. The reader is told nothing at all about the polygenetic basis of individual differences or about the logic of quantitative genetics and its application to the various kinship correlations on which the “Hereditarian Theory of IQ” is based. Naive readers will be completely misled as to the true nature of the current popular controversy over the inheritance of mental ability.

Instead, they will read about the first (1905) Binet tests and about how Binet’s early American followers, Goddard and Terman, allegedly corrupted Binet’s intentions by reifying the IQ as an inborn “thing” in order that it might better serve as an instrument of social and racial discrimination. About 30 percent of the chapter is taken up with a fine-grained critique of the psychometrically primitive 1917 army tests and the purported influence of the test results on U.S. immigration policy in the 1920s, which, we are told, was promoted by” Teutonic supremacists.”

The Cox (1926), and Terman estimates of the IQs of eminent historical figures, based on biographical accounts of their childhood accomplishments, are also unfairly ridiculed by Gould in this chapter. For example, Gould points out that such major acknowledged geniuses as Copernicus and Faraday were assigned lower IQs than some figures of lesser eminence (e.g., Galton, with an estimated childhood IQ of 200). But Cox’s monograph makes it very clear that the estimated IQs are the minimum values that could be estimated on the basis of the available evidence of early-life accomplishments. (Shakespeare, for example, was completely omitted because of inadequate biographical evidence.) In fact, no attempt was made in the monograph itself to rank-order individual historic geniuses by their estimated IQs. The aim of the Terman and Cox study was simply to see if there might be evidence for a higher average level of mental precocity among the world’s famous geniuses-and there clearly is. All the inherent methodological limitations of the study are fully acknowledged in Cox’s (1926) thoroughly careful monograph. Gould supplies no new information by his sarcastic embellishment.

By this point in Gould’s book, the weight of vituperative excess will no doubt have caused even technically naive but intelligent readers to begin to question whether the most influential figures in the early history of mental testing could really have been so utterly foolish and wicked as Gould makes them appear. The fact that Galton, Goddard, Yerkes, Terman, Brigham, Thorndike, and other pioneers of psychometrics may have expressed poorly founded and occasionally dogmatic hereditarian opinions concerning intelligence at a time before any adequately developed methodology or suitable evidence was available for the genetical analysis of mental test data, cannot legitimately be construed as an indictment of all subsequent research in this area. Yet Gould never mentions any of the considerable body of recent work in behavioral genetics. One wonders, does he avoid it perhaps because the technical issues cannot be so simplistically and entertainingly lampooned as the early efforts of the pioneer mental testers?

The “hereditarian fallacy” (p. 156) is described by Gould as (1) the implication that” heritable” is equated with “inevitable,” and (2) the assumption that if genetic factors explain a certain proportion of the individual differences variance within population groups, they explain the same proportion of the mean differences between various populations, such as racial groups. This” hereditarian fallacy” constitutes a strawperson if ever there was one. I cannot recall a single living “hereditarian” who has ever expressed either of these beliefs, though I know of many who have noted their inherent logical fallacy. I myself, dubbed by Gould as “America’s best-known hereditarian,” have attempted in several publications from 1969 to 1982 to explicate the illogic of trying to prove the heritability of mean differences between groups from a knowledge of the heritability of individual differences within groups. I have also attempted over the years to dispel the common, but unwarranted, assumption that heritability necessarily implies the inevitability or immutability of human differences. (A nontechnical treatment of these matters is found in Jensen [1981a, pp. 108-115 and 226-232].) Certainly these issues are more complex than Gould’s brief treatment even begins to suggest; they require considerably more explication than he presents, for even the barest understanding of them. Correctly understood, moreover, these are not matters of theoretical contention among behavioral geneticists.

The “Reification” of General Intelligence

In a chapter entitled “The Real Error of Cyril Burt,” we come to the core of Gould’s argument: his perceived necessity for demolishing the concept of g, Spearman’s symbol for the common factor in all cognitive tests. Because g constitutes by far the largest part of the variance in all “intelligence” tests, it is often termed the “general intelligence” factor. Gould gives a good nonmathematical explanation of the workings of factor analysis (and principal components analysis) and how g and other factors are “extracted” from a correlation matrix. After this quite acceptable explanation, Gould begins his battle.

According to Gould, g is the quintessential abomination. He writes, “The chimerical nature of g is the rotten core of Jensen’s edifice, and of the entire hereditarian school” (p. 320). What especially makes g so awful, according to Gould, is the error of reification. This, he claims, is the “real error” of Cyril Burt, and also of Charles Spearman, the inventor of factor analysis and the discoverer of g. These pioneers in the field are charged with the crime reifying g. Yet the kind of outlandish verbal reification for which they stand accused is, in fact, absolutely contrary to any expression about g that one can find in the works of Spearman or Burt, or, indeed, in any of the serious literature of factor analysis and intelligence, The g factor as supposedly conceived by Spearman and Burt is variously referred to by Gould as “ineluctable, innate general intelligence,” “innate essence of intelligence,” a “hard, quantifiable thing,” a “quantifiable fundamental particle,” a “single, scalable, fundamental ‘thing’ residing in the human brain,” “a ‘thing’ in the most direct, material sense,” and so forth. This language is all completely misleading. More importantly, it is Gould’s language, and not the language of those he chooses to discuss.

Reified or not, the factor g itself and factor analysis in general have nothing to do with “innateness” or the nature-nurture question. Whether individual differences (or group differences) in g factor scores have a heritable component or not is an entirely separate question, which cannot be answered by any methods of factor analysis, but only by the methods of quantitative genetic analysis.

Moreover, to anyone who has carefully read the major works of Burt and Spearman on factor analysis, the claim that they (or any other experts in this field) are guilty of reifying g will be recognized as another straw person, an unqualified hoax. Few psychologists, or few scientists in any field for that matter, have been as sophisticated in the philosophy of science as Spearman and Burt. The most sophisticated discussion of the whole issue of the meaning of factors to be found in the entire literature is Burt’s( 1940) chapter entitled “The Metaphysical Status of Mental Factors.” In it, Burt states” [t]o speak of factors of the mind as if they existed in the same way as, but in addition to, the physical organs and tissues of the body and their properties, is assuredly indefensible and misleading” (p. 218). Burt’s entire discussion is well worth reading even today. Surely no one before or since has ever presented a more intellectually profound and subtle consideration of the nature and interpretation of the factors derived by the factor analysis of mental tests.

As will be equally apparent to anyone reading Spearman’s (1927) great work, The Abilities of Man, he too was fully aware of the reification issue. Certainly Spearman makes it extremely clear that he intended his hypothesis of g as “mental energy” as just that-a hypothesis, a theoretical attempt to account for the phenomenon which the g factor highlights and quantifies, namely, positive manifold (i.e., the presence of all positive intercorrelations among all diverse tests of cognitive abilities, when the tests are given to representative samples of the general population). Spearman made no apologies for hypothesizing causal mechanisms to explain g. Quite the contrary:

(Psychology] is a science in its own right, and can no more fulfill this mission without hypotheses than a man can run properly with his legs tied in a sack. What would physics do without its electrons, its ether, or its heat, none of which are, or perhaps even can be, directly perceived? Indeed, there is no necessity for believing that such entities really exist at all. (p. 128)

In fact, what Gould has mistaken for “reification” is neither more nor less than the common practice in every science of hypothesizing explanatory models or theories to account for the observed relationships within a given domain. Well-known examples include the heliocentric theory of planetary motion, the Bohr atom, the electromagnetic field, the kinetic theory of gases, gravitation, quarks, Mendelian genes, mass, velocity, and so forth. None of these constructs exists as a palpable entity occupying physical space. The g factor, and theories attempting to explain g in terms of models independent of factor analysis itself, are essentially no different from the other constructs of science listed above. Nor is there any good reason that hypothetical models attempting to account for g should necessarily exclude all considerations of neural or biochemical processes. All such theoretical speculations about the nature of g, whether offered by Spearman, Burt, Jensen, or anyone else, have involved hypothetical processes or system concepts, presumably going on in the brain (where else?). But these theories have never depicted g as some “single,” “ineluctable,” “hard,” “object,” of the sort characterized by Gould. Would Gould then deny psychology the common right of every science to the use of hypothetical constructs or any theoretical speculation concerning causal explanations of its observable phenomena? He writes,” My complaint lies with the practice of assuming that the mere existence of a factor, in itself, provides a license for causal speculation” (p.268). But haven’t all sciences always exercised free license for theoretical speculation about the causes of the observable phenomena in their domains? Of course they have.

The crucial question, which is summarized by the existence of the g factor is this: In respect to what processes or mechanisms is it that persons who perform well on anyone test, in general, also perform well on many other tests, even on tests that are highly dissimilar in content and sensory and motor modalities? The concept of intelligence depends not on the fact that people can be ranked by this test or that, but rather on the fact that, whatever the test, so long as it is cognitive in the broadest sense, a positive correlation emerges between the ranks for any two tests. If an IQ test were just a rag-bag collection of cognitive tasks that did not all measure a common factor, there could be no positive manifold. Scientists today are trying to understand the causes of positive manifold, and this is what the present g theory is all about. Gould offers no alternative ideas to account for all these well-established observations. His mission in this area appears entirely nihilistic.

L. L. Thurstone, the leading American psychometrician and factor analyst, might have emerged as a minor hero in Gould’s drama, were it not for his alleged tendencies toward factor reification and his avowed hereditarian stance. At least Thurstone’s factors were a number of “primary mental abilities” and not the unholy g. Gould dubs Thurstone “the exterminating angel of Spearman’s g” (p. 296). With the development of multiple-factor analysis, Thurstone had chosen to rotate the factor axes in such a way as to maximize the variance of the loadings on all the latent common factors in a correlation matrix (a criterion he termed “simple structure”), a procedure that yields a number of first-order factors, or “primary mental abilities” (e.g., verbal, numerical, spatial, memory). According to Gould, “the hegemony of g was broken. >From the midst of an economic depression that reduced many of its intellectual elite to poverty, an America with egalitarian ideals (however rarely practiced) challenged Britain’s traditional equation of social class with innate worth. Spearman’s g had been rotated away, and general mental worth evaporated with it” (p. 304). Actually, the g variance was not at all “exterminated” by Thurstone’s method, but merely’ dispersed among the primary factors. Later, Thurstone himself realized that he could obtain a closer fit to his criterion of simple structure by allowing the factor axes to be obliquely rotated (i.e., correlated). Thurstone also came to realize that subsequent factor analysis of the intercorrelations among the oblique primary factors would recover the g factor, essentially the same g as arrived at by the Spearman and Burt methods of g extraction!

In discussing Thurstone’s primary abilities, Gould states, “Some children are good at some things, others excel in different and independent qualities of mind” (p. 304). If Gould is talking about cognitive abilities, this statement is deceptively plausible (because we know that everyone is better at certain things than at others). In the context of his discussion of factor analysis, however, it is essentially wrong and misleading. If Gould’s statement were wholly true, a second-order g factor could not emerge from any large collection of diverse mental tests. Yet, in fact, a second-order g always appears for all cognitive tests obtained in any representative sample of the general population. (This is equivalent to saying that the overall ability differences between individuals are generally greater than the average differences that exist between various abilities within individuals). Moreover, g factor scores, when g is extracted either as a first principal factor (Spearman-Burt) or as a hierarchical, second-order factor (Thurstone), are generally very highly correlated with one another, usually above .95 in most factor analyses of the same battery of tests in the same subject sample. (Congruence coefficients between the g factor loadings in the two methods are usually even higher.) True, the hierarchical, second-order g carries somewhat less variance than the g extracted as a first principal factor, but Gould greatly exaggerates this point in his effort to belittle the second-order g, In 10 factor analyses of Wechsler subtest batteries that I have examined, in which g has been extracted both as a first principal component and as a hierarchical second-order factor (using the Schmid-Leiman, 1957, transformation), the second-order g accounts for about 8O percent of the variance accounted for by the first principal component. The second-order g also accounts for about two-thirds of the total common-factor variance in the test battery, whereas the three primary factors (verbal, performance, and memory), after g is removed, account for about one-third of the variance. It would be a rare, even freakish, collection of cognitive tests that would yield a g which, by any proper method of extraction, would be subordinate to any of the rotated first-order factors.

No knowledgeable factor analyst of either the Spearmanian or Thurstonian school disputes the fact that the various methods or models of factor analysis are all mathematically equivalent in their ability to” account for” the matrix of intercorrelations. Other, nonmathematical considerations must determine preferences for one method over another. Although the number of factors that can be extracted from a correlation matrix is necessarily limited by the number of variables, there is virtually an infinite number of possible rotations of the factor axes, and hence an infinity of different possible factors. There is no rule in science that restricts the particular factors that any investigator may choose to focus upon. Some factor solutions make much more sense, psychologically, than others, however, and psychologists may suspect that there is more “pay dirt” in certain factors than there is in others.

In this respect, factor solutions that yield a g, and the g factor itself, have generally been of greatest interest throughout the history of psychometry. More scientific curiosity has been stirred up by g than by any other products of factor analysis, and for a number of good reasons. Here is a baker’s dozen:

The fundamental reason is the phenomenon of positive manifold: that is, the existence of positive correlations between all tests in the cognitive domain, over a wide range of diversity, regardless of the content or other surface characteristics of the tests. The g factor represents this salient fact of nature better than any other single factor or any combination of multiple orthogonal factors (which disperse the g variance and thus artificially create the misleading impression that there are zero correlations among the several clusters of tests defining group factors or primary abilities).
Taken together, the g factor plus smaller group factors (primary abilities independent of g) best represent the fact that, on average, overall differences between individuals in the population are greater than the differences among various abilities within individuals. Multiple orthogonal factors, without g, would not lead us to this (empirically established) expectation.
Certain tests (generally those involving greater complexity of mental manipulation) are consistently more g-loaded than others, when analyzed in different batteries of various tests. Other tests (usually involving sensory-motor skills or rote-learning ability) have rather consistently weak g loadings under these conditions.
Essentially the same g emerges from collections of tests which are superficially quite different. Unlike all other factors, g is not tied to any particular type of item content or acquired cognitive skill. (This is the basis for Spearman’s principal of “the indifference of the indicator” of g.)
It has proved impossible to construct a test to measure any of Thurstone’s Primary Mental Abilities (or any other first-order cognitive factors) that does not also measure g. That is to say, scores on “factor pure” tests (i.e., tests designed to measure some factor other than g) always measure g in addition to whatever primary ability factor they were specially devised to measure. The g variance in tests of primary mental abilities is, moreover, generally greater than the variance attributable to the primaries. It has proved possible, however, to devise tests that measure g and little or nothing else.
The g factor reflects more of the variance in informal, common-sense estimates of differences in people’s intelligence by parents, teachers, employers, and peers than any other factor that can be extracted from psychometric tests. In addition, g discriminates more accurately than any other factor between average persons and persons diagnosed as mentally retarded by independent, nontest criteria, and between average persons and those who are recognized as intellectually gifted on the basis of their accomplishments.
There is no general factor of human learning ability that is different from, or independent of, the g of psychometric tests. However, there is much more “specificity” (i.e., variance not related to any common factors) in learning tasks than in most psychometric tests composed of numerous items.
Although g may not be equally valued in all cultures, individual differences in g-related abilities are easily recognized, even by persons in societies that differ tremendously from Western or industrial civilizations.
In its practical ability to forecast the success of individuals in school and college, in armed forces training programs, in employment in business and industry, and so forth, g carries far more predictive weight than measures of any other factor or any other combination of factors independent of g (see Jensen, 1981 b). This fact also means that many “real life” kinds of performance, and not just psychometric tests, are substantially g-loaded.
Humphreys (1981) has pointed out that even where mental tests are not implicated, the naturally occurring educational and occupational selection in our society involves g more than any other measurable psychological variables. Each “sieve” in the educational and occupational ladders selects on g, and this is as true in those communist countries in which mental ability tests are officially forbidden as it is in the United States. For this and for many other reasons, Humpreys [sic] aptly refers to g as “The primary mental ability.”
Although more evidence is still needed for a firm conclusion, what evidence we have suggests that g has the highest degree of heritability of any component of variance in psychometric tests (e.g., Humphreys, 1981 ). The group factors (and specificity) show little or no heritability apart from the heritability of g.
The genetic phenomenon of inbreeding depression (i.e., the diminution of a metric character in the offspring of genetically related parents, such as siblings or cousins) is indicative of genetic dominance of the genes enhancing the trait in question. Large-scale data on the offspring of cousin matings show that the degree of inbreeding depression observed on 11 diverse subtests of the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for children is positively and significantly correlated with the subtests’ g loadings (Jensen, in press). (This is equally true whether g is extracted as a first principal factor or as a hierarchical second-order factor.)
The g factor (and g factor scores) are substantially correlated with measures of the speed of information processing in simple laboratory tasks, such as simple and choice reaction times, which bear no resemblance to the usual psychometric tests from with the g factor is extracted (Jensen, 1980c). Recently it has been found, in a sample of 100 university students, that speed of information processing, as measured by reaction-time techniques, is highly correlated with the g factor of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, and that no additional component of variance in the 12 WAIS subtests (including the verbal, performance, and memory factors) shows a significant correlation with the reaction time measures (Vernon, 1981). Vernon writes, “Given the strength of the association between mental speed and g, it is further argued that these attributes are largely the same: a person’s intelligence can be defined in terms of the speed and efficiency with which he can execute a number of basic cognitive operations” (p. 83). At an even more basic level, there is now considerable evidence that g is correlated with the amplitude, latency, and complexity of average devoked potentials in the brain, as measured by means of EEG apparatus and electrodes attached to the scalp (e.g., Eysenck, 1981; Jensen, Schafer, & Crinella, 1981). If such important findings are examples of what Gould wishes to suppress by his railing at the “reification” of g, then I will shout three cheers for “reification”!

But Gould does not tell his readers about any of these interesting things on the present scene. The fact is that psychologists have been witnessing in recent years a great revival of interest and research on Spearman’s g, research aimed mainly at discovering the basic processes-cognitive and neurophysiological-that will eventually explain the nature of g. That the theory of general intelligence is presently thriving is evidenced in many current publications, such as the relatively new journal Intelligence and the recent multiauthored books edited by Friedman, Das, and O’Conner (1981) Sternberg (1982), and Eysenck (1982). These publications are recommended for readers who want factual, up-to-date information about research on intelligence and mental testing.

Gould’s book, on the other hand, is so repetitiously cluttered by doctrinaire disparagement that it can hardly provide any real enlightenment regarding mental measurement. Although Gould’s book will be warmly embraced (along with Leon Kamin’s, 1974, The Science and Politics of IQ) by the dwindling band of genetic egalitarians and neo-Lysenkoists, it is hard to see that this book makes any scientific contribution or serves to inform the general public in any responsible way about the truly important issues in mental testing today.

Editor’s Note. Dr. Gould has been invited to respond to this article for publication in a subsequent issue of CER.

REFERENCES

BURT, C. The factors of the mind: An introduction to factor analysis in psychology. New York: Macmillan, 1940.

COX, C. M. Genetic studies of genious, vol 2: The early mental traits of 300 geniuses. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1926.

EYSENCK, H. J. The nature of intelligence. In M. P. Friedman, J. P. Das, & Neil O’Connor (Eds.), Intelligence and learning. New York: Plenum, 1981.

EYSENCK, H. J. (ED.). A model of intelligence. New York: Springer, 1982.

FRIEDMAN, M. P., DAS, J. P., & O’CONNOR, N. (Eds.). Intelligence and learning. New York: Plenum, 1981.

GOULD, S. J., & ELDREDGE, N. Punctuated equilibrium: The tempo and mode of evolution reconsidered. Paleobiology, 1977, 3, 115-151.

HUMPHREYS, L. G. The primary mental ability. In M. P. Friedman, J. P. Das, & N. O’Connor (eds.), Intelligence and learning. New York: Plenum, 1981.

JENSEN, A. R. Can we and should we study race differences? In J. Hellmuth (Ed.), Disadvantaged Child, Vol. 3: Compensatory education: A national debate. New York: Brunner/Mazel, 1970.

JENSEN, A. R. Educability and group differences. New York: Harper & Row, 1973.

JENSEN, A. R. Bias in mental testing. New York: The Free Press, 1980. (a)

JENSEN, A. R. Uses of sibling data in psychological and educational research. American Educational Research Journal, 1980), 17, 153-170. (b)

JENSEN, A. R. Chronometric analysis of intelligence. Journal of Social and Biological Structures, 1980, 3, 103-122. (c)

JENSEN, A. R. Straight talk about mental tests. New York: Free Press, 1981. (a)

JENSEN, A. R. Test validity: g versus the specificity doctrine. Invited address at the annual convention of The American Psychological Association, Los Angeles, California. August 26, 1981. (b)

JENSEN, A. R. The effects of in breeding on mental ability factors. Personality and Individual Differences, in press.

JENSEN, A. R., SCHAFER, E. W. P., & CRINELLA, F. M. Reaction time, evoked brain potentials, and psychometric g in the severely retarded. Intelligence, 1981, 5, 179-197.

KAMIN, L. J. The science and politics of IQ. Potomac, Md.: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1974.

SCHMID, J., & LEIMAN, J. M. The development of hierarchical factor solutions. Psychometrika, 1957, 22 53-61.

SPEARMAN, C. The abilities of man. New York: Macmillan, 1927.

STERNBERG, R. J. (Ed.). Recent advances in research on intelligence. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum, 1982.

VAN VALEN, L. Brain size and intelligence in man. American Journal of Physical Anthropology, 1974, 40, 417-423.

VERNON, P. A. Speed of information processing and general intelligence. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1981.


A substantial inheritance

A substantial inheritance
By Daniel Seligman
from National Review, October 10, 1994

As a result of genetic research, human nature is making a comeback.

Hereditarianism is on the march. Nature is clobbering nurture. A steady drip, drip, drip of scientific studies is cumulatively telling us that more and more human traits are genetically influenced. Some of the findings are based on studies of twins and adoptions; others have been generated by research in molecular biology and related hard sciences. The media have shown a particular interest in recent data linking genes to sexual orientation, alcoholism, violent and criminal behavior, and obesity, not to mention cheating on wives. “Infidelity: It may be in our genes,” proclaimed the August 15 Time cover. The cover story, by Robert Wright, was based on his new book, The Moral Animal: Evolutionary Psychology and Everyday Life, a work heavily influenced by the science of sociobiology – which has also generated a lot of data linking genes to human behavior.

Some of the nature – nurture news stories also touch on IQ, although you would have difficulty deducing from the coverage that in this area there has been no serious dispute for decades about a powerful genetic effect. The August 9 Boston Globe – which was bracing its readers for The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life, by Richard J. Herrnstein and Charles Murray (to be published in October) – had a headline that could have appeared forty years ago: “IQ Fight Renewed; New Book Links Genes, Intelligence.”

Curiously unnoticed by the reporters and anchorpersons of America is my own favorite finding of recent years: that political beliefs are strongly influenced by genes. The finding, exhaustively documented in the twin study program at the University of Minnesota, asks you to imagine a continuum of political attitudes. At one end are instinctive conservatives, here conceived as people who tend to respect traditional values and established authority; at the other end are rebellious types generally inclined to kick over the traces. One’s place on this continuum is established by responses to a battery of questions gauging attitudes toward conservatism. It turns out that the test scores of identical twins (who are, of course, genetically indistinguishable) correlate far more closely than do the scores of fraternal twins (who have only about half their genes in common), even when the identical twins were reared apart and the fraternal twins were brought up together in the same household.

The media’s rendering of the news about genes has been uneven, incomplete (especially in dealing with male – female differences), and maddeningly misleading in major respects. Still, there is no doubt that the literate public has been assimilating a few large truths: that genes play a greater role in human behavior than previously posited; that human beings are somewhat less malleable than had been assumed; that human nature is making something of a comeback.

Onward to Utopia

THE centrality of human nature, a.k.a “instinct,” was received wisdom in psychology and anthropology early in this century. It was very much onstage in the world’s first serious psychology textbook, William James’s Principles of Psychology (1890), a work that drew heavily on Darwinian parallels between human and animal behavior. The Darwinian paradigm remained dominant for many decades.

By mid century, however, this model was pretty much undone in the realm of ideas. It was fighting Marxism and Freudianism, whose alternative visions both featured human behavior shaped by the environment. In addition, the master-race version peddled by the Nazis had made hereditarianism much harder to defend. It was gradually supplanted by a commitment to one or another form of cultural determinism. In Search of Human Nature, by Carl N. Degler of Stanford, traces the rise of this new model to anthropologist Franz Boas, who had been assailing hereditarian ideas as early as 1910 and whose students and disciples increasingly nudged the thinking classes toward a model of human development in which “culture,” rather than biology, was supreme. By the 1950s, anthropologist Ashley Montagu was proclaiming that man “has no instincts, because everything he is and has become he has learned, acquired, from his culture.” In 1961 the president of the American Sociological Society hailed “the new optimism,” identifie d as a conviction that “anybody can learn anything.”

This expansive view of human malleability was exactly what numerous social engineers were eager to hear in the Sixties, and it still lingers in high-minded rhetoric about educational reform. In 1987, when he was the chief executive of Xerox, David Kearns made a speech calling for ” a new national agenda” and proposing, incredibly, that “every student – without exception – should master a core curriculum equivalent to college entrance requirements.” Possibly owing to his utopian credentials, Kearns later became deputy secretary of education in the Bush Administration.

Adapting to the era of limited malleability has not been easy for the media. First, there has been endless confusion about and misrepresentation of the data. One keeps reading that the evidence points to homosexuality being “immutable, not a personal choice” (Los Angeles Times), or that “sexual or-ientation is innate” (New York Times), or that it is “biologically determined” (Boston Globe). Or, when the subject is data pointing to genetic and biochemical markers for violent behavior, that “biology is destiny” (Time). Or, in news stories about a hereditary basis for obesity, that a particular gene “is the cause of” compulsive eating (St. Louis Post-Dispatch).

The principal difficulty with all these formulations – in some cases, they are hedged or qualified elsewhere in the article I am quoting – is that none of the data now emerging postulates any such determined outcomes. The news is about probabilities, not about “destiny.” In every case the data concern genetic effects that “predispose” one in this or that direction and thereby change the odds of particular outcomes. They represent new estimates of the “heritabilities” involved in the trait. The heritability of obesity, for example, is apparently somewhere around 0.40, meaning that 40 per cent of the population’s variability in body weight is attributable to genes, leaving 60 per cent for environmental effects. (Obesity is generally defined as 20 per cent or more overweight in relation to height and body type. ) For homosexuality the heritability may be as high as 0.50. Some scholars say it is in about the same zone for alcoholism. (Others are profoundly skeptical of any genetic influence at all in alcoholism.) For political attitudes it is about 0.60, a figure raising the question of whether ideological sperm banks are just over the horizon. For IQ the heritability is even higher, by some measures as high as 0.80.

A second, related problem with the press coverage is its insistent politicization of the data. Over and over again, one sees the media spin doctors gravitating to questions about the political implications of the news: whether it is good or bad for this or that politically correct cause, and, if bad, whether such research should be continued.

This was particularly the case with data suggesting a biological basis for violent crime. The existence of such data has been documented in many different ways. Studies have repeatedly shown identical twins to be more alike than fraternal twins in various measures of criminality. It is clear that several traits associated with violent criminals – muscular physique, low IQ, and impulsiveness – are strongly influenced by genes. Dr. Markku Linnoila of the National Institutes of Health has spent many years building a data base relating deficiencies in serotonin (a brain-based chemical that facilitates transmissions between neurons) to impulsive violent behavior, and almost nobody doubts he is on to something.

The Nazi Tradition?

THE BIG issue about such studies nowadays is not so much their validity as the permissibility of pursuing them at all. The hangup here is racial:

Justice Department data indicate that blacks, who represent about 12 per cent of the U.S. population, commit about half of all violent crimes (defined as murder, non-negligent manslaughter, rape, aggravated assault, and robbery). Which raises the prospect that any research into the genetic and/or biological roots of violent crime would at some point be addressing differences in racial propensities. Numerous scholars are determined that no such research be done, and scholars wishing to do it are endlessly told that they are acting in the Nazi tradition.

Prominent among those making such points is Dr. Peter Breggin, founder of the Center for the Study of Psychiatry, who was recently quoted in the Atlanta Journal and Constitution as concerned that the research would turn into a witch hunt against inner-city black kids. He added: “For America to suggest that the problem lies in them is hypocritical and evil, and to think of doing genetic studies in our inner cities is very close to the Nazi

philosophy of blaming and oppressing the victim.” Two years ago, the NIH was supporting a conference, to be held at the University of Maryland, on genetic factors in crime. Breggin howled, as did the Congressional Black Caucus. NIH Director Bernadine Healy instantly caved, and the conference was never held.

Political correctness has also been onstage in coverage of the data on gays. In this instance, however, there have been no demands for suppression of the data, which the gay-rights movement generally finds congenial. The new findings here have mainly been identified with two researchers. One is neurobiologist Simon LeVay, who in 1991, when he was at the Salk Institute in La Jolla, reported that a particular cell cluster in the hypothalamus was smaller in gay men than in straight men. The other is Dean Hamer of the National Cancer Institute, who reported in Science last year that he had found differences in the DNA of gay and straight men. Both LeVay and Hamer have repeatedly stated that their research does not point to a “gay gene” and does not imply that homosexuality is determined before birth.

Why, then, would so many media accounts create the opposite impression? Doubtless a contributing factor is the difficulty so many newsrooms have in dealing with complex quantitative data. But I believe that the main reason is political: the concept of a predetermined sexual orientation offered irresistible polemical opportunities to PC editorialists. For openers, it gave them a chance to beat the “Radical Right” over the head. If evangelicals say that homosexuality is “immoral,” that must mean they believe gays have a choice in their sexual orientation. So it would be nice to argue that no choice is involved – gayness, no less than straightness, is a God-given trait. As elaborated by a Boston Globe editorialist: “The arguments of homophobes usually imply that homosexuals are somehow making a perverted choice. But the findings of Hamer’s team . . . would tend to show that homosexuality . . . is biologically determined. . . . It could ease the struggle to secure equal protection for all Americans, regard less of sexual orientation.”

The notion of a biologically determined sexual orientation had another attractive implication for progressive journalists. It meant that parents could no longer rationally defend their objections to gay influences in their children’s lives. As Time argued in an article a year ago (July 26, 1993): “Parents might be more relaxed about allowing children to have gay teachers, Boy Scout leaders, and other role models, on the assumption that the child’s future is written in his or her genetic makeup.” Note, however, that this case crumbles fast as we move from biologically determined outcomes to mere tendencies. If a boy had any predisposition to gayness, his parents would possibly be more concerned about gay Scoutmasters than if they had never heard of the new research.

An amusing footnote to these arguments emerged from some comments made by Dean Hamer at last winter’s San Francisco meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science. At a news conference, Hamer expressed concern about one possible application of his research. He raised the possibility that the findings would lead eventually to prenatal tests for the predisposition to homosexuality, worried that some parents might elect to abort any fetuses at risk of being gay, and said he hoped to patent the gene in question and prevent homophobic parents from misusing his research. His position was widely reported, and applauded, and my search in Nexis turned up a non-amazing non-event. There were no editorials saying Hamer’s plan was in conflict with a woman’s right to abort unwanted pregnancies.

‘Anything You Can Do . . .’

POLITICAL agendas are also discernible in the media treatment of data on male – female differences. The press has done fairly well at rendering the work of Harvard psychologist Carol Gilligan – Nexis was recently offering 547 articles that mention her – and especially the core concepts of her book In a Different Voice, which portrays women as far more empathetic and “caring” than men. This thought, which had arguably occurred to your grandmother long before Professor Gilligan got around to it, has now been assimilated by most feminist thinkers. But the media and modern feminism are still rigidly rejecting the avalanche of data depicting basic differences in male and female intellectual skills.

A striking instance of the rejection was the colossally uninformed coverage of the lawsuit last winter in which the American Civil Liberties Union and the National Center for Fair & Open Testing called upon the U.S. Department of Education to declare the Scholastic Aptitude Test in violation of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, which bars sex discrimination in federally funded education. The suit’s basic proposition: that the SAT (the name has been changed, so that the “A” now stands for Assessment) obviously discriminates against young women. Principal evidence: that women represent 55 per cent of the high-school juniors taking the preliminary SAT but only 40 per cent of those whose test scores qualify them for National Merit Scholarships. To qualify, you have to be above the 98th percentile of the testees.

A thought that was almost impossible to find in media coverage of this event was that this is precisely what serious students of male – female differences would have expected. There is broad (not quite total) agreement that men and women are on average equal in mental ability: they have different strengths and weaknesses, with a huge advantage for men in spatial abilities, which are deeply implicated in mathematical talent, and an offsetting verbal advantage for women. Camilla Benbow of Iowa State University is among the numerous scholars who believe these differences have a biological basis.

If the sexes are on average equal in ability, why would men be dominant among the National Merit Scholarship winners? Because in virtually all mental domains, males are more variable than females, i.e., the distribution of their scores is less bunched around the mean. David Lubinski of Iowa State and Professor Benbow, two prominent researchers who have studied the variability issue, have analyzed the test scores of several hundred thousand high-school students and concluded that even in domains where females have a higher average, males will be more variable. Obvious implication: in any sizable group of gifted (or retarded) students, you would expect males to be overrepresented.

I said above that it was “almost impossible” to find this thought in the media. In fact, I stumbled upon it in only one place: in a publictelevision discussion program called To the Contrary. The program has only female discussants, and on the day I tuned in one of them was Linda Chavez, who said that the National Merit Scholarship results were not surprising, since the greater male variability was well established. To be sure, Miss Chavez is a conservative and an occasional NATIONAL REVIEW contributor.

Taking everything together, the emerging limits-to-malleability perspective looks like better news to conservatives than to liberals. Down through the years, conservatives have almost always been less attracted to political initiatives – public housing, penal rehabilitation, the Job Corps, Head Start, international Communism – that were in some measure advertised as creating new and better kinds of human beings. Conservatives tend to be far gloomier than leftists and liberals in judging the possibilities of changing mankind. In A Conflict of Visions, published in 1987, Thomas Sowell argued persuasively that their different perspectives on human nature were fundamental to their disagreements on a wide range of public-policy questions. Contrasting the utopianism of the Left with the “constrained vision” of the Right, Sowell wrote: “What fundamentally distinguishes the two visions is their respective perceptions of human potential.”

In the IQ debate, or at least that portion of it centering on the nature – nurture issue, conservatives have generally seemed quite comfortable with data running up the score for nature, possibly because the evidence confirms their intuitive doubts about so many ameliorative social programs. By the same token, strenuous resistance to the data tends to come from scholars on the Left. Typically they have been Marxists, Stephen Jay Gould of Harvard and Leon Kamin of Northeastern being among the more prominent. The single most hard-line statement against a genetic basis for IQ is still Not in Our Genes, a 1984 work by R. C. Lewontin, Steven Rose, and Leon Kamin, who posit that IQ studies are a weapon employed by the ruling class to hold down the poor and minorities, and who seem unable to discuss the human condition without dragging in Marx, Engels, Feuerbach, and “revolutionary philosophers and practitioners like Mao Tse-tung.” Kamin was one of the scholars turned to by the Boston Globe for its recent report on the Herrnstein – Murray book. He was quoted as stating that the book was “politics masquerading as science.”

Guaranteed: no shortage of politics as the gene data unfold.

Mr. Seligman, a Fortune columnist, is the author of A Question of Intelligence: The IQ Debate in America (Citadel)


The G Factor: The Book and the Controversy

The G Factor: The Book and the Controversy
by Prof. Edward Miller
from The Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies,
(Summer 1996)

n late March a book by Christopher Brand titled The G Factor: General Intelligence and its implications. appeared in UK bookstores. It was published by Wiley UK. On April 17, the New York office announced in an unprecedented action “After careful consideration of the statements made recently by author Christopher Brand (as reported in the British press), as well as some of the views presented in his work.. , we have decided to withdraw the book from publication. (Wiley) does not want to support these views by disseminating them or be associated with a book that makes assertions that we find repellant.” (Holden, 1996). It is very unusual for a publisher to break a contract with an author and announce that the reason for the this action is to prevent the dissemination of certain views. The question naturally arises as to what are the views whose dissemination they wish to prevent, and what is the evidence for these views? While Wiley has not been specific as to just what views that were trying to prevent the dissemination of, one presumes they have to do with racial differences in intelligence and the implications for economics and educational policy. Wiley announced (McMillen 1996) that they acted because of “deep ethical beliefs”, but what these were was not revealed. One suspects they were that racial differences and eugenics should not be discussed, but that is merely a guess.

Fortunately, the author of this review article had seen the Wiley prepublication publicity planned for the jacket (available at http://laboratory.psy.ed.ac.uk/DOCS/crb/new.htm) and decided to review the book. He had obtained a copy, and started this review when the book was withdrawn. The fact that this book was withdrawn in an announced attempt to prevent the dissemination of certain ideas will modify somewhat the nature of this review. It will be longer than the usual review so that the reader will have the opportunity to know what Brand had to say. Also references will be provided so that the reader will be able to find the sources for what Brand claimed.

Incidentally, this will serve to make clear that the views that Wiley was trying to avoid disseminating were based on well established science. Brands book is not primarily about racial differences or eugenics (the major policy recommendations relate to educational policy). But since much of the controversy has dealt with these issues, and it appears that Wiley’s goal was to prevent dissemination of Brand’s views of these issues, a disproportionate part of this review will be devoted to these topics. This will serve both to inform the reader of Brand’s views on these issues, and to frustrate Wiley’s attempt to prevent dissemination of certain ideas.

There are several interesting features of Wiley’s actions. In many countries there has been concern about domination of the economy by companies headquartered abroad. This concern has been especially strong with regard to national culture, and the industries that directly affect it including publishing, motion pictures, broadcasting, etc. Usually a multinational firm tries to leave the impression that key decisions affecting the culture or economy are made in the country affected.

Wiley’s decision is unusual in that it was announced in New York and made in the name of the chief executive, Mr. Ellis, even though the major effect was to cause the withdrawal of a book from British bookstores and to hurt a Scottish author. The very short period of time between the start of publicity in Britain and the decision of Wiley’s New York executives to withdraw the book make it very unlikely that anyone in New York had read the book in detail.

An interesting aspect of the Brand case, is that the Scottish Nationalist party, which is understood to believe that Scotland should not be ruled in all details from London, might have been expected to take the lead in preventing Scotland from being ruled from America.

However, their Leader, Mr Alex Salmond denounced Edinburgh and supported the decision of Wiley headquarters in New York to break their contract with Brand, and to remove his book from Scotland’s booksellers That he made this decision shows the power of the taboo against discussing racial differences in intelligence. The author’s royalties from books on intelligence will go not to Scotland, but to those Americans, such as Herrenstein and Murray, Jensen, Seligman, Rushton, Itzkoff (etc.) whose books say much the same as Brands, except with more emphasis on race. Nor will a UK publisher get the revenue, or UK workers get the printing jobs. That even a Scottish nationalist would support a NY decision to withdraw a book by a Scottish author from Scotlandís bookstores shows the strength of the taboo against discussing certain topics. As is well known, there is an organized effort in the US and elsewhere to suppress any discussion of racial differences in intelligence (Pearson, 1991).

In response to the furor caused by Brand, there were student protests on his campus, apparently left wing students who were opposed to the discussion of racial differences. They claimed that they were made uncomfortable by lectures in which racial and sexual differences were discussed. These complaints led to the announcement of an investigation of Mr. Brands teaching by his University. One suspects this was a result of political correctness since Brand had been lecturing at Edinburgh since 1970, apparently without significant complaints. Thus the investigation on its face appears an effort to penalize him for expressing controversial views. The withdrawal of the book by Wiley meant that debate about Brand’s view had to proceed with many having actual access to the book in which his view were expressed. It is partially to remedy this problem that this summary of the book is provided.

What is really in this Controversial Book?

Actually, The g Factor: General Intelligence and its implications provides a good readable discussion of what is known about intelligence that differs in most aspects little from what other authors have said (Herrenstein and Murray,1994, Jensen, 1980, 1981, Seligman, 1992, Rushton, 1995, Itzkoff ,1994, etc). The title of The g Factor arises from the psychometricians’ use of the letter g to stand for the general factor which can be extracted from performance on a battery of mental performance chapters. The book is relatively short consisting of only four chapters and a postscript.

The first chapter is devoted to discussing what is intelligence, and what do psychometricians mean by g. After a brief history of concepts of intelligence and of mental testing, the remarkable fact is presented that performance on most mental tests are correlated. Someone who does well on one test tends to do well on other tests. While this is sometimes described as an unsurprising finding, it is pointed out that the normal expectation is that skills are learned, and time spent on one activity comes at the expense of time spent on other activities. Thus, it is indeed surprizing that there is a positive correlation between different skills.

It is pointed out how many of the psychologists working on mental abilities have desired to make their mark by identifying a new mental ability that was uncorrelated with the already known. abilities. So far such attempts have failed. For instance, the Piagetian abilities that children master in the course of development were shown to be abilities well correlated with intelligence.

There is a good discussion of how such a variety of abilities, all of which are correlated, implies the existence of a common factor, g, which is useful for predicting school and job performance. The book deals nicely with the complaint that tests measure only “academic intelligence” pointing out that they provide the only way of predicting success in most occupations, with even noted critics admitting that lawyers, engineers, and chemists virtually never have IQs below 100. Even the military, an organization that is not usually considered to value academic aptitude, still finds tests useful. In one of many great lines in the book (p. 32), “By definition, it cannot be ‘narrow academic skills’ that boost efficiency ratings and remuneration across a wide range of jobs types: grasping capitalist employers and crime-busting police chiefs will surely not be taken in for long by mere scholasticism.”

The theory that g is merely measuring the social class of the parents is refuted by pointing out that parental social class has only a modest correlation with the education attainments of the children by their early twenties. (p.35). White (1982) reviewed 100 studies in the US and estimated the correlation at about .22. As Brand puts it “Evidently parental socioeconomic status (SES) today scarcely correlates with, so simply cannot be influencing, such a crucial variable as educational attainment in young adults.”

This chapter has a useful discussion of the lower performance of certain groups (notably blacks) on tests, drawing the useful distinction between the claim that the tests are a valid measure of ability but that some environmental disadvantage of the group (such as racial prejudice) has actually harmed the group, and the claim that the tests are actually biased against members of the group. Evidence is presented that measures of intelligence predict school performance equally well in both groups. (Scarr-Salapetek, 1971, 1972). Likewise, for adults IQ tests correlated just as well with job performance in all racial groups. “Actually, the tests slightly over-predict scholastic and workplace performance by blacks and are to that extent unfair to whites and Asians in competition for the same positions.” (p. 37). The author of this review has provided in this journal a simple graphical exposition of why this is (Miller, 1994).

The possibility that minority children lack motivation for test taking is disproved by the fact that “black children do perfectly well at laboratory tests that are not correlated with g-such as drawing a straight line, threading beads, and recalling past events.”(p. 37). It is pointed out that when particular items are identified by sociologists and educationists as appearing ‘culturally unfair’ to minorities, black children actually do a little better on these tests (often requiring memory and learning) than on items selected on the basis of being unbiased (and often requiring g).(p. 38). It is pointed out that at every age and every level of family income, that black children are no worse at the Weschler vocabulary than they are at block design (Roberts 1971, but yet vocabulary is probably more culturally influenced than the ability to copy block designs.

The second chapter of this short book deals with the bases for IQ differences, and in particular, the extent to which they are genetic. There is a nice simple discussion of factor analysis (with a numerical example for the centroid method).

There is then a fascinating discussion of the biological correlates of intelligence. While there is a brief mention of Jensen’s decision time work, the emphasis is on the inspection time work which Brand himself pioneered (Brand & Deary, 1982). In inspection time experiments the subject is shown (often with a tachiscope) for a fraction of a second two markedly different lines (2.5 inches versus three inches) and asked to say which is longer.

The minimum time the subject must see the lines to determine which is longer is determined. This task is simple, and has no obvious relationship to intelligence. However, it does correlate with intelligence (as Brand discovered), and the author argues (p. 73) that overall “results are compatible with an estimate that the true IT/IQ r in the full population (including representative proportions of the young, the elderly and the retarded) would be .-75.” The minus sign here indicates that that the time required to tell which line is shorter is less for the more intelligent.

Somehow it appears that the brains of the more intelligent function differently than the brains of the less intelligent, even on simple tasks where there is no learning involved. This is of course consistent with there being a genetic basis for many differences in intelligence.

The third chapter deals with issues of nature and nurture. There is now very little dispute among the experts that a substantial fraction of intelligence differences between people is for genetic reasons. Perhaps the most striking evidence comes from studies of identical twins raised apart. Their IQ’s correlated .78. The other twin studies are reviewed, with mention of the study that involved the largest number of monozygotic twins (Lynn & Hattori, 1990) where the correlation for 543 pairs of monozygotic twins was .78 and for 161 pairs of dizygotic twins .49. Like other authors that have reviewed the evidence, Brand finds there is evidence for substantial heritability.

Brand does violate the taboo of drawing (even if weakly) the eugenic implications the role of genetics in intelligence. He contrasts the implications that might be drawn from a belief in “environmentalism” with those that might result from a belief that genes play a role. He points out that (p. 12) “If children of the future are to receive maximum intellectual and education levels and to be more employable, there would need to be fewer homes where parent and caretakers were un-stimulating, drug-addicted, neglectful, and themselves of low IQ-even assuming large environmental origins of g”. He states, drawing on the Reed and Reed (1965) collected data on 80,000 descendants of the grandparents of 289 state colony patients having IQ’s <70 (and without epilepsy), that the overall rate of retardation would have been reduced by 50% if handicapped people themselves had not had children, even though only 88 of the 289 patients were diagnosed has having retardation of definitely genetic origins. What is happening here is that those suffering from retardation of unknown origin are having children who are themselves retarded, which suggests a genetic cause for most such cases.

He points out that (p. 120), “A eugenic policy focused on IQ must be attractive to any would-be improvement of human happiness-whether hereditarian or environmentalist.” To those that fear that acknowledgement of genetic influence might lead to state efforts to limit reproduction of certain individuals, he points out (p. 121) that “Acceptance of others’ rights is what protects everyone from state manipulation of any kind; and such acceptance follows perhaps a little more easily from a belief in biologically based individual agency than from an environmentalism that stresses the power of society to shape and even ‘construct’ the individual.”

The final chapter of the book is titled “Intelligence in Society”, and sets out the policy implications. Since this section appears to be what got the book withdrawn, it will be summarized here, even though doing so risks making the book appear more social in nature than it really is. The discussion opens with a discussion of Jensen’s 1969 article on the failure of Head Start, and his controversial suggestion that the problem was with the lower genetic IQ of black children. Brand comments that (p. 131) “Most educational experts agreed with Jensen and Eysenck that black IQ levels were low (for whatever reason) and that this deficiency helped to explain poor education records and later tendencies to crime and promiscuity. To recognize this deficiency (if not to publicize it) had remained tolerable while the racial differences in IQ seemed changeable.” He suggested that recognizing this became intolerable once the failure of early childhood intervention to correct the problem had become apparent, and been documented by Jensen.

Brand points out (p. 134) how three events have blocked off lines of dignified retreat for crusaders against the ‘Jensenist heresy.’ First evidence was produced that the tests were as fair and valid for black children as for anyone else (Jensen 1980). Secondly it had become apparent in America that low IQ’s were not generally characteristic of racial and ethnic groups that had experienced discrimination, as shown by Jews and Orientals in America. In Britain, Brand reports that Pakistani immigrants suffer from prejudice and maintain a language, religion, and moral code that distance them from their British hosts yet, their children have always tested as being of normal intelligence once they have learned English, and they slightly outperform English children educationally by mid-adolescence (Brand 1987c).

Brand points out that “almost the full Afro-American deficit, of some 15 IQ points, could be detected in children as young as three years, born to black mothers who were themselves college educated, married and had no pregnancy complication or health problem. (Monte & Fagan, 1988). Medically and socially matched, these young black children had a mean IQ of 91 and the white children tested at 104.” As he points out, the matching for socioeconomic status and the use of college educated mothers eliminated most of the environmental theories for racial differences that are commonly proposed. At age three most children have not been in school, or been exposed to much of the world outside of their own family and community (i.e. any societal racial discrimination should not have affected them).

Brand describes the experiments with adoption of black children into the homes of white middle-class homes. This yielded (p. 135), “the usual 8 point IQ gain plus some narrowing of the gap between black and white adoptees at age 7; but by age 17, the black youngsters lagged the white by the usual 12-15 IQ points (Weinburg, Scarr & Waldman, 1992; Lynn, 1994)”.

He points out (p. 136) evidence against the theory that blacks suffer from being in a white society is provided by the failure of blacks to perform conspicuously better in any of the countries or North American cities run by blacks themselves–indeed, they usually performed much worse.

Having dealt with the controversial topic of black white differences (this rather mild discussion was apparently the reason that caused Wiley to withdraw the book), the discussion moves on to the practical importance of intelligence. It is pointed out that IQ at age five correlated strongly (r=.50) with educational achievements when they were 15 (Brand did not provide the reference for this in the book, but he privately supplied, Yule, Gold, & Busch, 1981). It is pointed out that many studies in which IQ is unimportant are ones where restriction of range is important. IQ has seldom correlated better than .30 with college grades, but this is because of the restriction of admission to the better students, and because students sort themselves by ability into course of different difficulties.

The mental tests that correlated best among themselves (i.e. indexing g) turned out to be the main predictors of occupational success and income (Hunter & Hunter, 1984: Schmidt, Ones & Hunter, 1992). A statement in the text that upward inter-generational mobility is strongly predicted only by IQ is expanded on in a footnote where he points out that difference scores are particularly unreliable (since they are affected by the unreliability from both of the variables that contribute to them). Waller’s (1971) finding of a correlation of .29 between father-son IQ differences and father-son socioeconomic differences would imply a “true” correlation of around .50. As an illustration of the ability of IQ to explain outcomes better than socioeconomic status, several results from the Bell Cure (Herrenstein & Murray, 1994) relating to the probability of dropping out of high school, probability of white males being unemployed for a month, and probability of white out-of-wedlock mothers going on welfare) are graphed.

The discussion then moves to the implications for educational policy of individual differences in intelligence. Brand points out how many students are forced to study material in school they have already mastered. In Montreal, 45% of the children know 60% of the school curriculum (in French and math) before the years work begins (Gagne, 1986), while in a study of 160 gifted English school children, 60% were found to be doing classwork at a level more than four years below their actual attainments (Painter, 1976). He points out that the top 10% of 7 1/2 year-old-children are higher in g than the bottom 10% of 15 1/2-year-olds (Raven 1989). Brand thus pushes the apparently common sense idea that students should be grouped in accordance with ability.

Brand points out that although modern educational ideology talks about allowing children to progress at their own speed within mixed ability classes, that as a practical matter this cannot be done since the teacher cannot teach at two levels at the same time. The argument that smaller classes would permit better mixed ability teaching is countered by pointing out that classes of even six would still have virtually the full range of abilities, and that empirical studies regularly show that educational outcomes are unrelated to class size (Walsh, 1995).

He proposes that the problem of matching children’s mental ages be solved by putting the brighter eight-year-olds with the nine-year-olds, and the slower eight-year-olds with the seven-year-olds. The usual objection to this is that grade advanced children would not have sufficient maturity, emotional age, or moral development to associate with older children. Brand has dug up an impressive list of studies (p. 162) that the mental age predicts these better than chronological age. On 11 out of 12 measures of social and emotional adjustment, gifted children in Grade 3 were found to be more advanced than average children in Grade 6 (Lehman & Erdwins, 1981). He claims that there is no sound evidence that grade advancement will yield either social or emotional maladjustment (Silverman, 1989, and Feldhusen, 1991).

Brand proposes that children and parents should be free to pick scholastic programs that suit their abilities. It is surprizing that a book with such a mild conclusion should have caused such a furor. How unconventional are the views expressed by Brand, and summarized above. Actually, they differ little from those of other specialists who study intelligence. A survey sent to 1020 experts (Snyderman and Rothman, 1988) showed that there were three times as many who thought the racial differences were both genetic and environmental, as thought it was solely environmental.

Amazing, there a few other fields where admitting that one believes what is the mainstream wisdom will get one so soundly condemned.

References

Brand, C.R. & Deary, I.J.(1982). ‘Intelligence and inspection time.’ In H. J. Eysenck, A Model for Intelligence. New York : Springer, pp.133-148.
Brand, C. R. (1987c) ‘What can Britain’s schools do to help Black children?’ Personality & Individual Differences 8, 3, 453-5.
Feldhusen, J. F. (1991) ‘Effects of programs for the gifted: a search for evidence.’ in W. T. Southern & E. D. Jones, The Academic Acceleration of Gifted Children. New York: Teachers College Press.
Gagne, F. (1986) Douance, talent et acceleration du prescolaire a l’universite. Montreal: Centre Educatif et Culturel.
Herrenstein, R. & Murray, C. (1994) The Bell Curve. New York: The Free Press.
Holden, C. (1996). Wiley drops book after public furor. Science, 272, May 3, 644.
Hunter, J. E. & Hunter, R. F.(1984) ‘Validity and utility of alternative predictors of job performance.’ Psychological Bulletin 96, 1, 72-98.:
Itzkoff, S. W. (1994). The Decline of Intelligence in America. Westport: Praeger.
Jensen, A. R. (1980) Bias in Mental Testing. London: Methuen.
Jensen, A. R. (1981). Straight Talk About Mental Tests, New York: The Free Press.
Lehman, E. & Erdwins, C. (1981) ‘Social and emotional adjustment of young intellectually gifted children.’ Gifted Child Quarterly 25, 134-38.
Lynn, R. (1994) ‘Some reinterpretations of the Minnesota transracial adoption study.’ Intelligence 19, 1, 21-7.
Lynn, R. & Hattori, K. (1990) ‘The heritability of intelligence in Japan.’ Behavior Genetics 20, 4, 545-6.
Mackintosh, N. J. (1996). Science struck dumb. Nature, 381, 33)
Miller, E. M, (1994) “The Relevance of Group Membership for Personnel Selection: A Demonstration Using Bayes Theorem,” Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies 19, 323-359.
Montie, J. E. & Fagan, J. F., III (1988) ‘Racial differences in IQ: item analysis of the Stanford-Binet at 3 years.’ Intelligence 12, 315-32.
Painter, F. (1976) Gifted Children: A Research Study. Hertfordshire, UK: Pullen Publication.
Pearson, R. (1991). Race, Intelligence and Bias in Academe. Washington: Scott: Townsend.
Raven, J. (1989) ‘The Raven Progressive Matrices: A review of national norming studies and ethnic and socio-economic variation within the U.S.’ Journal of Educational Measurement 26, 1-16.
Reed, E. W. & Reed, S. C. (1965) Mental Retardation: A Family Study. Philadelphia: Saunders.
Rushton, J. P. (1995) Race, Evolution and Behavior: A Life History Perspective, New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.
Rushton, J.P. & C.D. Ankney Scarr-Salapetek, S. (1971). “Race, social class, and IQ.’ Science 174, 4016, 1285-1296.
Scarr-Salapetek, S. (1972). Some methodological questions’. Science 178, 235-40.
Schmidt, F. L., Ones, D. S. & Hunter, J. E. (1992) ‘Personnel selection.’ Annual Review of Psychology 43, 627-70.
Seligman, D. (1992). A Question of Intelligence. New York: Birch Lane Press.
Silverman, L. K. (1989) ‘The highly gifted.’ in J. F. Feldhusen, J. Van Tassel-Baska & K. Seeley, Excellence in Educating the Gifted, pp. 71-84. Denver: Love Publishing.
Snyderman, M. and Rothman, S. (1988). The IQ Controversy, the Media and Public Policy. New Brunswick, Transaction Books.
Waller, J. H. (1971) ‘Achievement and social mobility: the relationship between IQ score, education and occupation in two generations.’ Social Biology 18, 252-9.
Walsh, K. (1995) ‘China succeeds with large class sizes.’ Times Educational Supplement(Scotland), 1487, 17.
Weinberg, R. A., Scarr, S., & Waldman, I. D. (1992) ‘The Minnesota transracial adoption study: a follow-up of IQ test performance at adolescence.’ Intelligence 16, 117-35.
White (1982) ‘The relation between socioeconomic status and academic achievement’. Psychological Bulletin 91, 3, 461-8.
Yule, W., Gold, R.D. & Busch, C. (1981) ‘WISC-R correlates of academic attainment at sixteen-and-a-half years.’ British Journal of Educational Psychology 51, 2, 237-240.

Edward M. Miller
Department of Economics and Finance
University of New Orleans
504-286-6913 (work) 504-286-6397 (fax)
emmef@uno.edu


The G Factor: The Book and the Controversy

The G Factor: The Book and the Controversy
by Prof. Edward Miller
from The Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies,
(Summer 1996)

In late March a book by Christopher Brand titled The G Factor: General Intelligence and its implications. appeared in UK bookstores. It was published by Wiley UK. On April 17, the New York office announced in an unprecedented action “After careful consideration of the statements made recently by author Christopher Brand (as reported in the British press), as well as some of the views presented in his work.. , we have decided to withdraw the book from publication. (Wiley) does not want to support these views by disseminating them or be associated with a book that makes assertions that we find repellant.” (Holden, 1996). It is very unusual for a publisher to break a contract with an author and announce that the reason for the this action is to prevent the dissemination of certain views. The question naturally arises as to what are the views whose dissemination they wish to prevent, and what is the evidence for these views? While Wiley has not been specific as to just what views that were trying to prevent the dissemination of, one presumes they have to do with racial differences in intelligence and the implications for economics and educational policy. Wiley announced (McMillen 1996) that they acted because of “deep ethical beliefs”, but what these were was not revealed. One suspects they were that racial differences and eugenics should not be discussed, but that is merely a guess.

Fortunately, the author of this review article had seen the Wiley prepublication publicity planned for the jacket (available at http://laboratory.psy.ed.ac.uk/DOCS/crb/new.htm) and decided to review the book. He had obtained a copy, and started this review when the book was withdrawn. The fact that this book was withdrawn in an announced attempt to prevent the dissemination of certain ideas will modify somewhat the nature of this review. It will be longer than the usual review so that the reader will have the opportunity to know what Brand had to say. Also references will be provided so that the reader will be able to find the sources for what Brand claimed.

Incidentally, this will serve to make clear that the views that Wiley was trying to avoid disseminating were based on well established science. Brands book is not primarily about racial differences or eugenics (the major policy recommendations relate to educational policy). But since much of the controversy has dealt with these issues, and it appears that Wiley’s goal was to prevent dissemination of Brand’s views of these issues, a disproportionate part of this review will be devoted to these topics. This will serve both to inform the reader of Brand’s views on these issues, and to frustrate Wiley’s attempt to prevent dissemination of certain ideas.

There are several interesting features of Wiley’s actions. In many countries there has been concern about domination of the economy by companies headquartered abroad. This concern has been especially strong with regard to national culture, and the industries that directly affect it including publishing, motion pictures, broadcasting, etc. Usually a multinational firm tries to leave the impression that key decisions affecting the culture or economy are made in the country affected.

Wiley’s decision is unusual in that it was announced in New York and made in the name of the chief executive, Mr. Ellis, even though the major effect was to cause the withdrawal of a book from British bookstores and to hurt a Scottish author. The very short period of time between the start of publicity in Britain and the decision of Wiley’s New York executives to withdraw the book make it very unlikely that anyone in New York had read the book in detail.

An interesting aspect of the Brand case, is that the Scottish Nationalist party, which is understood to believe that Scotland should not be ruled in all details from London, might have been expected to take the lead in preventing Scotland from being ruled from America.

However, their Leader, Mr Alex Salmond denounced Edinburgh and supported the decision of Wiley headquarters in New York to break their contract with Brand, and to remove his book from Scotland’s booksellers That he made this decision shows the power of the taboo against discussing racial differences in intelligence. The author’s royalties from books on intelligence will go not to Scotland, but to those Americans, such as Herrenstein and Murray, Jensen, Seligman, Rushton, Itzkoff (etc.) whose books say much the same as Brands, except with more emphasis on race. Nor will a UK publisher get the revenue, or UK workers get the printing jobs. That even a Scottish nationalist would support a NY decision to withdraw a book by a Scottish author from Scotlandís bookstores shows the strength of the taboo against discussing certain topics. As is well known, there is an organized effort in the US and elsewhere to suppress any discussion of racial differences in intelligence (Pearson, 1991).

In response to the furor caused by Brand, there were student protests on his campus, apparently left wing students who were opposed to the discussion of racial differences. They claimed that they were made uncomfortable by lectures in which racial and sexual differences were discussed. These complaints led to the announcement of an investigation of Mr. Brands teaching by his University. One suspects this was a result of political correctness since Brand had been lecturing at Edinburgh since 1970, apparently without significant complaints. Thus the investigation on its face appears an effort to penalize him for expressing controversial views. The withdrawal of the book by Wiley meant that debate about Brand’s view had to proceed with many having actual access to the book in which his view were expressed. It is partially to remedy this problem that this summary of the book is provided.

What is really in this Controversial Book?

Actually, The g Factor: General Intelligence and its implications provides a good readable discussion of what is known about intelligence that differs in most aspects little from what other authors have said (Herrenstein and Murray,1994, Jensen, 1980, 1981, Seligman, 1992, Rushton, 1995, Itzkoff ,1994, etc). The title of The g Factor arises from the psychometricians’ use of the letter g to stand for the general factor which can be extracted from performance on a battery of mental performance chapters. The book is relatively short consisting of only four chapters and a postscript.

The first chapter is devoted to discussing what is intelligence, and what do psychometricians mean by g. After a brief history of concepts of intelligence and of mental testing, the remarkable fact is presented that performance on most mental tests are correlated. Someone who does well on one test tends to do well on other tests. While this is sometimes described as an unsurprising finding, it is pointed out that the normal expectation is that skills are learned, and time spent on one activity comes at the expense of time spent on other activities. Thus, it is indeed surprizing that there is a positive correlation between different skills.

It is pointed out how many of the psychologists working on mental abilities have desired to make their mark by identifying a new mental ability that was uncorrelated with the already known. abilities. So far such attempts have failed. For instance, the Piagetian abilities that children master in the course of development were shown to be abilities well correlated with intelligence.

There is a good discussion of how such a variety of abilities, all of which are correlated, implies the existence of a common factor, g, which is useful for predicting school and job performance. The book deals nicely with the complaint that tests measure only “academic intelligence” pointing out that they provide the only way of predicting success in most occupations, with even noted critics admitting that lawyers, engineers, and chemists virtually never have IQs below 100. Even the military, an organization that is not usually considered to value academic aptitude, still finds tests useful. In one of many great lines in the book (p. 32), “By definition, it cannot be ‘narrow academic skills’ that boost efficiency ratings and remuneration across a wide range of jobs types: grasping capitalist employers and crime-busting police chiefs will surely not be taken in for long by mere scholasticism.”

The theory that g is merely measuring the social class of the parents is refuted by pointing out that parental social class has only a modest correlation with the education attainments of the children by their early twenties. (p.35). White (1982) reviewed 100 studies in the US and estimated the correlation at about .22. As Brand puts it “Evidently parental socioeconomic status (SES) today scarcely correlates with, so simply cannot be influencing, such a crucial variable as educational attainment in young adults.”

This chapter has a useful discussion of the lower performance of certain groups (notably blacks) on tests, drawing the useful distinction between the claim that the tests are a valid measure of ability but that some environmental disadvantage of the group (such as racial prejudice) has actually harmed the group, and the claim that the tests are actually biased against members of the group. Evidence is presented that measures of intelligence predict school performance equally well in both groups. (Scarr-Salapetek, 1971, 1972). Likewise, for adults IQ tests correlated just as well with job performance in all racial groups. “Actually, the tests slightly over-predict scholastic and workplace performance by blacks and are to that extent unfair to whites and Asians in competition for the same positions.” (p. 37). The author of this review has provided in this journal a simple graphical exposition of why this is (Miller, 1994).

The possibility that minority children lack motivation for test taking is disproved by the fact that “black children do perfectly well at laboratory tests that are not correlated with g-such as drawing a straight line, threading beads, and recalling past events.”(p. 37). It is pointed out that when particular items are identified by sociologists and educationists as appearing ‘culturally unfair’ to minorities, black children actually do a little better on these tests (often requiring memory and learning) than on items selected on the basis of being unbiased (and often requiring g).(p. 38). It is pointed out that at every age and every level of family income, that black children are no worse at the Weschler vocabulary than they are at block design (Roberts 1971, but yet vocabulary is probably more culturally influenced than the ability to copy block designs.

The second chapter of this short book deals with the bases for IQ differences, and in particular, the extent to which they are genetic. There is a nice simple discussion of factor analysis (with a numerical example for the centroid method).

There is then a fascinating discussion of the biological correlates of intelligence. While there is a brief mention of Jensen’s decision time work, the emphasis is on the inspection time work which Brand himself pioneered (Brand & Deary, 1982). In inspection time experiments the subject is shown (often with a tachiscope) for a fraction of a second two markedly different lines (2.5 inches versus three inches) and asked to say which is longer.

The minimum time the subject must see the lines to determine which is longer is determined. This task is simple, and has no obvious relationship to intelligence. However, it does correlate with intelligence (as Brand discovered), and the author argues (p. 73) that overall “results are compatible with an estimate that the true IT/IQ r in the full population (including representative proportions of the young, the elderly and the retarded) would be .-75.” The minus sign here indicates that that the time required to tell which line is shorter is less for the more intelligent.

Somehow it appears that the brains of the more intelligent function differently than the brains of the less intelligent, even on simple tasks where there is no learning involved. This is of course consistent with there being a genetic basis for many differences in intelligence.

The third chapter deals with issues of nature and nurture. There is now very little dispute among the experts that a substantial fraction of intelligence differences between people is for genetic reasons. Perhaps the most striking evidence comes from studies of identical twins raised apart. Their IQ’s correlated .78. The other twin studies are reviewed, with mention of the study that involved the largest number of monozygotic twins (Lynn & Hattori, 1990) where the correlation for 543 pairs of monozygotic twins was .78 and for 161 pairs of dizygotic twins .49. Like other authors that have reviewed the evidence, Brand finds there is evidence for substantial heritability.

Brand does violate the taboo of drawing (even if weakly) the eugenic implications the role of genetics in intelligence. He contrasts the implications that might be drawn from a belief in “environmentalism” with those that might result from a belief that genes play a role. He points out that (p. 12) “If children of the future are to receive maximum intellectual and education levels and to be more employable, there would need to be fewer homes where parent and caretakers were un-stimulating, drug-addicted, neglectful, and themselves of low IQ-even assuming large environmental origins of g”. He states, drawing on the Reed and Reed (1965) collected data on 80,000 descendants of the grandparents of 289 state colony patients having IQ’s <70 (and without epilepsy), that the overall rate of retardation would have been reduced by 50% if handicapped people themselves had not had children, even though only 88 of the 289 patients were diagnosed has having retardation of definitely genetic origins. What is happening here is that those suffering from retardation of unknown origin are having children who are themselves retarded, which suggests a genetic cause for most such cases.

He points out that (p. 120), “A eugenic policy focused on IQ must be attractive to any would-be improvement of human happiness-whether hereditarian or environmentalist.” To those that fear that acknowledgement of genetic influence might lead to state efforts to limit reproduction of certain individuals, he points out (p. 121) that “Acceptance of others’ rights is what protects everyone from state manipulation of any kind; and such acceptance follows perhaps a little more easily from a belief in biologically based individual agency than from an environmentalism that stresses the power of society to shape and even ‘construct’ the individual.”

The final chapter of the book is titled “Intelligence in Society”, and sets out the policy implications. Since this section appears to be what got the book withdrawn, it will be summarized here, even though doing so risks making the book appear more social in nature than it really is. The discussion opens with a discussion of Jensen’s 1969 article on the failure of Head Start, and his controversial suggestion that the problem was with the lower genetic IQ of black children. Brand comments that (p. 131) “Most educational experts agreed with Jensen and Eysenck that black IQ levels were low (for whatever reason) and that this deficiency helped to explain poor education records and later tendencies to crime and promiscuity. To recognize this deficiency (if not to publicize it) had remained tolerable while the racial differences in IQ seemed changeable.” He suggested that recognizing this became intolerable once the failure of early childhood intervention to correct the problem had become apparent, and been documented by Jensen.

Brand points out (p. 134) how three events have blocked off lines of dignified retreat for crusaders against the ‘Jensenist heresy.’ First evidence was produced that the tests were as fair and valid for black children as for anyone else (Jensen 1980). Secondly it had become apparent in America that low IQ’s were not generally characteristic of racial and ethnic groups that had experienced discrimination, as shown by Jews and Orientals in America. In Britain, Brand reports that Pakistani immigrants suffer from prejudice and maintain a language, religion, and moral code that distance them from their British hosts yet, their children have always tested as being of normal intelligence once they have learned English, and they slightly outperform English children educationally by mid-adolescence (Brand 1987c).

Brand points out that “almost the full Afro-American deficit, of some 15 IQ points, could be detected in children as young as three years, born to black mothers who were themselves college educated, married and had no pregnancy complication or health problem. (Monte & Fagan, 1988). Medically and socially matched, these young black children had a mean IQ of 91 and the white children tested at 104.” As he points out, the matching for socioeconomic status and the use of college educated mothers eliminated most of the environmental theories for racial differences that are commonly proposed. At age three most children have not been in school, or been exposed to much of the world outside of their own family and community (i.e. any societal racial discrimination should not have affected them).

Brand describes the experiments with adoption of black children into the homes of white middle-class homes. This yielded (p. 135), “the usual 8 point IQ gain plus some narrowing of the gap between black and white adoptees at age 7; but by age 17, the black youngsters lagged the white by the usual 12-15 IQ points (Weinburg, Scarr & Waldman, 1992; Lynn, 1994)”.

He points out (p. 136) evidence against the theory that blacks suffer from being in a white society is provided by the failure of blacks to perform conspicuously better in any of the countries or North American cities run by blacks themselves–indeed, they usually performed much worse.

Having dealt with the controversial topic of black white differences (this rather mild discussion was apparently the reason that caused Wiley to withdraw the book), the discussion moves on to the practical importance of intelligence. It is pointed out that IQ at age five correlated strongly (r=.50) with educational achievements when they were 15 (Brand did not provide the reference for this in the book, but he privately supplied, Yule, Gold, & Busch, 1981). It is pointed out that many studies in which IQ is unimportant are ones where restriction of range is important. IQ has seldom correlated better than .30 with college grades, but this is because of the restriction of admission to the better students, and because students sort themselves by ability into course of different difficulties.

The mental tests that correlated best among themselves (i.e. indexing g) turned out to be the main predictors of occupational success and income (Hunter & Hunter, 1984: Schmidt, Ones & Hunter, 1992). A statement in the text that upward inter-generational mobility is strongly predicted only by IQ is expanded on in a footnote where he points out that difference scores are particularly unreliable (since they are affected by the unreliability from both of the variables that contribute to them). Waller’s (1971) finding of a correlation of .29 between father-son IQ differences and father-son socioeconomic differences would imply a “true” correlation of around .50. As an illustration of the ability of IQ to explain outcomes better than socioeconomic status, several results from the Bell Cure (Herrenstein & Murray, 1994) relating to the probability of dropping out of high school, probability of white males being unemployed for a month, and probability of white out-of-wedlock mothers going on welfare) are graphed.

The discussion then moves to the implications for educational policy of individual differences in intelligence. Brand points out how many students are forced to study material in school they have already mastered. In Montreal, 45% of the children know 60% of the school curriculum (in French and math) before the years work begins (Gagne, 1986), while in a study of 160 gifted English school children, 60% were found to be doing classwork at a level more than four years below their actual attainments (Painter, 1976). He points out that the top 10% of 7 1/2 year-old-children are higher in g than the bottom 10% of 15 1/2-year-olds (Raven 1989). Brand thus pushes the apparently common sense idea that students should be grouped in accordance with ability.

Brand points out that although modern educational ideology talks about allowing children to progress at their own speed within mixed ability classes, that as a practical matter this cannot be done since the teacher cannot teach at two levels at the same time. The argument that smaller classes would permit better mixed ability teaching is countered by pointing out that classes of even six would still have virtually the full range of abilities, and that empirical studies regularly show that educational outcomes are unrelated to class size (Walsh, 1995).

He proposes that the problem of matching children’s mental ages be solved by putting the brighter eight-year-olds with the nine-year-olds, and the slower eight-year-olds with the seven-year-olds. The usual objection to this is that grade advanced children would not have sufficient maturity, emotional age, or moral development to associate with older children. Brand has dug up an impressive list of studies (p. 162) that the mental age predicts these better than chronological age. On 11 out of 12 measures of social and emotional adjustment, gifted children in Grade 3 were found to be more advanced than average children in Grade 6 (Lehman & Erdwins, 1981). He claims that there is no sound evidence that grade advancement will yield either social or emotional maladjustment (Silverman, 1989, and Feldhusen, 1991).

Brand proposes that children and parents should be free to pick scholastic programs that suit their abilities. It is surprizing that a book with such a mild conclusion should have caused such a furor. How unconventional are the views expressed by Brand, and summarized above. Actually, they differ little from those of other specialists who study intelligence. A survey sent to 1020 experts (Snyderman and Rothman, 1988) showed that there were three times as many who thought the racial differences were both genetic and environmental, as thought it was solely environmental.

Amazing, there a few other fields where admitting that one believes what is the mainstream wisdom will get one so soundly condemned.

References

Brand, C.R. & Deary, I.J.(1982). ‘Intelligence and inspection time.’ In H. J. Eysenck, A Model for Intelligence. New York : Springer, pp.133-148.
Brand, C. R. (1987c) ‘What can Britain’s schools do to help Black children?’ Personality & Individual Differences 8, 3, 453-5.
Feldhusen, J. F. (1991) ‘Effects of programs for the gifted: a search for evidence.’ in W. T. Southern & E. D. Jones, The Academic Acceleration of Gifted Children. New York: Teachers College Press.
Gagne, F. (1986) Douance, talent et acceleration du prescolaire a l’universite. Montreal: Centre Educatif et Culturel.
Herrenstein, R. & Murray, C. (1994) The Bell Curve. New York: The Free Press.
Holden, C. (1996). Wiley drops book after public furor. Science, 272, May 3, 644.
Hunter, J. E. & Hunter, R. F.(1984) ‘Validity and utility of alternative predictors of job performance.’ Psychological Bulletin 96, 1, 72-98.:
Itzkoff, S. W. (1994). The Decline of Intelligence in America. Westport: Praeger.
Jensen, A. R. (1980) Bias in Mental Testing. London: Methuen.
Jensen, A. R. (1981). Straight Talk About Mental Tests, New York: The Free Press.
Lehman, E. & Erdwins, C. (1981) ‘Social and emotional adjustment of young intellectually gifted children.’ Gifted Child Quarterly 25, 134-38.
Lynn, R. (1994) ‘Some reinterpretations of the Minnesota transracial adoption study.’ Intelligence 19, 1, 21-7.
Lynn, R. & Hattori, K. (1990) ‘The heritability of intelligence in Japan.’ Behavior Genetics 20, 4, 545-6.
Mackintosh, N. J. (1996). Science struck dumb. Nature, 381, 33)
Miller, E. M, (1994) “The Relevance of Group Membership for Personnel Selection: A Demonstration Using Bayes Theorem,” Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies 19, 323-359.
Montie, J. E. & Fagan, J. F., III (1988) ‘Racial differences in IQ: item analysis of the Stanford-Binet at 3 years.’ Intelligence 12, 315-32.
Painter, F. (1976) Gifted Children: A Research Study. Hertfordshire, UK: Pullen Publication.
Pearson, R. (1991). Race, Intelligence and Bias in Academe. Washington: Scott: Townsend.
Raven, J. (1989) ‘The Raven Progressive Matrices: A review of national norming studies and ethnic and socio-economic variation within the U.S.’ Journal of Educational Measurement 26, 1-16.
Reed, E. W. & Reed, S. C. (1965) Mental Retardation: A Family Study. Philadelphia: Saunders.
Rushton, J. P. (1995) Race, Evolution and Behavior: A Life History Perspective, New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.
Rushton, J.P. & C.D. Ankney Scarr-Salapetek, S. (1971). “Race, social class, and IQ.’ Science 174, 4016, 1285-1296.
Scarr-Salapetek, S. (1972). Some methodological questions’. Science 178, 235-40.
Schmidt, F. L., Ones, D. S. & Hunter, J. E. (1992) ‘Personnel selection.’ Annual Review of Psychology 43, 627-70.
Seligman, D. (1992). A Question of Intelligence. New York: Birch Lane Press.
Silverman, L. K. (1989) ‘The highly gifted.’ in J. F. Feldhusen, J. Van Tassel-Baska & K. Seeley, Excellence in Educating the Gifted, pp. 71-84. Denver: Love Publishing.
Snyderman, M. and Rothman, S. (1988). The IQ Controversy, the Media and Public Policy. New Brunswick, Transaction Books.
Waller, J. H. (1971) ‘Achievement and social mobility: the relationship between IQ score, education and occupation in two generations.’ Social Biology 18, 252-9.
Walsh, K. (1995) ‘China succeeds with large class sizes.’ Times Educational Supplement(Scotland), 1487, 17.
Weinberg, R. A., Scarr, S., & Waldman, I. D. (1992) ‘The Minnesota transracial adoption study: a follow-up of IQ test performance at adolescence.’ Intelligence 16, 117-35.
White (1982) ‘The relation between socioeconomic status and academic achievement’. Psychological Bulletin 91, 3, 461-8.
Yule, W., Gold, R.D. & Busch, C. (1981) ‘WISC-R correlates of academic attainment at sixteen-and-a-half years.’ British Journal of Educational Psychology 51, 2, 237-240.

Edward M. Miller
Department of Economics and Finance
University of New Orleans
504-286-6913 (work) 504-286-6397 (fax)
emmef@uno.edu


Intelligence and Civilisation

Intelligence and Civilisation
by Linda Miller
from Spearhead October, 1995

“Modern comforts,” says Linda Miller, “are producing a downbreeding of our population which must be reversed”

‘A’ level passes this year are at an all-time high. The question being asked in the mainstream media is: Are students doing better or are the tests becoming easier?

This question helps to disguise the real issue in the same way as these exam results disguise the same important issue. That issue is the intelligence of the population, and the fact that it is dwindling significantly with each oncoming generation.

Everyone who is honest with themselves has noticed it. Incompetence is rife. If workmen are hired to do a job, all too often it is a botched job. The news is constantly full of examples of wasted public funds; financial calculations made by institutions or companies which have proved inaccurate; (Eurotunnel, Canary Wharf, Lloyds’ Names, for example); the shortsightedness of banks making loans to third world countries which will never be able to pay them back, no matter how many rain forests they cut down; and countless other major public fiascos.

Teachers and lecturers complain of soaring levels of illiteracy, which cannot all be explained away by misguided and ineffective educational techniques. Each new year, admittance into secondary schools contains many more pupils than the year before who can neither read nor write and who lack basic skills in numeracy.

University lecturers frequently find that they must attempt to teach new students the grounding in subjects which were insufficiently taught at school. The speed of the decay is gathering a rapid momentum.

Intelligence is biological. Knowledge is the acquisition of facts, but intelligence is the biological potential to understand and to learn.

There are huge variations in levels of intelligence between individuals within a race and between different races, communities or families. Intelligence is inherited. Because there are many genes involved in determining intelligence, it is a very delicate balance. Usually (not always, due to such factors as recessive genes and mutations) intelligent people have intelligent children and unintelligent people have unintelligent children.

If you wanted to improve the intelligence of the next generation in Britain, you would achieve this if you successfully encouraged intelligent couples to have several children and discouraged unintelligent people from so doing. This positive eugenics would result in a more intelligent population.

If, on the other hand, the policy were to encourage the intelligent to concentrate on careers at the expense of having children, and to lavish resources on the less intelligent, who as a rule produce the most offspring, this will result in a rapid lowering of the intelligence of the population.

Civilisation without a eugenic policy is self-destructive. Civilisation could, with the correct eugenic policy, be a great asset to intellectual advancement; but in practice it has always proved to be an implement for the erosion and down breeding of the population.

No Advancement

Almost everyone assumes that because of the progress in technology we have now achieved mankind today has mentally advanced from its intellectual level of a few thousand years ago. It is assumed that we have advanced genetically, but this is not the case. Certainly, the genetic characteristics of our population are continually evolving and changing. Civilisation has caused circumstances to arise in which these changes have been happening more rapidly than would otherwise have been the case. These changes have been for the worse. The present-day population is not as intelligent nor as strong of character nor as robust as were the Romans at the time of Cicero over two thousand years ago.

We are right to be proud of the civilisation that we have produced. However, throughout all the astounding progress made in science and technology, sociological progress has not kept up with it. Scientific progress is being maintained by a dwindling minority of non-reproducing intelligent people. This rate of advancement is declining and must eventually cease when no more people of sufficient intellectual calibre are being born. There has been no progress at all in government, religion, language or social organisation.

Astonishing as it may seem, civilisation can, in itself, be blamed for the lowering of the intelligence of the population.

All civilisations inherently contain the seeds of their own destruction. Only a eugenic policy to safeguard against deterioration can avert this decline. It is vital to recognise the negative aspects of civilisation so that we may overcome these problems and develop the first ever civilisation which is self perpetuating.

The solution is simple. It is a eugenic programme of improving racial quality. Civilisation saves the misfits. It is a ‘humanising’ process which sustains and subsidises the weak, the helpless, the morons, the idiots and the inadequates. These elements of the population are a burden carried by the more capable elements.

Without civilisation to protect them, the laws of nature — `natural selection’ — would have culled these people, instead of saving them to reproduce.

Consequently, the gene pool is flooded with the undesirable elements who breed more prolifically.

Needs of Survival

In civilisation there is far less impetus to use one’s own intelligence to survive. In primitive society, those who best used their wits, who had energy, who coped best, would survive and live to have children. As a result of this, our ancestors progressed slowly over hundreds of thousands of years. Eventually the population became intelligent enough to form a civilisation.

Next, the forces which lead to the evolution of a higher intelligence became reversed. Civilisation is organised to help all members of society, including the stupid, lazy and shiftless. Therefore, these genetic defectives now survived to procreate and perpetuate their own kind, decreasing the level of intelligence in the population. Extensive research has shown that those of lower intelligence, on average, have more offspring than those of high intelligence. The unintelligent are increasing in number, while the intelligent are shrinking. Similarly, physical weaknesses are also spread.

This tragic chain of events has doomed every civilisation that has ever existed. For some time, even while the decay is setting in, civilisation can still advance upward due to the momentum of previous inventions, systems and benefits. Eventually, as the intelligence level drops lower and lower still, the population is no longer able to continue to advance civilisation. As the intelligence level decreases further, the ability is lost even to sustain the level which previous generations had achieved. Civilisation then begins its downhill slide, and after another few hundred years, it slides into oblivion.

So, we can know this: the population is less biologically intelligent now than in the past. If the teaching techniques and methods of assessing educational achievement remained constant and unchanged, this would be blatantly obvious. It would be demonstrated by a massive failure rate in examinations.

If this was seen to have happened, the population (or, at least, those left with enough intelligence to become alarmed at this rapid decline) would demand that something be done to stop the down-breeding. This is why teaching techniques have been regularly changed, so that the techniques could be blamed for the inability to read, etc. Also, exams have changed. Course work is more significant in assessment than it used to be. Bad spelling is not penalised. Exams have been made easier. There are set quotas of passes which are awarded regardless of performance. The school league tables put pressure on schools to give the impression that they are doing well, with a high pass rate. However, no matter how these superficial factors cause a lowering of educational standards, we must recognise that the intelligence of the population can only decrease given the pressures of civilisation to increase the quantity of unintelligent children born in comparison to intelligent children.

We are caught in a downward spiral that can only be reversed by a policy of good common-sense eugenics.


The Limited Plasticity of Human Intelligence

The Limited Plasticity of Human Intelligence
by Arthur R. Jensen

As societies become increasingly technological, the demand for superior intelligence begins to exceed the supply, and the demand for sheer physical labor begins to decline Increased leisure, early retirement, and a lengthened life-span all raise the premium on intelligence for the social and moral well-being of society. With the eradication of malnutrition and infectious childhood diseases, and as universal public education and the amenities of our technological civilization become more widespread, the improvement of human intelligence, if it is to come about at all, will depend increasingly upon eugenic means.

We are now gradually emerging from a period of over-optimism regarding the supposed plasticity of intelligence, and the hope of appreciably raising the IQ of those with below-average intelligence through strictly psychological and educational methods. This hope is probably as old as humanity itself. Widespread faith in its practical implementation originated in the 1920′s with the radical behaviorism espoused by John B. Watson. Watson’s behavioristic conception of intelligence has pervaded psychology even to this day, although it has lost favor among the new generation of researchers in experimental cognitive psychology and psychometrics.

In the behavioristic view, intelligence became equated with learning. Man’s “original nature”, psychologically, consisted only of an undifferentiated, general capability for learning. All that developed throughout the course of evolution was an ever-increasing plasticity of the brain for being shaped by the physical and cultural environment. Human mental capabilities were viewed as wholly a product of learning. The wide range of individual differences (except those resulting from some form of brain damage) was attributed to differences in opportunities for learning, or to differences in the content of learning. It was believed that these differences became socially salient merely due to the fact that some forms of knowledge and skills are more highly valued than others in a particular society. Accordingly, what Western industrial societies recognize as “intelligence” and measure by means of standard IQ tests was viewed only as a specialized collection of particular bits of acquired knowledge and skills which happen to be valued within a specific cultural context.

Given the view of intelligence as essentially a product of learning, it was reasonable to expect that intelligence itself could be taught much the same way one teaches reading or arithmetic. It led to the optimistic expectation that the intelligence of children in the bottom half of the IQ distribution could be dramatically raised by providing them with early learning opportunities like those enjoyed by children in the top half of the distribution. The well-established correlation between children’s IQs and their parents’ socioeconomic status (SES) was accorded an erroneous causal significance: Low SES children were believed to have lower IQ’s and to achieve less well in school because they lacked the cultural advantages and learning opportunities enjoyed by children from higher SES backgrounds.

Over the past three decades, hundreds of experiments, many carried out on a massive scale, have sought to prove that intelligence can be substantially raised. In a few studies, subjects were given intensive training over a period of several years. No other field of psychological or educational research has commanded such vast funds nor marshalled such concerted efforts on such a grand scale. The truly remarkable finding is not the few points gain in IQ or scholastic achievement occasionally reported, but the fact that gains are so seldom found, and, when they are found, that they are so very small. The theoretical implication of this finding is that the behaviorist view of intelligence as synonymous with learning (or the products of learning) is seriously in error. Predictions based on this view have repeatedly failed to materialize under the prescribed conditions.

When gains in test performance have occurred as a result of educational treatments, they have displayed one or more of the following characteristics: (1) they have been small, rarely more than five or ten IQ points; (2) they have been of short duration, fading out within a year or so after the training has been completed; (3) they have been restricted to tasks or tests which closely resemble the actual training procedures themselves, and have failed to generalize to a broader range of mental tests.

Although I have scoured the research literature, I have yet to find a bona fide empirical demonstration that any psychological or educational techniques have succeeded in significantly raising children intelligence. Scores on one particular test or another, or achievement in particular scholastic subjects, may have been raised, usually only temporarily. But these gains are not reflected across a wide variety of tests or school subjects, as would be the case if it were g itself (the general intelligence factor) that had been improved. This conclusion is reinforced by evidence reported in a recent book which summarizes much of the best research and thinking in this field (Detterman and Sternberg, 1982).

The limited plasticity of intelligence can be more easily understood in terms of the newly ascending view of intelligence as comprising a small number of elementary information-processing capabilities which are closely dependent upon properties of the central nervous system. Learning itself is only one of many manifestations of these elemental processes involving stimulus encoding, discrimination, comparison, short-term memory capacity, speed of transfer of information from short- and long-term memory, and the like. The fact that ordinary IQ tests measure something more fundamental than acquired knowledge is demonstrated by the correlation of IQ with performance on laboratory tacks, such as reaction time, which have have virtually no intellectual content whatsoever, but which directly measure elemental information-processing capacities (Jensen, 1980, 1982a, 1982b). That these information-processing capabilities are closely linked to brain functions is shown by correlation of both IQ and reaction time measures with brain-wave measurements (termed average evoked potentials) (Hendrickson and Hendrickson, 1980; Jensen, Schafer, and Crinella, 1981).

It is now generally accepted that individual differences in IQ and information-processing capacity are strongly influences by hereditary factors, with genetic variance constituting about 70% of the total population variance in IQ (Jensen, 1981). There is also evidence that the genes for superior intelligence tend to be dominant, which is what would be theoretically expected if intelligence is a fitness character in the Darwinian sense, and if it had been subject to natural selection through the course of human evolution (Jensen, 1983).

The genetic and evolutionary view of human intelligence affords a possible explanation for its quite limited plasticity. If intelligence has evolved as an instrumentality for the survival of Homo Sapiens, it could well be that its biological basis has a built-in stabilizing mechanism, such an that of a gyroscope. Some degree of homeostatic autonomy in the ontogeny of mental ability would safeguard the individual’s capacity for coping with the exigencies of survival. Mental development then would not be wholly at the mercy of often-erratic environmental happenstance. A too-plastic malleability would give the organism little protection against the vagaries of its environment. Hence, there may have evolved homeostatic processes to buffer the semi-autonomous ontogeny of human intelligence, protecting it from being pushed too far in one direction or the other, either by adventitiously harmful or by intentionally benevolent environmental forces.

Arthur R. Jensen is Professor of Educational Psychology at the University of California, Berkeley, California 94720. Reprints of any of his articles listed below may be obtained from Dr. Jensen.

REFERENCES:

Detterman, D.K., and Sternberg, R.J. (Eds.) 1982, How and How Much Can Intelligence be Increased? Norwood, NJ: ABLEX Publishing Corporation

Hendrickson, D.A. and Hendrickson, A.E. 1980, The biological basis of individual differences in intelligence, Personality and Individual Differences, 1: 3-33

Jensen, Arthur R. 1980, Chronometric analysis of intelligence, Journal of Social and Biological Structures, 3: 103-122

Jensen, Arthur R. 1981, Straight Talk About Mental Tests, New York: The Free Press

Jensen, Arthur R. 1982a, The chronometry of intelligence, in R.J. Sternberg (Ed.) Advances in the Psychology of Human Intelligence (vol. 1) Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbau.

Jensen, Arthur R. 1982b Reaction time and psychometric A, in Hans J. Eysenck (Ed., A Model for Intelligence New York: Springer-Verlag

Jensen, Arthur R 1983, The effects of inbreeding on mental ability factors, Personality and Individual Differences, 4: 71-87

Jensen, A.R., Schafer, E.W. and Crinella, F.M. 1981, Reaction time, evoked brain potentials, and psychometric in the severely retarded, Intelligence, 5: 179-197


Sources of human psychological differences

Sources of human psychological differences:
the Minnesota study of twins reared apart
by Thomas J. Bouchard Jr.; David T. Lykken; Matthew McGue; Nancy L. Segal; Auke Tellegen
Science magazine, Oct 12, 1990

Introduction
Components of Phenotypic Variance
Similarity in the IQ of MZA Twins
Do Environmental Similarities in Rearing Environments Explain MZA IQ Similarity?
Has Pre- and Post-Reunion Contact Contributed to MZA Twin Similarity in IQ?
Similarity of MZA Twins on a Variety of Dimensions
The Minimal Effect of Being Reared Together
Why Are MZA Twins So Similar?
Relevance to Evolutionary Psychology and Sociobiology
References and Notes

Since 1979, a continuing study of monozygotic and dizygotic twins, separated in infancy and reared apart, has subjected more than 100 sets of reared-apart twins or triplets to a week of intensive psychological and physiological assessment. Like the prior, smaller studies of monozygotic twins reared apart, about 70% of the variance in IQ was found to be associated with genetic variation. On multiple measures of personality and temperament, occupational and leisure-time interests, and social attitudes, monozygotic twins reared apart are about as similar as are monozygotic twins reared together. These findings extend and support those from numerous other twin, family, and adoption studies. It is a plausible hypothesis that genetic differences affect psychological differences largely indirectly, by influencing the effective environment of the developing child. This evidence for the strong heritability of most psychological traits, sensibly construed, does not detract from the value or importance of parenting, education, and other propaedeutic interventions.

Monozygotic and dizygotic twins who were separated early in life and reared apart (MZA and DZA twin pairs) are a fascinating experiment of nature. They also provide the simplest and most powerful method for disentangling the influence of environmental and genetic factors on human characteristics. The rarity of twins reared apart explains why only three previous studies of modest scope are available in the literature [1-4].

More than 100 sets of reared-apart twins or triplets from across the United States and the United Kingdom have participated in the Minnesota Study of Twins Reared Apart since it began in 1979. Participants have also come from Australia, Canada, China, New Zealand, Sweden, and West Germany. The study of these reared-apart twins has led to two general and seemingly remarkable conclusions concerning the sources of the psychological differences – behavioral variation – between people: (i) generic factors exert a pronounced and pervasive influence on behavioral variability, and (ii) the effect of being reared in the same home is negligible for many psychological traits. These conclusions will not come as revelations to the many behavioral geneticists who have observed similar results and drawn similar conclusions [5]. This study and the broader behavioral genetic literature, nevertheless, challenge prevailing psychological theories on the origins of individual differences in ability, personality, interests, and social attitudes [6]. Here we summarize our procedures and review our results and interpretations of them.

Participants complete approximately 50 hours of medical and psychological assessment. Two or more test instruments are used in each major domain of psychological assessment to ensure adequate coverage (for example, four personality trait inventories, three occupational interest inventories, and two mental ability batteries). A systematic assessment of aspects of the twin’s rearing environments that might have had causal roles in their psychological development is also carried out. Separate examiners administer the IQ test, life history interview, psychiatric interview, and sexual life history interview. A comprehensive mental ability battery is administered as a group test. The twins also complete questionnaires independently, under the constant supervision of a staff member.

Reared-apart twins have been ascertained in several ways, such as: (i) friends, relatives, or the reunited twins themselves, having learned of the project, contact the Minnesota Center for Twin and Adoption Research (MICTAR); (ii) members of the adoption movement, social workers, and other professionals who encounter reared-apart twins serve as intermediaries; (iii) twins who are, or become aware of, a separated co-twin solicit assistance from the MICTAR staff in locating this individual. Selection on the basis of similarity is minimized by vigorously recruiting all reared-apart twins, regardless of known or presumed zygosity and similarity. We have been unable to recruit to the study six pairs of twins reared apart whom we believe to be monozygotic.

Zygosity diagnosis is based on extensive serological comparisons, fingerprint ridge count, and anthropometric measurements. The probability of misclassification is less than 0.001 [7]. Where appropriate, our data are corrected for age and sex effects [8]. Due to space limitations and the smaller size of the DZA sample (30 sets), in this article we focus on the MZA data (56 sets). The results reported here are, for the most part, based on previously reported findings, so that the sample sizes do not include the most recently assessed pairs and vary depending on when in the course of this ongoing study the analyses were conducted.

As shown in Table 1, the sample consists of adult twins, separated very early in life, reared apart during their formative years, and reunited as adults. Circumstances of adoption were sometimes informal, and the adoptive parents, in comparison to parents who volunteer to participate in most adoption studies, have a lower level of education (mean equals 2 years of high school), and are quite heterogeneous in educational attainment and socioeconomic status (SES). Because our sample includes no subjects with IQs in the retardate range ([is less than or equal to] 70), the mean IQ is higher and the standard deviation lower than for the general population.

[Tabular Data Omitted]

Components of Phenotypic Variance

If genetic and environmental factors are uncorrelated and combine additively (points we return to later), the total observed variance, [V.sub.t], of a trait within a population can be expressed as

[V.sub.t] = [[V.sub.g] + [V.sub.e] + [V.sub.m]

where [V.sub.g] is variance due to genetic differences among people, [V.sub.e] is variance due to environmental or experiential factors, and [V.sub.m] is variance due to measurement error and unsystematic temporal fluctuations. For measures of psychological traits, [V.sub.m] ranges from approximately 10% (of [V.sub.t]) for the most reliably measured and stable of traits (for example, IQ) to as high as 50 to 60% for traits that are less reliable or that show considerable secular instability (for example, some social attitudes). The environmental component, [V.sub.e], can be divided into variance due to experiences that are shared, [V.sub.es], and experiences that are unshared, [V.sub.eu]. Shared events may be experienced differently by two siblings (for example, a roller coaster ride or a family vacation), in which case they contribute to the [V.sub.eu] component. If the total variance, [V.sub.t], is set at unity, the correlation between MZ twins, [R.sub.mz], equals [V.sub.g] + [V.sub.es]. The heritability of a trait equals [V.sub.g]; the heritability of the stable component of a trait (for example, the mean value around which one’s aggressiveness varies) equals [V.sub.g]/([V.sub.t] – [V.sub.m]). [V.sub.t] and [V.sub.m] can be estimated from studies singletons, but [V.sub.g] is more elusive: for monozygotic twins reared together (MZT), some of the within-pair correlation might be due to effects of shared experience, [V.sub.es]. The power of the MZA design is that for twins reared apart from early infancy and randomly placed for adoption, [V.sub.es] is negligible, so that [V.sub.g] can be directly estimated from the MZA correlation.

Similarity in the IQ of MZA Twins

The study of IQ is paradigmatic of human behavior genetic research. There are more than 100 relevant twin, adoptee, and family studies of IQ, and IQ has been at the center of the nature-nurture debate [9]. The analysis of IQ is also paradigmatic of the approach taken by this study. It illustrates our use of replicated measures, evaluation of rearing environmental effects, and analysis of environmental similarity. We obtain three independent measures of IQ: (i) the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS); (ii) a Raven, Mill-Hill composite; and (iii) the first principal component (PC) of two multiple abilities batteries.

The WAIS consists of a set of six verbal and five performance subtests that are individually administered, requiring about 1.5 hours, and that yield an age-corrected estimate of IQ [10]. To avoid examiner bias, we administer the WAIS simultaneously to the twins in different rooms by professional psychometrists. The Raven Progressive Matrices (Standard Set) is a widely used nonverbal measure of problem-solving ability often paired with the Mill-Hill Vocabulary Test, a multiple-choice word knowledge test [11]. In this study, the Raven and Mill-Hill are both administered and scored by computer. The two ageand sex-corrected scores are transformed to have a mean equal to 50 and a standard deviation of 10. The sum of these transformed scores (which intercorrelate about 0.57) provides a separate estimate of IQ. The first major ability battery included in our assessment is an expanded version of the battery used in the Hawaii Family Study of Cognition [12]. The second major ability battery is the Comprehensive Ability Battery [13]. Detailed results from analysis of both tests are reported elsewhere [14].

In each of the three prior studies of MZA twins, two independent estimates of intelligence were obtained. The sample sizes and intraclass correlations for all four studies are compared in Table 2. The table illustrates the remarkable consistency of the MZA correlations on IQ across measurement instrument, country of origin, and time period. These correlations vary within a narrow range (0.64 to 0.74) and suggest, under the assumption of no environmental similarity, that genetic factors account for approximately 70% of the variance in IQ.

This estimate of the broad heritability of IQ is higher than the recent estimates (0.47 to 0.58) based on a review of the literature that includes all kinship pairings [9, 15]. Virtually the entire literature on IQ similarity in twins and siblings is limited, however, to studies of children and adolescents. It has been demonstrated [16] that heritability of cognitive ability increases with age. A heritability estimate of approximately 70% from these four studies of mainly middle-aged adults is not inconsistent with the previous literature.

Do Environmental Similarities in Rearing Environments Explain MZA IQ Similarity?

Such marked behavioral similarities between reared-apart MZ twins raise the question of correlated placement: were the twins’ adoptive homes selected to be similar in trait-relevant features which, in turn, induced psychological similarity? If so, given that the total variance equals 1.0, then [V.sub.es] will equal at least [R.sub.ff] X [r.sub.ft.sup.2], where [R.sub.ff] is the within-pair correlation for a given feature, f, of the adoptive homes (the placement coefficient), and [r.sub.ft] is the product-moment correlation between the feature and the trait in question, t.

A checklist of available household facilities (for example, power tools, sailboat, telescope, unabridged dictionary, and original artwork) provides an index of the cultural and intellectual resources in the adoptive home [17]. Each twin completes the Moos Family Environment Scale (FES), a widely used instrument with scales describing the individual’s retrospective impression of treatment and rearing provided by the adoptive parents during childhood and adolescence [18]. The age- and sex-corrected placement coefficients for these and other measures are shown in Table 3, together with the correlations between twins’ IQ and the environmental measure ([r.sub.ft]) and the total estimated contribution to MZA twin similarity. The maximum contribution to MZA trait correlations that could be explained by measured similarity of the adoptive rearing environments on a single variable is about 0.03(19). The absence of any significant effect due to SES or other environmental measures on the IQ scores of these adult adopted twins is consistent with the findings of other investigators [20]. Rearing SES effects on IQ in adoption studies have been found for young children but not in adult samples [21], suggesting that although parents may be able to affect their children’s rate of cognitive skill acquisition, they may have relatively little influence on the ultimate level attained.

[Tabular Data Omitted]

Has Pre- and Post-Reunion Contact Contributed to MZA Twin Similarity in IQ?

MZA twins share prenatal and perinatal environments, but except for effects of actual trauma, such as fetal alcohol syndrome, there is little evidence that early shared environment significantly contributes to the variance of psychological traits. Twins are especially vulnerable to prenatal and perinatal trauma, but these effects are most likely to decrease, rather than increase, within-pair similarity [22]. There is evidence that twins who maintain closer contact with each other later in life tend to be more similar in some respects than twins who engage in infrequent contact [23]. It appears, however, that it is the similarity that leads to increased contact, rather than the other way around [24]. MZA twins in this study vary widely in the amount of contact they have had prior to assessment. All twin pairs spend their formative years apart. Some had their first adult reunion at the time of assessment, whereas others met as much as 20 years earlier and had experienced varying degrees of contact. A small number of the pair actually met at intervals during childhood. As shown in Table 1, total contact time for the MZA twins ranges from 1 to 1233 weeks. In the one case of 1223 weeks of contact, the twins met as teenagers and lived near each other until assessment when they were adults. Since they met on a regular basis, most of this time was coded as contact time. Degree of social contact between two members of a reared-apart twin pair accounts for virtually none of their similarity. The correlations with the within-pair absolute WAIS IQ difference are 0.06 [+ or -] 0.15 for time together prior to separation, 0.08 [+ or -] 0.15 for time apart to first reunion, -0.14 [+ or -] 0.15 for total contact time, and 0.17 [+ or -] 0.15 for percentage of lifetime spent apart(25).

The absolute within-pair difference in WAIS IQ of co-twins as a function of degree of contact are plotted in Fig. 1. Also shown are the expected absolute IQ differences between randomly paired individuals and between two testings of the same individual(26). Although the MZA average difference approximates the absolute difference expected between two testings of a single individual, we do observe a wide range of differences. It is not that we have found no evidence of environmental influence; in individual cases environmental factors have been highly significant (for example, the 29 IQ point difference in Fig. 1). Rather, we find little support for the types of environmental influences on which psychologists have traditionally focused [27].

Similarity of MZA Twins on a Variety of Dimensions

Table 4 [28] gives the MZA correlations, most previously published, on variables ranging from anthropometry and psychophysiology, to aptitudes, personality and temperament, leisure-time and vocational interests, to social attitudes. Correlations for MZT twins and retest stability coefficients are also provided for comparison Stable, reliably measured variables like fingerprint ridge count and stature show the highest correlations. Brain wave spectra are highly reproducible [29] and are strongly correlated in both MZA and MZT twins. Most other psychophysiological variables (for example, blood pressure and electrodermal response) vary considerably across time so that the retest correlations between repeated measurements on the same persons range from 0.5 to 0.8(30). These retest correlations set the upper limit of similarity that might be found between MZ co-twins. The retest stability of aptitude measures, such as IQ, is rather better, ranging from 0.8 to 0.9 [10], whereas stability of personality and interest measures ranges from 0.6 to 0.7.

[Tabular Data Omitted]

With these upper limits in mind, the findings in Table 4 demonstrate remarkable similarity between MZA twins. In terms of standardized tests and measures, the MZA twin similarities are often nearly equal to those for MZT twins (last column) and constitute a substantial portion of the reliable variance (column 5) of each trait.

The Minimal Effect of Being Reared Together

Some of the MZA twins have had considerable contact as adults, but all of them were reared apart throughout the formative periods of childhood and adolescence. If being reared together enhances similarity in twins, within-pair correlations for MZA twins are expected to be smaller than those for MZT twins. For example, the mean MZT correlation for IQ, based on 34 studies of primarily children or adolescents, is 0.86 [9] as compared to 0.72 for all, primarily adult, MZA twins. If the mean MZT correlation were maintained into adulthood, its difference from the MZA correlation would suggest that common rearing increases the similarity of IQ in twins (and siblings). However, the MZT correlation apparently declines with age (for example, as a result of the accumulation of nonshared environmental effects) [16], in which even the small MZT-MZA correlation difference would suggest little influence of common rearing on adult IQ. In any case, a significant contribution of shared environment is found for the personality trait of social closeness(31), and possibly religious interests and values (32).

As illustrated in Table 4, however, adult MZ twins are about equally similar on most physiological and psychological traits, regardless of rearing status. This finding and the failure to find significant [r.sub.ft] effects for cognitive abilities [17] or personality (31), together with findings from numerous studies of MZT and DZT twins, sibs, and foster sibs, implies that common rearing enhances familial resemblance during adulthood only slightly and on relatively few behavioral dimensions. This conclusion is given detail discussion by Plomin and Daniels [5].

[Tabular Data Omitted]

Why Are MZA Twins So Similar?

It is well known to naturalists and to animal breeders that there are wide and heritable differences in behavior within other species, but there is a curious reluctance among some scientists [33] to acknowledge the contribution of genetic variation to psychological differences within the human species. Our findings support and extend those from many family, twin, and adoption studies [15], a broad consilience of findings leading to the following generalization: For almost every behavioral trait so far investigated, from reaction time to religiosity, an important fraction of the variation among people turns out to be associated with genetic variation. This fact need no longer be subject to debate [34]; rather, it is time instead to consider its implications. We suggest the following:

General intelligence or IQ is strongly affected by genetic factors. The IQs of the adult MZA twins assessed with various instruments in four independent studies correlate about 0.70, indicating that about 70% of the observed variation in IQ in this population can be attributed to genetic variation. Since only a few of these MZA twins were reared in real poverty or by illiterate parents and none were retarded, this heritability estimate should not be extrapolated to the extremes of environmental disadvantage still encountered in society. Moreover, these findings do not imply that traits like IQ cannot be enhanced. Flynn [35], in a survey covering 14 countries, has shown that the average IQ test score has significantly increased in recent years. This increase may be limited to that part of the population with low IQs [36]. The present findings, therefore, do not define or limit what might be conceivably achieved in an optimal environment. They do indicate that, in the current environments of the broad middle-class, in industrialized societies, two-thirds of the observed variance of IQ can be traced to genetic variation.
The institutions and practices of modern Western society do not greatly constrain the development of individual differences in psychological traits. The heritability of a psychological trait reveals as much about the culture as it does about human nature. Heritability must increase as [V.sub.e], the variance affected by the environment, decreases. Where the culture’s influence is relatively homogeneous and efficacious, [V.sub.e] will decrease and heritability will increase; most American boys, for example, have similar opportunities to play baseball, so that one expects heritability of baseball skill in American young men to be high. Where culture is efficacious, but heterogeneous, [V.sub.e] (and total phenotypic variance) will increase; thus, one would expect the heritability of specific linguistic o religious behaviors in the United States or in the Soviet Union to be low. Individuals in Western societies are heterogeneous with respect to personality traits, interests, and attitudes, yet the heritabilities of these traits are relatively high. We infer that the diverse cultural agents of our society, in particular most parents, are less effective in imprinting their distinctive stamp on the children developing within their spheres of influence – or are less inclined to do so – than has been supposed.

Psychologists have been surprised by the evidence that being reared by the same parents in the same physical environment does not, on average, make siblings more alike as adults than they would have been if reared separately in adoptive homes. It is obvious that parents can produce shared effects if they grossly deprive or mistreat all their children. It seems reasonable that charismatic, dedicated parents, determined to make all their children share certain personal qualities, interests, or values, may sometimes succeed. Our findings, and those of others [37], do not imply that parenting is without lasting effects. The remarkable similarity in MZA twins in social attitudes (for example, traditionalism and religiosity) does not show that parents cannot influence those traits, but simply that this does not tend to happen in most families.

MZA twins are so similar in psychological traits because their identical genomes make it probable that their effective environments are similar. Specific mechanisms by which genetic differences in human behavior are expressed in phenotypic differences are largely unknown. It is a plausible conjecture that a key mechanism by which the genes affect the mind is indirect, and that genetic differences have an important role in determining the effective psychological environment of the developing child [38].

Infants with different temperaments elicit different parenting responses. Toddlers who are active and adventurous undergo different experiences than their more sedentary or timid siblings. In addition, children and adolescents seek out environments that they find congenial. These are forms of gene-environment covariance, [C.sub.ge]. Moreover, different individuals pay different attention to or respond differently to the same objective experience, or both. These are forms of gene-environment interaction, [V.sub.ge]. From infancy onwards, genetic individually helps to steer the developing organism through the multitude of possible experiences and choices. That is, Eq. 1 must be elaborated to include these indirect and modifiable ways in which the genome exerts its influence

[V.sub.t] = [V.sub.g] + [V.sub.e] + [C.sub.ge] + [V.sub.ge] + [V.sub.m]

The proximal cause of most psychological variance probably involves learning through experience, just as radical environmentalists have always believed. The effective experience, however, to an important extent are self-selected, and that selection is guided by the steady pressure of the genome (a more distal cause). We agree with Martin et al. [39] who see “humans as exploring organisms whose innate abilities and predispositions help them select what is relevant and adaptive from the range of opportunities and stimuli presented in the environment. The effects of mobility and learning, therefore, augment rather than eradicate the effects of the genotype on behavior” (p. 4368).

In this view is correct, the development experiences MZ twins are more similar than those of DZ twins, again and environmentalist critics of twin research have contended. However, even MZA twins tend to elicit, select, seek out or create very similar effective environments and, to that extent, the impact of these experiences is counted as a genetic influence. Finally, if the genome impresses itself on the psyche largely by influencing the character, selection, and impact of experiences during development – if the correct formula is nature via nurture – then intervention is not precluded even for highly heritable traits, but should be the more effective when tailored to each specific child’s talents and inclinations.

Relevance to Evolutionary Psychology and Sociobiology

This research focuses on individual differences, but like other animals we share certain species-specific tendencies by virtue of our being human. Whereas behavioral geneticists study variatins within a species, evolutionary psychologists or sociobiologists attempt to delineate species-typical proclivities or instincts and to understand the relevant evolutionary developments that took place in the Pleistocene epoch and were adaptive in the lives of tribal hunter-gatherers. The genes sing a prehistoric song that today should sometimes be resisted but which it would be foolish to ignore.’

At the interface of behavioral genetics and sociobiology is the question of the origin and function, if any, of the within-species variability we have been discussing. One view is that it represents evolutionary debris [40], unimportant to fitness and perhaps not expressed in prehistoric environments. Another view is that variability has an adaptive function and has been selected for. Whether sociobiologists can make evolutionary sense of the varieties of human genetic variation we have discussed here remains to be seen [41].

Whatever the ancient origins and functions of genetic variability, its repercussions in contemporary society are pervasive and important. A human species whose members did not vary genetically with respect to significant cognitive and motivational attributes, and who were uniformly average by current standards, would have created a very different society than the one we know. Modern society not only augments the influence of genotype on behavioral variability as we have suggested, but permits this variability to reciprocally contribute to the rapid pace of cultural change. If genetic variation was evolutionary debris at the end of the Pleistocene, it is now a salient and essential feature of the human condition.

REFERENCES AND NOTES

1. H.H. Newman F. N. Freeman, K. J. Holzinger, Twins: A Study of Heredity and Environment (Univ. of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1937); N. Juel-Nielson, Acta Psychiatr. Neurol. Scand. Suppl. 183 (1965); J. Shields, Monozygotic Twins: Brought up Apart and Brought up Together (Oxford Univ. Press, London, 1962).

There are two other ongoing studies of twins reared apart, one in Sweden (2) and one in Finland (3). The questionable study by Burt (4) has been omitted.

2. N. Pedersen, G. E. McClearn, R. Plomin, L. Friberg, Behav. Genet. 15, 407 (1985); R. Plomin, P. Lichtenstein, N. L. Pederson, G. E. McClean, J. R. Nesselroade, Psychol. Aging 5, 25 (1990).

3. H. Langainvainio, J. Kaprio, M. Koskenvuo, J. Lonnqvist, Acta Gene t. Med. Gemellol. 33, 259 (1984).

4. L. Hearnsahw, Cyrill Burt: Psychologist (Hodder & Stoughten, Londo n, 1979); but see R. B. Joynson, The Burt Affair (Routledge, London, 1990).

5. R. Plomin and D. Daniels, Behav. Brain Sci. 10, 1 (1987); L. J. Ea ves, H. J. Eysenck, N. G. Martin, Genes Culture and Personality: An Empirical Approach (Academic Press, New York, 1989).

6. T. J. Bouchard, Jr., in The Chemical and Biological Bases of Indiv iduality, S. Fox, Ed. (Plenum, New York, 1984), p. 147; N. L. Segal, W. M. Grove, T. J. Bouchard, Jr., in Genetic Issues in Psychosocial Epidemiology, M. Tsuang, K. Kendler, M. Lyons, Eds. (Rutgers Univ. Press, New Brunswick, NJ, in press).

7. D. T. Lykken, Behav. Genet. 8, 437 (1978).

8. M. McGue and T. J. Bouchard, Jr., ibid. 14, 325 (1984).

9. T. J. Bouchard, Jr., and M. McGue, Science 212, 1055 (1981).

10. J. D. Matarazzo, Wechsler’s Measurement and Appraisal of Adult Intelligence (Williams and Wilkins, Baltimore, ed. 5, 1972).

11. J. Raven, Manual for Raven’s Progressive Matrices and Vocabulary Scales (Lewis, London, 1986).

12. J. C. DeFries et al., Behav. Genet. 9, 23 (1979).

13. A. R. Hakstian and R. B. Cattell, J. Educ. Psychol. 70, 657 (1978).

14. T. J. Bouchard, Jr., N. L. Segal, D.T. Lykken, Ada Genet. Med. Gemellol. 39, 193 (1990).

15. J. C. Loehlin, Am. Psychol. 44, 1285 (1989); R. Plomin and J. C. Loehlin, Behav. Genet. 19, 331 (1989).

16. K. McCartney, M. J. Harris, F. Bernieri, Psychol. Bull. 107, 26 (1990).

17. M. McGue and T. J. Bouchard, Jr., in Advances in the Psychology of Human Intelligence, R. J. Sternberg, Ed. (Erlbaum, New York, 1989), vol. 5, p. 7. This checklist yields four relatively independent scales: scientific or technical, cultural, mechanical, and material possessions.

18. R. H. Moos and B. S. Moos, Manual: Family Environment Scale (Consulting Psychologists Press, Palo Alto, CA, 1986).

19. Formally, this is the maximum linear contribution; nonlinear effects are, of course, possible. For these data, however, investigation of higher-ordered relationships (quadratic and cubic) showed no associations that did not exist at the linear level, and there was no discernible nonlinearity detected in visual inspection of the scatterplots.

20. T. J. Bouchard, Jr., Intelligence 7, 175 (1983).

21. C. Capron and M. Duyme [Nature 340, 552 (1989)] have shown an SES effect in an adoption study of young children; S. Scarr and R. Weinberg [Amer. Sociol. Rev. 43, 674 (1978)] did not find an SES effect in a study of young adult adoptees.

22. B. Price, Am. J. Hum. Genet, 2, 293 (1950).

23. R. J. Rose and J. Kaprio, Behav. Genet. 18, 309 (1988).

24. D. T. Lykken, T. J. Bouchard, Jr., M. McGue, A. Tellegen, Behav. Genet., in press.

25. As in our earlier analysis, nonlinear relationships were tested for and found not to exist. Additionally, deletion of a single outlier (IQ difference of 29 points) did not appreciably change the correlation estimates.

26. Expected difference (D) can be expressed as a function of the correlation (r) and standard deviation as [Mathematical Expression Omitted] [R. Plomin and J. C. DeFries, Intelligence 4, 15 (1980)].

27. K. R. White, Psychol. Bull. 86, 461 (1982).

28. D. T. Lykken, T. J. Bouchard, Jr., M. McGue, A Tellegen, Acta Genet. Med. Gemellol. 39, 35 (1990); and (6).

29. H. H. Stassen, D. T. Lykken, G. Bomben, Eur. Arch. Psychiatry Neurol. Sci. 237, 244 (1988).

30. Systolic blood pressure from Minnesota twin studies. Heart rate from B. Hanson et al., Am. J. Cardiol. 63, 606 (1989). Electrodermal and habituation data from D. T. Lykken, W. G. Iacono, K. Haroian, M. McGue, T. J. Bouchard, Jr., Psychophysicology 25, 4 (1988). Reliability data from K. Matthews, C. Rakczky, C. Stoney, S. Manuck, ibid. 24, 464 (1978); M. Llabre et al., ibid, 25, 97 (1988).

31. MPQ data from A. Tellegen et al., J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 54, 1031 (1988); CPI data from T. J. Bouchard, Jr., and M. McGue, J. Pers. 58, 263 (1990). Reliability data from test manuals.

32. MZA and MZT Religiosity data from N. G. Waller, B. A. Kojetin, T. J. Bouchard, Jr., D. T. Lykken, A. Tellegen, Psychol. Sci. 1, 138 (1990). Reliability of religious leisure time interests and religious occupational interests and mean of 14 nonreligious social attitude items from Minnesota twin study data base (28). Reliability of other scales from test manuals. For a general discussion of the reliability of traits such as those measured in this study, see K. C. H. Parker, R. K. Hanson, J. Hunsley [Psychol. Bull. 103, 367 (1988)] and J. J. Conley [Pers. Individ. Differ. 5, 11 (1984)].

33. R. C. Lewontin, S. Rose, L. J. Kamin, Not in Our Genes; Biology, Ideology and Human Nature (Pantheon, New York, 1984).

34. S. Scarr, Behav. Genet. 17, 219 (1987).

35. J. R. Flynn, Psychol. Bull. 101, 171 (1987).

36. R. Lynn, Pers. Individ. Differ. 11,273 (1990); T. W. Teasedale and D. R. Owen, Intelligence 13, 255 (1989).

37. R. Wilson, Child Dev. 54, 298 (1983).

38. K. J. Hayes, Psychol. Rep. 10, 299 (1962); C. J. Lumsden and E. O. Wilson, Genes, Mind and Culture (Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, MA, 1981); S. Scarr and K. McCartney, Child Dev. 54, 424 (1983).

39. N. G. Martin et al., Proc. Nat. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 83, 4364 (1986).

40. M. W. Feldman and R. C. Lewontin, Science 190, 1163 (1975); D. Symonds, The Evolution of Human Sexuality (Oxford Univ. Press, New York, 1979).

41. D. M. Buss, J. Pers. 58, 1 (1990).

42. T. J. Bouchard, Jr., D. T. Lykken, M. McGue, N. L. Segal, A. Tellegen, this article.

43. The MZA correlation of 0.771 reported by the late Sir Cyrill Burt and questioned for its authenticity after his death (4) falls within the range of findings reviewed here.

44. WAIS data for MZTs from K. Tambs, J. M. Sundet, P. Magnus, Intelligence 8,283 (1984). Reliabilities from (10). Raven, Mill-Hill, and composite data from Minnesota twin studies (6, 42).

45. MZA data on SCII and JVIS from D. Moloney, unpublished thesis (University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, 1990). Minnesota Occupational Interest Scale data from N. Waller, D. T. Lykken, A. Tellegen, in Wise Counsel: Essays in Honor of Lloyd Lofquist, R. Dawis and D. Lubinski, Eds. (Univ. of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, in press). SCII MZT data from Nichols [Homo 29, 158 (1978)]. Reliability data from test manuals.

46. We thank our colleagues E. D. Eckert, L. L. Heston, and I. I. Gottesman for their help on the medical and psychiatric portions of the study and H. Polesky, director, for the blood testing. This research has been supported by grants from The Pioneer Fund, The Seaver Institute, The University of Minnesota Graduate School, The Koch Charitable Foundation, The Spencer Foundation, The National Science Foundation (BNS-7926654), The National Institute of Mental Health (MH37860), The National Institute on Aging (AG06886), and the Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Publishing Company.


Whatever Happened to Eugenics?

Whatever Happened to Eugenics?

Glayde Whitney

Florida State University, Tallahassee

Review of:

Heredity and Humanity: Race, Eugenics and Modern Science
Roger Pearson
Scott-Townsend Publishers, Washington D.C., 1996
ISBN 1-878465-15-5 162 pps.

“Most of those who have sought to suppress human knowledge about heredity have done so with kindly intentions, but sound policies can never be constructed on bad science or unsound data. Any society that sets itself against the immutable causal laws of biology and evolution will ultimately bring about its own demise” (Pearson, p. 140).

Whatever happened to Eugenics? How is it that the prevention of human suffering came to be considered as the greater evil? In this delightful little book Roger Pearson takes us on an excursion through history, science and ideologies.

In so doing he illuminates the origins of great concepts and names the heroes and the villains in a saga that is not yet complete. In recommending this book to a Seminar in Evolutionary Psychology I told the graduate students that it is “an anti-PC, anti-egalitarian, historical polemic, well referenced and worth reading this is not the story you got in cultural anthropology class.” This is a story well-told that needs wide telling, and serious pondering by all who are concerned for the welfare of our civilization.

The opening chapter (The Concept of Heredity in the Ancient World) serves to remind the reader that heredity has been considered important since before the beginning of recorded history, and at least until earlier in the twentieth century. Unfortunately, these observations will be new to many students who have suffered a modern deconstructed education. Pearson announces his agenda in that the opening chapter “illustrates the deep belief in the importance of heredity and race which prevailed from the earliest times until roughly the end of the nineteenth century. Subsequent chapters document the rise of politically-motivated egalitarian ideology which, heavily supported by the media, eventually succeeded in making the idea of biological inequality taboo. Despite the fact that there is today a rapidly developing body of scientific research which validates the age-old comprehension of the role of heredity in shaping human abilities, too many people are unaware of the mechanics behind the swing toward the notion of the biological equality of mankind” (p. 9).
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Brain Size Matters: a Reply to Peters

Brain Size Matters: a Reply to Peters
by J. Philippe Rushton and C. Davison Ankney
University of Western Ontario

Abstract

Peters (1993) claimed that published research on brain size and IQ is flawed because it did not meet his list of minimum conditions that (a) subjects should be matched for height, weight and age, (b) analyses should be conducted separately within sex, (c) subjects should not vary in prenatal and nutritional history, (d) people with IQs appreciably below the population mean of 100 should not be studied, and (e) brain size measures should be done blind . However, these conditions have either been met or are unnecessary and/or inappropriate. We show, contrary to Peters’ claims, that (a) brain size is related to mental abilities, (b) brain size varies by sex and race, and (c) mental abilities vary by sex and race. Finally, we suggest that brain size constraints on behavioural complexity may be best understood from an evolutionary perspective.

In a reply to Lynn (1993) about brain size and IQ, Peters (1993) charged bias and questionable motives to dismiss relations first established over 100 years ago. Peters (1993) claimed that studies of brain size are confounded by systematic bias, including racial bias , over and above normal measurement error. Peters (1993) also conjectured that uni-directional measurement errors may exist and so he dismissed Rushton’s (1992) analyses showing race and sex differences in cranial capacity in 6,325 U.S. military personnel. Consequently, Peters claimed that such studies must be done blind , i.e., the person doing the measurement should not know the race of the subject being measured.

Peters did not note, although it was made clear in Rushton’s (1992) paper, that (1) Rushton neither made the measurements nor knew who did, and (2) measurements were made to determine proper helmet sizes not brain sizes (i.e., they were done blind , as the measurers were unaware of the use that Rushton would make of their data). The East Asian/European/African differences that Rushton (1992) found in cranial capacity (cm3) using external head measurements are similar to those found by Beals, Smith, and Dodd (1984) who estimated cm3 from endocranial volume, and by Ho, Roessmann, Straumfjord, and Monroe (1980) who weighed brain mass (grams) at autopsy. Does Peters believe that Ho et al. leaned on their scales, when weighing brains of European-Americans, by just enough to produce the same difference caused by extra snug measurements supposedly made by those measuring heads of African-Americans? Regardless, it is implausible that the racial bias alleged by Peters would also produce findings that East Asians have relatively larger brains than do Europeans.

Allometric and nutritional factors
Brain size and intelligence
Sex differences
Race differences
Evolutionary considerations
References

Allometric and nutritional factors

Peters (1993) misstates when and why it is appropriate to correct for variation in body size (e.g., height or weight) when analyzing human attributes. It is only appropriate to correct for body size if one wishes to determine whether two (or more) individuals or groups are relatively different in some attribute, when it is already known that they are absolutely different in that attribute and/or in body size. For example, men and women differ in both absolute brain size and absolute body size. Thus, it is appropriate to correct for body size to determine if men have relatively larger brains. But, it would be inappropriate to correct for body size to determine if men have absolutely higher IQs.

Consider this simple analogy: John Doe is 178 cm tall and can jump 1 m off the ground, whereas basketball star Michael Jordan is 208 cm tall and can jump 1.17 m off the ground. There are two questions that we can ask from this: (1) For his size, can Michael Jordan jump higher? (Answer is no he’s 17% taller and can jump 17% higher), and (2) Can Michael Jordan jump higher? (Answer is, obviously, yes).

Now, consider Peters’ argument that to determine if larger brains produce (absolutely) higher IQs, one must correct for body size. This, as can be seen from the above, makes no sense. A higher IQ is a higher IQ (just as a higher jump is a higher jump) regardless of body size. On average, taller people have higher IQ’s, not because they are taller, per se, but because, on average, they have larger brains. Correcting for body size reduces the question to a nullity, i.e., do tall people with their larger brains have relatively higher IQ’s?

Peters erred similarly when he argued that age must be controlled when analyzing brain-size/IQ relations in adults. Both brain size (Ho et al., 1980) and IQ (Brody, 1992) decline after the age of 45 years. This likely is not coincidental but, regardless, if one corrects for age then the result would simply be that brains of similar size tend to produce similar IQ’s.

Peters’ erroneously stated that subjects in studies of brain-size/IQ relations should have similar early-life nutrition and be from the same social class. His rationale is that these factors can affect brain size. But, the question is do people with smaller brains have lower IQ’s? , not why do they have smaller brains? . It might be interesting to know why John Doe is shorter than Michael Jordan but, regardless, he cannot jump as high.

Brain size and intelligence

As Lynn (1993) showed, the IQ/brain-size relation is ubIQuitous. Studies, additional to those provided by Lynn (1993), show that the correlation ranges from 0.10 to 0.30 with a mean of about 0.20 (Wickett, Vernon, & Lee, 1994). The head-perimeter/IQ relation occurs in Orientals as well as whites and blacks and is apparent early in life. The National Collaborative Perinatal Project (Broman et al., 1987) found that head perimeter at birth, at 1 year, and at 4 years correlated with IQ at age 7 from r = 0.13 to 0.24 in 19,000 black and 17,000 white children. Jensen and Johnson (1994) used these data to show that head size at age 7 (although not at age 4) is correlated with IQ within-families (i.e., among same-sex full siblings, with age partialed out), thus indicating a functional relation between brain size and IQ.

Magnetic resonance imaging technIQues that create a 3-dimensional model of the brain in vivo confirm the brain-size/IQ relation. Five studies found an average correlation greater than 0.40, an improvement over studies that used head perimeter as a measure (Willerman et al., 1991; Andreasen et al., 1993; Raz et al., 1993; Egan et al., 1994; Wickett et al., 1994). Peters critIQued the two studies then available, but only confused the issue. First, he claimed that Willerman et al.’s (1991) low IQ group, because it averaged only 90.5, was an improper control . It was, however, not intended to be a control. Importantly, Willerman et al. showed that those with below average IQ had, on average, smaller brains. Second, Peters (1993) almost conceded the brain-size/IQ relation in his footnote citation to Andreasen et al. (1993). However, even there he suspected bias, i.e., self-selection of subjects. But, this could only bias such results if people with large-brains/high-IQ and small-brains/low-IQ volunteered, whereas those with large-brains/low-IQ and small- brains/high-IQ did not. We are unaware of evidence to support such an implausibility. Regardless, beside studies by Willerman et al. (1991) and Andreasen et al. (1993) cited by Peters (1993), the brain-size/IQ relation established using magnetic resonance imaging was corroborated by Raz et al. (1993), Egan et al. (1994), and Wickett et al. (1994).

The null hypothesis of no relation between brain size and IQ is false. In anticipation of this, Peters (1993) argued that even if brain-size/IQ correlations are valid, they account for only a small percentage of variation. But, it is predictable that correlations between IQ and overall brain size will be modest. First, much of the brain is not involved in producing what we call intelligence; thus, variation in size/mass of that tissue will reduce the correlation. Second, IQ is an imperfect measure of intelligence and thus, variation in IQ scores is an imperfect measure of variation in intelligence.

Sex differences

Peters (1993) correctly noted the absolute male/female difference in brain size. He was, however, incorrect that comparisons of brain size across sex cannot be made because there are (supposedly) no appropriate scalars of body size. Ankney (1992) reexamined Ho et al.’s (1980) autopsy data on 1,261 Americans aged 25 to 80 after excluding obviously damaged brains. Using allometric technIQues that are standard in comparative biology, Ankney (1992) found that at any given surface area or height, brains of European-American men are heavier than those of European-American women and brains of African-American men are heavier than those of African-American women. For example, among 168 cm (5’7 ) tall European-Americans (the approximate overall mean height for men and women combined), brain mass of men averages about 100 grams heavier than that of women.

Ankney’s (1992) results were confirmed in Rushton’s (1992) study of a stratified random sample of U.S. Army personnel. After adjusting for effects of age, stature, weight, military rank and race, cranial capacity of men averaged 1,442 cm3 and women 1,332 cm3. This difference was found in all of the many analyses that were done to control for various possible body size effects (see Rushton, 1992). Moreover, the difference was replicated across samples of Asian-Americans, European-Americans and African-Americans, as well as in officers and enlisted personnel.

Peters (1993) correctly noted the paradox that women have proportionately smaller brains than do men, but apparently have the same IQ scores. Thus, Ankney (1992) proposed that the sex difference in brain size relates to those intellectual abilities at which men excel. Briefly, according to Kimura (1992), women excel in verbal ability, perceptual speed, and motor coordination within personal space; men do better on various spatial tests and on tests of mathematical reasoning. Ankney hypothesized that it may require more brain tissue to process spatial information. Just as increasing word processing power in a computer may require extra capacity, increasing 3-dimensional processing, as in graphics, requires a major jump in capacity. In support of Ankney’s hypothesis, although Lynn (1994) found that men average 4 points higher than do women on standard IQ tests, Ankney (1995) showed that nearly all of this difference derived from men’s higher scores on spatial and mathematical reasoning subtests.

Race differences

Rushton (1995) reviewed 100 years of scientific literature and found that across a triangulation of procedures, brains of East-Asians and their descendants average about 17 cm3 (1 in3) larger than those of Europeans and their descendents whose brains average about 80 cm3 (5 in3) larger than those of Africans and their descendents. Although critics can pick outliers to show counter-examples and suggest opposite trends (as could critics of a statement that men are, on average, taller than women) the aggregated data are clear (see Rushton, 1995, for full discussion of alleged counter examples).

Consider the following statistically significant comparisons. Using brain mass at autopsy, Ho et al. (1980) summarized data for 1,261 adults (see above) and reported a sex-combined difference between 811 European- Americans with a mean of 1,323 g (sd = 146) and 450 African-Americans with a mean of 1,223 g (sd = 144). Using endocranial volume, Beals et al. (1984, page 307, Table 5) analyzed 20,000 crania and found sex-combined brain cases differed by continental area. Excluding Caucasoid areas of Asia (e.g., India) and Africa (e.g., Egypt), 19 East Asian populations averaged 1,415 cm3 (sd = 51), 10 European groups averaged 1,362 cm3 (sd = 35) and 9 African groups averaged 1,268 cm3 (sd = 85). Using external head measure- ments, Rushton (1992) found, in a stratified random sample of 6,325 U.S. Army personnel, measured in 1988 to determine head size for fitting helmets, Asian-Americans, European-Americans, and African-Americans averaged 1,416, 1,380, and 1,359 cm3, respectively (see also, Rushton, 1994).

Globally, racial differences in brain size parallel those found in measured intelligence. Europeans in North America, Europe and Australasia have mean IQs of around 100. For East Asians, measured in North America and in Pacific Rim countries, means range from 101 to 111. Africans living south of the Sahara, African-Americans and African-Caribbeans (including those living in Britain), have mean IQs of from 70 to 90 (Lynn, 1991). Elementary speed of information processing in 9- to 12-year-olds, in which children decide which of several lights stands out from others, show that racial differences in mental ability are pervasive. All children can perform the tasks in less than 1 s, but more intelligent children, as measured by traditional IQ tests, perform the tasks faster than do less intelligent children. Japanese and Hong Kong children have faster decision times (controlling for movement time) than do British and Irish children who have faster decision time than South African Black and African-American children (Jensen, 1993; Jensen & Whang, 1993; Lynn, 1991).

Evolutionary considerations

Metabolically, the human brain is an expensive organ. Representing only 2% of body mass, the brain uses about 5% of basal metabolic rate in rats, cats, and dogs, about 10% in rhesus monkeys and other primates, and about 20% in humans. Thus, from an adaptationist perspective, unless large brains substantially contributed to evolutionary fitness (defined as increased survival of genes through successive generations), they would not have evolved.

Paradoxically, Peters (1993) cited Haug (1987) to refute speculations about the significance of differences in brain size across individuals, sex, or race , even though Haug (1987, p.135) reported a correlation of r = 0.479 (n = 81, p < .001) between number of cortical neurons and brain size including both men and women in the sample. Haug’s analysis showed that a person with a brain size of 1,400 cm3 has, on average, 600 million fewer cortical neurons than an individual with a brain size of 1,500 cm3. The difference between the low end of normal (1,000 cm3) and the high end (1,700 cm3) equates to 4.200 billion neurons (a difference of 27% more neurons for a 41% increase in brain size).

Haug noted that most female data points lay above the regression line (i.e., women average more neurons for a given brain size than do men). This suggests that women’s brains are differently organized than are men’s, and so causes and results of race differences in brain size may be different from those of sex differences. Kolakowski and Malina (1974) hypothesized that differing roles of men and women during human evolution produced a sexual dichotomy in abilities. Men roamed from the home base to hunt, which would select for targeting ability and navigational skills; women were relatively sedentary. Ankney (1992, 1995) expanded on this hypothesis to argue that selection for such abilities also selected for relatively larger brains in men and that it may require more brain tissue to process spatial information.

Rushton (1995) provided an evolutionary hypothesis for why East Asians have the largest brains. The currently accepted view of human origins posits a beginning in Africa some 200,000 years ago, an African/non-African split about 110,000 years ago, and a European/East Asian split about 40,000 years ago (Stringer & Andrews, 1988). Evolutionary selection pressures were different in the hot savanna where Africans evolved than in the cold arctic where East Asians evolved. According to Rushton (1995), the further north the populations migrated, out of Africa, the more they encountered cognitively demanding problems of gathering and storing food, gaining shelter, making clothes, and raising children during prolonged winters. As the original African populations evolved into Europeans and East Asians, they did so in the direction of larger brains, greater intelligence, slower rates of maturation, and other traits that differentiate these populations.

Conclusion

The evidence is overwhelming that there are racial and sexual differences in brain size, that there are racial differences in general IQ, that there are sexual differences in verbal versus performance IQ, and that differences in mental abilities are related to differences in brain size. Peters cannot simply deny this evidence. Thus, important research questions include (1) what is responsible for the group differences, i.e., are they genetically and/or environmentally caused?, (2) does the brain size/IQ correlation indicate cause and effect ?, and (3) is there bidirectional causality such that the greater learning ability of high IQ children feeds back to produce even larger brain size?

Address correspondence to:

rushton@sscl.uwo.ca

References

Andreasen, N.C., Flaum, M., Swayze, V., O’Leary, D.S., Alliger, R., Cohen, G., Ehrhardt, J. & Yuh, W.T.C. (1993). Intelligence and brain structure in normal individuals. American Journal of Psychiatry, 150, 130-134.

Ankney, C.D. (1992). Sex differences in relative brain size: The mismeasure of woman, too? Intelligence, 16, 329-336.

Ankney, C.D. (1995). Sex differences in brain size and mental abilities: Comments on R. Lynn and D. Kimura. Personality and Individual Differences, 18, 423-424.

Beals, K.L., Smith, C.L. & Dodd, S.M. (1984). Brain size, cranial morphology, climate, and time machines. Current Anthropology, 25, 301-330.

Brody, N. (1992). Intelligence. New York: Academic Press.

Broman, S.H., Nichols, P.L., Shaughnessy, P. & Kennedy, W. (1987). Retardation in young children. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Egan, V., Chiswick, A., Santosh, C., Naidu, K., Rimmington, J.E., & Best, J.J.K. (1994). Size isn’t everything: A study of brain volume, intelligence and auditory evoked potentials.Personality and Individual Differences, 17, 357-367.

Haug, H. (1987). Brain sizes, surfaces, and neuronal sizes of the cortex cerebri. American Journal of Anatomy, 180, 126-142.

Ho, K.C., Roessmann, U., Straumfjord, J.V., & Monroe, G. (1980). Analysis of brain weight. Archives of Pathology and Laboratory Medicine, 104, 635-645.

Jensen, A.R. (1993). Spearman’s hypothesis tested with chronometric information processing tasks.Intelligence, 17, 47-77.

Jensen, A.R., & Johnson, F.W. (1994). Race and sex differences in head size and IQ.Intelligence, 18, 309-333.

Jensen, A.R., & Whang, P.A. (1993). Reaction times and intelligence.Journal of Biosocial Science, 25, 397-410.

Kimura, D. (1992). Sex differences in the brain.Scientific American, 267 (No. 3), 119-125.

Kolakowski, D., & Malina, R.M. (1974). Spatial ability, throwing accuracy, and man’s hunting heritage.Nature, 251, 410-412.

Lynn, R. (1991). Race differences in intelligence. Mankind Quarterly, 31, 255-296.

Lynn, R. (1993). Brain size and intelligence in man: A correction to Peters. Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology, 47, 748-750.

Lynn, R. (1994). Sex differences in intelligence and brain size. Personality and Individual Differences, 17, 257-271.

Peters, M. (1993). Still no convincing evidence of a relation between brain size and intelligence in humans. Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology, 47, 751-756.

Raz, N., Torres, I.J., Spencer, W.D., Millman, D., Baertschi, J.C., & Sarpel, G. (1993). Neuroanatomical correlates of age-sensitive and age-invariant cognitive abilities. Intelligence, 17, 407-422.

Rushton, J.P. (1992). Cranial capacity related to sex, rank, and race in a stratified random sample of 6,325 U.S. military personnel. Intelligence, 16, 401-413.

Rushton, J.P. (1994). Sex and race differences in cranial capacity from International Labour Office data. Intelligence, 19, 281-294.

Rushton, J.P. (1995). Race, evolution, and behavior. A life-history perspective. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction.

Stringer, C.B. & Andrews, P. (1988). Genetic and fossil evidence for the origin of modern humans. Science, 239, 1263-1268.

Wickett, J.C., Vernon, P.A., & Lee, D.H. (1994). In vivo brain size, head perimeter, and intelligence in a sample of healthy adult females. Personality and Individual Differences, 16, 831-838.

Willerman, L., Schultz, R., Rutledge, J.N., & Bigler, E.D. (1991). In vivo brain size and intelligence. Intelligence, 15, 223-228.


Paternal Provisioning versus Mate-Seeking in Human Populations

Paternal Provisioning versus Mate-Seeking in Human Populations
by Prof. Edward M. Miller
Professor of Economics and Finance
University of New Orleans

from Personality and Individual Differences, Vol. 17, August 1994

Abstract
Introduction
Male Competition for Mating Opportunities
Hunting as a Fuction of Latitude
The Cold Climate Situation
Predictions of the Hypothesis
Using Racial Data to Test Clinal Theories
Explaining Racial Variation by Mating Competition versus Provisioning
Aggression
Dominance
Anxiety
Impulsivity
Delay of gratification
Sociability
Extraversion
Behavioral restraint
Criminal activity
Sexual restraint
Sexual behavior
Size of sex organs
Body build
Muscle characteristics
Life Span Variations
Hormonal Levels Versus Timing of Sexual Maturity
Implications for Females
The Distribution of Polygyny
New World African Origin Populations
Father Absent Societies
Testing the Theory with other Populations
Conclusions

Abstract

Paternal investment theory suggests that in cold climates males were selected for provisioning, rather than for mating success. In warm climates, where female gathering made male provisioning unessential, selection was for mating success. Male hunted meat was essential for female winter survival. Genes that encouraged mating success were selected for in warm (was cold) climates. Negroids (blacks) evolved in warm cold climates, while Caucasians (whites) and Mongoloids (Asians) evolved in colder climates. Mating is assisted by a strong sex drive, aggression, dominance, sociability, extraversion, impulsiveness, sensation seeking, and high testosterone. Provisioning is assisted by anxiety, altruism, empathy, behavioral restraint, gratification delay, and a long life span. Explanations are offered for racial differences in many personality characteristics, hormone levels, monamine oxidase levels, testosterone levels, lactase dehydrogenase metabolic paths, life spans, prostate cancer rates, hypertension, genital (penis and testes) size, vocal frequencies, liver size, muscle structure, mesomorphy, bone density, sports performance, crime rates, rape, child abuse, earnings, age at first sexual activity, AIDs, illegitimacy, divorce, marriage, and polygyny rates. Eye color correlations are discussed. Negro family structure in the Caribbean and the U.S. may reflect selection in Africa during hunter-gather times. Comparison is made with differential K theory and father absence theories.

Key words: race, climate, evolution, personality, polygyny, aggression, provisioning, mating, dominance seeking, paternal investment

Rushton (1985, 1987, 1988, 1989b, in press) and Ellis (1987) have drawn attention to the existence of many racial differences, including behavioral ones, and shown that they were frequently arranged in the order Mongoloid, Caucasoid, Negroid (or Negroid, Caucasoid, Mongoloid, depending on the trait). The differences Rushton drew attention to include twinning rates, (Negroids first, Caucasoids second, Mongoloids third), intelligence (Mongoloids first, Caucasoids second, Negroids third), various differences in aggression, dominance seeking, impulsivity, extraversion, sexual behavior, genital size (Negroids first, Caucasoids second, Mongoloids last), extent of altruism, and behavioral restraint (Mongoloids first, Caucasoids second, and Negroids last), and timing of birth, menarche, birth of first child, and death (Negroids earliest, Caucasoids second, Mongoloids last).

Rushton explains his observations by a version of r versus K selection theory. The terms r and K come from population biology, where r is a population’s maximum growth rate, and K is the environment’s carrying capacity. K selected species have been selected for success at competition with conspecifics. Species selected for fast reproduction with low ability to compete are called r selected. Rushton extends the idea to human populations. He argues that Negroids are the least K selected among human populations, Mongoloids the most K selected, and Caucasoids in between. This idea has produced considerable scientific (J. Anderson, 1991; Flynn, 1989; Leslie, 1990; Lynn, 1989; Roberts & Gabor, 1990; Silverman, 1990; Weizmann, Wiener, Wiesenthal, & Ziegler, 1990; Zuckerman, 1991; Miller, 1993) and popular controversy (Gross, 1990; Pearson, 1991, Chap. 5; Lerner, 1992, pp. 139-147), to which Rushton (1989a, 1990a, 1990b, Rushton & Ankney, 1993) has responded. Chisholm (1993) has also applied life cycle theory to humans, arguing that early experiences with the correlates of high death rates affects the allocation between mating and parenting.

This paper will propose an alternative explanation to differential K theory. Like differential K theory, it will be derived from a standard biological theory, parental investment theory. In some species, males devote more effort to seeking mating opportunities. In other species, they devote more effort to assisting their offspring. In each species, males evolve to use the strategy that most promotes their fitness. Which strategy most promotes their fitness depends on the effect of paternal investment on offspring survival and fitness, and on the opportunities for obtaining reproductively successful additional matings (Katz & Konner, 1981; Clutton-Brock, 1991). Likewise, within the same species different populations have been selected for different positions on the paternal investment versus mating effort continuum.

In humans, an especially important form of paternal investment is provisioning, bringing the mother and child food. Offspring’s benefit from provisioning depends on climate. In warm climates, females typically can gather enough food for themselves and their children. In cold climates, hunting is required to survive winter, and females typically do not hunt (other than for easily captured small game). Hence, offspring survival requires male provisioning in cold climates. Thus, cold climate males were selected to devote more efforts to provisioning, and less to seeking matings. In warm climates, such male provisioning was not essential, even if desirable. Thus, warm climate males who devoted more efforts to seeking mating opportunities, and less to provisioning, left more offspring. This theory can explain many of the known racial differences.

Paternal investment theory’s chief advantage is its specificity as to the traits populations should exhibit. It makes specific testable predictions (which are generally sustained) as to how cold-adapted populations and tropical populations should behave. In contrast, Rushton’s and Ellis’s differential K theories, after stating that Mongoloids are most K selected, and Negroids least, are very vague as to why this is. They fail to predict how other races (Malays, Australian aborigines, Polynesians, etc), or populations within the major races, should differ (J. Anderson, 1991; Miller, 1993).

To limit this paper’s length, a detailed treatment of the evidence for the racial differences discussed will not be attempted. The reader can find relevant references in Ellis (1987, p. 159) and in Rushton’s papers (especially 1987, p. 1019, 1989a, p. 9) and in Rushton’s forthcoming book (in press). The author has checked most of these. Although many of the individual studies could be improved on, the racial differences do appear to be as Rushton and Ellis depict them. Strong evidence as to whether most racial differences in behavior are of environmental or genetic origin is lacking. While cultural explanations have been proposed for many of the behavioral differences, (but not for the morphological, or biochemical ones), there is not space to discuss them here. Occasionally, when new evidence has appeared since Rushton and Ellis wrote, it will be noted.

This paper combines several generally accepted ideas from different disciplines. It accepts the evidence from human behavior genetics that most personality traits have an inherited component (for instance Eaves, Eysenck & Martin, 1989; or Bouchard, Lykken, McGue, Segal, & Tellegen, 1990, or Rushton, in press, chap. 4). From biology and population genetics, it takes natural selection. From physical anthropology, it takes the theory that humans have been separated into races long enough to have evolved somewhat different appearances, many of which can be traced to climatic differences. From sociobiology, it takes the idea that males differ in the extent to which they devote their efforts to mating versus parenting, and that basic human behavior traits evolved during the hunter-gatherer 99% of human history (Barash, 1977; E. Wilson, 1975). It extends this by arguing that cold weather hunter-gatherers evolved into Mongoloids and Caucasoids, and tropical African hunter-gatherers into Negroids, and that differences in morphological and behavioral gene frequencies can be explained by the climatic differences during hunter-gatherer times.

MALE COMPETITION FOR MATING OPPORTUNITIES

In many species, much male behavior consists of competition for females (Barash, 1977; Wilson, 1975; Trivers, 1972). This seems to be true of humans. Standard sociobiology explains differences between human male and female behavior by contrasting the male’s ability to father children by several females with the female’s inability to have children by more than one male at a time (Symons, 1979; Hrdy, 1981). Thus, men evolved to exploit any impregnation opportunities that arise, while women direct their copulations to males who are willing and able to invest in them and their children.

Thus, in discussing male behavior across species, biologists argue that males evolved a trade-off between paternal investment and mating efforts that maximizes their inclusive fitness for that environment (Draper, 1989, pp. 149-150). The argument generalizes easily to explain differences in male mating and paternal investment within a single species, such as humans.

Under some conditions males leave more descendants by devoting more energy to seeking copulations (an endeavor that often includes prestige seeking), and relatively less to provisioning their offspring. In these conditions, selection will be for such characteristics as high sex drive, aggression, a mesomorphic body build, and large testes. In these conditions females can raise children with only limited male provisioning.

In other circumstances, males are selected for extensive provisioning of their children. This normally implies less energy being devoted to seeking matings for two reasons. First, energy and resources devoted to seeking additional matings would be diverted from provisioning their mates and children, thus reducing the number of surviving children. Secondly, added matings would frequently produce children able to survive only if resources were diverted from the father’s other children. The net gain in surviving offspring would be small, or even negative. The first effect of devoting more energy to mating is to reduce total male investment in offspring, while the second spreads it among more offspring, reducing per capita investment.

I will argue that selection for male provisioning is especially common in climates with cold winters, where large game hunting is required for survival. Children of males who failed to provision would often not survive the winter.

Physical anthropologists can explain many racial variations as climatic adaptations (Baker, 1974; Coon, 1965, 1982; Krantz, 1980; Roberts, 1978). For instance, in northern latitudes, winter ultraviolet radiation intensity is low, and pale skin permits maximum vitamin D production. In low latitudes, there is a risk of excess vitamin D production and sunburn. Here dark skin is optimal (see Robins, 1991). Likewise, variations in adult ability to tolerate lactose has been interpreted as partially an adaption to low levels of ultraviolet radiation (Durham, 1991). Lynn (1991b) has contrasted the hunting required for survival in cold climates, in which Mongoloids and Caucasoids evolved, with the tropical gathering. He used this to explain the racial intelligence differences he had earlier documented (Lynn, 1991a). Here, this difference in reliance on hunting will be used to explain many other behavioral differences.

The reader will probably have little difficulty in accepting that Negroids evolved in the tropics, and Caucasoids and Mongoloids in colder climates. However, some may wonder why the Mongoloids are considered to have evolved in a colder climate than did the Caucasoids. One reason is that certain Mongoloid features (a stocky body build, and distinctive eye folds) appear to be adaptations to arctic conditions (Baker, 1974; Coon, 1965, 1982; Krantz, 1980; Roberts, 1978).

Admittedly, Europe is also cold. However, it is believed that farming started in the Middle East and then spread with the farmers’ migration into Europe. This conclusion comes from archaeology and a northwest to southeast distribution of certain genes (Menozzi, Piazza, & Cavalli-Sforza, 1978; Piazza,1993; Sokal, Oden, & Wilson, 1991). The latter suggests a population movement, rather than merely technology diffusion. The result is that some European ancestors were Middle Eastern hunter-gatherers, rather than hunter-gatherers who had evolved where the populations now live.

Hunting as a Fuction of Latitude

Richard Lee (1968, pp. 42-43) in the widely cited Man the Hunter book emphasized that most calories eaten among typical (tropical) hunter-gatherers come from gathering, leaving the impression that gathering was the primary subsistence mode for the ancestors of most peoples. However, this really held only for the well studied inhabitants of warm and tropical areas, which are the majority of surviving hunter-gatherers. He reports that “In warm-temperature, sub-tropical, and tropical latitudes, zero to thirty-nine degrees from the equator, gathering is by far the dominant mode of subsistence, appearing as primary in 25 of the 28 cases.” He found that 6 of the 8 societies whose latitude exceeded 60 degrees relied primarily on hunting. Eskimos (Inuits) are classic examples. In cool to cold temperature latitudes, from 40-59, degrees fishing was the most common subsistence mode. Temperature tells the same story, “Hunting is primary in three of the five societies in very cold climates (annual temperatures less than 32 F0.), fishing is primary in 10 of the 17 societies in cold climates (32-50 F0.): and gathering is primary in 27 of 36 societies in mild to hot climates (over 50 F0.).”

Fishing (usually male) appears to be a relatively recent development (Washburn & Lancaster, 1968, p. 294). In earlier times, before the most fertile mid-latitude lands were cleared for farming, there was probably more mid-latitude hunting. The hunting of large sea mammals from boats, so important to Eskimos, developed relatively recently.

Especially significant in the Lee tabulation (p. 43) is the absence of any predominantly gathering society above 500 latitude. Gathering is the primary way a single mother can feed her family.

The above tabulations suggest that ancestral Negroids relied on gathered vegetable material and ancestral Caucasoids and Mongoloids relied on animal matter from hunting and fishing. Supporting evidence is provided by blacks’ greater current salt retention compared to whites (Luft et al., 1991). Presumably, the lower salt content of the prehistoric low meat African diet, combined with greater sweat loss, selected for salt retention.

Another piece of evidence consistent with the environment of evolutionary adaptation for Caucasoids involving more meat eating than Negroids’ original environment is that the Negroids’ livers are smaller (Lewis, 1942, p. 276). The liver’ s function is to produce bile, which is used in fat digestion. A diet lower in fats (which are much more common in animal foods) would requires less bile for digestion.

The obvious problems of hunting while pregnant or with a small child assure that males do the hunting (for other than small and slow game) in virtually all societies (Friedl, 1975, p. 16-18; Watanabe, 1968).*(1) In climates typical of those now prevailing north of 500 a woman would have difficulty raising children without male supplied meat.

An example of women hunting small game is provided by the Twi of Melville Island, Australia (Goodale, 1971, pp. 151-169). They commonly hunt lizards, snakes, crabs, rats, and opposum and bandicoot. The last two are small animals found sleeping in logs or hollow trees, and typically are easily killed where found (i.e. without pursuit). In northern climates most such small animals would be hibernating during winter, or would be rare then.

The Hadza of Tanzania are typical tropical hunter-gatherers. Woodburn (1968, p. 52) describes the abundance of game and other food, stating, “For a Hadza to die of hunger, or even to fail to satisfy his hunger for more than a day or two, is almost inconceivable.”

Barnard and Woodburn (1988) noted that, “In all known hunter-gatherer societies, with immediate return systems, and in many but not all, hunter-gatherer societies with delayed return systems, people are almost always able to meet their nutritional needs very adequately without working long hours.” If gathering permits this, one would expect that women could adequately feed themselves and their children without male provisioning. Most tropical hunter-gatherer societies are immediate return ones.

Gardner (1972, p. 414), in describing the Paliyans, a foraging people of India, has pointed out that, “In normal times Paliyan men and women spend a bare three to four hours a day obtaining food and evidence no anxiety whatsoever about its supply.” Single individuals are able to feed themselves easily, and married couples may not feed each other. Male provisioning is clearly not necessary. Not surprisingly, with the parties not needing each other economically, “the usual situation is one of fragile, often serial, unions, terminated quickly by the offended party when conflict arises” (p. 419).

A similar impression is left by descriptions of other tropical hunter-gatherer societies. Lee & DeVore’s famous Man the Hunter is often summarized as showing that most calories come from gathering, not hunting, that most gathering is done by females, and that hunter-gatherers need spend only a relatively small part of their time in gathering. Taken together, these facts imply that a woman can feed her family with little male assistance. This suggests that males would leave more descendants by focusing their efforts on mating rather than on provisioning.*(2)

The Cold Climate Situation

Now consider a cold climate, such as prevailed where the northeastern Mongoloids (Chinese, Japanese, Koreans) are believed to have evolved. Even now these areas have cold winters. During the last ice age they were much colder. Their people’s physical features evidence numerous cold adaptations (Coon, 1965, 1982; Krantz, 1980; Roberts, 1978).

Although winter is only part of the year, it is the season animals have the greatest difficulty surviving. Most plant foods disappear (fruits, berries, edible leaves). Hunting becomes more difficult. Most animals time their reproductive cycles so there are no winter young or eggs. Eggs and young were the easiest animal protein for primitive men and women to obtain, since they were immobile or moved too slowly to escape. Many adult animals migrate (birds) or hibernate to escape the winter food shortage. Frozen ground prevents humans from digging for tubers and ice prevents or complicates fishing. Snow cover makes it hard to find fallen nuts or tuber locations, and makes walking much more difficult (Jochim, 1976, p. 138). Winter has severe weather episodes in which it is unsafe to leave shelter to hunt. Also, winter cold increases the body’s food requirements (Kleiber, 1961, p. 164, p. 239). Finally, winter is a time of short days (Torrence, 1983, emphasizes this). Thus, the very period when food is needed most is also when it is scarcest, hardest to acquire, and the time for gathering it is least.

Admittedly, there could be geographical circumstances where winter is easier. Many ungulates (such as elk) in mountainous areas winter in the lowlands. Possibly this concentration, aided by ease of tracking in snow, could make winter an easier time for survival. However, males would still be expected to be the sex that took advantage of this situation.

Jochim (1976, pp. 141-143) has estimated food consumption for German mesolithic foragers by seasons. Plants (female gatherable) are estimated to be 30% for spring and summer, 23% for fall, but zero in winter.

In northern climates a female cannot be self supporting. A female would avoid marriage to a hunter already supporting another’s family. Even if married to an excellent hunter, a second wife (receiving half of his support) would probably be poorly provisioned. Cold climates lead to environmental monogamy (Alexander, Hoogland, Howard, Noonan, and Sherman, 1979). Males evolve drives that encourage family provisioning, and discourage competing for mates.

Large game hunting often requires cooperation by groups of males. A male who doesn’t have the cooperation of others is likely to bring home less meat, and to leave fewer descendants. Variability in hunting success makes it desirable to hunt in groups that share their kills. Withdrawal of cooperation by other males is a likely penalty for trying to impregnate another’s wife. In such circumstances, the drives that lead to seeking multiple mates are selected against.

Of course, in a warm climate hunting groups are likely to exist and a philandering male may be penalized by exclusion from the group, or less cooperation. However, with opportunities for gathering and hunting small game abundant at all times, the penalty of loss of participation in the large hunts is less severe, and the selection against mating drives weaker.

Why presume that primitive hunters could not kill enough food to carry multiple females through the winter? After all, there is a lot of meat on even a single ungulate carcass. If game were abundant enough for a typical hunter to support more than one wife, population would grow. It would grow until the pressure on the game resource had reduced the yield from hunting to where one hunter could typically support only a single wife and offspring. The argument is the standard Malthusian one.

Although Man The Hunter is usually cited as showing that hunter-gatherers can feed themselves with a short work day, this appears true only of the tropical peoples discussed. That book also contains Balikci’s (1968, p. 82) discussion of the Netsilik Eskimos, who had a 10% loss of life from starvation in two years. The inland Eskimos appear to be able to support only one family per male (Alexander et al., 1979). Other northern hunter-gatherers such as the Ainu appear to have monogamy as the typical pattern, even if a few males have more than one wife.

Other descriptions of northern hunting peoples emphasize the difficulty of the life and the risks of starvation. For instance, Rogers (1972, p. 104) in his discussion of the Mistassini Cree, American sub-Arctic natives, states that, “Securing sufficient food is a constant problem and a never ending concern. Times of starvation are vividly remembered.” He also states that the gathering of vegetable foods is minimal. In such an environment a typical male could not support more than a single female. Any inadequate provisioning of her offspring could reduce his reproductive success.

Likewise, Nelson (1973) discusses how those Kutchin (north Alaska) who remembered the old ways emphasized hardships and lack of food. He reports that similar attitudes to the past are found among other Athapaskan people. Emphasis is placed on far north people because Ice Age Europe and Asia had climates similar to these peoples’ current homes (Soffer & Gamble, 1989; Scott, 1984).

Admittedly, a female without a “husband” would probably receive some meat from brothers, other family members, and other band members. In contemporary hunting bands game is usually shared with other band members (Hawkes, 1993). Even unmated females get some. Such a meat sharing system is very useful in spreading the risks of the hunt among families (Hames, 1990). In the short run, this clearly supplies some meat to women without husbands. However, it is likely that in the long run a female unattached to a male hunter would suffer. Adverse effects are most likely during occasional famines, when social traditions of sharing are likely to break down. Then band members are likely to give priority to their own offspring. One possible mechanism is through the more successful hunters joining bands with fewer non-related dependents, where their own families would be better provisioned. Thus, in time of famine, poor provisioning by a father would affect his children’s survival. The sharing systems observed among current hunters probably evolved relatively late, after an earlier system in which males gave priority to themselves and their families. While sharing may moderate regional differences in the consequences for offspring survival of male provisioning, they are unlikely to eliminate them.

Predictions of the Hypothesis

There appear to be several traits that contribute to success in mating competition. A strong sex drive would lead to more matings. A strong Coolidge effect (in which women other than regular sex partners were considered unusually attractive, see Symons, 1979, p. 209) would encourage taking additional wives, matings with other men’s wives, and rape. Efforts to mate with other men’s wives involves risks of retaliation. Thus, aggressiveness, impulsiveness, and lack of fear would contribute to leaving more descendants. If one were to have only an occasional mating with certain women, greater sperm production would lead to leaving more children. If males frequently succeeded in mating another’s wife, a high sperm production and strong sex drive would lead to leaving more offspring.

Empathy with others is not conducive to extra-marital relationships or even to taking additional wives. For instance, strong sympathy for one’s children is likely to lead to devoting spare resources to them, rather than using the resources to purchase sexual access through prostitutes, concubines, or extra wives. Likewise, if extramarital intercourse violates social mores, a strong tendency to follow social mores is not conducive to extra-marital access.

The above paternal investment theory makes a number of interesting predictions about the mating patterns of hunter-gatherer populations in warm versus cold climates.

Using Racial Data to Test Clinal Theories

Because agriculture was adopted relatively recently, differences that emerged during the hunter-gatherer stage should have survived into the ethnographic present. The above suggests that personality and behavior differences among modern populations should be correlated with the winter temperatures where they evolved. Tropical populations would be selected for greater mating efforts and lower paternal investment. In cold climates, the opposite would be true.

Ideally, analysis would use data expressed as behavioral clines drawn from data on many different populations. (A cline is a line connecting points of equal values for observations, such as lines on a weather map.) Unfortunately, such data is rare. Admittedly, some data is available from physical anthropologists’ studies of specific populations, and from the ethnographic record, coded in the Ethnographic Atlas (Murdock, 1967).

However, some population level studies do exist using such data. Wolfe and Gray (1982) found a correlation between the extent of polygyny and the height of males and females. This is easily explained by the taller males having an advantage in acquiring mates, which leads to greater selection for height in polygynous societies. Wolfe and Gray were surprized not to find clear evidence of greater sexual dimorphism is such societies, which they expected from the animal evidence. However, in humans it is known that most genes that affect height appear to affect both males and females equally (excluding the obvious exception of those carried on the X or Y chromosomes). What they regarded as a puzzling correlation between polygyny and female height is easily explained. If taller males leave more offspring, the mean height of both males and females will be raised, leaving sexual dimorphism little changed.

Wolfe and Gray used a code for the extent of father-infant proximity in the first year of life as a measure of male parental investment. They found that this correlated to a statistically significant degree with measures of polygyny (Table 8.1), and with male and female heights. Since it is unlikely that height causes differences in marriage patterns, it is more plausible that sexual selection has affected the frequencies of genes for height, and possibly for a measure of paternal investment (if that is subject to genetic variability). For these effects to have appeared, the differences in marriage patterns must have persisted long enough for natural selection to have acted. Although Wolfe and Gray did not notice this, this is the first clear evidence that sexual selection has played a role in the evolution of differences in gene frequencies among human populations.

Studies of the above type can be done for only a few variables. As Wolfe and Gray (1982, pp. 206-207) report, “Our search of the literature of cross-cultural codes revealed no codes that directly rate societies on the degree of male parental investment. This lack of codes is partly due to the fact that ethnographers rarely had a theoretical orientation in which the problem of male parental investment was of central concern and therefore rarely collected data on this problem.”

However, various physical variables do correlate with climate, among which are skin color, shape of nose, body mass and shape, etc. These highly visible surface features include the variables usually used for racial classification. It appears that Negroids evolved in the warmest climate (tropical Africa), Mongoloids in the coldest (the North China-Siberia area), and Caucasoids in intermediate climates (Europe and the Middle East). These areas are separated from each other by barriers to gene flow. The Sahara partially isolates tropical Africa. During the ice ages, the Himalayan ice sheet separated the Caucasoids from the Mongoloids.

Limits on gene flow between different areas (although not complete) permitted populations in each region to develop somewhat different morphology and behaviors. Each evolved in their respective environments so as to produce the largest numbers of descendants. Each of the major races of mankind, Negroid, Caucasoid, and Mongoloid, is itself composed of numerous separate populations. In the absence of detailed information on personality in a large number of localities around the world, the best way to look for evidence of personality varying with climate is through examining racial variability.

Rushton and Ellis have assembled considerable racial information. (These differences of course are related only to central tendencies, and any one individual need not resemble his race with regard to any single trait.) Theirs are the best summaries of non-morphological racial differences. They deserve considerable credit for assembling this data. While they interpreted their findings in differential K selection terms, their data can also be used to test the male mating effort versus paternal investment hypothesis.

Explaining Racial Variation by Mating Competition versus Provisioning

Let us start by taking the list of personality characteristics Rushton assembled (1987, p. 1019; 1988, p. 1010; 1989a, p. 9; Rushton & Bogaert, 1989) and see whether a mating effort versus parental investment framework can explain them. This can be done for most items.

Aggression

Negroids are reported (by Rushton) to be the most aggressive and Mongoloids least aggressive (Caucasoids intermediate). From a reproductive viewpoint, aggression’s benefits include leadership positions. These assist in obtaining multiple wives, and frequently provide opportunities for extramarital relationships. Aggression also produces children through rape. In warm climates, where extra wives can be self-supporting, there are clear reproductive benefits to additional wives. In cold climates, lower survival of children by the first wife will provide a partial or even complete offset.

The disadvantage to high levels of aggression is that it leads to injury or even death, either in the course of the conflict caused by the aggression, or through retaliation by victims or society. In all climates death eliminates, and disability reduces, the chances of fathering additional children. However, in cold climates, death and disability are more likely to lead to the death of existing children, while in warm climates the mother is more likely to be able to rear her children alone. This effect alone would make the optimal position on an aggression-fearfulness continuum climate dependent.

Aggression also leads to interband raiding and warfare. These increase sexual access to other bands’ females. Direct access may be through rape or wife capture. Indirectly, killing or defeating competing males reduces mating competition. Wives are later obtained by courtship or exchange.

However, additional wives only contribute to reproductive success if there is enough food to rear the resulting offspring. Where women supply their own subsistence, warfare and wife capture can produce reproductive gains. This is likely to be true in tropical areas. In cold areas, where wives must be provisioned by hunting, additional children from captured wives would divert scarce resources from other children, limiting the net gain.

A defeat in interband conflict leads to deaths and injuries. In northern climates, where the gains from success are small, and the losses large, the relatively non-aggressive will leave more descendants. In tropical climates, where the benefits are larger, selection will be for higher aggression.

While Rushton interprets aggression as a r characteristic, this is implausible. Gould (1982, p. 367) argues, “Since member of K-selected species inhabit the same niche and compete for population-limiting resources, it should not be surprising that these animals regularly fight with each other for control of those resources. Among r-selected species, on the other hand, fighting would be a waste of their most precious commodity, time.” In essence, if resources are abundant, organisms will not benefit from fighting. Destroying other individuals is only beneficial when it eliminates competitors, which is to say in K conditions. In contrast, aggression appears unambiguously useful for obtaining numerous matings, even if not for provisioning.

Dominance

Very similar comments can be made regarding dominance, where Negroids are reported to be the strongest seekers of dominance and Mongoloids least (Caucasoids intermediate). Dominance seeking leads to more mating opportunities, but also to death and injury, which reduces the survival of already born offspring, especially where male provisioning is essential. If the extra wives that dominance and prestige provide cannot be supported, the ability to attract them gives little reproductive benefit.

Anxiety

Mongoloids are reported to be the most anxious, and Negroids least (with Caucasoids in between). This is closely related to dominance seeking and aggression, in that high anxiety deters dominance seeking and aggression. The more prone an individual is to anxiety, the less likely he is to seek additional matings beyond his first wife. It is usually not in the wife’s reproductive interest for him to either take additional wives, or to seek extramarital relationships. She can be expected to have evolved to threaten retaliation, and occasionally retaliate by leaving, attacking the offending male, or enlisting the aid of her relatives or society against him. Conducting an affair with another man’s wife, or an unmarried chaste female, or rape, all involve risk taking. Thus, where the optimal male strategy is to devote less efforts to mating than to provisioning existing children, high anxiety is selected for .

There are additional reasons for selection for high anxiety in cold climates. One strategy for surviving the winter is food storage (see Miller, 1991). Food storage is practiced only (with exceptions) in societies whose growing seasons are less than about 200 days (Binford, 1980). Anxiety about food supply encourages storage, and discourages their too rapid consumption. Where storage makes a difference, high anxiety is selected for.

Coon’s descriptions (1971, p. 26-39) of hunter-gatherer housing shows that simple domed houses and lean-tos are used by southern people, while igloos, plank houses, and pit houses are used further north. Pit houses, roofed holes, are common among northern hunters because they protect well against intense cold. Houses in snowy areas can collapse with a heavy snowfall, and cause loss of life, as well as leaving the inhabitants exposed to the cold. Collapse of a tropical conical hut, or lean to, is only an inconvenience. Anxiety would appear to encourage the construction of houses with adequate safety margins, and possibly an early start to such construction. Thus, anxiety would appear to promote reproductive success more in areas with snow than in tropical areas.

Anxiety about being caught in a freezing storm, or away from a warm campfire overnight is likely to promote survival in cold climates. Thus, stronger cold climates selection for anxiety is predicted. (Nelson [1969] mentions the caution and absence of thrill seeking in Eskimos).

Impulsivity

Frequently, short term pleasures can be obtained by acting, but acting requires risking adverse consequences. One who frequently takes advantage of short term opportunities displays impulsivity. Those with high anxiety levels are less likely to seek immediate pleasures. Thus, it is not surprising that the ordering on impulsivity, Negroids highest, Mongoloids lowest (Caucasoids in between), is opposite to the ordering on anxiety.

In particular, males frequently have the opportunity to father children through extramarital relationships or rape. High impulsivity individuals would be expected to more often act on these opportunities than would low impulsivity individuals. Thus, impulsivity would be selected for where a high mating effort contributed to fitness.

Delay of gratification

Closely related to impulsivity is the ability to delay gratification. Mischel (1958, 1961c, 1971, p. 127) found a racial difference in preference for delayed gratification. Trinidad Indians (i.e. India origin) children would wait longer for a reward than Negro children, although he interpreted this as reflecting the greater absence of fathers among the Negro children. As is common in Negroid populations (see below), many of the Negroes lacked a father in the home, while few Indians lacked a father in the home. Cultural factors probably also play a role, since Grenada Negroes were similar to Trinidad Indians (Mischel, 1961c). Delay of gratification was less in a Trinidad industrial school for juvenile deliquents than in an ordinary Trinidad school, supporting the theory that difficulty in deferring gratification (such as choosing the immediate gratification obtainable from stealing, risking a future punishment) contributes to criminal activity (Mischel, 1961a). Gratification delay in Trinidad Negroes was found to be positively related to Harris’s Social Responsibility Scale, which conceptualized responsibility “as a composite of attitude elements reflecting behavior classifiable as reliable, accountable, loyal, or doing an effective job” (Mischel, 1961a, b). Interestingly, the Trinidad Negroes scored much lower than a similar aged (presumably predominantly white) US group, which Mischel (1961a, p. 6) notes is “fully consistent with anthropological observations.”

It is not known how heritable the ability to defer gratification is, although most personality variables appear to have a significant degree of heritability. However, in one experiment, using Barbadian Negroes in the Cambridge area, the mother’s delay of gratification (choice of large bottle of instant coffee in a week or a small bottle now) was found to be correlated with the child’s violating or not violating a prohibition in a temptation situation (Mischel & Gilligan, 1964, p. 412). This suggests both behaviors are reflecting a heritable trait.

Difficulty in delaying gratification and impulsivity makes provisioning more difficult. Provisioning requires suppressing the desire to eat in order to bring food back to the family. In warm climates, not eating food when available would merely deny the male forager the nutrition required to compete with other males, since his children will normally be fed in any case.

Also, a food storage strategy for surviving the winter requires deferring gratification. The impulse to immediately eat available food must be resisted to store it, and later the impulse to eat the stores must be resisted in order to retain them for later use. Survival through the winter may require not only storing food, but also storing fuel, making clothing, and building shelters. These activities require resisting impulses to divert energy to activities with shorter term returns (gathering non-storable food, drinking, or even flirting). Thus, there are other reasons why seeking immediate gratification and impulsivity would be selected against in cold climates.

Banfield (1974) has proposed that seeking immediate gratification among the U. S. inner city poor (who tend to be Negroids) explains much of their poverty. While he carefully denies believing in genetic differences (like other writers of the time), it is plausible that this trait, like most personality traits, has a genetic component. Furthermore, tropical environments, such as that of Africa, are ones where hunter-gatherer populations are described by Woodburn (1980) as “immediate gratification” ones. He has described how for the Hadza of Tanzania, food is available in the bush at any time, and that as a result there is little need to plan ahead or to defer gratification. Thus, it is plausible that the immediate gratification behaviors that Banfield blames for so many inner city problems may be a continuation of tropical hunter-gatherer behavior.

Sociability

Sociability assists in learning of, and exploiting, mating opportunities. However, time spent socializing reduces the time available for gathering food and for other parental investments. Sociability often involves remaining near the camp where others are located, while provisioning requires leaving to forage. Thus, selection for provisioning will reduce sociability.

It should be noted that if sociability leads to talking it would be selected against in northern climates, where quiet is required for hunting.

Extraversion

Extraversion represents a combination of impulsivity and sociability (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1985). Thus, extraversion will be selected for where selection for seeking copulations occurs, and be selected against in other areas. Thus, it is not surprising that Negroids rank highest in extraversion, and Mongoloids rank lowest, with Caucasoids in between.

Behavioral restraint

Rushton (1988, p. 1013) combined many of these characteristics and described them in terms of behavioral restraint, with Mongoloids being highest in behavior restraint, and Negroids being lowest (Caucasoids intermediate). Behavioral restraint is not conducive to males seeking mating opportunities, but is conducive to making high paternal investment, which frequently requires resisting immediate gratification opportunities.

Criminal activity

Criminal activity is closely related to behavior restraint, for which the evidence is that Negroids are highest, Mongoloids lowest, and Caucasoids in between (for documentation see Wilson & Herrnstein, 1985; Ellis, 1988, p. 532; Jaynes & Williams, 1989, chap. 9; Rushton, 1990a). Paternal investment theory would explain high crime rates as resulting from high aggressivity and low empathy, altruism, and rule following behavior, traits that contributed to tropical reproductive success. A contributing factor is that the racial ordering for intelligence (Mongoloids first, Caucasoids next, and Negroids last [Jensen, 1987 on Negroids; see Rushton, in press, for other references]) is opposite to those for crime, and criminal behavior is known to be more common among the less intelligent. Intelligence differences have been offered as explaining the racial differences in crime (Gordon, 1987).

If those selected for mating effort have higher levels of aggression, lower behavioral restraint, and higher sex drives, it would be predicted that rape rates would be higher. They are known to be higher in Negroids than in Caucasoids (Brownmiller, 1975, pp. 213-216; Ellis, 1989, p. 94).

Child abuse is another form of crime. Abusing a child is the opposite of investing in it. If cold climate fathers were selected for paternal investment, their descendants should commit less child abuse. Caucasoids do have lower child abuse rates than Negroids (Ellis, 1987, p. 159), and Mongoloids the lowest (Ellis 1993, p. 171) .

Sexual restraint

The form of behavioral restraint most sensitive to natural selection is sexual restraint. With regard to a wide range of sex related variables, including marital instability, Rushton (1988) and Rushton & Bogaert (1987) show that Mongoloids are the most sexually restrained, and Negroids least, with Caucasoids intermediate. Sexual restraint is the ability to resist opportunities for copulation. Males that devote their energies to paternal investment have less energy left for seeking additional matings.

Two mechanisms could produce greater sexual restraint. The sex drives (including those for seeking variety in partners) could be weaker, or the inhibitions to sexual activity could be greater. That populations exhibiting greater sexual restraint are also more restrained in other ways suggests that part of the explanation is the greater inhibition (discussed above).

However, populations may also differ in the strength of sex drives. Selection for a stronger sex drive (and for a stronger desire for variety in partners) appears a more efficient mechanism for increasing mating effort than merely selection for less restraint. Generalized mechanisms, such as changing anxiety levels, might prove counterproductive in non-sexual spheres. For instance, less anxiety might encourage taking excessive hunting risks.

Simpson and Gangestad (1991) show that the strength of the desire for numerous sexual partners (what they call sociosexuality) varies independently of the strength of the desire for frequent sex. It is very plausible that both are genetically influenced. They (Gangestad & Simpson, 1990; Simpson & Gangestad, 1991) present evidence that sociosexuality varies with personality dimensions that have been shown to possess heritable components. Gangestad and Simpson (1990) argue that seeking separate partners, versus making a commitment to one partner represent different reproductive strategies, but fail to consider the possibility that the equilibrium percentage of individuals following the different strategies may vary with the environment (and hence with race).

A genetic influence on the drive for sexual variety is also suggested by the greater male desire for variety. This is probably caused by the effects of testosterone (or another sex related hormone) on some part of the brain. Genetically controlled variability in the number of receptors or the level of hormones could produce variability in the strength of the desire for sexual variety across populations.

Sexual behavior

Rushton and Bogaert (1987) document differences in sexual behavior. Besides a literature review, they reanalyzed the Kinsey data on sexual behavior in American whites and blacks. This showed greater sexual activity in blacks than in whites. For instance, the black frequency for coitus in their first marriage was 3.83 times per week for those aged 21-25 versus 3.11 for similar whites. The more frequent intercourse within marriage suggests differences in sex drive, rather than in a generalized restraint (which should not affect the frequency of marital relations). Measures of the extent and frequency of extra-marital sexual activity (p. 542) showed more activity outside of marriage among blacks than among whites, with all reported measures being statistically significant at the .001 level. Most black working class females believe that a wife should expect running around (Staples & Johnson, 1993, pp. 156-157). “. . .Black females have their first full sexual intercourse some years earlier than the typical White female.” (Staples & Johnson, 1993, p. 77). Differences in either sex drive or in social restraint could explain these differences.

Since age at first intercourse (Martin, Eaves, & Eysenck, 1977), and age at first date, marriage, and first and second child appears to be genetically influenced (Mealey & Segal, 1993), it appears appropriate to consider hypotheses that population differences in sexual behavior are also genetically influenced.

Differences in sexual restraint and in the number of sexual partners predict racial differences in sexually transmitted diseases. Such differences exist in the distribution of AIDS (Rushton and Bogaert, 1989). They had earlier been reported for syphilis, where the negro rate (often approximated by the rate for non-whites) is a multiple of the white rate, both in civilians and in the military (Aral & Holmes, 1984, p. 130; Berg, 1984, p. 93; Lewis, 1942, p. 158). The reported gonorrhea rate is 21 times as high in blacks as in whites, although part of this difference may reflect better reporting from the public clinics frequented by blacks (Aral & Holmes, 1990, p. 22). For the common herpes simplex virus -2, the antibodies at ages 60-74 are found in over 80% of black females versus slightly over 20% of the white females (Aral & Holmes, 1990, p. 27). Pelvic inflammatory disease (caused by the spread of gonorrhea and/or chlamydia to the upper reproductive structures of women) is currently a major cause of female infertility in parts of Africa.

The most plausible proximate explanation for racial differences in sex drives is the possibility discussed below of differences in testosterone levels at the relevant ages. Testosterone promotes male sexual activity (Kemper, 1990, pp. 38-46).

Size of sex organs

One consequence of higher levels of puberty causing hormones could be greater development of the sex organs. Rushton and Bogaert (1987) use the Kinsey data to document longer penises and greater circumference of penises in blacks than in whites. From other sources they find Mongoloids to have shorter penises than Caucasoids. One condom manufacturer provides for larger size condoms for Africa than for other areas, and the smallest size for Asia (Wong, 1991). Mongoloids have smaller testes than Caucasoids (Short, 1984; Diamond, 1986).

It would be desirable to have good quality measurements of Negroid testes size, because the theory that they have been selected for high mating effort would predict larger testes in order to win at sperm competition. High levels of polygyny, and accompanying sperm competition, would select for large testes and high sperm production, especially allowing for the tendency for the largest number of wives to occur late in life. Among the large apes, the species that have multimale mating systems (notably the chimpanzee) have larger testes (Short, 1981; Smith, 1984).

The available evidence, while not of the highest quality, does not confirm this prediction. Ajmani, Jain, & Saxena (1985) found the scrotum diameters in 320 Nigerian males to be greater than had been reported for Europeans, as predicted. An American study of adolescents (Daniel, Feinstein, Howard-Peebles & Baxley, 1982) reported “There was no significant differences in testicular volumes between black and white adolescent boys. Any possible simple correlation with race was not significant against the general variability of testicular volume.” No actual report is provided of the racial averages, leaving the possibility that some difference was found. In any case, a difference in adolescents might reflect only an earlier start to maturation among the blacks. In addition, one early autopsy study actually found lower testes weights in Negroids than in Caucasoids (Freeman, 1934).

Rushton and his colleagues explain these sex organ differences with his differential K selection hypothesis. Yet it is not obvious that larger penises (or clitorises or vaginas) lead to more offspring. Thus, they should not be interpreted as r characteristics. More plausibly, they are a mere by product of selection for high levels of sex hormones. The testosterone surge at puberty enlarges the penis, and it is plausible that higher hormonal levels would produce a larger organ. Testosterone increases the penis size of castrated rats whether applied externally or injected (Wigodsky & Greene, 1940). This makes it more plausible that racial differences in penis size reflect hormonal differences.

Body build

There are racial differences in body build. Negroes have a more masculine body build than Caucasians (Laska-Mierzejewska, 1982). The masculine body build implies strong accentuation of such masculine characteristics as a large chest, and muscular body. Negro soldiers (males) have been found in two studies to be more mesomorphic (and less endomorphic) than white soldiers, with the difference being more than one standard deviation (Damon, Bleibtreu, Elliot, & Giles, 1962, Table 2).*(3). Simply put, mesomorphy is the amount of visible muscularity. Such a body appears to have been selected for conflict with other males. Notice, this observation is evidence for paternal investment theory, since other theories do not predict that the Negroid males will be more masculine.

However, the Japanese are relatively mesomorphic, both in Hawaii (Heath, Hopkins, & Miller, 1961), and in Japan (Kraus, 1951). Thus, the extent of mesomorphy appears to be one case where Ruston’s generalization that the Caucasoids fall between the Negroids and Mongoloids breaks down.

Hudson & Holbrook (1982) found lower mean fundamental vocal frequencies in Negro males and females than others had found for whites. As is well known (and found by them), males display a lower frequency (deeper voice) than do females, and puberty deepens the male voice. This deepening is generally attributed to testosterone. The deeper Negro voice may reflect the influence of higher testosterone levels at puberty or prenatally.

Muscle characteristics

An interesting set of statistically significant differences in muscle characteristics has been found between black and white sedentary males (Ama, Simonau, Boulay, Serresse, Theriault, and Bouchard, 1986). African blacks were found to have less type I muscle fibers, more type IIa and lower activities in enzymes catalyzing reactions in phosphagenic and lactase dehydrogenase metabolic pathways. These were interpreted as likely to be inherited, and suggesting that blacks would exhibit better performance in sports requiring a short duration of exertion. Malina (1988) reviewed the literature on childhood performance, and found that blacks excelled in the dash, the standing long jump, the vertical jump, and the ball throw for distance. All of these involve a short burst of exertion. Tests with a bicycle ergocycle have shown Caucasians to have higher maximal O2 uptake, a trait adapted for endurance activities. Also, Ama, Lagasse, Bouchard, and Simonau (1990) reported better white performance (compared to black West Africans) in the last 30 seconds of a 90 second knee extension exercise, a result consistent with blacks making greater use of anaerobic energy metabolism than whites. What would have selected for racial differences in such traits?

Hunting is implausible both because Caucasoids are likely to have hunted more than Negroids, and because hunting often requires prolonged exertion to follow large animals. A likely explanation is male fighting, since fights often involve short periods of vigorous exertion (after which the opponent is hopefully defeated). Thus, Negroids appear to be selected more for fighting. This would be consistent with their more muscular body build and higher aggression. It is what would be expected if Negroids had been selected to win mating competitions.

Blacks have denser and stronger bones than whites (Himes, 1988; Pollitzer and Anderson, 1989). The disadvantage to higher density bones is higher weight (more energy required for movement) and greater need for calcium. The advantage is fewer fractures, and thus, lower mortality. The bone differences can be explained if black males engaged in more intermale conflicts, and those with stronger bones were less often injured. No other hypothesis comes immediately to mind that can explain these density differences.

Worthy (1977, chapter 2; Worthy & Markle, 1970; see also Jones & Hochner, 1973) has shown systematic differences in the sport positions blacks and whites play. He argues that where the positions require reacting properly to the opponents’ actions, blacks are more successful, while whites do better where the player initiates his own motions, as in baseball pitching, marksmanship, or in shooting a basketball free goal. He reports a Negroid relative advantage in the defensive position of an experimental game where they had to react to their opponents’ initiatives.

Worthy also correlated eye color with positions played. Dark eyed whites are overrepresented in the same positions in which blacks are overrepresented. In Worthy’s theory, eye color plays a direct role. However, eye color also varies with ethnic origin, with north Europeans having more blue eyes. This suggests an Old World cline such that ability to react to opponents’ actions increases to the south.

What circumstances would have selected for these different abilities? Survival in fights with other males would appear to depend on quick reactions to opponents’ moves. In contrast, a hunter usually stalks his prey and then chooses the time to attack. Worthy’s observations could be explained if male reproductive success in colder regions varied with hunting ability, while in the tropics it varied more with fighting ability. The eye color differences could be explained if hunting was even more important in northern Europe than in southern Europe, or if southern Europeans had interbred more with farmers of Middle Eastern origin.

Possibly relevant evidence is provided by Coleman (1980). Successful prone rifle shooters (who choose the moment of shooting) are the most introverted, while successful rapid fire pistol shooters (who have very little time to fire five shots, and have to move the pistol from target to target), are very extroverted. Apparently personality correlates with what looks like Worthy’s reactive versus non-reactive distinction. Thus, an alternative explanation for these racial differences would rely on selection for different personality traits. Since tropical climates seem to select for both quick reactions (as in fighting) and for extraversion, and cold climates for the opposite, both theories predict a similar north-south behavioral gradient.

There are other intriguing reports of correlations of eye color with behavior. Rosenberg & Kagan, (1987, 1988) and Rubin & Both (1989) report that Caucasian children that are behaviorally inhibited ( a concept related to introversion) are disproportionately blue eyed. While Rosenberg & Kagan suggest several possible biological mechanisms for this effect, a very plausible explanation is that north European children (more likely to be blue eyed) are more behaviorally inhibited than South European children (who are more likely to have brown eyes). Both eye color and behavioral inhibition are believed to be genetically influenced. If the effect is really biological with both eye color and behavior having a common cause (a pleiotropic gene effect), it would be predicted that where one sibling was blue eyed and one brown eyed, that the blue eyed one was more likely to be behaviorally inhibited. If the genes for eye color and behavior were associated merely because the ancestors of different children came from different regions, there would be no sibling correlation. Unfortunately, such a study has not yet been done.

An argument against Negroids having evolved for fighting is that they show lower pain tolerance than other races (Worthy, 1977, pp. 123-124)

Life Span Variations

Negroids have shorter lives than Caucasoids, who have shorter lives than Mongoloids. For instance, U. S. whites have a life span estimated at 76.1 years versus 69.1 years for U. S. blacks (U. S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1993). If testosterone shortens life (Hamilton, 1948), as it appears to do (shown by the shorter life span of males than females, and of normal males compared to castrated males), differential testosterone levels could explain the life span ranking.

Part of the shorter Negroid life span reflects more violent and accidental deaths, which could result directly from higher aggression. However, disease causes most of the excess deaths. As a general rule, more polygamous species have higher male death rates (relative to female rates), with much of the difference being due to degenerative diseases (Daly and Wilson, 1988, p. 142). As discussed below, Negroids appear to be more polygamous than other races.

An evolutionary biology theory of aging (Rose, 1991) holds that many genes are pleiotropic (i.e. have more than one effect). The same genes that contribute to longer life often impose disadvantages earlier in life. In the simplest case, genes which delay degeneration (perhaps through directing more energy to cell repair) also imply early life disadvantages (perhaps through leaving less energy available for mating or for lactation). A longer life can be purchased only at the expense of an earlier reproductive disadvantage. Which genes are selected for depends on whether reproductive success is facilitated more by a long life, or by early life success. This may depend on whether selection is for high paternal investment or high mating effort.

Copulation precedes childbirth, while paternal investment follows childbirth. Since death destroys a man’s ability to help his children, longevity facilitates paternal investing. Thus, if a father’s death hurts his child’s survival chances, selection for a long life will be stronger than if children can be raised without paternal assistance. Conversely, if an early death from mating competition is going to eliminate any reproductive benefits from slower degeneration later, the alleles that protect against degeneration in old age will be less beneficial (Diamond, 1992, Chapter 7, especially p. 132).

If a male does not obtain a mate when young, living longer will not add to his descendants. Suppose the number of matings determines how many descendants a man leaves. Then men are more likely to be selected for early vigor and competitive ability, even at the expense of an earlier death. Where males have been selected for mating competition, polygyny often emerges (see below). For many men to have multiple wives, others must have no wives. Thus, to perpetuate his genes in a polygynous society, a man must be ranked relatively highly by those who control sexual access. Dominance and prestige seeking would be selected for.

In a monogamous or nearly monogamous society, even undesirable men marry. Suppose genes that handicap men in mating also contribute to a longer life, and hence to greater offspring survival. Then carriers of these may leave more descendants than worse providers who are better at mating, but who still get only one wife. Genes for high testosterone probably shorten life but may contribute to mating success through stronger muscles, higher sex drive, and aggression. Many athletes shorten their lives by taking steroids (essentially synthetic testosterones) to promote competitive success.

Thus, strong male sexual competition leads to a shorter life span. This can be explai


Get Real About Race

Get Real About Race
by Professor Chris Brand
from ‘Downlow’, Volume 2, Issue 1, p. 33 (1996).

THE FACTS ABOUT RACE AND IQ ARE A CHALLENGE. THIS CHALLENGE MUST BE MET BY ALLOWING PEOPLE MORE CHOICE AND GREATER FREEDOM, CLAIMS CHRIS BRAND WHO INSISTS WE “GET REAL ABOUT RACE”

Note: CHRIS BRAND’s career began as a prison psychologist, giving tests and therapy. For the past 25 years, he’s been an academic psychologist at Edinburgh University. An established researcher of intelligence and the structure of personality, he’s a Fellow of the Galton Institute and MA (Oxon.). He’s also an experienced book-reviewer; though he’s never called another author’s work ‘repellent’, which was the term used in April by his then publisher, John Wiley & Sons, to denounce his own book, ‘THE ‘g’ FACTOR.’

I’m a White Devil and I’m in deep shit. In February this year, I brought out a book called THE ‘g’ FACTOR. It’s about general intelligence (‘g’) and my beliefs that intelligence can be fairly measured and that our levels of intelligence, yours and mine, depend heavily on our genes. My book says that Asians – on average – appear smarter than Whites, who themselves are smarter than Blacks. Okay, so there’s an overlap between the average IQ’s of Blacks, Whites and Asians. And yeah, 16% of African-Americans have a HIGHER IQ than the average American White. So what’s the problem about facing up to those facts? None, I should have thought, but my book had barely appeared before the forces of PeeCee, paparazzi and tabloid scribblers pounced. Had any of them read my book from cover to cover? I doubt it, because it’s not your average comic or ‘Hello’ magazine. It requires intelligence to appreciate. Still, they were there, on my door-step, geared to crirticize and condemn. Their questions flew thick and fast. Did I hate Blacks? Was I a member of any extremist political grouping? Had the KKK funded me? Was I a racist? Well, yes, I am what’s often called a ‘scientific racist’. I am certainly a race-realist. From the evidence, I certainly believe that there are important and deep-seated race differences in psychological variables. Intelligence is the variable about which most is known. But is any of this ‘big news’? Should it have generated shock-horror headlines from those who’ve mastered joined-up writing or caused trauma amongst the intellectual establishment, not noted for offering high office to people of African origin? I didn’t think so.

Even as far back as 1926, psychologists had agreed there were significant differences between those of different color – White, Black, Brown, Red and Yellow. Yet for expressing myself, straight-away I was up there with another White Devil incarnate: Sir Roger Banister, the original four-minute-miler who, in 1995, casually observed Africans appeared to have an innate gift for athletics and most sports (although relatively less often winning Gold from swimming or rowing). Shit, just to point out facts, do we really deserve to be torn apart? I SAY LET’S GET REAL ABOUT RACE, RECOGNIZE WHAT WE ARE, AND STAND PROUD.

Let’s put to flight the PeeCee battalions whose absurdities warrant psychological research in their own right and wipe out modern White Anglo-Saxon Protestant ‘speech codes’ which blur and deny our differences. Once upon a time, we were equal before God and struggled for equality in the eye of the Law and in voting booths. But today, the central doctrine of PeeCee claims us to be naturally equal in every important way: morally, psychologically and in all-round cultural achievement. Who can believe such absurdity – apart from fat-cat high priests of PeeCee? Are we all to be grey, dull, boring, mass-produced units turned out like Pentium chips in Taiwan or Silicone Vallley? If we’re to retain our individuality and different qualities, we must face the TRUTH, with honesty. Now let me remind you that – without any reader here going into a frenzy – a Black person can say ‘White people are made to be evil’ or that modern Blacks have lost their ‘culture, language and religion’ or that ‘You open up a store and Niggas are gonna steal from you’. I didn’t make up those quotes. They come from Leo X and Fat Joe, featured in articles published in this magazine in January. I applaud them and the ‘downlow’ editor for being frank. But, as a ‘White Devil’, I am not allowed to point out that the average African-American has an IQ of 85 or a better sense of R&B music than a White. No! No way must I say those things! I’m expected to change the facts to suit the PeeCees.

If Whitey academics and politicians admit the differences between the races, and these are perceived as ‘problems’, we must say immediately, ‘Hey, we can find an instant solution!’ All that needs to be done to remedy things is to alter social conditions through spending money – just a little bit more than the 40% of Gross National Product currently dedicated {in the UK} to our so-called ‘Welfare State’. Yes, if you’re a Black and you’re failing to get that job or pass that examination, don’t worry, we’ve got the antidote to all your ills. And if we don’t, we’ll pretend. But that attitude is condescending. To me, there’s a lack of realism in today’s Western world and it impacts equally badly on both Whites and Blacks. This is what I’ve tried to explain in THE ‘g’ FACTOR: the same type of education offered Blacks and Whites – of all IQ levels – in the US and the UK has been a disaster. It hasn’t improved knowledge or even enhanced students’ capabilities? Why? Because school children, White and Black, are treated according to their *chronological* age rather than their *mental* age. Many are ‘taught’ what they know already; or what they’re not yet ready to understand. I believe – on the evidence – that all children (under parental guidance) should be allowed TRACK CHOICE.

At school, they should be able to choose the age-group in which they are taught. That would allow both Blacks and Whites to eliminate deficiencies and catch up where necessary. To use a sporting analogy: a broad, 250lb male is unlikely to achieve success in a 100-yard dash, irrespective of the type of coaching he’s offered; but he could, probably, become a successful hammer thrower. ‘Horses for courses’ is an old saying which still makes a valid point. It’s time to get real about race and IQ – for the sake of children of all races and IQ levels. Now what about families? Here, too, there’s a major problem, as we all know. It centres on the West’s great growth industry: ‘single parent families’ and fatherless children. It’s a disaster for both Blacks and Whites, particularly for our kids. Admit it, how many of you ‘downlow’ readers saw your dad recently? Blacks ‘took the lead’ in the US during the 1970′s when welfare was increased and lessened a woman’s need to have a man about the house; but since then Whites have been catching up fast. Then there’s the crime and drugs problem, also increasing dramatically. Study the statistics, and you’ll find that young offenders come mainly from fatherless households. Do we have to accept this as inevitable? Not at all! Just rid ourselves of the UN-FREEDOM with which we live! The trouble is the lack of individual choice to pick what’s best for *us*, not what’s best for the PeeCee egalitarians.

If there’s only one type of marriage contract, for example, don’t expect marriage automatically to remain intact for the couple’s lifetime. Partners should be able to plan for reality, not pie-in-the-sky ideals. Black people are *especially* hindered by having no choice of marriage contract. In many African countries, a successful Black man will have mistresses as well as a wife or wives. There are two main advantages of allowing men to have more than one female partner at a time. First, more women can have children by, and support from really successful husbands. Secondly, if a partnership does falter (perhaps because the woman becomes more interested in her children than in her husband) the home lives of the adults and children don’t have to be violently disrupted in order for the man to find a new sexual partner. Polygyny thus keeps families together and ensures children a father who is a high achiever and good role model. Polygyny is a natural part of many African cultures, despite the considerable interference of European missionaries; but PeeCee would never allow it here, whatever your traditions. Forced to put aside tried and tested customs, it’s not surprising that family unity is uncommon in Black communities forced to conform to Western values. The result is a lack of support economically and no foundation for the moral upbringing of Black youth, who end up rejected everywhere through no fault of their own. Black kids become crap on the streets, and crap gets removed. And that’s the rub of my work: THE ‘g’ FACTOR simply advocates the need for different arrangements to cater for and harness the individuality of people of different races, recognizing how our minds tick. If that makes me ‘RACIST’, then so be it. Although my PeeCee publisher broke contract and withdrew my book from sale, I won’t be stopped from getting real about race and intelligence. I will try to re-publish elsewhere, perhaps on the Internet, for example at laboratory.psy.ed.ac.uk or www.webcom.com.

Because I want you to EXAMINE and DECIDE for yourself the case I make for FREEDOM tempered with REALISM.


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